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I. Report ofthe Council
Fortieth annual report of the Council
(second part)
II. Political questions
1. A European security policy
2. WEU's relations with Russia
III. Defence questions
1. The readiness and capabilities of air-
forces in WEU member states
2. A European defence policy
IV. Technological and aerospace questions
1. Transatlantic co-operation on European
antimissile defence
2. Co-operation between European space
research institutes
3. The development ofa European space-
based observation system - Part III
4. The future of the WEU Satellite Centre
in Tonej6n
V. Budgetary questions
1. Draft budget of the adminisftative
expenditure of the Assembly for the
financial year 1995
2. Evolution of the Assembly's logistical
requirements to take account of enlar-
gement
3. Supplementary draft budget of the
adminisffative expenditure of the
Assembly for the financial year 1995
4. Accounts of the administrative expen-
diture of the Assembly for the financial
year 1993 - the auditor's report and
motion to approve the final accounts
VI. Rules ofProcedure and Privileges
1. Amendments to the Charter and Rules
of Procedure of the Assembly in view
of the creation of a status of associate
member
AGENDA
of the second part of the fortieth ordinary session
Paris,2Eth November - lst December 1994
25th October 1994
Report tabled by Mr Soell on behalf of the Politi-
cal Committee
Report tabled by Mr Baumel on behalf of the
Political Committee
Report tabled by Mr Hardy on behalf of the
Defence Committee
Report tabled by Mn Baumel on belwlf of the
Defence Committee
Report tabled by Mr Atkinson on behnlf of the
Technological and Aerospace Committee
Report tabled by Mr Galley on belalf of the Tbch-
nological and Aerospace Committee
Report tabled by Mr Valleix on behalf of the Tech-
nological and Aerospace Committee
Report tabled by Mr lipez Henares on behalf of
the Technological and Aerospace Committee
Report tabled by Mr Rathbone on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administra-
tion
Report tabled by Mn Rathbone on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administra-
tion
Report tabled by Mr Rathbone on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administra-
tion
Report tabled by Mr Rathbone on behnlf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administra-
tion
Report tabled by Lord Finsberg on behalf of the
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges
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VII. Parliamentary and Public Relations
1. The WEU Institute for Security Studies
2. Western European Union
Report tabled by Mr. Roman on behalf of the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions
Report tabled by Sir Russell Johnston on behalf of
the Committee for Parliamentary and Public
Relations
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DRAFT ORDER OF BUSINESS
of the second part of the fortieth ordinary session
Paris,2Eth November - lst December 1994
MONDAY 2Eth NOYEMBER
Morning
Meetings of political groups.
Afternoon 3 p.m.
1. Opening of the second part of the fortieth ordinary session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by IrIr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly.
4. Election of three Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
5. Adoption of the draft order of business of the second part of the fortieth ordinary session.
6. Address by Mr. Cutileiro, Secretary-General of WEU.
7 . Amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in view of the creation of
a status of associate member:
Report tabled by Lord Finsberg on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.
Vote on the draft decision.
8. A European security policy:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Soell on behalf of the Political Committee.
Debate.
TUESDAY 29th NOVEMBER
Morning 10 a.m.
1. Address by Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly.
10.15 a.m.
2. Address by Mr. van Mierlo, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-
Office of the Council 
- 
Presentation of the first part of the fortieth annual report of the Council.
3. A European defence policy:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Baumel on behalf of the Defence Committee.
4. A European security policy;
A European defence policy:
Joint debate.
At noon
5. Address by Mr. Kucan, President of Slovenia.
Afternoon 3 p.m.
1. Address by Mr. Iliescu, President of Romania.
2. A European security policy;
A European defence policy:
L2
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Resumed joint debate.
Votes on the draft recommendations and draft orden
3. The future of the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrej6n:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. L6pez Henares on behalf of the Technological and
Aerospace Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the drafi recommendation.
4. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the drafi budget.
5. Evolution of the Assembly's logistical requirements to take account of enlargement:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
6. Draft supplementary budget of the adminisffative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial
year 1995:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the drafi supplementary budget.
7. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1993 
- 
the
auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the motion to approve the final accounts.
WEDNESDAY 30th NOVEMBER
Morning 10 a.m.
l. The development of a space-based observation system 
- 
Part III:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace
Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
2. Co-operation between European space research institutes:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Galley on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace
Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft resolution
At noon
3. Address by Mr. Caputo, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy.
t3
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Afternoon 3.30 p.m.
1. Transatlantic co-operation on European antimissile defence:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Atkinson on bLhalf of the Technological and Aero-
space Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendntion.
2. The readiness and capabilities of airforces in WEU member states:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Hardy on behalf of the Defence Committee.
Debate.
Votes on the draft recommendation and draft order
3. The WEU Institute for Security Studies 
- 
achievements and future prospects:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Roman on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary
and Public Relations.
Debate.
Vote on the drafl recommendation.
4. Western European Union:
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Russell Johnston on behalf of the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations.
Debate.
Vote on the draft order
6p.m.
5. Address by Mr. Balladur, Prime Minister of France.
THURSDAY IstDECEMBER
Morning 10 a.m.
1. WEU's relations with Russia:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Baumel on behalf of the Political Committee.
Debate.
11 a.m.
2. Address by Mr. Kozyrev, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia.
WEU's relations with Russia:
Resumed debate.
Vote on the draft recornmendation.
CLOSE OF TIIE SECOND PART OF THE FORTIETH ORDINARY SESSION
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Accounts of the odministrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 199i
THE AUDITOR'S REPORT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Lgrrcn FRoM THE pRESIDENT oF THE AssgtrsI.y ro rHE Auonon suBMrrrrNc THE
AccouNrs oF rHE Assrunly FoR rHE FTNANcTAL venn 1993 
- 
3rd May 1994.
Lrrrrn FRoM THE AUDrroR To rHE rRESTDENT oF THE AssEMBLy 
- 
2fth July 1994.
RTPONT OF THE EXTERNAL AUDIToR TO THE AsSEMnry or WrsTrnN EunopsAN UNToN oN
rHE AccouNrs FoR rHE FTNANcTAL vEAR 1993 
- 
2fth July 1994.
CENTIRCNTT OF THE AUDITOR FOR THE FINANCIAL YSAR ISt JANUARY TO 3ISt DECEMBER
1993 
- 
20th July 1994.
APPENDIcES
II.
III.
Iv.
V.
u.
uI.
Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1993 
-
financial position as at 3lst December 1993.
Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits
for the financial year 1993.
Contributions to the WEU Assembly budget for 1993.
Provident fund 
- 
account for the financial year ended 3lst December
1993.
1993 balance sheet for the Federated Group of Christian Democrats and
European Democrats.
1993 balance sheet for the Liberal Group.
1993 balance sheet for the Socialist Group.
Letter from the Pruident of the Assembly
to the Auditor submitting the accoants
lor the fiaancial year 1993
3nl Moy 1991
Dear Dr. Czasche-Meseke,
In accordance with Article 14 of the
Financial Regulations of the Assembly of WEU,
I have the honour to submit to you the accounts
for the financial year 1993 in accordance with
the statements attached hereto, which refer to:
l. (a/ Summary of income and expenditure
financial position as at 3lst
December 1993 (Appendix I).
(D/ Statement of budget authorisations,
expenditure and unexpended credits(Appendix II).
(c/ Contributions (Appendix III).
(d) Provident fund (Appendix IV).
As is customary, after being audited these
tables will be signed by the President of the
Assembly, the Clerk of the Assembly and the
Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Administration before being sub-
mitted to the Assembly.
2. The statement of budget authorisations,
expenditure and unexpended credits shows a
saving of F 581 862, whereas the final statement
15
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of income and expenditure shows a credit
balance of F 578 926. The difference between
these two figures, i.e. F 2 936, shows an excess of
receipts over estimates:
FF
- 
Bank interest 12 858
- 
Sundry receipts 22748
- 
Sale of publications 35 624
- 
Contributions 7 9o 800 834
872064
875 000
- 
2936
3. Excess expenditure under Heads III and V
of the operating budget and Head I of the pen-
sions budget amounting to F 601537 has been
met by transfers from other heads of the
budget.
4. The statement of contributions for the
financial year 1993 received from the Secretary-
General of WEU, London, is given at Appendix
III.
5. Amounts in the provident fund of the
Assembly staffon 3lst December 1993 stood at
F 4 090 440 as shown in Appendix IV. On that
date there remained one loan to a staffmember,
amounting to F 275 000.
On 3lst December 1993 the amounts in
the provident fund for all the organs of WEU
were held by the Cr6dit Lyonnais in Paris.
6. Also appended to the accounts of the
Assembly are the reports on the funds attributed
to the political groups in accordance with the
directives issued by the Presidential Committee
(document A/WEU/CP (86) 39) as follows:
- 
Federated Group of Christian Demo.
crats and European Democrats;
- 
Liberal Group;
- 
Socialist Group.
These reports will be considered as an
integral part of the accounts of the Assembly;
they give details of the use of credits included in
Sub-Head 30 of the operating budget of the
Assembly.
Yours sincerely,
Sir Dudley Surrs
President of the Assembly
Dr. Hedda Cznscne-Mrsrxr
President of the Federal
Court of Accounts
Berliner Str. 5l
D.60284 FRANKFURT
I*tter from the Auditor
to the Pruident of the Assembly
2&h July 1994
Dear President,
I have the honour to enclose the accounts
of the Assembly of Western European Union for
the financial year 1993 together with my
opinion and report on these accounts.
Yours sincerely,
Hedda CznscnE-Mnsrxr
(President of the Federal
Court of Accounts)
Auditor
Sir Dudley Sunn
President of the Assembly of
Western European Union
43, avenue du Pr6sident-Wilson
75116 PARIS
Report of the Extenal Auditor
to the Assembly of Watern European Unbn
on the occoants for the financial year 1993
20th luly 1994
I have audited the accounts of the
Assembly for the financial year 1993 in
accordance with Article l5 of the Financial Reg-
ulations of the Assembly of Western European
Union in order to appraise the correct man-
agement of the budget and the book-keeping.
Certain savings and profitability criteria in the
operation of the budget have been taken into
account.
The 1993 budget provided for income
and expenditure of F 32 644 830, of which
F31769 830 came from contributions from
member states and F 875 000 from sundry
receipts. Actual expenditure was F 32 062 968,
representing a saving of F 581 862 as compared
with estimated expenditure.
The final statement of income and
expenditure shows that actual expenditure was
F32062968 and income F32641894 (of
which F 31 769 830 in contributions and
F 872064 in sundry receipts) resulting in a
credit balance of F 578 926 of actual income
over effective expenditure.
The difference, between surplus receipts
and budget savings, shows a deficit of 
- 
F 2936.
This amount is identical to the difference
between actual sundry receipts and estimated
receipts (F 872 064tF 875 000).
- 
Receipts for 1993
estimated in the
budget
t6
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The saving in the budget may be summa-
rised as follows:
Total
credits Total
after exoenditure
transfers - rralanceFFF
Part I:
Operating budget
Head I
Permanent staff l7 719930 l7 513 718 206212
Head II
Temporary staff 3776250 3410408 365842
Head III
Expenditure on
premises and
equipment 2 137 W 2 136 167 833
Head IV
General adminis-
trative costs 2 085 500 2077 356 8 t44
Head V
Other
expenditure
Part II:
Pensions budget
Head I
Pensions,
allowances
and social
charges
Total
2 s72000 2 57t 344 656
4 353 975
32 062 968
The results of the 1993 budget are in line
with those for previous financial years in as
much as there are again substantial budget
savings, as shown in the following comparative
table for the last five years.
4 354 150
32 644 840
t75
581 862
Difference
between
estimates
and income
+ 63 140
+ 9496
+ 95 983
+ ll7 934
- 2936
Final statement
of income
and exoenditure Saving. on
"i'}rifiiiiJilul. expenditureof the financial year
1989: + 106 133 + 42793
1990: + 720333 +710837
l99l: + 514471 +418488
1992:+118248 + 314
1993: + 578926 + 581 862
Receipts exceeded budget estimates for
two of the four heads concerned and were below
estimates for the two remaining heads:
- 
Bank interest
- 
Sundry receipts (social security
reimbursements)
- 
Sale of publications
Pension contributions 7 7o
Estimates Actual
recelprs
60000 12 858
l0 000
40 000
765 000
875 000
22 748
35 624
800 834
872064
There is a deficit balance of income
over expenditure under these various heads
of 
- 
F 2936.It should also be noted that bank
t7
interest earned was F 22 646 and interest owing
F 9 788, the latter amount resulting mainly from
the somewhat erratic nature of contribution pay-
ments (see below).
***
For the financial yeair 1993, contributions
by member states stood at F31769 830 in-
cluding F 501 830 carried forward from the pre-
vious year, representing an increase ofjust over
F2.9 million (+l0.l7o). In comparison, the
increase for 1992 as compared with 1991, again
taking account of sums brought fonrard, was
approx_imately F 1.8 million (or 6.5%). A large
part of the increases in credits requested 
- 
and
hence of the increased payments made by the
member states 
- 
resulted from an increase in
expenditure on permanent staff under Head I of
1.5 million francs (+ 9.3%) as compared with the
previous year. Fixed-scale salary adjustments
decided during 1993 were in large part respon-
sible for this increase.
The rhythm of the payment of contribu-
tions is not entirely satisfactory. At the end of
the first half-year 
- 
30th June 1993 
- 
only
E !?.8 million, or 40.3V0, and at the year end
F 27.7 million or 87.10/o of the contributions had
been paid. At closure of the accounts for the
financial year 1993 on 3lst March 1994 contri-
butions of F 117 806 were yet to be paid.
rt
d. rt
Sitaatioa of truasfen
between heds ia 199i
+-
Part I:
Operating budget
Head I
Permanent staff
Head II
Temporary staff
Head III
Expenditure on
premises and
equipment
Head IV
200700 297 9N
9 100 345 100
3l l 000 l4l 000
210 000
354 100 l8 100
General administrative
costs 40000
Head V
Other
expenditure
Part II:
Pensions budget
Head I
Pensions,
allowances
and social
charges
Total
149 750
l 064 650
52 550
I 064 650
DOCUMENT I428
As the retirement date of one official
cannot be forecast with certainty, Part II Head I(Pensions budget) has been increased by
F 97 200, chargeable to Part I under Article 6.2
of the Financial Regulations. At its meeting held
on l2th April 1994 the WEU Council granted
the necessary authorisation for this transfer.
Other transfers totalling F 714200 were made
between Heads II to V of Part I, Head III
(Expenditure on premises and equipment) being
increased by F170000 and Head V (Other
expenditure) by F 336 000. In particular,
Sub-Head 27 of the latter (Oflicial journeys of
members of the Oflice of the Clerk) was
increased by F248600, from F590000 to
F 838 600. Expenditure under this head was
F 838 504 (cf. 1992: F 750 595; + 11.7%). Simi-
larly expenditure on other items under this head
have again increased sharply:
- Sub-Head 24 (Travelling and sub-
sistence allowances and insurance forthe President of the Assembly,
chairmen of committees and
rapporteurs):
F 259 760 (t992: F 140 119; + 85.4%)
- 
Sub-Head 25 (Expenses for represen-
tation):
F 361 003 (1992: F 326242; + 10.7%)
- 
Sub-Head 29 (Expenditure on infor-
mation; especially newspapers and peri-
odicals):
F 510 581 (1992: F 441 751; + 14.8%)
By contrast, a reduction was possible in
expenditure under Sub-Head 28 (Expenses of
experts and the auditor) from F 79 210 during
the 1992 financial year to F 45 284 (- 42.8%).
The auditor feels that the extensive nature
of transfers as they have been effected towards
Head V is disturbing both in general terms and
from the point of view of the rights of the
responsible bodies in matters of establishing and
authorising the budget.
In the previous year's report it had
already been noted that excessive recourse to
transfers carried the danger of distorting the
budget (initially) adopted. Apart from this
somewhat technical factor, the fact should be
borne in mind, primarily, that large credit
transfers between heads raises the question of
the supplementary budget (Article 5 of the
Financial Regulations). Major savings achieved
within one budget head (in this case by the
translation service during sessions) should be
transferred to other heads in accordance with
normal budgetary procedures 
- 
and not merely
through the management of the budget 
- 
to the
extent that it is regarded as essential substan-
tially to increase the amounts under those heads.
This is particularly true in cases where a transfer
is intended to cover expenditure or increases in
expenditure which are neither an essential con-
straint (in other words not based on a legal obli-
gation) nor unavoidable for other reasons.
When the payment process extends
beyond the term ofthe financial year, it is nec-
essary to ensure that such operations are not
only accounted for internally, but are also trans-
parent externally. If, as we have noted, invoices
issued by one and the same creditor, among
which one relates to the previous financial year
prior to closure and the other to the new
financial year, are settled by a single transfer or
cheque, this fact must at very least be noted on
the two payment orders. Another possibility
would be to settle such invoices by two separate
cheques or transfers. The administration has
undertaken to follow the auditor's suggestion in
the interests of transparency in budget man-
agement.
t
Having completed this audit, I thank the
Clerk and staff of the Assembly for their val-
uable co-operation in the exercise of my duties
as auditor.
Hedda Cznscur-Mpsxr
(President of the Federal
Court of Accounts)
Auditor
Ccrtifrcate of tlu Auditor for the financial yur
lst lanuary to 31st December 1993
2&h luly 1994
In application of Article 15 of the
Financial Regulations of the Assembly of
Western European Union, I have examined the
appended financial statements of the Assembly
comprising the summary of income and expend-
iture for the financial year 1993.
My examination included verification of
the bools and other relevant documents that I
deemed necessary.
As a result of this examination, my
opinion is that these statements faithfully record
the book-keeping operations for the financial
year and that these operations were in con-
formity with the budget estimates, the Financial
Regulations, the financial instructions and other
decisions of the legislative authority, and that
they are a correct record of the financial situ-
ation for the year ended 3lst December 1993.
Hedda Czescnr-Mrsrxr
(President of the Federal
Court of Accounts)
Auditor
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APPENDIX I
Summary of incomc and *penditure for the financial yeu 1993
(in French francs)
Assessments of member states (see Appendix III)
Miscellaneous
(A) Sundry receipts
Bank interest . ..
Sundry receipts
Sale of publications ....
(B) Pensions
Contributions (7%)
Financial position $ at 31st December 1993
31 769 830
l2 858
22748
35 624
800 834
872064
32 64t 894
32062968
s78 926
4 tto 520
5 885
448 505
F 4564910
204t t73
l 073 061
871 750
s78 926
F 4s649t0
Tim RarnnoNr
Chairman of the Committee
on Budgetary Atfairs
and Administration
Budget credits
Total expenditure (see Appendix II)
Excess of income over expenditure
Assets
Contributions received
Miscellaneous debtors
Recoverable taxes
Liabililies
Balance at the bank
Miscellaneous creditors
Sums paid
Excess of income over expenditure
Sir Dudley Sunn
President of the Assembly
Henri Buncu,n
Clerk of the Assembly
CertiJied correct:
Dr. Hedda Czescsr-Mrsrrr
(President of the Federal
Court of Accounts)
Auditor
l9
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APP:
STATEMENT OF BIJDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDITU
(in Fre
PART I: OPERATING BUDGET Total budgetfor 1993
Hreo I 
- 
PpnunNer.t-rsrarr
Sub-Head / Basic salaries
Sub-Head 2 Allowances
2.1. Expatriation allowance
2.2. Household allowance :
2.3. Allowance for children and other dependent pennns
2.4. Rent allowance
2.5. Education allowance
2.6. Allowance for language courses
2.7. Overtime
2.8. Home leave
Sub-Head -l Social charges
3.1. Social security
3.2. Supplementaryinsurance
3.3. Provident fund
Sub-Head 4 Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of
permanent oflicials
4.1. Travelling expenses of candidates for vacant posts
4.2. Travelling expenses on arrival and departure of per-
manent officials and their families
4.3. Removal expenses
4.4. Installationallowance
Sub-Head 5 Medical examination
t2 6t4 950
243280
554 060
610 000
60 000
83 000
2 000
60 000
50 000
727 707
s90 000
209 t33
l3 000 I
Total of Head I l7 817 130
I
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xII
[D UNEXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1993
tcs)
12 387 050
t 263 980
562060
633 800
62900
l l0 500
2 000
90 900
50 000
t 657 707
617 900
209 133
t2241397
I 653 656
6t7 874
162970
145 653
t7 719 930 t7 513718
* Transfers
Total after
transfers
Total
expenditure
Unexpended
credits
227 900
20700
8 000
23 800
2900
27 500
30 900
70 000
27 900
l5 600
2 000
l6 800
24 600
l5 600
2 000
l6 800
24 600
l3 000
t 263 939
562 005
633 725
62 859
l l0 408
90 819
46063
l5 582
t 946
16 760
24 592
9 t23
4t
55
75
4t
92
2 000
8l
3 937
4 051
26
46 163
l8
54
40
8
3 877
200700 I 297 9N 206 212
21
DOCUMENT 1428
PART I: OPERATING BUDGET Total budgetfor 1993
Hrno II 
- 
Truponeny srarr
Sub-Head 6 Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly
6.1. Sittings service
6.2. Interpretation service
6.3. Translationservice
6.4. Other services
SubHead 7 Interpretation staff requircd for Assembly work between
sessrons
Sub-Head I Temporary staff for the Offrce of the Clerk
Sub-Head 9 Social charges
9.1. Insurance for temporary staffother than interpreters
9.2. Provident fund for interpreters
9.3. Insurance for interpreters
r 397 000
7ll 550
I 0s6 000
85 000
638 000
25 000
9 s00
182 960
7 240
Total of Head II 4112250
Hrno III 
- 
ExprNplruRE oN pREMrsEs AND EeurpMENT
Sub-Head 10 Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises
Sub-Head I I Hire of committee rooms
Sub-Head 12 Technical and other installations forAssembly sessions
Sub-Head 13 Various services for the organisation of sessions
Sub-Head 14 Maintenance of the premises of the Oflice of the
Clerk
Sub-Head 15 Purchase or repair of oflice furniture
Sub-Head 16 Purchase of reproduction and other oflice equipment
SubHead 17 Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other
oflice equipment
570 000
l0 000
64s 000
105 000
l5 000
40 000
t0 000
572000
Total of Head III l 967 000
I
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l 387 900
711 550
720000
89 100
638 000
30 000
t 339 929
682 312
676 018
89 006
44095t
29 946
47 971
29 238
43 982
94
t97 049
54
3 776 2s0 3 410 408
l 000
24 600
2r8 500
2s 900
74 400
l0 000
495 600
686 000
48 400
l6 000
64 600
228 500
s97 900
495 584
685 953
48 3r5
l5 888
64 546
228 tto
597 77t
2 t36 t67
23
4 100
5 000
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PART I: OPERATING BUDGET Totalfor
budget
1993
Hrno IV 
- 
Grurnel ADMINIsTRATIvE cosrs
Sub-Head 18 Postage, telephone, telefa:r and transport of documents
Sub-Head 19 Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other
oflice supplies
Sub-Head 20 Printing and publication of documents
Sub-Head 21 Purchase of documents
Sub-Head 22 Oflicial cars
Sub-Head 23 Bank charges
630 000
240 000
185 000
75 000
125 000
s00
Total of Head IV 2255 5N
Hrno V 
- 
Ornen EXPENDITURE
Sub-Head 24 Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance
for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of com-
mittees and rapporteurs
Sub-Head 25 Expenses for representation
Sub-Head 26 Committee study missions
Sub-Head 27 Official journeys of members of the Office the Clerk
Sub-Head 28 Expenses of experts and the auditor
Sub-Head 29 Expenditure on information
Sub-Head 30 Expenses for political groups
Sub-Head 31 Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere
provided for
Sub-Head 32 Non-recoverable taxes
246000
350 000
5 000
590 000
s0 000
430 000
s34 000
3 000
28 000
Total of Head V 223600o
Total 28 387 880
24
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l6 000
140 000
54 000
670 000
224 0W
l 045 000
75 000
71 000
500
667 84t
223 tts
t 043 607
72760
69 839
194
2 t59
88s
l 393
2240
I 16l
306
l3 800
ll 100
259 800
361 100
838 600
45 400
510 600
534 000
500
22000
259 760
361 003
838 504
45 284
5r0 581
534 000
278
2t 934
2 571 344
l 012 100 27 708993
25
+
Transfers Total aftertransfers
Total
expenditure
Unexpended
credits
40 000
40 000 210 000 2 085 s00 2077 356 8 144
248 600
80 600
s 000
4 600
2 500
6 000
40
97
96
ll6
l9
222
66
354 100 r8 100 2 572000 6s6
914 900 28 290 680 581 687
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PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET Total budgetfor 1993
Hreo I 
- 
PnNsrous, ALLowANcEs AND socrAl cHARcEs
Pensions and leaving allowances
Retirement pensions
Invalidity pensions
Survivors' pensions
Orphans' or dependants' pensions
Iraving allowances
Family allowances
Household allowances
Children's and dependants' allowances
Education allowances
Supplementary insurance
3 401 750
497 750
64 150
l 56 750
3l 550
105 000
Total of Head I
32 644 830
Sir Dudley Sutrs
President of the Assembly
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Sub-Head I
t. 1.
1.2.
1.3.
1.4.
1.5.
Sub-Head 2
2. t.
2.2.
2.3.
Sub-Head 3
APPENDIX II
3 485 450
449 300
93 000
152 650
32900
140 850
3 485 435
449 258
9295t
152 624
32871
140 836
4 354 150 4 353 975
IRCELIN
t Assembly
Tim RernnoNe
Chairman of the Committee on
Budgetary Alfairs and Administration
27
Total
expenditure
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APPENDIX III
Contributions to the WEU Assembly budga for 199i
F
31 268 000
501 830
3l 769 830
Torer- Ner
F
1993 budget [Doc. 1325 Addendum]
Brought over from 1992
[Doc. A/UEO/BA (93)2]
Nrr Tornr-
Contributions received for 1993:
27th January 1993
22nd February 1993
23rd March 1993
l9th May 1993
9th June 1993
8th July 1993
l9th July 1993
2lst July 1993
6th August 1993
lTth September 1993
30th September 1993
l5th November 1993
l9th November 1993
8th December 1993
lfth December 1993
l3th December 1993
2lst December 1993
24th January 1994
7th February 1994
22nd February 1994
4th March 1994
24th March 1994
Amount from 1994 budget
Brought over from 1992
Sub-total
Carried over from 1992
967 929.62
I 418 206.00
2 448 883.00
5 315 560.00
2 657 780.W
630172.W
l 305 439.00
2 657 780.N
I 913 757.00
I 419 288.00
3 067 768.50
67912t.00
18 000.00
t 242743.W
l 026 489.00
23 500.00
246 816.50
218 903.50
1242743.00
t 266 396.00
2t 928.00
1242743.00
l l7 805.82
r l8 248.06
31268 000.00
501 830.00
I
I
I
,l
{3t 769 830.00
28
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APPENDIX IV
PROVIDENT FI.JND
ACCOUNT FOR THE FINAI\CIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1993
Henri BuncEuN
Clerk of the Assembly
Sir Dudley Surrn
President of the Assembly
Tim RernsoNe
Chairman of the Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Administration
in French
Balance brought forward:
Accounts of staff members as at lst January
1993
Contributions of staff members and of the
Assembly of Western European Union
Repayments of loans by staff members
Gain on valuation at 3lst December 1993
F
7 008 216
250036
108 000
428 3sO
Withdrawals
Management fees
Accounts of existing staff members as at
3lst December 1993
F
3 700 957
3 20s
4090 440
7 794 602 7 794 602
t
,U
tl.,z
U
X
Uoo
z
l?Iz
-l
5
N)@
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APPENDIX V
1993 Balance shect for the Fedcrated Group
of Christian Democrats
Surplus at 3lst December 1992 (bank
Assets
accounts, cash)
Interest .
Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1993
Total
Liabilities
I. Expenditure
l. Allowance for the Secretariat
2. Estimates for the Symposium
3. Share of the PPE group operating expenses (Council of Europe) (7 months at
F 5 000)
4. Other expenditure
Total .
II. Surplus at 31st December 1993 (bank accounts, cash) .
Total .
Signatures of the Treasurer
and two auditors of the group
European Democrats (37 mcmbers out of 96 Fed. Group)
Assets
l.
2.
3.
F
35 758.34
24 000.58
146 699.81
206 458.73
24 000.00
120 000.00
3s 000.00
l 397.85
180 397.85
26 060.88
206 458.73
F
77 969.19
3 427.58
91 998.19
173 394.96
l.
2.
3.
Surplus at 3lst December 1992 (bank accounts, cash).
Interest
Appropriations gxanted by the Assembly of WEU for 1993 (37 members) ....
3lst December 1993 total credit
Liabiltties
I. Expenditure
l. Secretarial staff (salary, insurance)
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone)
3. Seminars, meetings and interpretation costs .
4. Travel and subsistence (members and staff) .
Total expenses...
II. Surplus at 3lst December 1993 .
Balance 3lst December 1993
Treasurer (Sir John HuNr)
Auditors (Mr. B. ScrnuNen)
39 500.00
l 509.00
2L 827.70
,r"r*
l l0 558.26
173 394.96
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l.
2.
3.
APPENDIX VI
1993 Bolance sheet for the Liberal Group
Surplus at 3lst December 1992 (bank accounts, cash).
Interest
Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1993
Total
F
84 654.48
2 449.42
107 421.00
194 524.90
Liabilities
I. Expenditure
l. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance) 38 840.00
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) . 9 280.00
3. Seminars and meetings . . . 23 700.00
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) . I I 000.00
5. Interpretation costs
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners) 16 700.00
7. Sundry expenses
Total . 99 520.00
Surplus at 3lst December 1993 (bank accounts, cash) 9s 004.90
t94 524.90Total
Signatures of the Treasurer
and two auditors of the group
3r
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APPENDIX VII
1993 Bal.ance sheet for the Socialist Group
Surplus at 3lst December 1992 (bank accounts, cash).
Interest
Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1993
Total
Liabilitics
I. Expenditure
l. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance)
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, oflice supplies) ..
3. Seminars and meetings ...
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) .
5. Interpretation costs
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners)
7. Sundry expenses
II. Surplus at 31st December 1993 (bank accounts, cash) .
Total .
Signatures of the Treasurer
and two auditors of the group
l.
2.
3.
F
179 325.8t
9 354.03
187 881.00
376 560.84
92 640.00
4 260.06
37 335.s0
7 664.00
826.00
233 835.28
376 s60.84
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The Assembly,
Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1993, together with the
auditor's report, in accordance with Article 17 of the financial regulations,
Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his financial
responsibility.
Document 1428 Addendum 28th July 1994
Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly
for the financial year 1993
MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1993I
submitted on behalf
of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Ailministration 2
by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Rathbone (Chairman); Mr. Redmond (Vice-Chairman); MM. Alvarez, Antretter, Biefrrot (Alter-
nate: Picriausc), Branger, N..., Biichler, Curto, Daniel (Altemate: Hunault), Dimmer, Mrs. Durrieu, Mr. Eversdijk, Dane Peggy
Fenner, N..., MM. Homs I Ferret, Howell (Altemate: Cummings), Jurgens (Altemate: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman), N... (Alternate:
Mattina), Maass, Masson, Meyer zu Bentrup, Mrs. Moreno Gonzalez (Altemate: Robles Orozco), MM. Pinto (Altemate: Roseta),
N..., Thissen.
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft budget of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 7995 ' *
submilted on belulf
of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration2
by Mr. Rathbone, Cluimun and Rapporteur
TABLEOFCONTENTS
Expr-nNnronv MruoneNouu
I. Introduction
tr. Head I 
- 
Expenditure relating to permanent staff of the Office of the Clerk of
the Assembly
Itr. Operating budget
fV. Pensionsbudget
V. Conclusions
Surunraanv oF FsrMArEs oF EXpENDITURE AND REcEIprs FoR THE FINANCIAL veen 1995
Partl : Operating budget
Section A 
- 
expenditure
Section B 
- 
receipts
Part II : Pensions budget
Section A 
- 
expenditure
Section B 
- 
receipts
Appexprces
I. Recapitulatory table showing changes in the staff of the Office of the Clerk
of the WEU Assembly proposed in the 1995 budget
tr. Organogram of the Office of the Clerk of the WEU Assembly
III. Description of proposed B5 post
IV. Salaries of staff recruited for Assembly sessions
V. Five-year modernisation and maintenance programme for the equipment of
the Office of the Clerk
VI. Implications of the various heads for the 1994 and 1995 budgets
* See lOth sining, 30th November 1994 (previous question, Document 1447 , agreed to).
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee and approved by the Presidential Committee.
2. Members of the comminee: Mr. Rathbone (Chairman); Mr. Rednond(Yice-Chairman); MM. Alvarez, Antretter, Biefnot (Alter-
nate: PCcriaux), Branger, N. . ., Biichler, Curto, Daniel (Altemate: Hunault), Dimmer, Mrs. Durrieu, Mr. Eversdijk, Dane Peggy
Fenner, N..., MM. Homs I Ferret, Howell (Alternate: Cummings), Jurgens (Alternate: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman), N..., (Alter-
nate: Mattina), Maass, Masson, Meyer zu Bentrup, Mrs. Moreno Gonzalez (Alternate: Robles Orozco), MM. Pinto (Alternate:
Roseta), N..., Thissen.
N.B. 7fte rames of those taking pan in the vote are printed in italics.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submilted by Mn Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur)
I.Introduction
General
1. In the medium term, th9 Assembly will pursue its work in four main directions in line with its gene-
ral mandate, agreed by the Presidential Committee and in parallel with the initiatives taken by WEU
ministers.
2. For purposes of this document, the general political direction may be summarised as follows:
(i) to deepen understanding of the implications for WEU of the goals laid down in the Maastricht
Treaty regarding the implementation of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and pre-
parations for the intergovernmental conference in 1996;
(ii) t9 ensure appropriate participation of associate members, associate partners and observers in
the activities of the Assembly;
(iii) to develop relations and consultations with non-member countries in accordance with succes-
sive declarations by WEU ministers;
(iv) to re-assess the operational r6le of WEU, taking into account in particular the decisions reached
at the NAIO summit meeting in January 1994;
(v) to promote close co-operation between member countries, associate members,
ners and observers in the field of armaments;
associate part-
(vi) more broadly, to continue examining issues relating to European defence and security in
general.
3. In pursuing these objectives, the WEU Assembly will act in close liaison with other national or
international parliamentary bodies and institutions active in related fields, in particular:
(i) governments and parliaments of member countries;
(ii) governments and parliaments of other countries with a special status in WEU;
(iii) govemments and parliaments of other countries concerned with European security;
(iv) the newly-elected European Parliament;
(v) NATO and the North Atlantic Assembly, and its governments;
(vi) the CSCE Assembly; and
(vii)the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
4. The Presidential Committee of the WEU Assembly will continue to play an important r6le in sha-
ping the programme of work of the Assembly, making its own proposals and reviewing those prepared by
the various committees of the Assembly, taking into account theheed to make the mbst effiiient use oi
scarce resources.
5. The WEU Assembly, its Rapporteurs, together with the Office of the Clerk, will continue to ana-
lyse problems and examine the issues they raise by applying consistently the working methods of a parlia-
mentary body, i.e. making the best possible use of available resources toobtain information at source from
those who are the authorities on the issues in question. The quality of reports prepared by Rapporteurs and
consequently the level of the discussions which result from them depend oh the neceisary-effort being
made. From a budgetary management point of view, this implies that the corresponding heads of the bud--
get are appropriately funded.
Gene ral nnnag ement obj e ctiv e s
6. Considering-these substantive objectives from the viewpoint of the general management of
resources (human, financial, premises) of the WEU Assembly, the following objectives may be formula-
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ted for 1995, itbeing well understood that with its yearly rhythm the WEU Assembly budget cannot claim
to provide a perfect setting for taking into account medium-term international political developments:
(i) to organise effectively relations with non-member countries with associate member, associate
partn-er or observer status, without diverting attention from the important ongoing activities of
the WEU Assembly stemming from the modified Brussels Treaty;
(ii) to ensure that the work of the WEU Assembly as an important actor in the definition of a com-
mon European foreign and security policy obtains coilrmensurate public attention and cover-
age in WEU countries and outside;
(iii) to increase European public awareness of the requirements of the security and defence of
Europe;
(iv) to ensure that the WEU Assembly, including its committees, has the resources and skills
needed to carry out its mandate, and in particular appropriate facilities to accommodate the
rapidly increasing number of countries associating with WEU.
Main budget policy issues for 1995
7. There are essentially three major budget policy issues underlying the preparation of the anached
budget proposals for 1995: (il the question of the accommodation of the WEU Assembly, its committees,
the Delegations and the Office of the Clerk, given the rapidly increasing number of countries with
observer, associate member and associate partner status; (ii) the implementation of a communications
strategy of the WEU Assembly aimed at member and, under the circumstances, particularly at non-mem-
ber countries, at the media and other policy-shaping bodies; (iii) the consolidation and modernisation of
available resources and modernisation of the working environment.
8. As regards accommodarion, discussions at both political and staff levels between the Assembly and
the Council will intensify during the autumn of l994.It is therefore not possible, in the budget proposals
that follow, to take account of the possible outcome of these discussions. However, the issue of accommo-
dation is of critical importance to the WEU Assembly to enable it to pursue its objectives within those set
for WEU as a whole by the WEU ministers. The result of the ongoing discussions between the Assembly
and the Council may lead to the need to present a supplementary budget for 1995 in the autumn of 1994.
9. The budgetary proposals for 1995 presented below do not therefore attempt to anticipate the results
of the discussions referred to above. However, in order to ensure continuity, it is necessary to plan current
expenditure related to limited improvements in the premises used by the WEU Assembly, its committees
and the Office of the Clerk.
10. The issue of accommodation, however serious in its own right, is only one aspect of the much broa-
der issue of how to associate effectively the quickly increasing number of countries with the process of
European integration and the formulation of a European common foreign and security policy. To respond
to thii challenge efficiently, the WEU Assembly has to implement a communications strategy with major
attendant budgetary implications. Such a strategy must take into account a broad range of aspects. There
is a strong need for the WEU Assembly to extend and deepen its relations with the executive and legisla-
tive branches, particularly of non-member countries, be it, in the first place, through their embassies or
permanent representations to WEU or NATO on the spot, and, more important, through visits to the capi-
tals. In addition, the Office of the Clerk is faced with a rapidly-growing interest in the work of the WEU
Assembly and many requests for participation in symposia and conferences. This interest and these invita-
tions come from a large number of institutions representing the media and communications organisations
and other policy-shaping bodies and research institutions dealing with foreign, defence and security
policy matters.
11. In budgetary terms, the implications of such a communications strategy are reflected mainly in
Chapter I, Permanent Staff (regarding assistants and the language service), and several sub-heads under
Heads IV and V. It may be noted that these efforts may not systematically result in increases in resources
but in a more targeted and efficient use within the existing level of resources.
12. As regards consolidation and modernisation of the existing resources of the Offrce of the Clerk, the
budget proposals for 1995 cover two facets: (i) a proposal for the regrading of two posts in the Office of
the Clerk; and (ii) a proposal to introduce a new budget line devoted to staff training with some limited
funding.
13. A justification for the proposed regradings is given below.
14. Efforts to adapt the structure of posts to the requirements of new technologies must be complemen-
ted by an equally great endeavour to adapt the qualifications of existing staff members in order to enable
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them to make the most effective use of new and, in particular, information technologies. It is therefore pro-
posed to introduce a new sub-head29 in the budget with the title "Expenses for staff training", with, atta-
ched to it, a relatively modest proposal for appropriations. This should allow some immediate needs to be
satisfied, particularly in the information technology training area, until a more comprehensive approach is
developed.
II. Head I 
- 
Expenditure relating to permanent staff
of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly
15. On the basis of the above main budget policy issues, the draft budget for the financial year 1995
includes the following proposals under Head I of the budget of the WEU Assembly:
Post creations:
- 
creation of a grade 85 post in the Press and Information Office;
- 
creation of a grade L2 post of translator in the Translation Service (English section).
Post regradings:
- 
regrading of two gradeC4 posts to grade B3 in the storage and accounting of equipment and repro-
graphic unit.
Justification 
- 
proposed creations
16. Creation of a grade 85 post in the Press and Information Office; The request for the creation of this
post is in direct relation with the overall communications strategy referred to above: a substantial increa-
se in the political and operational activity of WEU, a tripling of the number of countries with which the
WEU Assembly has to develop increasingly close relations and a substantial increase in the targets of a
WEU Assembly communications strategy. Initially, the increases were absorbed through intensive use of
information technologies. More recently, the workload of the Press and Information Office has increased
to an extent where a full exploitation of the technology in turn requires an additional investment in human
resources, to avoid running the risk of not being able to satisfy needs in full and in good time (a job des-
cription is attached at Appendix III).
17. Creation of a grade L2 post in the Translation Service (English section): The rapid expansion in the
WEU Assembly's relations with the governments and parliaments of European countries, including those
in Central and Eastern Europe, and also countries outside Europe, makes it necessary to strengthen the
English translation team consisting at present of one reviser and one translator. The creation of a gradeL2
post of translator in the English section with as wide a range of languages as possible is therefore propo-
sed again in this budget to ensure that the Offrce of the Clerk is able to translate from the seven languages
of the Assembly.
J ustiftcation 
- 
proposed regradings
18. Regrading of fwo grade C4 posts to 83 in the storage and accounting of equipment and repro-
graphicunirs: These proposals for regradings had already been considered for inclusion in the budget for
1994last year. However it proved to be impossible to accommodate them, despite the very modest increa-
se in expenditure they entail, within the limits imposed for that budget. These regradings are being propo-
sed again this year, because they arejustified "per se" considering the substantial evolution in the content
of these positions, where technological developments have led to more sophisticated equipment, requiring
new and improved skills on the part of the operators.
19. To sum up, these proposals for restructuring the Offrce of the Clerk included in the draft budget for
the financial year 1995 result in the following increases in the budget:
- 
creation ofa grade L2 post F 570 000
- 
creation of a grade 85 post F ,+40 500
- 
regrading of two C4 posts to grade B3 . . . F 5 500
Torer F 1 016000
***
20. The cost calculations for basic salaries and allowances of permanent staff are based on the salary
scales approved by the WEU Council following the proposals by the Co-ordinating Committee on Remu-
neration (CCR) and applicable as of lst January 1994. These scales have been adjusted to take account of
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the second part of the increase, delayed for reasons of "budgetary feasibility", i.e. l.9Vo calculated on the
same bases (see fortieth report of the CCR), the result being increased by a projected 0.6Vo for 1995. Those
for temporary staff are the result of collective agreements between co-ordinated organisations and the
representative professional organisations, the scales for permanent staff salaries being frequently used as
a reference. In those cases where a real price adjustrnent was called for, in other sections of Head II and in
Heads III to V an inflation rate of 2.2Vo for France for 1995 was assumed.
III. Operating budget
21. Estimates under Heads II to V have been calculated so as to permit the efficient pursuit of the objec-
tives dev'eloped from the guidelines given by ministers. Nevertheless, in view of the financial consffaints
in member countries, and their effects on resources made available to WEU, the proposals put forward by
the Office of the Clerk are already the result of carefully-considered compromises. Detailed explanations
are given for individual heads and sub-heads, as appropriate, in the paragraphs following each table.
22. The introduction of information technology equipment together with rationalisation of work p(rce-
dures made it possible to carry out substantial savings in the temporary staff of the English and French
translation sections. For the sitme reasons, it was possible to abolish the temporary English typing pool.
These savings compensate in part the statutory increases.
Implications of Greeceb accession to WEU
23. The process of ratifying the agreement on Greece's accession to WEU is under way, and it may there-
fore be expected that this country might soon participate as a full member in the work of the Assembly.
This participation will give rise to non-negligible cost increases in a variety of areas, e.g. offices for the
Delegation and their equipment, interpreters and translators and their accommodation, additional
expenses for political groups. Preliminary estimates for such expenditure items had been included in the
draft budget for 1994 (see document 1383) as a contingency item.
24. In line with observations made concerning the accommodation of the Assembly generally, additio-
nal offices for the Greek Delegation cannot be made available at this stage pending a general agreement
with the Secretary-General regarding, in particular, the use of offices in the Wilson wing. For reasons
of budgetary transparency, it was considered preferable to include all the costs involved by the
accession of Greece to WEU in the planned supplementary budget for 1995 to be presented in the autumn
of 1994.
Programme for the rnodernisation of equipment
25. The five-year programme for the modernisation of equipment has been updated for the period 1995-
1999 (see Appendix V), and shows a reduction in estimates of F 56 000 for 1995 compared to appropria-
tions for 1994 under Sub-Heads 15 to 17. This result could be achieved because of efforts being made to
constrain the cost of indexed maintenance conffacts and to lengthen periods of economic use of existing
equipment.
Other operating expenditure
26. As indicated above, the implementation of a communications strategy will have important budge-
tary implications for those sub-heads of the budget providing for all movements of persons and informa-
tion, such as Sub-Head 24: Missions and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the
Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs; Sub-Head 27: Offrcialjourneys of members of the
Office of the Clerk; Sub-Head 18: Postage, telephone, facsimile and transport of documents; Sub-Head
19: Duplication paper, headed notepaper and other office supplies. Detailed comments can be found in the
explanations given after Table 4.
27, Details on the proposals for increases in appropriations will be given in the explanations accompa-
nying each table.
IV Pensions budget
28. 
- 
Two pensions projections are included in the estimates for the financial year 1995. One pension
may become payable to one grade B4 official taking early retirement with effect from 1st January 1995,
the other will be payable on 1st August 1995.
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29. The estimates for basic pensions and allowances are based on the salary scales approved by the
WEU Council following the proposals by the Co-ordinating Commiftee on Remuneration (CCR) report
and applicable as of lst January 1994. These scales have been adjusted to take account of the second part
of the increase (see fonieth report of the CCR) i.e. I.9Vo calculated on the same bases, the result being
increased by a projected 0.6Vo for 1995.
30. With effect from lst June 1994, following the decision of the WEU Council based on the proposals
by the CCR, the contributions by the permanent staffto the pension scheme have been increased fromTVo
to 87o (of basic salary). By the same decision it was agreed that the temporary levy of 0.57o should be
reimbursed to staff.
31. A sum of F 44 500 francs has been included on the receipt side to account for contributions by the
new posts to be created or for posts to be regraded.
V. Conclusians
32. In conclusion, as shown in Table 1, the general net total of estimates in the draft budget of the WEU
Assembly for 1995 (operating budget plus pensions minus receipts) amounts to F 35 ,140 500 which, com-
pared with the general net total for the financial year 1994, shows a growth rate of 7.69Vo. The operating
budget (expenditure under Heads I to V) shows a growth rate of 7.487o, whereas the corresponding figu-
re for overall estimates under Heads II to Y where the Assembly has budgetary autonomy, is 5.9lVo.
33. It should be noted that: (i) real growth (taking account of the inflation rate assumed for France in
1995) of these estimates can be assumed to be lower by 2.2 percentage points; (fi) a substantial part of the
increases relating to Heads I and II are outside the control of the WEU Assembly and Office of the Clerk
because the corresponding decisions are taken by the CCR; (iii) the increase proposed in the ordinary bud-
get is the lowest for the last six years. This illustrates quite clearly the substantial effort made by the WEU
Assembly and the Office of the Clerk at a time when the guidelines agreed by the WEU Council have
considerably increased their workload.
Summary of estimates of expenditure and receipts
for the financial years 1994 and 1995
1995
a
1994
b Eoa-bb
A. Operating budget
Head I. Permanent staff
Head II. Temporary staff
Head III. Expenditure on premises
and equipment
Head IV General administrative costs
Head V Other expenditure
19 911 000
4 176 500
2t47 0N
2 350 500
2730000
18 369 000
3 952 500
2074m0
2238 500
2 503 000
+ 8.39
+ 5.67
+ 3.52
+ 5.00
+ 9.07
Total expenditure
Receipts
31 315 000
95 000
29 r37 000
95 000
+ 7.48
Ner roret- A 31220W0 29 @.2000 + 7.50
B. Pensions budget
Pensions and leaving allowances
Receipts
5 258 000
1 037 500
4756000
887 000
+ 10.56
16.97+
Ner rorAt- B 4220 500 3 869 000 + 9.09
Gexrul NEr rorAl (A + B) 35.+40 500 32 911 000 + 7.69
Toral oF HEADS II ro V oF oPERATTNc
BI.JDGET l1 404 000 10 768 000 + 5.91
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PART I : OPERATING BUDGET
Section A- Expenditure
Table 2
HeadI-Permanentstaff
Sub-Heads
Budget
for
1995
Budget
for
t994
Expected
expenditure
in 1994
Actual
expenditure
in 1993
Sub-Head I 
- 
Basic salaries
Sub-Head 2 
- 
Allowances:
2.1. Expatriation allowance
2.2. Household allowance
2.3. Children's and
other dependants' allowance
2.4. Rent allowance
2.5. Education allowance
2.6. Language allowance
2.7. Overtime
2.8. Home leave
Sub-Head 3 
- 
Social charges:
3.1. Social security
3.2. Supplementary insurance
3.3. Provident fund
531 000
669 500
692000
59 500
139 500
3 000
80 000
50 000
1 928 000
625 000
112 500
Sub-Head 4 
- 
Expenses relating to
the recruitment and
the departure of per-
manent offrcials
4.1. Travelling expenses of
candidates for vacant posts 40 000
4.2. Travelling expenses on arrival
and departure of permanent
officials and their families
4.3. Removal expenses
4.4. Installation allowance
Sub-Head 5 
- 
Medical examination
Toml or neAD I
20 000
110 000
68 500
13 768 000
3224 5W
2665 sW
238 500
14 000
t2727 5N
2974 000
2 521 000
133 500
13 000
t2 @2 150
2849 s30
2 490 0N
133 500
8 500
t2241 397
2769 8r8
2 434 500
s8 880
9 123
19 911 000 18 369 000 18 123 680 t7 513718
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Table 2 : Exphnations
Sub-Heads I and 2
Estimates under these two sub-heads cover emo_luments (basic salary and allowances) paid to per-
manent staff in accordance with the Staff Rules of the Office of the Clerk of the WEU Assembiy. They are
calculated on the basis of gl.obal salarieq in application of the scales in force on lst January 1994 , sei out
in^the thirty-fir1t co-ordination rgport. firese s-cales have been adjusted to take account of -the second part
of the increase for 1994, delayed for reasons of "budgetary feasibility" (see fortieth report of ttre CCnf i.e.
I.9Vo calculated on the same bases, the result being increised by a frojected O.6Eo foi 1995.
These estimates also take account of the financial implications of creating two new posts (one grade
L2 and one grade B5)^q4 the regrading of two existing pbsts. Expenditure involved in-these propisals
amounts to F 1 016 000.
The table of establishment of the Office of the Clerk, showing grades, is given at Appendix I and
the organogram at Appendix II.
Sub-Head 3
Estimated expenditure for "Social charges" is based on commitments stemming from:
- 
application of 
_the social security agreement signed between Western European Union and the
Government of the French Republic on 2nd June 1979 (Sub-Head 3.1) ,;
- 
application of the convention on complementary collective insurance (Sub-Head 3.2) 3;
- 
applicationof Article 27 of the StaffRules providing for the employer's contribution to the Pro-
vident Fund, amounting to l4Vo of basic salary for staffnot afhliate<i to the pension scheme (Sub-
Head 3.3).
. 
Social ghalee-s (F lq3 500) relating to the creation of two new posts and the regrading of two exis-
ting posts are included in the total for this sub-head.
Sub-Head 4
These estimates relate to the expenditure involved in recruiting new officials.
Sub-Head 5
The sum requested is to cover the cost of the annual medical check-up which all members of the
staff must undergo in accordance with Article 9 of the Staff Rules. Medical iheck-ups for WEU staff in
Paris are carried out at the OECD medical cenfre.
1. These scales are worked olt by the Inter-organisation Study Section on Salaries and Prices and approved by the WEU Coun-
cil and the Councils of the other co-ordinated organisations (NATO, OECD, Council of Europe, ESA; ECMRWF).
2. Under this convention, WEU staff benefit from the French social security scheme, with the exception of family allowances and
retirement pensions.
1, VT-{". this agreement, WEU staff benefit from complementary insurance in the event of sickness or temporary or permanentdisability. Furthermore, in the event of the death of an insured person, the insurance company pays a lump sirm t6 the-beneficia-
ries he has named.
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Sub-Heads
Estimates
for
r995
Budget
for
1994
Expected
expenditure
lll.1994
Actual
expenditure
in 1993
Sub-Head 6 
- 
Staff recruited for sessions
of the Assembly:
6.1. Sitting service
6.2. Interpretation service
6.3. Translation service
6.4. Other services
435 000
753 500
803 000
95 000
Sub-Head 7 
- 
Interpretation staff required for
Assembly work between sessions
Sub-Head 8 
- 
Temporary staff for the Office
of the Clerk
Sub-Head 9 
- 
Social charges
9.1. Insurance for temporary staff
other than interpreters
9.2. Provident fund for interpreters
9.3. Insurance for interpreters
Torar- oF HEAD II
9 000
169 000
9 000
3 086 500
828 000
75 000
187 000
2 899 s00
793 000
75 000
185 000
2752@0
793 000
75 000
182 000
2787 265
4/i0951
29 946
r52246
4 176 500 3952500 3 802 @0 3 410 408
Table 3
Head II 
- 
Temporary staff
Table 3: Explanations
Sub-Head 6
Estimates under this sub-head relate to:
(a) Salaries and, where appropriate, per diem allowances, allowances for ftavelling time and the reim-
bursement of travelling expenses of temporary staffrecruited for sessions (sittings, interpretation and trans-
lation services). A list of such staff, showing their respective duties and salaries, is given at Appendix III.
(b) Lump-sum payments made to staffrecruited for various services during sessions (doctor, post office
technician, information technology office equipment technician, guards for the security service, etc.).
Salaries for temporary staff are calculated on the same bases as those for permanent staff.
In application of the agreement signed between the co-ordinated organisations and the International
Association of Conference Interpreters (IACI), the salaries of interpreters are calculated on the basis of the
scale in force for gradelA step 8 staff, increased by 6Vo.
Savings referred to above are the result of a reduction in the number of assistants in the English sec-
tion and of translators in the French section in each case by 2 persons. The abolition of the typing pool
resulted in a net saving of 5 assistants.
Sub-Head 7
This sub-head shows the sums paid to interpreters recruited for simultaneous interpretation at mee-
tings between sessions (salaries and, where appropriate, per diem allowances, travelling time and travel-
ling expenses).
Salaries and working conditions are the same as for interpreters recruited for sessions (see Sub-
Head 6 (b) above).
Sub-Head 8
Estimates under this sub-head remain unchanged in value terms.
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Sub-Head 9
Estimates under this sub-head correspond to the following social charges:
Insurance for temporary staff other thnn interpreters
Staffrecruited for Assembly sessions are insured with the Van Breda insurance company against the
risks of death, accident or sickness, 60Vo of thepremium being paid by the Office of the Cierk ana +Ofo Ay
staff. The estimates take account of the updating of the capital and piemiums as from May 1988.
Provident fund. for interpreters
In accordance with the agreement between the co-ordinated organisations and the IACI, WEU has to
pqy intq th9 gonference interpreters' fund or, where appropriate, another provident fund, a contribution of
l4%o, which is added to a conffibution of 7Vo by interpreters.
Insuranc e fo r inte rp re t e r s
A Lloyds insurance policy, taken out through the intermediary of Stewart Wrightson in London,
covers interpreters for accidents, sickness and temporary or permanent disability preventing them from
working. The premium of I .l%o of their fees (lower rate) is divided between the Offrce of the elerk (0.7 Vo)
and the interpreters (O.4Vo).
Table 4
Head III 
- 
Expenditure on premises and equipment
Table 4: Explanations
Sub-Head l0
Estimates under this sub-head have been raised by 2.47o on the basis of information furnished by the
administrative services of the WEU Institute for Security Studies responsible for the management of the
WEU premises in Paris. The estimates represent a fixed share of 30Vo of the total costs for the building.
Sub-Head ll
The participation of representatives of countries with observer, associate member or associate pqrt-
ner status in meetings of committees or political groups may require the renting of meeting rooms outside
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Sub-Heads
Estimates
for
r995
Budget
for
1994
Expected
expenditure
in 1994
Actual
expenditure
in 1993
Sub-Head
Sub-Head
Sub-Head
Sub-Head
Sub-Head
Sub-Head
Sub-Head
Sub-Head
10 
- 
Share of joint expenditure on
the Paris premises
11 
- 
Hire of committee rooms
12 
- 
Technical and other installa-
tions for Assembly sessions
13 
- 
Various services for the organi-
sation of sessions
14 
- 
Maintenance of the premises of
the Office of the Clerk
15 
- 
Purchase or repair of office fur-
niture
16 
- 
Purchase ofreprographic and
other office equipment
17 
- 
Hire and maintenance of repro-
graphic and other equipment
599 000
10 000
809 000
60 000
20 000
40 000
9 000
600 000
585 000
10 000
690 000
55 000
15 000
40 000
2s 000
654 000
560 000
0
788 000
55 000
17 000
40 000
25 000
6000 000
495 584
0
685 953
48 315
15 888
64 546
228 lto
597 77t
Torel or ureo III 2t47 0N 2074000 2 085 000 2 167136
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WEU premises offering appropriate seating and interpretation equipment or the installation of temporary
interpretation equipment in rooms not so equipped. A total of F 10 000 is foreseen under this sub-head to
allow such expenditure to be met, if necessary.
For meetings outside Paris, the national delegations concerned normally make available committee
rooms with simultaneous interpretation equipment.
Sub-Head 12
This sub-head relates to expenditure for the installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment,
telephone booths, a seventy-five seat television area in the lobby, facsimile, screens, a detection gate and
other installations on the premises of the Economic and Social Council during Assembly sessions. The
temporary nature of these installations makes them highly labour-intensive and subject to intense wear and
tear. Taking these factors into account and based on experience in 1994, this estimate has been increased
by l5vo in real terms.
Sub-Head 13
Estimates under this sub-head relate to contracts for the provision of various services during Assem-
bly sessions (removal of equipment, cleaning of premises, use of reprographic equipment on free loan,
etc.) and are based on experience.
Sub-Head 14
As in the past, this sum is expected to allow minor repairs to be carried out to the premises of the
Office of the Clerk. The estimate has been raised based on experience in 1994.
Sub-Heads 15, 16 and 17
Estimates proposed under these sub-heads are justified by the five-year maintenance and moderni-
sation programme for equipment given at Appendix IV. As indicated in the introduction, it was possible to
reduce the estimates under this sub-head by F 54 000 as a result of efforts to constrain the rise of indexed
maintenance contracts and to extend the useful life of existing equipment.
Table 5
Head IV 
- 
General administrative costs
Table 5 : Explanations
Sub-Head 18
The estimate for 1995 is the result of a major effort of communication by post, telephone, facsimile
and, on occasion, courier services, directed in particular towards countries having observer, associate
member or associate partner status in WEU. The estimate has been increased by 3OVo in real terms.
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Sub-Heads
Estimates
for
1995
Budget
for
1994
Expected
expenditure
in1994
Actual
expenditure
in 1993
Sub-Head 18 
- 
Postage, telephone, facsimile
and transport of documents
Sub-Head 19 
- 
Duplication paper, headed wri-
ting paper and other office
supplies
Sub-Head 20 
- 
Printing and publication of
documents
Sub-Head 21 
- 
Purchase of documents
Sub-Head 22 
- 
Offrcial car
Sub-Head 23 
- 
Bank charges
Totar- or neeo IV
853 000
237 NO
I 100000
75 000
85 000
500
646 000
237 W
1 215 000
75 000
65 000
500
700 000
200 000
l 100000
75 000
65 000
0
667 84t
223 tt5
1043 ffi1
72760
69 839
194
2 350 500 2238 500 2 140 000 2077 356
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Sub-Head 19
Estimates under this sub-head remain unchanged in value terms.
Sub-Head 20
The estimates under this sub-head have actually been reduced in value terms by F 115 000 follo-
wing a general tightening up on the costs of the printing workload.
Sub-Head 2l
Estimates under this sub-head remain unchanged in value terms.
Sub-Head 22
Estimates under this sub-head include mainly the cost of hiring a car with driver for the President of
the Assembly. They take account of the fact that the post of usher/driver/messenger was not granted in the
1994 budget, thus increasing the need for a hired car with driver.
Sub-Head 23
The estimate of F 500 remains unchanged in value terms.
Table 6
Head V 
- 
Other expenditure
Sub-Heads
Estimates
for
1995
Budget
for
1994
Expected
expenditure
in 1994
Actual
expenditure
in 1993
Sub-Head 24 
-Travelling and subsistence allo-
wances and insurance for the
President of the Assembly,
chairmen of committees and
rapporteurs
Sub-Head 25 
- 
Expenses for representation
Sub-Head 26 
- 
Committee study missions
Sub-Head 27 
- 
Offrcialjourneys of members of
the OfFrce of the Clerk
Sub-Head 28 
-Expenses of experts and the au-
ditor
Sub-Head 29 
- 
Expenses for staff training
Sub-Head 30 
- 
Expenditure on information
Sub-Head 31 
- 
Expenses for political groups
Sub-Head 32 
- 
Contingencies andotherexpendi-
ture not elsewhere provided for
Sub-Head 33 
- 
Non-recoverable taxes
Torar oF HEAD V
346 000
404 000
s 000
830 000
60 000
10 000
510 000
534 000
3 000
28 000
295 000
360 000
5 000
708 000
60 000
0
510 000
534 000
3 000
28 000
30s 000
400 000
0
800 000
60 000
0
510 000
534 000
0
25 000
259 760
361 003
0
838 504
45 284
0
510 581
534 000
278
2t 934
2730000 2 503 000 2634000 2 57t 3M
Table 6: Explanations
(Expenditure under all these sub-heads reflect experience to date (1994) as well
as the anticipated rise in costs due to the Assembly's increased activities in 1995)
Sub-Head 24
The Assembly bears only the cost of official missions by the President of the Assembly, rapporteurs
and, when appropriate, committee chairmen when these missions are connected with the preparation of a
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report or the work of the Assembly. Missions by chairmen and rapporteurs are subject to approval by the
Presidential Committee.
The estimates under this sub-head have been increased by l1%o inreal terms, to take account of increa-
sed contacts, in particular with counfties having observer, associate member or associate partner status.
Sub-Head 25
One result of the present communication effort is a substantial increase in the number and rank of
offrcial speakers and the increasing number of visits to the Assembly by parliamentary delegations from
countries connected with WEU in various ways, together with rising prices in the labour-intensive cate-
ring industry, which together justify the increase of l0Vo in real terms in the estimates under this sub-head.
Sub-Head 26
Sums under this sub-head are to cover extraordinary and unforeseeable expenditure for study visits
by committees. The estimate remains unchanged in value terms.
Sub-Head 27
Estimates under this sub-head are based on the prograrnme of work of the Assembly and the various
Assembly commiftees in 1995. The increase takes account of past experience and also reflects the present
increases in contacts with countries in and outside WEU.
Sub-Head 28
This sum is to cover the cost of auditing the Assembly's accounts and the participation of experts in
symposia organised by the Assembly.
Sub-Head 29
As indicated above, this sub-head for stafftraining is new and the sums in question are to be used in
1995 only if necessary, pending the development of a policy on staff raining.
Sub-Head 30
The estimate under this sub-head remains unchanged in value terms.
Sub-Head 31
In accordance with the decisions taken by the Presidential Committee, each of the political groups of
the Assembly is allocated the same flat rate amount and a further sum proportionate to the number of
members listed. All the groups have to submit a balance sheet at the close of the financial year. All the
balance sheets are appended to the accounts of the Assembly and are consequently subject to examination
by the auditor.
The estimate has been calculated on the basis of a total of nine member countries.
Sub-Heads 32 and 33
The estimates under these sub-heads remain unchanged in value terms.
Table 7
PART I : OPERATING BUDGET
Section B 
- 
Receipts
Estimates
for
1995
Budget
for
1994
Expected
receipts
in 1994
Actual
receipts
in 1993
l. Sale of publications
2. Bank interest
3. Receipts (reimbursements, social security, etc.)
25 000
60 000
10 000
25 000
60 000
10 000
24000
0
26000
35 624
12 858
22748
Torel REcEIPTS 95 000 95 000 50 000 7l 230
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Table 7 : Explanations
Estimates for the sale of publications, bank interest and social security reimbursements are based on
past experience.
PART II : PENSIONS BI.JDGET
Section A 
- 
Expenditure
Table I
Head I 
- 
Pensions, allowances and social charges
Table 8: Explanations
Sub-Heads I and 2
It is forecast that the Offrce of the Clerk will be paying nineteen pensions in 1995, as follows:
- 
sixteen retirement pensions;
- 
one invalidity pension;
- 
two survivors' pensions.
Estimates of expenditure under these two sub-heads are calculated in accordance with the provi-
sions of the pension scheme rules on the basis of the scales set out in the fortieth co-ordination report.
Sub-Head 3
Pensioners are insured against the risk of sickness in accordance with Article 19 bis of the
collective convention in force.
Estimates of expenditure under this sub-head correspond to the proportion of the premium paid by
the Assembly.
Estimates
for
1995
Budget
for
1994
Expected
expenditure
in 1994
Actual
expenditure
in 1993
Sub-Head 1 
- 
Pensions and leaving allowances
1.1. Retirement pensions
1.2. Invalidity pensions
1.3. Survivors' pensions
4 489 000
197 000
25r 000
1.4. Orphans' or dependants'pensions 0
1.5. Leaving allowances 0
Sub-Head 2 
- 
Family allowances
2.1. Household allowances
2.2. Chrldren's and other
dependants' allowances
2.3. Edacation allowances
Sub-Head 3 
- 
Supplementary insurance
Torar oF HEAD I
163 500
17 000
4 000
4937 000
184 500
136 500
4 4040W
200 000
152 000
4274713
157 182
r25 t94
4027 644
185 495
140 836
5 258 000 4 7s6 000 4 557 089 4 353 975
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PART II : PENSIONS BI.JDGET
Table 9
Section B 
- 
Receipts
Table 9 : Explanalions
Estimated receipts are calculated on the basis of confributions to the pension scheme paid by the
thirty-eight permanent staff members of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly (8Vo of basic salary) affi-
liated to the pension scheme. By a decision of the Council taken on the basis of the thirty-fourth co-ordi-
nation report, this contribution has been raised fromT%o to \Vo.
At the same time, the Council agreed to reimburse to staff members the temporary levy of 0.5Vo
decided originally on the basis of the fifteenth co-ordination report. The receipts expected for 1994 take
account of this decision.
Estimates
for
r995
Budget
for
1994
Expected
receipts
in 1994
Actual
receipts
in 1993
Contributions by permanent officials 1 037 500 887 000 867 000 800 834
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APPENDX I
Reca-pitalatory tgble showing changes in the staff
of the Offtce of the Clerk of the WEU Assemb[f
proposed in the 1995 hudget
Grade Duties 1995 budget
(proposals)
1994 budget
(approved)
+or-
HG
A6
A5
A4
IA
L2
A2
A2
A2
B5
B4
B4
B3
B3
B3
B3
C4
Clerk
Clerk Assistants
Counsellors
First secretaries
Translator- interpreter
Translator
Head of general services; Head of private office
Translators ; Documentalists
Chief accountant
Principal assistant: informatics
Principal assistants
Inventory clerk, Head of reprographics service
Accountant
Bilingual shorthand-typists
Switchboard operator
Offset operators
Offset operators
I
2
5
2
I
1
2
4
I
I
7
1
I
6
I
2
;
1
I
6
I
2
1
2
5
2
I
;
4
I
0
0
0
0
0
+1
0
0
0
+1
0
0
0
0
0
+2
-2
38 36 2
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APPENDIX II
Organograrn of the Offtce of the Clerk of the Assembly
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Organogram of the Offtce of the Clerk of the Assembly
Notes
t.l Service organised/staff recruited during sessions of the Assembly
Posts underlined are those it is proposed to create in 1995
* Posts proposed for regrading in the 1995 budget
( I ) The Clerk and his assistant are responsible for the secretariat of the Presidential. Committee and the
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.
(2) The duties of Head of the Committee Service are exercised by the Clerk Assistant for Political
Affairs together with his assistant.
(3) This post is normally filled by the assistant in the English Translation Service.(4) The duties of Head of the Administration and Finance Service, Head of the Personnel Section,
Security Officer and Secretary of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration are
carried out by the Clerk Assistant for Adminisftation and Finance together with his assistant.(5) These duties are exercised by the translator/interpreter in the French section of the Translation
Services.
(6) The Deputy Head of the Administration and Finance Service is responsible for General Services.(7) The assistant to the Deputy Head of the Administration and Finance Service is also the assistant for
the Mail and Archives Service.
(8) The staff responsible for storing and accounting for equipment is responsible for reprographing
documents.
(9) The duties of Head of the Translation and Publications Service are exercised by the most senior
reviser who, since 1st October 1986, has been the English reviser. He is helpedin the exercise of
these duties by his assistant.
(10) The assistant in the Private Office of the President is responsible for the reception desk.
(11) The Clerk Assistant (Political Affairs) and his assistant are responsible for the secretariat of the
Standing Committee.
(12) The assistant to the Secretary of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations is also the
assistant to the Research Office.
(13) The Clerk Assistant (Adminisration and Finance) supervises protocol work and the reception desk.
5t
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APPENDIX III
Description of proposed 85 post
Service: Press and Information
Title: Principal Assistant - Informatics
Grade: 85
Summnry
Under the supervision of the Head of the Press and Information Service, to handle the service's
computer equipmeni for the production of information documents, to update its data-base regularly and be
responsible for the elecfronic circulation of information.
Main duties
Under the authority of the Head of the Press and Information Service, the holder of this post will be
responsible for :
- 
typing, page-setting and printing of documents necessary for preparing press conferences, press
communiqu6s and sessions;
- 
layout, correction and follow-up of the Letter of the Assembly;
- 
transmission, reception and circulation of all documents on the Internet data network;
- 
management of the photographic archives of the Press Service;
- 
keeping press files up to date;
- 
all desktop publishing for the Office of the Clerk;
- 
management and daily updating of the service's information data-base; data-base monitoring;
amendment and possible development of its structure; regular production of indexes and lists
from the data-base;
- 
indexing the Press Review;
- 
production and updating of visual presentation materials for briefing visitors.
Qualifications
- 
Very good knowledge of the computer hardware used in the Office of the Clerk and of:
- 
the use of desktop publishing software
- 
the use and development of relational data-bases
- 
computer and communications networks.
- 
Excellent typing ability.
- 
Taking dictation (from tape-recorder).
- 
Ability to correct and amend existing texts.
- 
Good knowledge of the two working languages of the organisation.
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APPENDIX IV
Salnries of staff recruitedfor Assembly sessions
I. Sittings service
'F ln accordance with scales in force on lst January 1994.
a. Recruited locally.
b. Recruited outside Paris.
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Duties Number No. ofdays
Total
F
Internrefers l4a 8
l0
406224
231 228
Adirrsfment for 1994 (l R65q"\
6b
20 637 452ll 888
3 896
"-J"*-"'-"-
Adjustment for 1995 (0.6OVo)
653 236
100 000
Rounded up to
753 236
753 500
2. Interpretation semice
a. Recruited locally.
b. Recruited outside Paris.
Note: On lst January 1994, the daily remuneration of interpreters amounted toF 3 627.|n addition, interpreters recruited outside
Paris are entitled to payment for time spent in travelling (one or two half-days as appropriate), a daily allowance (per diem) cor-
responding to that of a Grade L4 permanent official, plus reimbursement of their travelling expenses.
3. Translation semice
I. Based on 20 days for revisers and translators and 25 days for assistants.
a. Recruited locally.
b. Recruited outside Paris
Duties Number DailyRemuneration
F
Estimates I
F
Total
F
Revisers
Translators
Principal assistants. . .
Assistants.
5a
2b
5a
5b
la
lb
4a
4b
I 432
2300
t t32
2027
583
I 156
5il
I 084
143 200
92 000
I t3 200
202700
t4 575
28 900
51 100
r08 400
235 200
3rs 900
43 475
159 500
Adirrcfrnent fnr lQQ4 (l 96\0/^\ 27 I I 754074 754 07514063
4 609Adjustment for 1995 (0.60Vo)
Travelli
772747
30 000
Rounded up to
802747
803 000
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APPENDIX V
Five-year modernisation and maintenance programme for the equipment of the Offue of the Clerk
(The estimates given may fluctuate with the trend of prices)
Ref.
No.
F4uipment Modernisation and equipmentprogfarnme
Budgets
1995 1996 1997 r998 1999
I
1.1
1.2
t.3
1.4
r.5
2
2.
3
3.
4
4.1
4.2
4.3
A. Reprographic
and printing
equipment
Photocopiers
I RX 1090
RX 5380
Gestetner 2382ZDF
RX 5034
RX 5317
Offset machines
I Gestetner 311
Elect ro s tatic st e re otyp e r s
I Gestetner DT I
Bhding machines
1 Gestetner 100
1 Orpo Planax
1 Orpo Thermatic
Hire since end of 1991 (rate
blocked).
The contract expires at end of
1996.
Maintenance contract for 240 000
copies per quarter included in the
hire cost.
Hired since June 1993.
The contract expires in June 1998
(rate blocked).
Maintenance contract for 225 000
copies per quarter (indexed).
Maintenance calculated on the
basis of the number of copies
excluding the abovementioned
limits.
This is leased for a five-year
period. The contract expires in
January 1996. Cost of hire.
The cost of maintenance depends
on the number of copies made.
Hired since 1992.
Cost of hire.
The cost of maintenance depends
on the number of copies made.
Hired since June 1993.
Assigned to the archives and mail
offrce.
The cost of maintenance is calcula-
ted on the basis of a fixed number
of4 500 copies per quarter.
Purchased in 1984.
Purchased in 1985.
As these machines are not often
used, the maintenance contracts
have been cancelled.
Property of the Assembly. This
machine is in good condition. Nor-
mal maintenance by the staff
concerned is enough to keep it in
good working order.
104 500
74600
74 500
11 000
31 700
8 500
29 000
20 000
3 000
lM 500
74 600
74 500
ll 000
8 000
8 500
29 000
20 000
3 000
74ffio
74 500
lr 000
8 500
960
20 000
3 000
37 300
37 250
5 500
8 500
20 000
l 500
8 500
20 000
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Ref.
No.
Equipment Modernisation and
equipment programme
Budgets
r995 1996 1997 r998 1999
5
5.1
5.2
5.3
6
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
7
7.t
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
8
8.1
M is c e llaneous e quipment
1 Logabax-Ordina 7630
collating machine
with stapler
AM international 5000
Addressograph
Fortematic 655
B. Typewriters and
calculators
Office of the Clerk
8 Olivetti ET 121 elec-
tronic typewriters
I ET 221Olivetti
I ETz4mOlivetti
4 calculators
For use during the ses-
SrcNS
4 RX 6015 electronic
typewriters (English
keyboard)
2 ET 109 Olivetti elec-
tronic typewriters (Ita-
lian keyboard)
I Olivetti Editor elecffic
typewriter (Italian
keyboard)
2 Olivetti elecfonic type-
writers ET 2400:
I Portuguese keyboard
I Spanish keyboard
Hired typewriters
Typewriters in reserve
2l Olympia mechanical
typewriters:
19 English keyboards
2 French keyboards
Purchased in 1977, this machine is
serviced when required, since the
cost of a maintenance contract is
exorbitant. It is no longer conside-
red necessary to replace it as the
printing workshop was equipped
in 1991 with photocopiers that
collate.
Property of the Assembly.
Maintenance contract (indexed).
Purchased in1976.
Purchasedbetween 1981 and 1983,
these typewriters are in good
condition.
Purchased in 1983 
- 
in good condi-
tion
Purchased in 1989 
- 
in excellent
condition.
These machines are in good wor-
king order.
These machines were purchased in
1986 and are assigned to session
serylces.
Assigned to the Italian Delegation
and the Jtalian summary reporters.
Assigned to the Italian summary
reporters.
Purchased in 1989, assigned to the
Portuguese and Spanish Delega-
tions.
To meet the requirements of the
various services during Assembly
sessions, the following hire pro-
gfturrme is envisaged for each ses-
slon:
- 
4 electric machines with French
keyboards
- 
3 electric machines with Ger-
man keyboard
4 300
2 100
4 300
2 100
4 300
2 100
4 300
2 100
4 300
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Ref.
No.
Equipment Modemisation andEquipment programme
Budgets
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
9
9.1
9.2
9.3
9.4
l0
l0.l
10.2
10.3
ll
t2
C. Miscellaneous equip-
ment
Dictaphones
7 SonyBM
3 Grundig stenorettes
2 facsimile copiers
I stenotype machine
Grandjean
D. Word processors and
computers
Word processors and
computers
6 Olivetti M 3003 Olivetti M 300/052 Olivetti M 300/086 Olivetti M 300/152 Olivetti M 300/30
I Olivetti M 24
l5 Olivetti M4-40
Macintosh
SE
sE 30
IICI
E.
E Officefurniture
Office of the Clerk
Purchasedbetween 1987 and 1994.
These dictaphones are in very good
working order.
Purchasedbetween 1963 and 1987;
replacement started in 1992.
Purchased in 1988 and 1993.
Purchased in 1974, this machine is
in good working order.
These have been hired on a five-
year lease. The contracts expire in
May 1995, January 1998 and July
1998.
Cost of hire.
Property of the Assembly.
Maintenance contract (indexed) for
all word processors and computers
described in paragraphs 10.1.
Purchasedin 1988, 1990and 1991.
Maintenance contract (indexed).
Estimate intended to cover repairs
of any equipment not under main-
tenance contract.
Purchase or replacement of various
items of furniture in the Office of
the Clerk
10 000
t42000
67 500
14 000
l3 000
40 000
10 000
r03 500
67 500
14 000
r3 000
40 000
r03 500
67 500
14 000
l3 000
40 000
71 000
50 000
14 000
13 000
40 000
50 000
14 000
l3 000
40 000
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Brealrdow n by budget clas sifitation
Budget classification Ref. No. in
prograrnme
Budgets
Head Sub-Head 1995 t996 1997 1998 1999
m
m
m
15. Purchase or repair of office
furniture
Purchase of reprographic and
other office equipment
Hire and maintenance of repro-
graphic and other office equip-
ment
16.
17.
Torer-
RouNoeo up
11
9.2
1.1
1.2
1.3
t.4
t.6
5.2
7.7
10.1
10.3
10.4
11
40 000 40 000 40 000 40 000 40 000
10 000 10 000
104 500
160 100
40200
49 000
3 000
4 300
2 100
r42000
67 500
14 000
r3 000
104 500
160 100
16 500
49 000
3 000
4 300
2 too
103 500
67 500
14 000
13 000
160 100
20960
3 000
4 300
2 r00
103 500
67 500
14 000
13 000
80 050
l 500
4 300
2t00
71 000
67 500
14 000
13 000
4 300
2 t00
67 500
14 000
13 000
5997W
600 000
537 500
538 000
388 460
389 000
253 450
254000
100 900
101 000
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APPENDIX VI
Itnplications of the variaus heads for the 1994 and 1995 operating budgets
1994 r995
Amount Vo of. Amount Vo of
A B A B
Operating budget
Expenditure
Head I. 
- 
Permanent stalf
Head II. 
- 
Temporary staff
Head Itr. 
- 
Premises and equipment
Head IV. 
- 
General administrative
costs
Head V. 
- 
Other expenditure
A. Torar-
Receipts
18 369 000
3 952 500
2074000
2238 5N
2 503 000
63.04
t3.57
7.12
7.68
8.59
63.25
13.61
7.14
7.7t
8.62
19 9rl 000
4 t76 500
2 147 000
2 350 500
2730000
63.58
13.34
6.86
7.51
8.72
63.78
13.38
6.88
7.53
8.74
29 137 000
95 000
100.00 100.33
0.33
3r 315 000
95 000
100.00 100.30
0.30
B. Nsr Toral 29 M2000 100.00 100.00 3t 220 000 100.00 100.00
Column A = Total of expenditure
Column B = Net total (expenditure less receipts)
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The WEU Institute for Security Studies
REPORT'
submitted on beha$of the
Commifree for Parliamentnry and Pablic Relations'
by Mn Roman, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnerr RgcoI\TMENDATIoI.I
on the WEU Institute for Security Studies
Elclmnronv Mruonexouu
submitted by Mr. Roman, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
tr. The origins and tasks of the Institute
(r) Stages in the Institute's creation
( ii ) The Institute's tasks
III. Srucrure and activities of the Institute
(il Structure and operation
(a) The Director(b) The research staff(c) Organogram and budget
(ii)Activities
(a) Reports and studies for the Council(b) Other studies and works(c) Seminars and study $oups(d) The Institute's external relations
IV. Achievements and prospects
(i)The Institute and the question of the academy
(ii)Relations between the Assembly and the lnstitute
V. Conclusion
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Masseret (Chairman); Sir Russell Johnston, Baroness GouA of Ponernewton (Alternate for
Dr. Godman) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Amaral, Benvenuti, Biraux, Btihler (Alternate: Junghanw), Decagny, Dionisi, Sir Anthony
Durant, Mrs. Err, Mr. Eversdijk, Mrs. Fischer (Alternate: Miiller), MM. Ghesqui0re, Gouteyron, Sir John,Etunr, MM. Kempinaire,
Martins, Mattina, Mitolo, Pfuhl, Reimann, Robles Fraga, Sainz Garcia, Mrs. Sanchez de Miguel (Alternate: Romai), Mrs.
Verspaget.
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Recommendation
on the WEU Institutefor Securily Studies
The Assembly,
O Noting with satisfaction that the WEU Institute for Security Studies has successfully accomplished
the tasks assigned to it since its creation;
(iil Sressing the importance of the activities of the Institute for the emergence of a European awareness
of security and defence questions;
(iiil Welcoming the vital r6le played by the Institute in the development of relations with the Central and
Eastern European countries, associate partners of WEU;
(iv) Noting with interest the initiatives taken by the Institute to make WEU and other European organi-
sations aware of the problems of the Mediterranean and the Maghreb;
(v) Welcoming the fact that the Institute's expertise was called upon in the context of the International
Conference on Peace in former Yugoslavia, thus demonstrating the reputation enjoyed by the Institute
among European research institutes;
(vi) Stressing the Institute's active policy of openness towards European countries seeking membership
of the European Union and WEU;
(vii) Noting that the enlargement of WEU entails an increase in the Institute's responsibilities towards
new members, associate members, associate partners and observers, but that there has been no adjustment
of the Institute's means to meet this new situation;
(vlii) Noting that the present structure of the Institute is not such as to be able to meet all expectations ari-
sing from enlargement and from the emergence of a new European security and defence identity;
(ix) Recalling the declaration of the WEU member countries, annexed to the Maastricht Treaty, in which
the Council undertook to study "the ffansformation of the WEU Institute into a European security and
defence academy";
(x) Recalling Recommendation 474, requesting the Council to "take no measures that may involve
relations between the new institute and the Assembly without securing the latter's prior agreement";
(xi) Regretting that the Assembly may not always be in a position to take advantage of closer and more
direct co-operation with the Institute, to their mutual benefit,
RecopnvtpNos rHAT rrm CotrNcu-
1. Consider forthwith the Institute's transformation into a European security and defence academy, in
accordance with the Council's own wishes as expressed in 1991;
2. Encourage member counffies to resume holding advanced European defence study sessions, with
the support of the Institute, and to ensure the continuity of such sessions;
3. Provide the Institute with appropriate means for handling the increase in its requirements and acti-
vities stemming from the enlargement of WEU and the development of relations with countries seeking
membership of the European Union and with the Mediterranean countries;
4. Redefine, as necessary, the tasks of the Institute assigned to it at the time of its creation and adapt
them to the new European situation in view of whatever changes may result from the 1996 intergovern-
mental conference;
5. Permit the development of co-operation between the Institute and the Assembly, without the former
having to request the permission of the Council on each occasion in order to respond to a request for infor-
mation or collaboration from the Assembly;
6. Ask the Institute to make declassified versions of its studies available to the Assembly and ensure
that, in its work, it takes account of the Assembly's point of view on topics of common interest;
7. Associate the Assembly with the process of examining the transformation of the Institute into an
academy, and, if necessary, establish procedures for close co-operation between the latter and the Assem-
bly with a view to achieving the openness and transparency necessary for fostering European awareness
of security and defence matters.
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I.Introductian
1. Among the European and world-wide
research institutes studying defence and interna-
tional relations, the WEU Institute for Security
Studies is an institution unique of its kind.
2. Its European dimension, its structure, its
methods of operation and its tasks contribute to
the original character of this institution, created
by a ministerial decision of the Council on l3th
November 1989.
3. Unlike governmental, non-governmental
and international research institutes and national
think tanks (be they private or attached to an inter-
national organisation) the Institute, in addition to
traditional research and consultancy activities,
was assigned the rOle, from the outset, of promo-
ting a European security identity r. This objective
gave the Institute a unique European and interna-
tional dimension, thus distinguishing it from other
research institutions working in the same area.
4. Since it started work on lst July 1990, the
Institute has developed in various directions ran-
ging from research to establishing contacts with
institutions dealing with defence and security
matters in most European and several non-Euro-
pean countries and including the promotion of a
European awareness of security issues 2 in acade-
mic circles and public opinion.
5. After four years of work, the overall result
is positive and the Institute has won its place in
the research world through the quality of its work
and activities 
- 
seminars, colloquies and study
groups 
- 
and through its European spirit and
efforts at openness towards third countries in
Europe and elsewhere.
6. However, attention should also be drawn to
certain aspects of its tasks and r6le in WEU that
reflect a degree of ambiguity and uncertainty on
the part of the Council towards the Institute and
the latter's relations with the Assembly.
7. In the framework of the present report,
which, together with the reports of the Technolo-
gical and Aerospace Committee on the WEU
1. Ministerial decision concerning the seffing-up of a WEU
Institute for Security Studies, Brussels, 13th November
1989, Documentl2l9, Annex I.
2. Document 1253, reply of the Council to Recommendation
484, 30th November 1990.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submi.fred by Mr. Romaq Rapporteur)
Satellite Cenfre 3 and the Defence Committee on
the WEU Planning Cell n, constitutes a fipartite
study of the subsidiary organs of the Council, an
attempt will be made to describe the Instinrte, its
tasks and achievements and also to analyse its r6le
in WEU and make proposals which seem appro-
priate for guiding co-operation between the Insti-
tute and the Assembly in a direction profitable to
the two institutions, with the aim, ultimately, of
confibuting to the emergence and development of
a European security and defence spirit.
II. The origins and usks of the Insfitute
(i) Stages in the Institute's creatian
8. The ministerial decision on the creation of
the Institute, reached by the Council in Brussels
on 13th November 1989, was the outcome of thin-
king regarding the development and future of
WEU which began in Rome in 1984 s and was
implemented with the adoption of the Hague plat-
form on 27th October 1987 6.
9. The WEU Assembly played an important
r6le in the Institute's creation as farback as in 1986
by recommending that the Council "Provide the
Assembly with detailed information on the steps it
has taken to strengthen co-operation between exis-
ting European institutes for security studies"
(Recommendation 438, Znd December 1 986).
10. In Recommendation 442 (Luxembourg,
27th April 1987), the Assembly asked the Council
to ensure "co-ordination of member countries'
participation in the course to be organised by the
French Institut des hautes 6tudes de ddfense natio-
nale in 1988" 7 and the "development of subse-
quent courses so as to promote public awareness
of European security requirements in all member
countries". Funher to this recommendation, the
Council entrusted the Secretariat-General with the
task of participating in the preparatory work for
this European seminar.
3. The development of a European space-based observation
system 
- 
Part II, Document 1393, 8th November 1993, Rap-
porteur Mr. Valleix.
4. The WEU Planning Cell, Document 1421, l9th May 1994,
Rapporteur Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.
5. Rome declaration, Document 989,27th October 1984.
6. Platform on European security interests, Document 1122,
27th October 1987.
7. During the meeting of the Council in Luxembourg on l3th
and 14th November 1986, the French Govemment proposed
organising a first European defence seminar in 1988.
I
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11. In the light of the success of this under-
taking, other European defence courses were
scheduled and it was decided to set up an associa-
tion of alumni under the auspices of WEU and
with WEU logistic support 8.
12. On 16th March 1989, at the initiative of the
Presidential Committee, the Assembly adopted
Recommendation 467 on the creation of a Euro-
pean institute for advanced security studies. This
text recommended that "a European institute for
advanced security studies be established under the
terms of Article VIII, paragraph2e, of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty in order to promote a Euro-
pean spirit in matters of defence".
13. In London, on 3rd April 1989, the ministers
"instructed the Permanent Council to continue its
efforts to review the question of an institute for
strategic studies (...) with a view to a further dis-
cussion at its next meeting" r0. Further to this
decision, the Permanent Council reconstituted the
Institutional Working Group with the task of
considering the mandate, tasks and structure of
the Institute.
14. The Institr'rtional Working Group, which met
four times: on lst June, 3rd July, 18th September
and 19th October 1989, prepared a report which
was transmitted to the Council of Ministers.
Meeting in Brussels on 13th November 1989, the
Council adopted the report and decided to create
the WEU Institute for Security Studies, recalling at
the same time the Assembly's rOle as a catalyst.
15. On 17th January 1990, the Council appoin-
ted Mr. John Roper to the post of Director of the
lnstitute. Mr. Roper took up his post on lst April
and on 13th June the Council approved appoint-
ments by the Secretary-General, on the proposal
of the Director of the Institute, to the four
research fellow posts. The Institute became opera-
tional on lst July 1990.
(ii) The Institute's tasks
16. While the need for the creation of the Insti-
tute seemed obvious to the Assembly and the
majority of the Council ", discussion of tasks
8. Second part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Coun-
cil (July [988 - December 1988), Document ll77,l7th
March 1989.
9. This text stipulates that "[the Council] shall set up such
subsidiary bodies as may be considered necessary".
10. WEU Ministerial Council, London, 3rd April 1989,
Document 1180, l0th April 1989.
I l. At the June session 1989, Mr. Younger, Secretary of State
for Defence of the United Kingdom, and then Chairman-in-
Office of the Council, stated before the Assembly: "The Uni-
ted Kingdom approaches the idea with an open mind but it is
not self-evident that there is a need for such an institute.
There are already over twenty in the field... We will there-
fore need to be convinced that a new institute would have a
genuinely distinctive and useful r6le."
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reveals differences of assessment likely to affect
relations between the Assembly and the Institute.
fi . The common point of departure for the exa-
mination underway is to be found in the address
by Mr. Michel Rocard, then Prime Minister of
France, to the first European session ofthe French
Institut des hautes 6nrdes de d6fense nationale, on
15th November 1988.
18. In his speech, Mr. Rocard stated that he
wished to see "the creation of a European institute
for advanced security studies, attached to WEU
under arrangements still to be defined. This would
enable WEU, still uncertain of its course, better to
choose its direction... The tasks of such an insti-
tute would be training and teaching, in order to
propagate a common defence spirit and create an
awareness among national public opinions of the
notion of European collective security... In the
absence of a shared gralnmar, how can one speak
with a single voice?"|'
19. In June 1989, the Assembly adopted a
report by the Political Committee, section IV of
which broaches the question of the creation of a
European institute for advanced security studies
attempting to define its tasks and its operation.
According to the Rapporteur, Mr. van der Sanden,
the Institute should have a threefold task: infor-
mation, study and training and "aim to promote an
awareness of security questions among national
public opinions by acting on those in influential
positions in a wide range of capacities".
20. The Institute thus created was to benefit
from a large measure of autonomy, indeed inde-
pendence, and "it should be directed by an admi-
nistrative board on which all parties are represen-
ted, composed of the Chairman-in-Office of the
Council, the President of the Assembly, the Secre-
tary-General and the Clerk with whom might be
associated a small number of persons... This
administrative board would appoint a director-
general of the Institute who would select his own
limited staff'.
21. "The Institute would organise conferences
on general topics ... and seminars on well-defined
topics with a smaller number of panicipants. It
would also have the support of existing national
institutes and ensure the continuity of the Euro-
pean sessions organised by the latter."'3
22. Addressing the Assembly at the same ses-
sion, Mr. Chevdnement, then Minister of Defence
of France, declared himself in favour of a lighr
weight structure, divided into three units corres-
ponding to the three tasks of the Institute: re-
12. D6fense Nationale, January 1989, page 25.
13. Future of European security 
- 
reply to the annual report
of the Council, Document I 185, Rapporteur Mr. van der San-
den.
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search and publications, liaison with independent
institutes with authority in the field, follow-up of
the sessions of the Institute for advanced Euro-
pean defence studies. According to the Minister,
"the common underlying objective of all three
units might be defined as the harmonisation of the
security docfrines of the member countries"'0.
23. TWo aspects, information and co-ordination
with other institutes, are the corlmon points of
these two approaches. This emerges clearly from
the description of the Institute's tasks by the Secre-
tary-General, Mr. van Eekelen, in his information
letter on the activities of the intergovernmental
organisations according to which "there is undoubt-
edly a r6le for such an institute... in the area of co-
ordination ofboth security research... and the pro-
motion of public awareness of the European secu-
rity identity in the member countries"15.
24. Finally, in its ministerial decision of 13th
November 1989, the Council decided to assign
five main tasks to the Institute:
- 
to carry out research, principally for the
Council, and in consultation with the
Secretary-General...;
- 
to encourage and help the existing insti-
tutes in the member states promote a
greater awareness of European security
issues and particularly to organise semi-
nars and courses to that end;
- 
in collaboration with existing institutes,
to organise meetings with institutes and
countries not belonging to Western
Europe, particularly those in the Cenfral
and Eastern European countries;
- 
to establish and keep up-to-date a data
bank for the purposes ofresearch into the
defence efforts of the WEU member
countries and studies relating to Euro-
pean security;
- 
to contribute to academic work on the
same topic.
25. The development of relations with the Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries will eventu-
ally become one of the most important tasks of the
Institute. As Mr. Schiifer, then Minister of State
for Foreign Affairs of Germany, stated in his
speech to the Assembly at the 1989 December
session, the Institute must as a priority "contribute
to the development of concepts for a new form of
European security thinking, in part through
contact with comparable institutions in Central
and Eastern Europe"'6.
14. Official report of debates, hrst part of the thirty-frfth ordi-
nary session, June 1989.
15. Information letter on the activities of the intergovern-
mental organs (June - September 1989), Document 1196.
16. Official report of debates, second part of the thirty-fifth
ordinary session, December 1989.
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26. The use of the Institute as a bridge between
WEU and the Central and Eastern European coun-
tries receives clear mention by the Council in the
communiqu6 issued after its meeting in Brussels
on23rd April 1990 which calls upon the Institute
to play "an active r6le in pooling ideas and in
drawing together the new strands of thinking
being developed in both the East and the West"',.
27. As the start of the lnstitute grew closer, the
nature and content of its tasks became increas-
ingly specific. According to the first part of the
thirty-sixth annual report of the Council, the Insti-
tute was assigned two essential tasksrs:
"- study and research for the governments
of the member states of WEU represen-
ted by the Council and in consultation
with the Secretariat-General... ;
- 
stimulating the wider debate on Euro-
pean security issues..."
28. In December 1990, the French Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Roland Dumas, defined the
two main tasks of the Institute as deepening the
debate on matters of European security and deve-
loping dialogue with the countries of Central and
Eastern Ewopere.
29. From the information presented above, the
three major tasks for the Institute finally emerge:
- 
that of assisting the Council (through
reports and studies provided to it on
request or on the initiative of the Institute,
or possibly through oral presentations by
the Director of the Institute);
- 
that of stimulating debate on European
security, a task.translated into practice by
the organisation of seminars, colloquies
and study groups, establishing contacts
with other such institutions and publica-
tion of studies directed towards a wide
readership;
- 
external relations directed towards the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe
and other non-WEU countries of varying
closeness to the organisation (for
example, the Nordic countries, Slovenia
and the Maghreb and Mediterranean
countries).
30. Although some of the Assembly's propo-
sals on the tasks of the Institute have been taken
up by the Council 
- 
such as the information func-
tion, thinking on European security, autonomy in
the implementation of the Institute's tasks, organi-
17. Document 1224,4th May 1990.
I 8. First part of the thirty-sixth annual report of the Council(lst January - 30th June 1990), Documeni 1247.
19..Official report ofdebates, second part ofthe thirty-sixth
ordinary session of the Assembly, December 1990.
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sation of seminars, relations with Central and Eas-
tern European countries 
- 
it should also be noted
that, aside from certain declarations of limited
scope20, the Council, by placing the Institute
under its sole authority, ruled out any possibility
of the Assembly subsequently having an influ-
ence on the tasks and activities of the Institute. By
acting in this manner, the Council contributed to
reducing the scope of a co-operation between the
two institutions, which had nevertheless frequen-
tly been termed desirable2'.
III. Strucnre and activifus of the Insfitute
31. Since the start of its work the structure of
the Institute has remained stable, without signifi-
cant alteration from that decided by the Council in
1989 and 1990: namely a lightweight structure, a
small staffcomplement and a fairly rapid turnover
ofresearch staff(contracts limited to three years).
In the Ministers' view, these options are justified
on the one hand by budgetary considerations, and
on the other to emphasise the Institute's European
character by encouraging a continual flow of
research staff from WEU countries.
32. This has not prevented the Institute, from
the outset, from developing an intensive pro-
gramme of work, organising open or restricted
seminars and other activities directed towards
govemment circles, other research institutions in
Europe and elsewhere, and university circles.
This work of contact and stimulation of the deba-
te on European security has been accompanied by
the publication of various studies, reports and
other works deriving from the deliberations and
information tasks pursued by the Institute.
(i) Stractare and operation
(a) The Director
33. The Director is appointed by the Council of
Ministers on the basis of nominations submitted
by the WEU member countries. Experience in
research, in political and military analysis and in
managing a research institute are some of the fun-
damental criteria in the appointment of the Direc-
tor of the lnstitute. Other criteria are linguistic
20. At the June 1990 session, the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Belgium, Mr. Eyskens, Chairman-in-Office of the Coun-
cil, stated that "the creation of the WEU Institute for Securi-
ty Studies should enable the Council and the organisation as
a whole, and hence the Assembly, to benefit from academic
expertise in security matters". Offrcial report of debates, June
1990.
21. In its reply to Recommendation 474, the Council stated
that "dialogue between the Assembly and the Council regar-
ding the tasks to be carried out by the Institute is desirable in
that the Institute's work will be widely available to the public
and that its thinking will naturally complement the Assem-
bly's discussions". Document 1233, lst June 1 990.
skills and also, although this is not an overriding
factor, being a national of one of the major WEU
member countries.
34. The term of office of three years has been
extended by two years for the current Director
(the three-year term expired on 30th June 1993).
It might be desirable, when the the new Director is
appointed in 1995, for the Council to consider the
possibility of offering a longer contract or of
making it renewable for at least one further term.
This will prevent recourse to extensions of the
term of office and contribute to increasing the sta-
bility of the office of Director who has important
management as well as research duties.
35. Broadly speaking, the Director's functions
are as follows:
(a) determining the workprogramme of the
Institute, leading its research team and
contributing to its outputs;
(b) liaison with the Council;
(c) responsibility for the Institute's publica-
tions; approval of subject and content,
"quality con[ol";
(d) external representation of the Institute
and following up contacts with other
institutions;
(e) selection and appointment of Institute
research staff;
(fl management and control of the budget;
(g) managing and ensuring the smooth run-
ning of the Institute.
36. On 17th October 1990, it was also decided
that, "subject to the views of the Council or its
working groups, and depending on the agenda, the
Secretary-General would invite the Director of
the Institute to attend or be represented at their
meetings"2'.
(b) Research staff
37. Proposals for the appointment of research
staff are sent to the Council by the Director. The
Council gives its approval and may also reject an
applicant if it feels the latter does not fulfil all the
necessary criteria for working in the Institute.
38. Contracts are for three years and may not
be renewed and selection of applicants also takes
account of nationality distribution. At the time of
appointment, priority is given to countries not yet
represented. Alongside the nationality criteria,
age, experience in the areas ofdefence, European
affairs, international relations and other fields of
interest to the Institute are taken into account.
22. Second part of the thirty-sixth annual report of the
Council (lst July - 3lst December 1990), Document 1265,
l9th April 1991.
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39. The diversity of geographical origin and
age represented in the Institute appears to corres-
pond to the wishes of the Council to enable quali-
fied people from different backgrounds to work
together in a European environment. The fixed-
term conftacts allow a constant flow of staff, even
although, according to the Director, it would be
desirable to be able to renew conffacts, if only for
a further year.
40. The activities and functions of the research
staff are of varying kinds:
- 
undertaking research work on topics fal-
ling within the province of the Institute
and of WEU;
- 
organising and preparing seminars and
other external activities of the Institute;
- 
follow-up of the Institute's work in a spe-
cific field of expertise; for example rela-
tions with the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean;
- 
keeping abreast of the current situation in
one's own coungi establishing contacts
with national institutes;
- 
written or other contributions to the acti-
vities of similar institutions in fields rele-
vant to the Institute's activities.
4I. Assessment of the work of the research
staff and the Institute is carried out in varying
ways. The research team itself assesses the docu-
ments sent to the Council and undertakes an ana-
lysis of seminars and other external activities.
There is no formal evaluation of publications, the
Chaillot Papers or other written contributions.
Acceptance of and interest in these documents
from similar institutions, researchers and other
recipients is in itself an assessment of the quality
of the Institute's work. In certain cases the advice
of experts outside the Institute may be sought on
specific subjects.
42. Alongside its research staff, the Institute
also accepts, for short periods (normally three
months) award-holders working on subjects rela-
ting to European security and WEU, selected
according to their academic attainments and their
experience in political and military research.
They may participate in the preparation and
organisation of seminars and the results of their
research may be published in the Chaillot Papers.
(c) Organogramandbudget
43. In 1990, the Institute's organogram consis-
ted of 23 posts: the Director (hors grade), the
Head of Administration (grade A), four research
staff (grade A), two ffanslators (grade L), secreta-
ries, an accountant and a member of staff in
charge of documentation (grade B) and six grade
C staff. ln1994, the Institute has26 posts, includ-
ing two part-time posts. A revision of the staff
rules was required to accommodate the part-time
contracts.
M. Within the Institute, it is perhaps more
appropriate to refer to an intellectual hierarchy
than one of grades or responsibility. With the
exception of the Director, for obvious reasons,
relations between research staffare rather the pro-
duct of their personal experience and background
than of an administrative grading system.
45. The Institute's budget has shown modest
regular increases over the years: F 11 380 000 for
1990, F 129OB 400 for 1991, F 13 516 000 for
1992,F L5 205 000 for 1993 and F 15 676 050 for
1994'z3. These increases correspond to the expan-
sion in the activities of the Institute, particularly
in relation to travel and increased contacts with
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and
the Mediterranean.
46. So far, the Institute is just able to live
within its budget. Nevertheless, the enlargement
of WEU and the development of associate mem-
ber, associate partner and observer statuses will
have an impact on the activities and functioning
of the Institute, which will lead to an increased
budgetary requirement.
(ii) Activitias
(a) Reports and studies for the Council
47. The Institute works in a spirit of intellectual
independence without being submitted to direct
control by the Council as regards choice of topics
and the manner of dealing with them. The latter is
entitled to request the Institute to provide it with
studies and other work on questions within its spe-
cialist remit. These requests give rise to a dialogue
between the Institute and the Council on the topic
to be dealt with in which the ideas and suggestions
of the two parties are taken into consideration.
48. F4ually, the Institute may take the initiative
lhe Council, as this also falls within thetowards t i
framework of the Institute's powers. As a research
institr,rte its r6le is to monitor current developments
and indicate subjects deserving of attention to the
Council. The studies are in response to a need for
information and provide the Council with concep-
tual tools (as, for example, in relation to associate
partner status and the development of relations
with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe).
(b) Other studies and works
49. In addition to the preparation of documents
for the Council, the Institute also co-operates with
other institutions in preparing studies within its
66
23. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs: 1990-
1994, Documents 1264,1303,1399 and 1425.
DOCI.IME}.IT 1430
purview. These studies are undertaken either at
the initiative of the Institute or in co-operation
with national or international research institutes.
The topics are discussed and selected at meetings
of the research team.
50. Thus the Institute prepared a study on the
settlement of the crisis in former Yugoslavia at the
request of Lord Owen within the context of the
International Conference on Former Yugoslavia
in 1994. Another example, on co-operation, is the
research into transatlantic relations produced in
conjunction with the Rand Corporation (United
States, 1993).
51. Some of the Institute's research is publi-
shed in book form (for example, the study on
transatlantic relations) and in its Chaillot Papers.
These publications are directed principally
towards governmental organisations (in WEU
member countries and other countries with which
the Institute has contact), research institutions and
the like active in the fields of defence and interna-
tional relations (both public and private bodies),
universities, parliaments and the press.
52. As a general rule, the Chaillot Papers,
which are published five or six times a year, cover
topical subjects, are intended to have policy rele-
vance and seek to express a European rather than
a national point of view. These works are well-
received in specialist circles as illustrated by their
reviews in the specialist press or the use made of
them by universities and other such institutions in
their own work.
(c) Seminars and study groups
53. One of the most important activities of the
Institute is organising seminars and study groups
on European security and other related matters
(minorities, nuclear and ballistic proliferation, co-
operation between regional and international
organisations, etc.).
54. A number of seminars are held each year.
The open seminars are directed towards a larger
audience including participants from other research
institutes as well as the governments of WEU
member countries, associate partners and obser-
vers. In addition, representatives are invited from
other European organisations. The restricted
seminars are open only to senior civil servants in
the defence and foreign affairs ministries of WEU
member countries and other countries, as determi-
ned by the subject under discussion.
55. These activities enable the Institute to
become better known and to develop its contacts
abroad (with the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe, the Mediterranean and Asia). The semi-
nars are held in Paris and sometimes in other
countries. The subjects dealt with are prepared by
the research team on the basis of documents and
studies by the Institute and may be published in a
Chaillot Paper.
56. The study groups bring together Institute
members and specialists from government bodies
(such as the armed forces, foreign affairs specia-
lists, etc.) or from other research institutes and the
universities. Some of these groups (task forces)
operate on a virtually permanent basis, their work
extending over several months (such as, for
example, research work into the defence indus-
tries, in preparation for a seminar on this topic in
1995). The subjects tackled, which may form the
basis of a Chaillot Paper, relate to questions
concerning WEU and the security and defence of
Europe in a wider, non-exhaustive perspective
(problems pertaining to the Mediterranean, for
example).
57. The seminars and study group activities are
subject to regular assessment by the Institute and
reports are sent to the Council on the outcome of
such assessments, together with the seminar or
study group conclusions on the subject under dis-
cussron.
(d) The Institute's extental relations
58. Since 1990 the Institute has established a
wide network of contacts with other similar insti-
tutions, universities, international and regional
organisations in Europe and on other continents.
59. The Institute has close relations with
research institutes in the member, associate mem-
ber, associate partner and observer counffies. It is
strengthening its relations with the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states
and developing contacts with institutes in the
Maghreb countries and Egypt.
60. Initiatives in this area are many and
varied. The Institute also offers researcheri from
non-member countries the opportunity of
working in other European research institutions
through a programme of research awards. It also
supports the organisation of conferences and
training courses for senior political and military
officials of the countries with which it co-
operates.
61. Beyond the circle of WEU member coun-
tries and others with links with the organisation,
the Institute has on-going relationships with seve-
ral political and military research institutes in
Russia and with the Rand Corporation, in the
United States.
62. As regards international and regional
organisations, the lnstitute has contacts with the
European Union, NATO, the CSCE and the Uni-
ted Nations including the United Nations Institute
for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva.
This list is by no means exhaustive and the Insti-
tute's energetic efforts in this area are amply
demonsffated by the range and frequency of its
outside activities.
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IV Achievements and prospects
63. The Institute has established itself firmly
on the European security and defence research
scene where it is vigorously accomplishing the
tasks assigned to it by the Council within the
limits of the staffing and material resources avai-
lable to it. Nevertheless, this success has also rai-
sed the question of how the institution should
evolve.
@. This issue is one of major importance at a
time when WEU is growing, not only by opening
up to other European countries, but also in deve-
loping its structures and seeking new fields of
action, as the creation of the Satellite Centre and
the Planning Cell and the transfer of IEPG's res-
ponsibilities to WEAG2o all serve to demonstrate.
Such development makes it essential to examine
the r6le that the Institute might play in this
process.
(i) The In$inte and the questbn of the academy
65. In spite of its present flexible and efficient
structure, the lnstitute will have diffrculties, from
a financial and logistical point of view, in meeting
the requirements of the enlargement of WEU.
Furthermore, the framework in which it operates
is far from being that of an academy, a matter to
which the Ministers proposed, in their declaration
on the r6le of WEU and its relations with the
European Union and the Atlantic Alliance, to give
consideration.
66. Paragraph C ofthis text on the operational
rdle of WEU states "Other proposals will be exa-
mined further, including: ...development of the
WEU Institute into a European security and
defence academy"'s. However, the Council has
not subsequently clarified further what it meant
by the word "academy" nor as to when examina-
tion of this question might begin.
67. Transforming the Institute into an academy
in fact involves providing it with the structures
and means of undertaking a training and teaching
r6le in addition to its research work. This approach
was developed in the address by Mr. Rocard, then
Prime Minister of France, at the first European
session of the French Institut des hautes 6tudes de
d6fense nationale, on 15th November 1988'6.
In 1991, President Mitterrand and Chancellor
Kohl also stated that they were in favour of trans-
24. T\e Western European Amaments Group was formed
following a decision by the Council on 4th December 1992
which led to the transfer of the IEPG's activities to WEU.
25. Document I 3 I 5: second part of the thirty-seventh annual
report of the Council to the Assembly of WEU, Annex III;
25thMay 1992.
26. D6fense nationale, January 1989,page25.
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forming the Institute into a European security and
defence academy2l.
68. At the same time, this implies a reform of
the Institute's structures and logistical and budge-
tary means in line with the objectives to be achie-
ved. Perhaps for this reason the Council did not
yet appear to be in a hurry to reach a clear deci-
sion on this matter. However, it is also possible
that this lack of action may be due to an absence,
within the Council, of a consensus on what the
present and future tasks of the Institute should be
and on the r6le the latter should have within the
European security and defence structures.
69. The ministers' hesitation is in part justified
by the forthcoming reviews in 1996 and 1998.
The 1996 intergovernmental conference on the
European Union, which must to some extent deal
with the achievements of the common foreign and
security policy (CFSP) will have implications for
WEU which, since the Treaty of Maastricht, has
been identified as the "defence component of the
European [Jnion"28.
70. In 1998, the modified Brussels Treaty is
due to expire2e. Under Article XII thereof "after
the expiry of the period of fifty years, each of the
High Contracting Parties shall have the right to
cease to be a party thereto". This does not in any
sense mean that the treaty is dissolved, but that
any decisions that are taken at the 1996 inter-
governmental conference (in which all WEU
members will take part) might determine what
will happen after 1998.
71. In the meantime, it is difficult to envisage
the Institute's tranformation into an academy in
the short term. Moreover, when reference is made
to the various descriptions of its tasks the minis-
ters and the Secretariat-General have presented to
the Assembly, all the uncertainties and questions
over the future r6le of the Institute immediately
become obvious.
72. In these descriptions, some of which are
discussed in the first part of this report, the Insti-
tute's r6le is considered primarily in a national
rather than a European perspective. France has
seen it as a political planning cell for producing
independent strategic analyses (Mr. ChevEne-
ment, June 1989) and for in-depth examination of
European defence issues (Mr. Dumas, December
1990), Italy has attributed it "ambitious tasks" of
27. Document 1290: information letter from Mr. van Eeke-
len, Secretary-General of WEU, on the activities of the
ministerial organs, 25th November 1991.
28. Document I 3 I 5: second part of the thirty-seventh annual
report of the Council to the WEU Assembly, Annex III, 25th
May 1992.
29.T\e start of the fifty year period referred to in Article XII
is the subject of a debate in the Assembly and the Council.
According to the latter, the treaty period starts from the entry
into force of the Brussels Treaty on lTth March 1948.
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stimulating ideas and research (Mr. Vitalone,
December 1989), Germany has emphasised the
r6le that the lnstitute might play in contacts with
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Mr.
Schiifer, December 1989), Belgium considered
that it should enable the entire organisation, inclu-
ding therefore the Assembly, to benefit from aca-
demic expertise in security matters (Mr. Eyskens,
June 1990).
73. Only a United Kingdom minister, Mr.
Younger, questioned the need for the Institute
(June 1989), but at a time, if truth were known,
when discussions on its formation were in pro-
gress. The Secretariat-General initially envisaged
the Institute as a co-ordinating structure between
universities, those responsible for planning and
other institutions (Mr. van Eekelen, December
1989). The Assembly envisaged that the Institute
should function on two levels: those of research
and analysis work and of co-ordinating the Euro-
pean activities of national institutes with similar
objectives (Mr. Fourr6, Vice-President of the
Assembly, June 1989).
74. Once the Institute was established, the mat-
ter of its r6le and activities no longer tended to be
discussed. The Council makes regular reference
to the activities of the Institute in its annual report
and in its communiqu6s and declarations. With
the exception of a passing mention in 1991, at the
time of the signature of the Maastricht Treaty, no
further indications have come from the ministers
on the future of the Institute. The Secretary-Gene-
ral referred to the matter in his information letter
on the activities of the ministerial organs in 1992,
but without giving any details3o.
75. The Institute, for its part, has submitted
proposals for its development into an academy on
several occasions, to which the Council has not as
yet responded. This issue remains a crucial one
for the future of the Institute. Were it to become an
academy, its co-ordinating and European r6les
would be strengthened and consolidated, contri-
buting to its development and to the emergence of
a true European security and defence thinking. As
to the Assembly, although suggestions have not
been lacking, the fact remains that its relations
with the Institute are neither as open nor as close
as it would originally have wished.
(ii) Rehtions between the Assembly and the Institute
76. In June 1989, in answer to a question from
Mr. Baumel on the future status of the Institute,
Mr. Chevdnement, then Minister of Defence of
France, replied that it would be desirable for this
institute to be under WEU's authority. It would
30. Document 1391: information letter from Mr. van Eeke-
len, Secretary-General of WEU, on the activities of the
ministerial organs, 22nd March 1992.
draw up its own programme of work, report to the
Assembly and be responsible for its publica-
tions."3r. This reply concurred with the position
frequently expressed by the Assembly that the
Institute should carry out its work in co-operation
with the Assembly.
77. With this in mind, in December 1989, the
Assembly, in its Recommendation 474, had
requested that the Council "take no measures that
may involve relations between the new Institute
and the Assembly without securing the latter's
prior agreement" 32. The Council replied that
"during its discussions on the practical amange-
ments for establishing a WEU Institute..." it had
taken the Assembly's point of view on that ques-
tion into account 33 and reiterated its position,
when the decision was taken on 13th November to
establish the Institute, that "the Assembly may,
with the Council's approval, assign to the Institu-
te studies relating to the Assembly's own acti-
vities".
78. In point of fact, this effectively limited any
possibility of direct co-operation between the
Assembly and the Institute or of establishing co-
ordination in joint actions in the interest of the
two institutions (for example, seminars or develo-
ping studies on topics of common interest). The
situation, in short, is as follows: if the Assembly
has need of the Institute's expertise for a study on
a topic within its area of responsibility, the latter
must refer to the Council, which will decide,
solely on its own criteria, on the appropriateness
of such a step. As decisions of the Council are col-
legiate decisions taken by consensus, the question
must necessarily arise of the time-scale required
for obtaining a reply, not to mention the matter of
on which other topics the Assembly might obtain
the Institute's co-operation in such instances.
79. It was inevitable that in this situation areas
of disagreement should arise between the Assem-
bly on the one hand and the Council and the Insti-
tute on the other, even though the latter is protec-
ted by the decisions of the ministers. The first area
of disagreement emerged in 1991, when the Presi-
dential Committee requested the Permanent
Council and, through the intermediary of the
Secretary-General, the Institute, for information
on the situation in former Yugoslavia and on the
conditions under which WEU might possibly
intervene. The Institute could not provide the
information requested, not having been authori-
sed to do so by the Council3a.
31. Thity-fifth ordinary session: official report of debates,
Volume II, June 1989.
32. Document 1233; Recommendation 474 on WEU in the
single European market 
- 
reply to the half-yearly report of
the Council, paragraph 4.
33. Idem.
34. Offrcial report of debates, December 1991, second part of
the thirty-seventh session of the Assembly.
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80. This case in point serves to illustrate the
narrowness of the Council's interpretation of the
possibilities of co-operation benveen the Assem-
bly and the Institute. In the four years the two
bodies have existed side by side in Paris, the Ins-
titute has prepared one document only for the
Assembly 
- 
on relations with the Central and Eas-
tern European countries, in the framework of the
colloquy organised by the Assembly on this topic
in Berlin in 1992. A request for a study on natio-
nal and reserve forces of WEU countries35 has
seemingly also been rejected by the Council.
81. As far as direct relations between the two
institutions are concerned, the picture is far from
being wholly negative. The Institute endeavours,
within the limits that are permissible to it, to
inform the Assembly of its research and activities.
Parliamentarians and offlrcials of the Office of the
Clerk are regularly invited to seminars organised
by the Institute and the Chaillot Papers and the
Letter of the Institute are sent to the Assembly on
a regular basis, thus giving the latter the opportu-
nity of being informed of the Institute's current
activities.
82. The Director of the Institute, himself a for-
mer member of the Assembly, was invited to
speak to the Presidential Committee in 1992, thus
contributing his specialist knowledge to a discus-
sion on topics of common interest and he, and his
research team, have assisted in preparing the pre-
sent report. Nevertheless, co-operation between
the two institutions is far from satisfactory and its
sporadic nature, on a case-by-case basis, is far
from meeting the wish for co-operation expressed
by the Assembly throughout the process of the
Institute's formation and the four years of its exis-
tence.
83. [n its recommendations, the Assembly has
on several occasions asked the Council to request
the Institute to study one or other subject and, in
so far as possible, to associate the Assembly with
its work, particularly in relation to the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterra-
nean. Although the ministers have sometimes
accepted its recommendations, the Assembly has
never truly been able to profit from the work of
the Institute, as it would have wished. This situa-
tion is the more reprehensible in that the Assem-
bly, composed of representatives of the national
parliaments, is denied any co-operation with the
Institute by ministers who are answerable to those
parliamentarians in their respective coun-
35. Recommendation 534 on European security 
- 
reserve
forces and national service, paragraph 10, 3rd December
1992.
84. Is it conceivable that the British, Spanish or
French Governments would seek to prevent their
parliaments from approaching a national defence
institute to request studies and information on the
political and defence orientations of govern-
ments? A situation such as this, which is unaccep-
table at national level, should not be tolerated in
WEU.
V. Conclusion
85. Through its work, the reputation of its
research for quality and its dynamic contacts in
Europe, both in the framework of WEU and
beyond, the Institute has fulfilled the hopes
engendered by its creation. Discussion must now
begin on reforms to consolidate its position as a
genuine European research institute. Transfor-
ming it into an academy is one possible solution
and doubtless the one which can contribute most
effectively to the emergence of a real European
awareness in security and defence matters which
is not simply the existence, side by side, of natio-
nal positions, a sort of European lowest common
denominator.
86. Another option might be to retain the pre-
sent structure of the Institute and concentrate its
activities on developing WEU's contacts with the
associate partners and the countries of the Medi-
terranean, as the Council and also the Assembly
have both suggested on several occasions; how-
ever, this would restrict the Institute to the r6le of
a liaison body with these countries until their sta-
tus evolved within WEU and the European Union,
which does not really correspond to the tasks assi-
gned to it. However praiseworthy the work of the
Institute in this area may be it should not be used
to gloss over the absence of consensus in the
Council as regards WEU's relations with these
countries.
87. The Assembly, for its part, intends to pur-
sue its policy of seeking closer and more direct
co-operation with the Institute, which is in the
interest of the two institutions and of WEU in
general. In so doing, it is aware that the Institute is
not responsible for any obstacles that might arise.
The Institute, on the one hand, should know that it
can count on the Assembly to urge the Council to
direct its efforts towards reforms that might
strengthen every aspect of WEU's operational
capabilities 
- 
political, military and space, not to
mention research and the stimulation of intellec-
tual debate. Together, the Assembly and the Insti-
tute are better placed to participate fully in the
establishment of a true defence Europe, in the
interests of peace and the security of the conti-
nent.
same
tries.
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Western European Union (WEU)
(Draft of a new booklet)
REPORT'
submitted on behalf of the
Committee for Pafliamentary and Public Relations'
by Sir Russeil fohnston, Rapporteur
TABLE OFCONTENTS
DncFr Onoen
on the draft of a new booklet on Western European Union
Explexnronv Meuoneuouru
submitted by Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur
Drafi Order
on the draft of a new booklet on Western European Union
The Assembly,
(i) Recalling Orders 75 and84;
(ii) Noting the information report on the draft of a new booklet on Western European Union submitted
by its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations;
(iii) Considering that this text is an appropriate basis for the general information of parliamentarians and
the wider public in member, associate member, associate partner and observer countries,
INvtres ITs CoMMITTEE FoR pARLTAMENTARy AND puBLIc RELATToNS
1. To ensure that, with the aid of national delegations, a booklet on the report submitted is published
in the languages of the WEU member states, associate members, associate partners and observers;
2. To ensure that the text of this booklet is brought up to date regularly and in the event of major deve-
lopments in WEU prior to its publication.
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Masseret (Chairman); Sir Russell.Iolrnston,Barcness Gould of Potternewton (Alternate for Dr.
Godman) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Amaral, Benvenuti, Birraux, Biihler (Altematei Junghanns), Decagny, Dionisi, Sir Anthony
Durant, Mrs. Err, Mr. Eversdijk, Mrs. Fischer (Alternate: MiiUer), MM. Ghesquidre, Gouteyron, Sir John Hunt, MM. Kempi-
naire, Martins, Mattina, Mitolo, Pfuhl, Reimann, Robles Fraga, Sainz Garcia, Mrs. Sanchez de Miguel (Alternate: Rornan),Mrs.
Verspaget.
N.B. Tfte names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur)
1. The Committee for Parliamentary and
Public Relations thought it necessary to bring up
to date the information report, published in 1993,
in the light of recent developments in the organi-
sation. Since Petersberg, WEU has been expanded
considerably towards European countries, mem-
bers of the European Union and NAIO, and Cen-
tral European countries.
2. The meetings of the Council in Rome in
May 1993 and Kirchberg in May 1994, confirmed
this evolution, initially by establishing the WEU
Forum of Consultation and subsequently by crea-
ting the status of associate partner. At the same
time, the organisation was assigned greater res-
ponsibilities in European security and defence
following the summit meeting of the Atlantic
Alliance which expressed its support for the deve-
lopment of a European security and defence iden-
tity.
3. The purpose of the present text, like that of
previous issues, is to provide parliamentarians
and the wider public with information on the evo-
lution of WEU, its structures and its prospects. At
a time when political, military, scientific and other
events in Europe and elsewhere are increasingly
intertwined and occurring in rapid succession, the
present text is also intended as an invitation to
give considered thought to the future which is the
reason, in part at least, for its provisional and
constantly evolving nature.
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Replies of the Council to Recommendations 556 to 564
RECOMMENDATION 556 
'
on the evolution of NATO and its consequences for WEU'
The Assembly,
(i) Emphasising the importance of the NATO summit meeting reaffirming its attachment to transatlan-
tic links on the basis of a substantial presence of United States forces in Europe and the direct engagement
of the North Atlantic allies in the security of Europe;
(ii) Welcoming the WEU Council's readiness to offer an enhanced status of association to those member
states of the WEU Forum of Consultation which have or are likely to have " Europe Agreements " with the
European Union, but regretting that the term " associate partnership " may be used for this arrangement;
(iii) Endorsing the partnership for peace programme offered by NATO to the countries taking part in the
work of NACC and other interested CSCE countries;
(iv) Noting nevertheless that the Atlantic Alliance has not yet managed to define in a coherent manner
the nature of its relations with Russia and the CIS, nor the shape of a security system including the coun-
tries of Central Europe that will satisfy the aspirations and appease the concems of all sides;
(v) Emphasising consequently the importance of WEU's r6le with a view to helping to maintain stabi-
lity and security in the East;
(vi) Also emphasising the importance of the greater r6le played by WEU in the framework of its co-ope-
ration with NATO with regard to peace-keeping and crisis-management missions;
(vii) Strongly welcoming the decision of the heads of state and of government of the Atlantic Alliance to
uphold the strengthening of the European pillar of that alliance through WEU and their readiness to make
the collective assets of the alliance available to WEU;
(vlii) Recalling at the same time that since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty WEU has beco-
me an integral part of the development of the European Union and is required to work out and implement
the decisions of the Union that have defence and security implications;
(ix) Consequently recalling that the Council has to take as a matter of urgency a series of important
decisions to make WEU a truly operational organisation and to respond to expectations and the increased
responsibilities entrusted to it;
(x) Convinced nevertheless that the WEU Council now needs special political impetus to overcome its
difficulties in reaching the necessary decisions;
(xi) Considering that the intention of the ministers to reduce to six months the duration of the Chair-
manship-in-Office of WEU in order to facilitate the harmonisation of the presidencies of the European
Union and of WEU calls for new measures to ensure the continuity of WEU's political planning in order
to accelerate the process of decision-taking and to ensure a better hearing for WEU's voice in alliance and
European Union bodies;
(xii) Insisting on the need to associate the Assembly to a greater extent in the Council's thinking before
the latter takes decisions or decides not to take them in the absence of the necessary unanimity;
(xiii) Hoping that the new European Parliament to be elected on 12th June next will refrain from adop-
ting resolutions that seek 
- 
contrary to the spirit and the letter of Maastricht 
- 
to hinder WEU efforts to
contribute to the definition of a European defence policy,
l. Adopted by the Standing Committee in Paris on 3rd May 1994.
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Baumel on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 14l0).
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RncoMrraeNos rHAT THE CoUNCIL
1. At its next ministerial meeting, grant simultaneously to all the member countries of the Forum of
Consultation an associate status in WEU enabling them to participate to the greatest possible extent in the
work of the Council and of its subsidiary bodies without prejudice to the status of associate member accor-
ded to Iceland, Norway and Turkey as members of NATO;
2. Employ the term " associate member " for the relationship already being established with Iceland,
Norway and Turkey and choose " associate " to describe the new status of the Central European and
Baltic states which are members of the WEU Forum of Consultation and which have or are likely to have
" Europe Agreements " with the European Union;
3. Conclude its work on strategic mobility and inform the Assembly of its conclusions;
4. Decide before the end of this year:
- 
to establish a European system of space-based observation in accordance with the results of the
feasibility study;
- 
to move from the feasibility study phase to the conclusion of a contract with European industry
for building the European military transport aircraft;
- 
to create a European air-maritime force reinforced by ground components;
- 
to agree on the conditions for the use and command of the European corps which is to be placed
under the political direction of WEU in conformity with the agreements already concluded with
SACEUR;
- 
to make arangements for associating with the European corps the other forces answerable to
WEU so as to allow a European rapid action force to be created;
- 
to create a European aJrnaments agency with effective responsibilities and powers in order to
achieve true co-operation between member states and their industries on questions of mat6riel;
5. Increase the means and enlarge the field of action of the Planning Cell by giving it a true r6le of ope-
rational co-ordination between WEU and NATO based on overall guidelines, including contingency plans
and the planning of joint mancuvres of forces answerable to WEU;
6. Harmonise with NATO the concept of combined joint task forces (CJTF) with its own concept of
forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU);
7. Harmonise its working relationship with the European Union in matters that might have repercus-
sions on its co-operation with NATO;
8. Show greater determination in its relations with the United Nations and the CSCE with a view to
possible missions by offering them its operational capabilities in peace-keeping and crisis-management
questions;
9. Draw up political guidelines for meetings of chiefs of defence staff and specify forthwith a struc-
ture of relations and the sharing of responsibilities between:
- 
chiefs of defence staff;
- 
military delegates belonging to national delegations;
- 
the Planning Cell and
- 
the WEU Secretariat-General;
10. Ensure the continuity of its political planning by giving the WEU Secretary-General political
powers including:
- 
the right of initiative;
- 
the right to convene and to chair meetings of the Council of Ministers;
- 
primordial responsibility for making WEU's voice heard in alliance and European Union bodies;
11. Take the appropriate measures to transform the Planning Cell into a powerftrl operational centre for
WEU co-ordination and planning, with all the resources in equipment and staffing required to achieve this;
12. Ensure in particular the participation of the Secretary-General of WEU in meetings of the common
foreign and security policy (CFSP) authorities of the European Union in the same spirit of transparency,
complementarity and reciprocity that already exists between WEU and NAIO;
13. Ratify the decisions set out in paragraph 4 above and give the political impetus necessary for WEU
!9 take its place as the European defence organisation and as a credible playerln its areas of responsib-ility by convening before the end of the year an extraordinary meeting of heads of state and of government
of the member countries.
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REPLY OF TIIE COUNCIL'
to Recommendation 556
l. Following the work of the Permanent Council pursuant to the mandate given in Luxembourg on
22nd November 1993, the foreign and defence ministers on the WEU Council and its nine partners of the
Forum of Consultation came to an agreement on a status of association with WEU at their meeting in
Luxembourg on 9th May 1994. Underthis status, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic become associate partners of WEU.
To promote the gradual integration of associate partners into WEU activities, this status enables
them to participate in the meetings of the Council and to be kept regularly informed on the activities of its
working $oups and paves the way for a liaison arrangement with the Planning Cell.
The Permanent Council confirms to the parliamentary Assembly that the " document on a status of
association with WEU ", adopted in Luxembourg on 9th May 1994,inno way modifies the " document on
associate members ", adopted in Rome on 20th November 1992.
The status will formally be achieved when:
the Hellenic Republic, curently an active observer, becomes a member of WEU and the Repu-
blic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey, currently active observers,
become associate members;
the associate partner has signed a Europe Agreement with the European Union.
2. The Permanent Council can assure the parliamentary Assembly that the term " associate member "
will continue to be applied to Iceland, Norway and Turkey, in their status as European members of the
Atlantic Alliance. As stated in the Kirchberg declaration, the name adopted for the former consultation
partners of the WEU Forum of Consultation will henceforth be " associate partner " of WEU.
3. The Council informs the parliamentary Assembly that the results of the WEU strategic mobility
study (WSMS) will be submitted to the CHODS meeting in spring 1995. This study is being conducted in
two stages. In the first phase, WEU's strategic mobility requirements are being assessed by simulating the
projection of force packages over short, medium and long distances, using strategic transport models.
These deployments will be modelled on a computer with the help of national experts. In a second phase,
the study will define a WEU strategic mobility concept. The findings of the study will be reported to the
ministerial Council.
4. In the Kirchberg declaration, ministers " reaffirmed their will to set up an independent European
satellite system. A decision would be taken subject to evaluation of the merits of the proposed
system, of other WEU alternatives and affordability. To prepare a possible decision of launching
such a programme, ministers tasked the Space Group to prepare, for their spring 1995 meeting,
a proposal for decision ".
In the case of the future military transport aircraft, a feasibility study funded by some of the
WEU member countries is currently being conducted by the EUROFLAG industrial consor-
tium, which includes several European enterprises operating in the aviation field. This study,
which was launched in October 1993 on the basis of preliminary work done within the frame-
work of the former Independent European Programme Group (IEPG, now WEAG), should be
completed by the end of the year. It will be in the light of the findings of this study that the coun-
tries concerned will reach a decision in the course of 1995 on the launching of a further phase
with the aim of defining the project.
Regarding the creation of a European air-maritime force reinforced by ground components, the
Italian proposals for a multinational ground force within the context of maritime co-operation
will be submitted to the Permanent Council for discussion once they have been finalised in
conjunction with France and Spain.
The Council reminds the Assembly that, at their meeting in Luxembourg on 22nd November
1993, ministers endorsed " the adoption of the joint declaration laying down the conditions for
the use of the European Corps in the WEU framework and interpretations in this respect ".
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th October 1994.
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- 
The Council takes due note of the Assembly's recommendation " to make arrangements for asso-
ciating with the European Corps the other forces answerable to WEU so as to allow a European
rapid action force to be created ".
- 
Concerning the European Armaments Agency, an Ad Hoc Study Group was tasked with analy-
sing the legal framework within which such an agency could operate. The conclusions of the
Study Group and the recommendations of the National Armaments Directors will provide the
basis on which ministers will be able to take a decision at the appropriate time concerning the
possible establishment of an agency and the definition of its precise tasks and responsibilities.
5. With regard to an increase in the means assigned to the Planning Cell, the Council draws the atten-
tion of the parliamentary Assembly to the fact that, in the declaration following on from the document on
" associate membership " of 20th November 1992, the Council of Ministers meeting in Luxembourg on
9th May 1994 decided that " the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey
may nominate officers to the Planning Cell in order to increase WEU's planning capabilities and to enable
WEU to draw more easily on the associate members' expertise and resources for the tasks identified in the
Petersberg declaration. The Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey
should be connected as soon as possible to the WEUCOM network for all communications concerning
meetings and activities in which associate members participate ".
On the " true r6le of operational co-ordination between WEU and NATO ", the Council informs the
parliamentary Assembly that this function is assigned to the Planning Cell's " co-ordination " section.
Under the circumstances, no new terms of reference are needed. More generally, links between the WEU
and NATO will be developed to improve co-ordination across a range of actions.
6. The Council is aware of the need to harmonise criteria for the use of CJTF Headquarters with
NATO, in particular with regard to the framework created for relations between WEU and forces answer-
able to WEU (FAWEU).
To this end, the Permanent Council has set up a Politico-Military Working Group, which has for-
mulated a joint WEU position which has been introduced into the framework of the alliance consultation
process.
7. In adopting the Kirchberg declaration, ministers " welcomed the fact that working relations with the
European Union were now being developed. They also recalled their endorsement at their last meeting of
the measures to ensure close co-operation between the European Union and WEU contained in the conclu-
sions of the General Affairs Council of 26th October 1993 and approved by the European Council on
29th October 1993. Ministers emphasised in this context the need to improve co-operation, particularly in
the management of crises and looked forward to close co-operation between the two organisations in order
to respond rapidly and efficiently in the event of crises ".
8. On the intensification of relations between WEU and CSCE, the Council draws the attention of the
parliamentary Assembly to the Kirchberg declaration, which states that " Ministers agreed that the CSCE,
as the only European and transatlantic forum covering all of Europe, must be sffengthened to avoid the
emergence of new divisions. To this end, they reaffirmed their governments' resolution to commit the
necessary resources and to continue working for a reasonable division of labour with the CSCE, giving
effect to the concept of mutually reinforcing institutions developed in the 1992 Helsinki declaration ".
9. The Council reminds the parliamentary Assembly that the sharing of responsibilities among the
Chiefs of Defence Staff, Military Delegates, the Planning Cell and the WEU Secretariat General was spe-
cified when the Permanent Council transferred to Brussels at the beginning of 1993, pursuant to the Peters-
berg declaration.
This declaration states that: " Ministers agreed that the Chiefs of Defence Staff should meet twice a
year prior to the regular ministerial Councils and on an ad hoc basis whenever necessary. Ministers also
agreed that, following the transfer of the Council and Secretariat to Brussels, national delegations could
be reinforced with military delegates to develop and provide advice for the Council, to introduce the views
of the Chiefs of Defence Staff to the Planning Cell and to monitor the professional standards of the Plan-
ning Cell's work ".
The provisions applicable to the Planning Cell's relations with the said bodies are set out in the
Planning Cell's terms of reference approved by WEU ministers in Petersberg on 19th June 1992.
The responsibilities of the WEU Secretariat General are the organisation, chairmanship and follow-
up of meetings organised in Brussels, and any other work that the Council may require it to do.
Regarding the political guidelines that may be given to the CHODS, the Council draws the parlia-
mentary Assembly's attention to the fact that the agendas for their meetings are prepared by the WEU pre-
sidency in office.
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10. The Council reminds-the parliamentary Assembly that WEU is an intergovernmental body in which
the WEU presidency in office performs the functions mentioned with appiopriate involvem-ent of the
Secretary-General.
11. The Council reminds the parliamentary Assembly that the Planning Cell is tasked with:
- 
preparing contingency plans for the use of forces under the WEU auspices;
- 
preparing recommendations for the necessary arrangements for the command and control of ope-
rations and communications, including standing orders for those headquarters which may be cho-
sen;
- 
e_stablishing an_updated inventory of the forces and force packages that might be assigned to
WEU for specific operations.
Witltil th_ebudgetary limits determined by member states, the Permanent Council provides WEU
bodies with " all the resources in equipment and staffing required " so that they can perform the tasks with
which they have been entrusted.
12. The Council reminds the Parliamentary Assembly that Annex IV of the document on the imple-
mentation of the Treaty on European Union, approved by the General Affairs Council and endorsed by the
ministerial Council in Luxembourg on 22nd November 1993, states on this subject that " this collabora-
tion inclu4es cross-participation of collaborators from the two secretariats in relevant meetings in the two
organisations according to decisions taken on a case-by-case basis, after consultation of the two presiden-
cies at the appropriate level. This applies to meetings at working group level, as well as with regard to rele-
vant agenda points in meetings at ambassadorial level and at ministerial level ".
13. In the Kirchberg {g_clqqtion, ministgrs " recalled the importance they attach to the continued ope-
rational development of WEU, as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to
sffengthen the European pillar of the alliance ".
They also-recalled " the longer-term perspective of a common defence policy within the European
Union, which might lead in time to a common defence, compatible with that -of tne Atlantic Allianc^e. In
this spirit, they tasked the Permanent Council to begin workon the formulation of a common European
$9f9nc9 policy_with a view.to presenting preliminary conclusions at their next ministerial meeting in the
Netherlands ". In the meantime, the Netherlands presidency has circulated a draft discussion paper on this
subject, which will be discussed in the months to come.
Regarding the convening of an extraordinary meeting for the end of the year at the level of heads of
state and gov€rnment of the WEU member states, it is the responsibility of the presidency to evaluate the
necessity and desirability of convening such a meeting if it is formally requested by a member state.
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RECOMMENDATION 5571
on the European armaments agency 
- 
reply to the
thirQ-ninth annual report of the Council2
The Assembly,
(i) Taking account, on the one hand, of the declaration of the member countries of WEU annexed to the
Treaty on European Union, which, with reference to WEU's operational r6le, provides inter alia for exa-
mination of " enhanced co-operation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a European arma-
ments agency " and, on the other hand, the Petersberg declaration which follows the same direction;
(ii) Welcoming the decisions taken in Bonn in December 1992 by the Defence Ministers of the thirteen
IEPG countries to transfer the functions of that group to WEU and the decisions taken at the meeting in
Rome in May 1993 on the practical measures relating to this transfer, in particular the new name for the
IEPG which has become the Westem European Armaments Group (WEAG);
(iii) Noting with satisfaction the report on armaments co-operation prepared by the National Armaments
Directors and submitted for examination by the WEAG Defence Ministers meeting in Luxembourg on
22nd November 1993;
(iv) Similarly welcoming the creation of an ad-hoc working group for the purposes of identifying the
tasks of a European armaments agency and determining the legal grounds on which it should be based;
(v) Welcoming the transfer to WEU of certain activities of Eurogroup, specifically the information acti-
vities, EUROCOM, EUROLOG and EUROLONGTERM;
(vi) Considering furthermore that a European armaments agency should be based on a common Euro-
pean industrial and defence policy, an integrated armaments market and a common export policy for such
armaments;
(vii) Noting that the ultimate objective of a common defence policy involving agreement on political
guidelines in military and armaments matters is far from being achieved;
(viii) Considering that in present circumstances a European armaments agency must be regarded as a
point of departure for an undertaking that will be developed until it achieves its full capability as European
positions converge in security and defence questions;(ix) Convinced nevertheless that the creation of a European armaments agency, initially with a mini-
mum of speciflc tasks, meets a clear need, as testified by the present dispersal of the armaments sector in
Europe, the many bodies responsible for various co-operative programmes, the need to make the most of
diminishing resources, to increase industrial trade, to improve and widen co-operation in the research sec-
tor and to continue work on the principles of harmonisation and standardisation including in particular
their political, administrative and legal aspects;(x) Bearing in mind that the increasingly multinational composition of armed forces in Europe implies
interoperability of military units, which must be accompanied by a firm move towards armaments
co-operation;(xi) Welcoming the decision of the French and German authorities to create a joint armaments agency;
(xii) Considering the importance of a European armaments agency in securing a competitive presence
for Europe in the world armaments market;
(xiii) Regretting that the Kirchberg declaration in no way tackles the question of creating a European
armaments agency,
RBcorraurBNos rHAT rHs CouNcL
1. Have a study made for the harmonisation of the political and administrative structures of the bodies
responsible for armaments in the WEU member countries;
1. Adopted by the Assembly on l3th June 1994 during the first part of the fortieth ordinary session ( I st sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Borderas on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee
(Document l4l9).
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2. Document the regulations on arms exports in force in the member states and provide information on
its methods for their standardisation as well as the time schedule previewed for realising harmonisation;
3. Insist on the need to ensure and document parliamentary conffol either through national parliaments
or the Parliamentary Assembly over defence procurement as well as arms exports;
4. Examine fiscal and employment legislation governing the defence industries of the member coun-
tries, with a view to their possible harmonisation;
3. Inform the Assembly of the results of the report by the ad hoc working group on the tasks to be assi-
gned to the European armaments agency and the legal grounds on which it should be based;
4. Complete the integration of the armaments secretariat into the Secretariat-General in order to pro-
mote synergy between WEU's armaments activities and the other activities of the organisation;
5. Strengthen the means of the armaments secretariat so that it might afford more active support to the
work of WEAG panels and working groups;
6. Establish forthwith a European armaments agency as a subsidiary body of the Council, initially
tasked as follows:
(a) management of co-operative programmes;(b) management of the EUCLID programme;(c) management of joint research and testing facilities;(d) technological and operational studies;(e) establishment of information and data services and a register of patents relating to innovation
in the defence sector;(f) research into and evaluation of the world armaments market; the agency would be assisted
in this task by industrial groups such as EDIG, which already has extensive experience in this
sector.
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL'
to Recommendation 557
1 The Council supports, in principle, the Assembly's call for harmonisation of the political and admin-
istrative structures of the bodies responsible for armaments in the WEU member countries. The Council
considers this harmonisation process to be a desirable long-term aim. The co-operative activities carried
out in WEU within the framework of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) are helping to
achieve this aim.
2. The Council informs the Assembly that the question of harmonisation and co-ordination of national
arms export policies is dealt with in the framework of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of
the European Union. Furthermore, the national regulations on anns exports are already a matter of public
record.
3. The Council informs the Assembly that parliamentary control over defence equipment procurement
and exports is at present provided by national parliaments in accordance with the procedures and regula-
tions in force in each country.
4. The Council informs the Assembly that flscal and employment legislation are among the topics on
which a process of harmonisation is in progress within the framework of the European Union. Conse-
quently, [he application of this process to the European defence industry is a matter for the European
Union.
5. The Council informs the Assembly that the Ad Hoc Study Group on a European Armaments Agency
is pursuing its work under the authority of the National Armaments Directors and pursuant to the manda-
te it received from ministers on 22nd November 1993 in Luxembourg. A report of the group and propo-
sals will be presented by the National Armaments Directors at the next meeting of the WEAG defence
ministers on-l4th November 1994. The ministers will decide on the follow-up to be given to this report.
6. The Council informs the Assembly that the Armaments Secretariat has been a part of the WEU
Secretariat-General since 1st April 1994, in accordance with the decision in principle taken by ministers
on2}ndNovember 1993 in Luxembourg. Staffrecruitment is in progress.
7. The Council takes note of the Assembly's recommendation to strengthen the Armaments Secreta-
riat and will consider the possibility of doing so in good time on the basis of proposals drawn up by the
National Armaments Direbtors and in the light of the progress of work carried out by the WEAG and of
the experience gained.
8. The Council informs the Assembly that an examination of the tasks which could be given to a future
European Armaments Agency is in progress within the Ad Hoc Study Group. This group is also analy-
sing the legal framework within which such an agency could operate. The conclusions of the Study Group
and the recommendations of the National Armaments Directors will provide the basis on which ministers
will be able to take a decision at the appropriate time concerning the possible establishment of an agency
and the definition of its precise tasks and responsibilities.
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 13th October 1994.
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RECOMMENDATION 5581
on WEa in the process of European Uni.on
- 
reply to the thirg-ninth annual report of the Council2
The Assembly,
(i) Recalling that the Assembly of WEU,.qp3rt of the organisation of Western European Union undertfe termg of the agreement on the status of WEU- slgped ir1 Paris on 1lth May 1955, is in integral part of
the.development of the European Union as providedln Article J.4,parugraph2, of the Treaty ofreriop.*
Union;
(i:) 
. 
Underlining that Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty obliges the Council to keep the Assem-bly better informed than hitherto about developments in the CfSp anl other sectors of the Union in all
matters which come within the competence of WEU in accordance with the modified Brussels Treaty;
(ity'__ DisaPproving the Council's delay in transmitting Annex IV, on the links between the Union and
WEU, to Chapter IV of the document on the implemeniation of the Maastricht Treaty;
(iv) 
. 
Deploring also the poor information contrained in the thirty-ninth annual report of the Council to
the Assembly on the new working relations between wEU and the Union;(v) Consideringthat the wording of Article-J.,-4,.paragraph 2, of the Treaty on European Union gives
reason for doubts about the sharing of responsibilities betw6en WEU and the Union;
(yi) 
. 
Considerin8_llgo that the hitherto agreed " practical iurangements " contained in Annex IV on the
links between the Union and WEU restricf the areas of action for WBU in a way which is not compatible
with WEU's far-reaching obligations stemming from the modified Brussels Treity;
(vit) 
. 
Deplolng in fac-tthat these arrangeme-rlts ang the lack of political will are some of the many factors
which contributed to WEU's.marginalised r6le in intemational crisis-management particularly r6garding
the conflicts in former Yugoslavia;
(viii) 
-U-nderlining the important rdle WEU has to fulfll on behalf of the Union in maintaining rransatlan-tic solidarity and co-operation in security and defence matters;
(ix) 
-Welcoming the successful outcome of the negotiations with Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden
regarding their accession to the European Union;
(x) 
- 
Welcoming also the firm commitment of all the acceding states to include in their accession, in full
and without reservation, the provision of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty regarding the establishment of a
common foreign and security policy;
(xi). 
. 
Expressing the hope that the referenda to be held in Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden will bepositive;
(xii) Recalling the im_portant_contribution and experience of the four EFTA countries in peace-keeping
operations within the United Nations;
(xiii) Convinced that deflning_a.common Europe-an defence pglicy should now commence even though
all members of the EuropgaT Ugetgle not yet -full members -of WEU and welcoming therefore the deii-
sion of the Council to task the WEU Permanent Council to start work now on the foimulation of such apolicy;
(xiv) 
.Noting th_at the countries called-upon to accede to the European Union have not applied for mem-bership of^ryEq with the_e_xception of Norway which seeks full membership of WEU on6e it becomes a
member of the European Union;
(y) Welcoming the fact that the Council's KirchbeE dgclaration of 9th May lgg4recognises rhe signi-
ficant contribution of the three associate members of WBU to European security and stabllity; "
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 14th June 1994 during the first part ofthe fortieth ordinary session (2nd sitting).
2' Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Fenari on behalf of the Political Committee (Document l4l7).
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(7;ui) Convinced however that the Council's wish to reinforce the relationshln of these three countries
*itfi WfU in order to strengthen its position as the defence compo-nent of the Puropean Union and as theguropean pillar of the Atlaitic Alliairce could be achieved bettei if the Council invited them to accede to
the modified Brussels TreatY;
(xvii) Recalling rhat the NAIO summit meeting on 10th^Janu-Tl_1994 did notagree to the accession to the
iVoit Atlanticireatyof anyof themembercountriesoftheWEUForumof Consultation;
(xviii)Welcoming therefore that by its Kirchberg declaration, the Council is following para^graph 1. of
ilecommendatioi 556 in granting iimultaneousty to all the member countries of the Forum of Consulta-
tion a status of association with WEU;
(xix) Eamestly desiring the progressive integration of all the states of Western and Central Europe in a
iystem of co-operation Ensurihg security, stab;ility and peace for Europe as a whole;
(xx) Hoping that the necessary conditions can be created for other countries, such as Slovenia and Mol-
io.1u, to u^"qulir" the new associite status in the future, on the basis of the same historical, geograptical and
p"fiii*f ."iiia"rations which allowed this status to be granted to the countries of the Forum of Consulta-
tion;
(xxi) Considering that the devolution of the exercise of matters within the competence of WEU to other
intiinationA institutions or to countries which are not members of WEU or NATO might paralyse any
steps towards joint action on defence and security in Europe;
(xxii) Recalling the importance of maintaining, in any fqlqry par-liamenrary system rge-uire{ to supervise
I .o1n*on forfign r"",i.ity and defence po[c!, the pbssibility of bringing together d:legations fro.m 1!e
p*iiu111"nt"of m"ember countries in an Assem5ty which represents the wilLof the peoples of Europe in this
particular area,
RscorrMENDs rHAT rHs CouNcu-
1. Carefully prepare the intergovernmental conference planned for 1996 in line with its
declaration I D8 annexed to the Maastricht Treaty;
Z. Fully associate the Assembly with the Council's reflection on its preparation for the 1996 confe-
rence;
3. Retain the modified Brussels Treaty so that all the members of the European Union will be able to
accede to its provisions;
4. Seek, in conjunction with the authorities of th9 European Union,lo clear YP the ambiguities of
Article J.4 of the Miastricht Treaty with a view to obtaining a general mandate to elaborate and implement
decisions and actions on behalf of the Union in WEU's area of responsibility;
5. Reconsider the WEU declaration II annexed to the Maastricht Treaty with a view to allowing the
bu.op"* members of NATO which are not members of the European Union the right to accede to the
modified Brussels Treaty;
6. Encourage all member countries of the European Union and those acceding to it to become full
members of Western European Union;
7. Study the possibility of creating a WEU peace-keeping training centre on the basis of experience
gained in tliis area by the Nordic countries and especially Finland;
8. Improve the information communicated to the Assembly on developments in the CFSP and the
Council's activities in the framework of the Union.
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REPLY OF TIIE COUNCIL'
to Recommendation 558
l_.^ 
^. 
Bginq fully aware of the need carefully t9 prepare the agenda of the intergovernmental conference(IGC) scheduled for 1996, the Council draws thd A-ssembly's-attention to the linguage adopred il rar;-graph 5 of the Kirchberg declaration of 9th May t994:
" Ministers recalled the-longer-term perspective-of a common defence policy within the European
Union, which r-ntght lead in time to a common defence, compatible with tirat oithe Atlantic Alliince.
ln thit spint,-they tasked the Permanent Council to begin-work on the formulation of a commonEuropean defence policy with a view to presenting preliminary conclusions at their next ministerial
meeting in the Netherlands. "
In the view of the Council these conclusions can be considered as a first preparation for the sub-
stantive aspects of the 1996 WEU review.
? _ Always welcoming.the^positive contributions made by the WEU Assembly to the development of
the.European security..and.defence identity through its reports, recommendationi, written qr"rfionr and
colloquia, the- Council will continue to ionsidei with great attention any subsiantive inirut from the
Assembly in this context.
3. The Council reminds the Assembly of the declaration of the WEU member states issued on the
occasion of the 46th European Council on 9th and 10th December l99l atMaastricht, which stated that:
" States which are members of the European Union are invited to accede to WEU on conditions to
be agreed.in accordance with Article Xfof the modified Brussels Treaty, or to become observers if
they so wish. "
4. {cgor$ng to Article J.4 of the Treaty on European Union, WEU is an integral part of the develop-
ment of the Unibn. It may be requested toelaborate and implement decisions ailA aitions of the Union
which have defence implications..This aim will be achieved -through the development of pragmatic wor-
king relations between the institutions of the Union and of the WEU.
At their meeting on2_2ndNovember 1993, ministers agreed to reduce the period of the WEU presi-
dency to six months fro11 1st July 1994 as suggested by thJEuropean Council. They requested ttr6 per-
manent Council to consider further the question of hanironising tlie presidencies of ihe European Union
and WEU and to report back.
Since WEU remains institutionally autonomous and responds to the Union's requests in the frame-
work of its own decision-making.procedures, the Council doe^s not see the need to obfain a general man-
date to elaborate and implement decisions and actions on behalf of the Union in WEU's areiof responsi-
bility.
5. Since the Union, with at present twelve member states, relies on WEU and its nine members for ela-
porytiol and_implemenktion of decisions and actions which have defence implications, it was logical to
invite those EC members which are not yet members of WEU to become menibers of UfgU or, if "they so
wished, observers. With a view to strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, an invita'tion
to become associate member of WEU was addressed sirirultaneously to the other European members ofNAIO, in order to give them the opportunity of panicipating fully ih the activities of WnU. The Kirch-
berg declaration underlined the need to reinforce the relationihip of the associate members with WEU in
u Yuy that would enable them to make an even stronger conribution to WEU as it faces new challenges
and opportunities.
The Council is of the opinion that " reconsideration of the WEU declaration II annexed to the Maas-
tricht Treaty with a view to granting the European members of NAIO, which are not members of the
European Union, the right to accedsto the modified Brussels Treaty " is not foreseen under the present
arrangements.
6. The Council considers that the decision to become a full member of WEU is a national one.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 3lst October 1994.
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7. Being fully aware of the valuable experience gained by^all Scandinavian countries in the area of
peace-keeping, the Council recognises the b-enefit to be drawn fromthis ex-perience.Norway (as an asso-
fiut"."*ber) and Denmark (asin observer) participate in WEU's Council and working groupl and pro-
vide valuable information on this topic whenever it-is addressed.IVloreover, increasingly member coun-
tries benefit from the possibilities ofrered in the context of NATO's partnership for p9.1c9 programma.In
this f.u.e*ork, Finlaird has explicitly offered its facilities at the trainin_g c_e_ntr_e_at Niinisalo to all allies
and all partners. The Council does nbt see the need for the creation of a WEU peace-keeping training
centre at this stage.
8. The Council takes due note of the Assembly's request for information on developments in the CFSP
and will fteat it as a matter of priority to keep the WEU parliamentary Assembly as fully informed alpol-
sible especially on aspects reiating 
-to WfU Meetin^gsbetween $9 ppsidg.ncy.Pd thc Assembly Presi-
dential bor-itt"" eitfier before an-d/or in the wake of-the ministerial Councils will continue in accordance
with the existing arrangements.
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RECOMMENDATION 559 
'
on European securi$: crisis-prevention and managementz
The Assembly,
(i) Deploring the powerlessness of the European institutions to avoid the outbreak of a bloody war bet-
ween the components of former Yugoslavia and their inability to find joint ways and means of bringing it
to an end;
(ii) Concerned by the Council's silence regarding the continuation of the civil war in Yemen and the
terrible massacres perpetrated in Rwanda;
(iii) Concerned at North Korea's nuclear policy and its threatening attitude towards South Korea;(iv) Stressing the urgency of implementing co-ordinated operational mechanisms between the United
Nations, the CSCE, NATO the European Union and WEU capable of preventing conflicts and managing
future crises constituting a threat to peace and security;
(v) Stressing that any measures to maintain and re-establish peace in any region where it is threatened
must be authorised by the United Nations;
(vi) Stressing also that reliance should be placed on the crisis-prevention mechanisms of the CSCE;
(vii) Welcoming paragraph 1 of the reply of the Council to Recommendation 549 and paragraph 6 of its
reply to Recommendation 548 recognising the need to develop joint assessment of risks and threats;
(viii) Recalling nevertheless that the Assembly does not make " suggestions " to the Council but recom-
mendations that have been formally adopted;
(ix) Noting with interest of the work of the Council on;
- 
WEU's rdle in peace-keeping;
- 
anti-missile defence;
- 
intelligence policy;
- 
missions by WEU forces in humanitarian aid, peace-keeping and restoring peace;
- 
WEU policy on exercises;
- 
the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty;
- 
progress in the feasibility study for a WEU space-based observation system;
- 
air and naval co-operation in WEU;
(x) Wishing sincerely that these studies will rapidly lead to actions that will make WEU truly operatio-
nal in crisis-prevention and management;
(xi) Perturbed nevertheless by information received from the Council to the effect that most of the WEU
member countries have responded negatively to the request to make troops available to protect the safe
areas in former Yugoslavia;
(xii) Consequently recalling the wide-ranging obligations placed on all the member countries under the
modified Brussels Treaty to preserve peace and security;
(xiii) Believing that a fully operational WEU will be capable in future of preventing the development of
a conflict such as that in former Yugoslavia,
RecouueNos rHAT tlrp Corwcu-
1. Make a regular assessment of risks and threats in the world liable to affect peace and security and
draw the consequences therefrom for Europe;
2. Take an initiative in the context of the common foreign and security policy to define a crisis-preven-
tion and management policy taking account of the lessons drawn from the crisis in former Yugoslavia;
l. Adopted by the Assembly on l4th June 1994 during the first part of the fortieth ordinary session (3rd sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. de Puig on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1418).
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3. Inform the Assembly of the results of the work on " mutually reinforcing institutions " carried out
by the CFSP working group on security and of the Council's own contribution to this study;
4. Play an active part in the conference on the pact for stability in Europe, by offering its good offices,
in the framework of this conference, to the associate partners of WEU and future associate partners, insis-
ting in particular on the principle of the inviolability of present frontiers;
5. Establish a permanent dialogue with Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on
crisis-prevention and management;
6. Maintain a dialogue on a permanent basis with the Mediterranean states which are not members of
WEU;
7. Complete the development of the measures referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9 of Recommendation
556 necessary for WEU to become fully operational in the framework of crisis-management and relating
to:
- 
the space-based observation system;
- 
strategic means of transport;
- 
the European corps and the European air and naval force and other forces answerable to WEU so
as to enable a European rapid action force to be created;
- 
afinaments co-operation;
- 
interaction between the chiefs of defence staffs, military representatives, the Planning Cell and the
WEU Secretariat-General;
8. Co-ordinate with NATO the means available and the sharing of responsibilities in crisis-manage-
ment, particularly in the area of restoring peace;
9. Establish direct co-ordination with the United Nations and the CSCE with a view to permanent
representation in these two organisations;
10. Take the necessary steps to ensure that, in the event of a given crisis, member states increase their
efforts to seek the necessary political consensus;
11. Pursue its dialogue with the Maghreb countries and with Egypt and keep the Assembly informed;
12. Establish a dialogue with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN);
13. Support the United Nations' call for the cease-fire in Yemen to be respected immediately;
14. Examine at the earliest opportunity the r6le that WEU might play in terminating the killings in
Rwanda and establishing order and peace in that countryi
15. Hold consultations on the consequences for European security of North Korea's nuclear policy and
inform the Assembly of its conclusions.
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REPLY OF TIIE COUNCIL'
to Recommendation 559
1. The Council considers that the regular meetings of its working groups and the item topical ques-
tions on their agendas provide oppornrnities for regular assessment of risks and threats affecting peace,
security and European interests. It goes without saying that the Council will draw the consequences of its
flndings when they are perceived as affecting European security.
2. The Council has already taken several initiatives in the field of crisis-management and conflict pre-
vention in the context of the emerging common foreign and security policy (CFSP).
The most promising aspect of today's preventive diplomacy is that the EU, WEU, and NATO have
taken measures to involve at least some of the former Warsaw Pact states as active partners in a common
security dialogue. In the case of the European Union, the signing of Europe Agreements, as well as in the
case of WEU, the adoption of a status of association to WEU, are recognition of these states' aspiration to
full membership of both organisations.
In its relation to the institutions involved in crisis-prevention, mainly the United Nations, the CSCE
and the EU, and their array of approaches and sanctions to attain their goals, WEU's supporting and imple-
menting r6le will grow in importance when operational assets are deployed, as demonstrated by the com-
bined WEUA.{ATO operation Sharp Guard, by the initiative on the Danube and by the participation of a
WEU police element in the EU adminisration of Mostar.
Furthermore, the Council considers that the deployment of inspection and evaluation teams under
current and future arms control treaties and agreements on confidence- and security-building measures
will provide a useful instrument for early warning and information-gathering, confidence-building and
crisis stabilisation during preventive diplomacy operations. Full implementation of arms conffol treaties
will make an essential conffibution towards building confidence and security, hence WEU's dedicated
efforts aimed at implementation of the Open Skies Treaty.
3. The Council cannot report on the results of work undertaken by working $oups of the European
Union dealing with CFSP matters.
4. As the defence component of the European Union, it was appropriate that WEU was present at the
inaugural conference on stability in Europe as one of the organisations supporting a Pact on Stability in
Europe. Enhancing security and stability throughout Europe has been one of WEU's priority tasks over
recent years. The establishment in June 1992 of the WEU Forum of Consultation with its nine Central
European partners had this aim in mind.
The Council reminds the Assembly that a status of association existing since 9th May 1994 between
WEU and the associate partners is based on the following criteria :
- 
settlement of differences by peaceful means, in accordance with the obligations from the United
Nations Charter, the commitments entered into under the terms of the Helsinki Final Act and the
Paris Charter and the generally recognised principles and rules of international law;
- 
refraining from the threat or use of force, in accordance with the United Nations Charter.
This new status will therefore enable WEU and its associate partners to actively support, when
appropriate, the conference for a pact on stability in Europe.
5. Paragraph 9 of the Kirchberg declaration adopted by the WEU ministerial Council states to this
effect that " Ministers, in the context of the growing r6le of WEU for promoting peace, security and sta-
bility in Europe, agreed on the importance of developing dialogue and exchanges of information on issues
of common concern between WEU and Russia ".
6. The Council draws the Assembly's attention to paragraph 8 of the Kirchberg declaration which
reads :
" Ministers reviewed the developments in the Mediterranean region and welcomed in panicular the
recent breakthrough in the Middle East peace process. Stressing the importance of security and sta-
bility in the Mediterranean basin for the security of Europe, they agreed further to develop the dia-
logue already initiated with the Maghreb countries and to expand it to Egypt and gradually to other
non-WEU Mediterranean states. "
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th October 1994.
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7. The Council refers the Assembly to its reply to paragraphs 4 and9 of Recommendation 556.
8. As for co-ordinating with NATO the means available for crisis-management, the Council draws the
Assembly's attention to paragraph 3 of the Kirchberg declaration in which ministers:
" welcomed the summit's endorsement of the principle that collective assets and capabilities of the
alliance can be made available for WEU operations in order to strengthen WEU as the defence com-
ponent of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic
Alliance. They underlined that the modalities for making these available should preserve WEU's
own planning procedures and capabilities.
(...)
Ministers underlined the importance of co-ordination with the alliance on the implementation of the
CJTF concept and the definition of separable but not separate military capabilities so as to ensure
their effective use where appropriate by WEU, and in that case under its command. "
The Council also reminds the Assembly of paragraph 2 of the Luxembourg declaration of 22nd
November 1993 in which ministers:
" Welcoming the further development of close working links in Brussels between WEU and the
alliance, they recalled that the relations between the two Organisations continued to be based on
transparency and complementarity. They reaffirmed their decision to intensify their co-ordination
on alliance issues representing an important common interest with the aim of introducing joint posi-
tions agreed in WEU into the process of consultation in the alliance.
(...)
In future crises, WEU and NATO should hold consultations, including as necessary through joint
Council meetings, on whether and how they might co-operate. "
9. The mission to the United Nations and to the CSCE of the country holding the WEU presidency acts
as a contact point at the United Nations and at the CSCE. It is responsible for presenting WEU's contri-
butions to the competent United Nations or CSCE bodies. Therefore the Council is of the opinion that
WEU is already pennanently represented in these two organisations.
10. The Council can assure the Assembly that member states, through the debates taking place at all
levels, always make maximum efforts to seek political consensus, especially in the event of crises where
WEU is likely to play a r6le. The Council considers the successful mounting of the Sharp Guard and
Danube operations, as well as the deployment of a WEU police element in support of the EU administra-
tion in Mostar, to be excellent examples.
11. Expressing its satisfaction with the results of the contacts and meetings held so far by the WEU pre-
sidency and the Secretariat-General with representatives of the Maghreb countries in Brussels, the minis-
terial Council has decided to develop the dialogue further and to expand it gradually to other non-WEU
Mediterranean countries.
The Council will keep the Assembly informed of the development and the results of this dialogue.
12. The Council informs the Assembly that the presidency and the Secretary-General are willing to
hold an exchange of views on issues of common concem with representatives of the ASEAN if so
requested.
13. The Council has fully supported the United Nations' call for the ceasefire in Yemen to be respected
immediately.
14. At the time of drafting this reply, the Council has already met five times since lTth June 1994 to dis-
cuss the situation in Rwanda. A number of member states confirmed their readiness to contribute to the
initiative to alleviate the terrible sufferings of the population, subject to a new decision from the United
Nations Security Council, taking into account the time needed to gather the necessary resources for the
effective deployment of expanded UNAMIR. In this context, the Council has decided to give WEU's sup-
port to the efforts of its member states by ensuring the co-ordination of their contributions.
To this end, the Council confirmed the mandate given at its last meeting to the Planning Cell and
instructed it to act as a contact and co-ordination point between contributing states and the headquarters
commanding the operation.
The Council welcomes the readiness of certain African states to contribute to the intemational
humanitarian efforts in Rwanda, which it considers essential.
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The Council will continue to monitor the situation in Rwanda, notably in the light of decisions of
the United Nations Security Council and of the activities of the European Union in this respect.
15. The Council is fully aware of the possible consequences of North Korea's nuclear policy and will
inform the Assembly of any conclusions reached by the Council in this respect.
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RECOMMENDATION 560'
on parliamentary co-operation with
the countrie s of the WEU Forum of Consuhntion2
The Assembly,
(i) Recalling Recommendations 528,547 and 548 requesting the Council to:
(a) Fulfil the expectations of the Central European states by regular and relevant dialogue, duly
organising discussions on topical questions, and including the states of Central Europe in
appropriate seminars to provide an opportunity for debate on subjects of mutual interest;
(b) ensure that consultations held with the Central European states at Ministerial Council and
WEU Permanent CounciVAmbassador level and meetings of senior officials or seminars orga-
nised by the lnstitute for Security Studies are included in the annual report to the Assembly;
(c) establish WEU information points in the capitals of the Central European states;
(d) develop WEU's relations with the countries of the Forum of Consultation by seeking greater
cohesion with the work of the European Union in Central and Eastern Europe and intensify the
work of the Forum of Consultation giving it a structured programme of work, encompassing
inter alia, joint development of risk and threat assessment;
(ii) Stressing the importance for peace and stability in Europe of the consolidation of democratic struc-
tures and the success of economic reforms in the countries of the WEU Forum of Consultation;
(iii) Warmly welcoming the Council's decisions to associate the consultation partners more closely in
the work of WEU;
(iv) Welcoming the signature by several countries, members of the Forum of Consultation, of Europe
Agreements with the European Union and wishing all members of the Forum of Consultation to become
party to such agreements;
(v) Stressing the importance, repeatedly confirmed in the Council's declarations, of the development of
relations and co-operation between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of the member states of the
Forum of Consultation with a view to integrating these countries into European political and security
structures,
RrcoutrleNps rHAT rue CouNcu-
1. Keep the Assembly regularly informed on the activities of the Forum of Consultation and of deci-
sions taken at meetings of the latter at ministerial and Permanent Council level and in the Counsellors'
Group;
2. Invite the Assembly to participate on a regular basis in symposia and seminars on subjects of com-
mon interest to WEU and the Forum of Consultation, organised by WEU or by the Institute for Security
Studies;
3. Ensure that the Assembly has adequate means to develop relations and co-operation with the states
of the Forum of Consultation, in accordance with the Council's own expressed wish.
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 14th June 1994 during the first part of the fortieth ordinary session (3rd sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Sir Russell Johnston on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and
Public Relations (Document 1414).
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l. The Council informs the Assembly that meetings within the Forum of Consultation have been sus-
pended upon implementation of a status of association with WEU for the Central and Eastern European
countries and the Baltic States. This also applies to meetings of the Counsellors' Group of the Forum of
Consultation. Accordingly, meetings of the Forum of Consultation at ambassadorial level have already
been replaced by meetings of the Council with associate partners, these meetings taking place at least
twice a month.
The meetings of the Counsellors' Group have also been suspended; now the associate partners par-
ticipate in the Council Working Group when it is preparing for Council meetings which they are to attend.
As far as information of the Assembly is concerned, the Council takes due note of this point and will
treat it as a matter of priority to keep the WEU parliamentary Assembly informed of its meetings, espe-
cially those at ministerial level. The-current WEU presidenc! will also-carry on the establishediradition
of meetings between the presidency and the Assembly's Presidential Committee immediately after the
ministerial Councils.
2. The Council noted with great satisfaction the highly successful WEU seminar on peace-keeping,
organised by the Luxembourg presidency and attended by representatives of 19 full, associate and obser-
ver members of WEU and of the Forum of Consultation and by representatives of the WEU parliamenta-
ry Assembly. The excellent work of the77 participants greatly conffibuted to the success of the gathering.
Furthermore, the Council will ask the Director of the Institute for Security Studies to invite the
Assembly whenever possible to seminars and symposia organised under its auspices.
3. As for ensuring that the Assembly has the adequate means to develop relations and co-operation
with the associate partners, the Council recalls an exchange of views held with the Assembly at the
meeting between the Council and the Presidential Committee on27th September 1994.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th October 1994.
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RECOMMENDATION 561'
on the WEU Planning Cell 
- 
reply to the thifi-ninth
annual report of the Council2
The Assembly,
(i) Considering Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty and the decision contained in the declaration of the
member states of WEU at Maastricht on l0th December 1991 to develop WEU as the defence component
of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance;
(ii) Considering the Petersberg declaration of l9th June 1992 on strengthening WEU's operational r6le
through the establishment of a Planning Cell with a number of operational tasks;
(iii) Welcoming the fact that in the Kirchberg declaration of 9th May 1994, the Council of Ministers of
WEU has confirmed the importance which they attach to the continued operational development of WEU;
(iv) Welcoming the decisions taken at the NAIO summit meeting in Brussels on l0th-11th January
1994 giving full support to the development of a European security and defence identity and to the streng-
thening of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance through Western European Union as the defence
component of the European Union;
(v) Welcoming the NAIO summit meeting's decision to endorse the concept of combined joint task
forces (CJTF) which will provide separable but not separate military capabilities that could be employed
by NATO orWEU;
(vi) Considering that the abovementioned decisions will make sense only if the Council attaches the
highest priority to strengthening WEU's operational r6le;
(vii) Noting, however, that a clear definition of WEU's requirements for the implementation of the CJTF
concept will have to be accompanied by the establishment of a clear command and conffol structure pro-
viding the indispensable political-military interface for WEU operations in view of the vital importance of
the CJTF concept for the relevance and effectiveness of future WEU activities and operations;
(viii) Considering that in order to be able to operate in a satisfactory way, WEU will have to benefit from
NATO and national intelligence;
(ix) Stressing that the Planning Cell should have appropriate infrastructure and communication links
with NATO which would allow WEU to perform its tasks as stated in the final communiqu6 of NATO's
January 1994 Brussels summit meeting,
RrcouueNos rHAT rns CouNcu-
1. Attach the highest priority to the formulation of a common European defence policy in order to pro-
vide a clear reference framework for the activities of the Planning Cell and all other organs of WEU;
2. For the time being, allow the Planning Cell to concentrate on the three main tasks as formulated in
the Petersberg declaration:
- 
keeping an updated list of units and combination of units which would be allocated to WEU for
speciflc operations;
- 
preparing contingency plans for employment of forces under WEU auspices;
- 
preparing recommendations for the necessary command, control and communication arrange-
ments, including standing operating procedures for headquarters which might be selected;
while ensuring that it can fully participate in, and furthermore work on, the implementation process of the
CJTF concept which is vital for WEU's operational r6le;
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1994 during the first part of the fortieth ordinary session (5th sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman on behalf of the Defence Comminee (Document
t42t).
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3. Provide the Planning Cell with more equipment and technical resources for data processing and
communications;
4. Ensure that national capitals provide full co-operation with the Planning Cell and urgently settle the
remaining shortcomings in relations between the Planning Cell and NATO in order to help the Planning
Cell implement its basic tasks;
5. Further promote the extension of existing contacts and exchanges of information between WEU and
the United Nations and, in particular, between the WEU Planning Cell and the United Nations Secretary-
General's Military Adviser in New York;
6. For the planning and possible implementation of peace support operations, adopt the terminology
employed in the United Nations Agenda for Peace;
7. Avoid the multiplication of mandates given to the Planning Cell, if this is not accompanied by a cor-
responding enlargement of its staff;
8. After assessing the Planning Cell's activities and its internal organisation by lst October 1994,
make the basic choice between maintaining the present military liaison group with limited capability or
establishing a military planning centre which should be able to carry out the numerous planning tasks and
other activities which the Council may have in mind;
9. Ensure that the rotation of Planning Cell personnel will be achieved with a minimum of disconti-
nuity;
10. Promote the internal coherence of the Planning Cell by ensuring that all staffmembers are remune-
rated in accordance with standards similar to those used for all other WEU staff.
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL'
to Recommendation 561
1. The Council reminds the parliamentary Assembly of paragraph 5 of the Kirchberg declaration
issued by the WEU Council of Ministers meeting in Luxembourg on 9th May 1994:
" Ministers recalled the longer term perspective of a common defence policy within the European
Union, which might lead in time to a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance.
In this spirit, they tasked the Permanent Council to begin work on the formulation of a common
European defence policy with a view to presenting preliminary conclusions at their next ministerial
meeting in the Netherlands. "
In the meantime the Netherlands presidency has circulated a draft discussion paper on this subject
which will be discussed in the months to come.
The Council can therefore reassure the Assembly that the formulation of a common European
defence policy is high on its agenda.
2. The Council informs the Assembly that the main point of focus of the Planning Cell's activities is
the three tasks as formulated in the Petersberg declaration.
As far as participation in and work on the implementation of the CJTF concept is concerned, the PC,
mandated by the Council, has made a preliminary analysis of the impact of CJTF on the WEU operational
concept and has submitted it to the Council. The Council has decided to continue the work in a special
Politico-Military Working Group. The terms of reference for this group were approved by the Council on
15th March. In accordance with these terms of reference, the PQ is authorised to take part in the meetings
of the group in order to support its work.
3. The Council informs the Assembly that an automated data processing (ADP) plan is being drawn
up in the PC and the Secretariat-General. Its objective is to conclude the organisational and functional stu-
dies so that the PC and SG requirements can be defined.
4. As for the PC infrastructure and communication links with NATO, the Council informs the Assem-
bly that the work completed in mid-April now provides a useful basis for further progress.
Furthermore, the Council informs the Assembly that through direct contact with the respective
MODs, discussions with the Military Delegates and through the WEUCOM network, a good co-operation
between national capitals and the PC is already in place. Relations between the Planning Cell and NATO
are one aspect of the general dialogue that exists between the two organisations, which is aimed at ensu-
ring complementarity and transparency, so that the Planning Cell may undertake its tasks in an effective
manner.
5. The Council reminds the Assembly of its reply to Assembly Recommendation 542 on United
Nations operations 
- 
interaction with WEU, and especially of paragraphs 4 and 5 which state:
" 4.(...) WEU contributions in the fleld of planning and periodic contacts between the Planning Cell
representatives and the United Nations staffresponsible could be of real value. The Council wishes
to draw the Assembly's attention to a letter dated 25th June 1993 from the WEU Secretary-General
to his United Nations counterpart, in which it is planned to step up contacts and exchanges of infor-
mation between WEU and the United Nations.
" 5.WEU is prepared to envisage, with the United Nations Secretary-General, the development of
contacts and exchanges of information between the WEU Secretariat-General and Planning Cell on
the one hand and the appropriate United Nations bodies on the other. "
On the initiative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations a meeting has taken place with
representatives of several international organisations, i.a. WEU, on the topic of crisis-management.
6. The Council reminds the Assembly that there is no single, generally accepted definition or even ter-
minology of " peace support operations " and related activities, and it must be borne in mind that it is a
highly evolutive and dynamic concept. However, the Council is aware that there is a need to develop a
common understanding of this concept, proceeding from the existing terminology as set out in the relevant
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th October 1994.
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United Nations, CSCE and NACC documents, including the United Nations Secretary General's agenda
for peace; the latter also constituted the basis for the conceptual work on definitions of the 11th Juno 1993
" Report to ministers by the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Co-operation in Peace-keeping ".
Since the terminology used in this fleld is constantly changing, it is important to keep related defi-
nitions under review.
7. The Council draws the Assembly's attention to Part trI of the Kirchberg declaration issued by the
WEU Council of Ministers meeting in Luxembourg on 9thMay 1994.
Therein, the WEU Council of Ministers agreed that:
" the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey may nominate offi-
cers to the Planning Cell in order to increase WEU's planning capabilities and to enable WEU to
draw more easily on the associate members' expertise and resources for the tasks identified in the
Petersberg declarations. "
Furthermore, the Planning Cell review will be an opportunity to assess how the PC's capabilities
can be further improved.
8. The Council does not wish to prejudge its decision in this respect, which will take full account of
the findings and proposals of the PC, the military delegates, the DRG and the CHODS.
9. The Council can assure the Assembly that the rotation of PC personnel will be achieved as smooth-
ly as possible, taking full account of the CHODs' deliberations on the rotation of the Director and Depu-
ty Director appointments, from which the subsequent rotation of all other personnel will ensue.
10. The Council reminds the Assembly that all military personnel in the PC are paid nationally, whe-
reas the remuneration of the civilian WEU staff is based on criteria common to the co-ordinated organis-
ations.
As this issue is strictly national and is therefore not discussed in the Budget and Organisation Com-
mittee, the Council sees no scope for following up this part of the Assembly's recommendation.
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RECOMMENDATION 562'
on an operational organisationfor WEU:
naval and maritime co-operation2
The Assembly,
(i) Convinced of the imponance of a WEU capaciry to carry out naval and maritime operations, given
the fragile nature of intemational relations in many parts of the world where European interests may be at
stake;
(ii) Pleased that, as forecast, the NATO summit meeting on lOth
position as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and formally
identity;
(iii) Regretting therefore that the North Atlantic Council should choose now to downgrade the single
major NATO Commander's post occupied by a European and effectively abolish the Channel Command
which, created by the Western Union, antedates NAf,O;
(iv) Welcoming the willingness of the WEU Council to establish pragmatic arrangements for current
naval, maritime and riverine operations;
(v) Recalling previous recommendations of the WEU Assembly to:
- 
" ...create a European standing naval force with organic naval aviation including air defence, air-
borne early waming, attack, anti-submarine and heliborne assault assets for deployment under
single command and unified control to areas outside the NAIO theatre where Western Europe's
security interests are at stake in emergency or war; " (1988);
- 
" ...give practical expression to the European pillar of defence:
(a) encourage more multinational units such as the United Kingdom-Netherlands landing force
and the Franco-German brigade;
(b) take specific action to allow at an individual level the exchange of military personnel between
countries to enhance their awareness of European co-operation, give them greater opportunity
for travel and a more interesting work environment, and serve as a useful recruiting incentive
at a time when the demographic levels are making recruiting most difficult; " (1989);
- 
"...examine for the longer term the idea of creating a WEU naval on-call force for external opera-
tions, together with a possible pooling of appropriate national air mobile assets into a European
rapid action force; " (1990);
- 
" Establish in co-operation with the United Nations and especially with the relevant Gulf states, a
WEU maritime presence in the Gulf area in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels
Treaty with as many member countries as possible contributing assets at least on an occasional
basis, to help maintain peace and stability in the region and support diplomatic efforts directed
towards the same ends; " (1991);
- 
" Design a symbol of specific European identity to represent WEU and urge member countries to
use it to distinguish their military forces 
- 
ships, aircraft, vehicles and personnel 
- 
taking part in
WEU operations. Personnel serving in the Planning Cell should be among the first recipients of
suchabadge."(1992);
- 
" Re-examine the respective tasks and r6les of the United States and its European allies in the
maintenance of peace and security on the European continent and take the appropriate measures
to ensure that under no circumstances'rvill it be possible for a security vacuum to develop for lack
of appropriate preparation, co-operation and co-ordination; " (1993),
l. Adopted by the Assembly on l5th June 1994 during the first part of the fortieth ordinary session (5th sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Sir Keith Speed on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document l4l5).
January 1994 confirmed WEU's
recognised the European defence
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RrcoMNaeNDs rHAT rns CouNcrr-
1. Actively encourage member states to maintain and develop naval and maritime assets, co-ordina-
ting natio_naljapabilities in line with a defined WEU naval and maritime policy and ensuring comparibi-
lity with NATO's naval doctrine wherever possible;
2. Establish a working relationship on maritime matters with the European Commission's Directorate
for Maritime Transport and develop links with appropriate international-maritime agencies such as the
Intemational Maritime Organisation and the International Hydrographic Organisation as well as with
maritime-orientated non-member countries in strategic areas;
3. Consult the North Atlantic Council to review the abolition of the Channel Command so that the
European dimension in the new NATO command structure is not neglected 
- 
establishing WEU liaison
teams with NATO major and major subordinate commanders is a possible initial solution;
4. Consider the expansion of the Channel Committee to include all WEU full and associate members
from the Atlantic seaboard and also the establishment of a " Mediterranean Committee " to encompass all
Mediterranean full and associate members;
5. Give, via the WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff Committee, the Heads of European Navies forum a for-
mal status and a specific mandate to contribute to the development of a WEU naval and maritime policy
in conjunction with the Planning Cell;
6. Staffthe Planning Cell with adequate numbers and levels of naval personnel, including marines and
representatives of the other maritime services as required to develop forthwith co-operation in the follo-
wmg areas:
- 
joint task force planning;
- 
command and control for naval operations (including naval intelligence gathering);
- 
logistics (including transport by sea);
- 
merchant ship construction and specialist requirements for both numbers and types of merchant
ship as well as safeguards for recruiting and training appropriate crews;
- 
policy for the effective employment of both naval and merihant marine reserves;
- 
a coherent naval exercise policy and programme;
7. Give priority to practical aspects of aero-maritime and amphibious co-operation such as the need to
co-ordinate the operational availability of at least one carrier amongst appropriate member nations and to
maintaining and furthering amphibious capabilities as a componentparrof aEuropean rapid action force;
8. Encourqge the co-ordination of operations, using existing naval assets, especially in the Caribbean
and notably with the United States authorities, to combat the drug traffrcking whith undermines European
security;
9. Seek to develop co-operation in the domain of naval procurement 
- 
hulls as well as systems 
-
through the Western European Armaments Group and emphasise the naval and maritime dim6nsion of
satellite observation when developing WEU's Tonej6n Sate[ite Centre and the WEU Earth Observation
Satellite programme;
10. Create and award, in conjunction with national authorities, a WEU campaign medal to those who
participate in operations under the aegis of WEU.
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REPLY OF TIIE COI]NCIL'
to Recommendation 562
1. Recognising the need to strengthen European co-operation on defence in the framework of WEU,
WEU member staies also pay more attention to maritime forces. WEU's usefulness for European co-ordi-
nation in crisis-management having been proven in maritime action in two Gulf wars and in the Adriatic,
WEU member states have agreed to develop a mechanism for generating WEU maritime forces on a mis-
sion-oriented basis, as envisaged in the Petersberg declaration of 19th June 1992.
The compatibility with NATO's naval doctrine and procedures is based on Article IV of the modi-
fled Brussels Treaty and is ensured by the prevailing co-operative working methods of western navies.
2. The Council is aware of the need to establish links with European maritime bodies and countries
wherever possible. The establishment of a working relationship on maritime matters with the European
Commissi-on's Directorate for Maritime Transport could be set up in the framework of Annex IV to Chap-
ter IV of the document on the implementation of the Treaty on European Union concerned with the links
between the Union and WEU.
As for the development of links with appropriate international maritime agencies as well as with
maritime-oriented non-member countries in sftategic areas, it is generally agreed that the relevant diplo-
matic mission of the country holding the WEU presidency acts as a contact point for the organisation.
3. The Council considers that the disbandment of Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN) and the
absorption of this area into the Allied Command Europe (ACE) is the result of a careful assessment of
evolving requirements mainly based on the changed politico-military situation in Europe and is not due to
any neglect of the European dimension in the new NAIO command structure.
Taking due note of the Assembly's recommendation to establish WEU liaison teams with NAIO
major and major subordinate commanders, the Council will consider this recommendation in the context
of the deepening working relations between WEU and NATO.
4. As stated in the Honourable Parliamentarian's report, on which the present recommendation is
based, the decisions of the members of the Channel Committee not to abandon their independent r6le and
to continue to meet and ensure the continuity of European interest in this important area is also conside-
red very positive by the Council.
They constitute a high level forum whose advice will be of benefit to NAIO as well as to WEU.
The same would apply for the establishment of a " Mediterranean Committee ". This idea could be
the subject of a preliminary examination by the Council's Mediterranean Group, reinforced by naval dele-
gates from capitals.
5. The Heads of European Navies forum has a wider membership than WEU. It is intended to
enhance maritime co-operation in Europe, from which also WEU will benefit.
6. Although personnel from the navies of member countries are represented in all operational sections
of the Planning Cell, the question of adequate numbers and levels of naval personnel on the PC staff can
only be thoroughly addressed once the issues of rotation of PC personnel and the review of the internal
organisation have been examined.
As regards the development of co-operation in the areas of:
- 
joint task force planning;
- 
command and control for naval operations (including naval intelligence gathering);
- 
logistics (including transportby sea);
- 
merchant ship construction and specialist requirements for both numbers and types of merchant
ships as well as safeguards for recruiting and training appropriate crews;
- 
policy for the effective employment of both naval and merchant marine reserves;
- 
a coherent naval exercise policy and programme
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 3lst October 1994.
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these aspects are covered to a large extent by the PC's work on the
- 
WEU operation plan Combined Endeavour
- 
list of FAWEU
- 
WEU strategic mobility study
- 
WEU generic evacuation planning
- 
WEU command and control
- 
the PC's exercise observation activity
- 
study on multinational formations
- 
intelligence policy long-term objectives,
and !y virtue of the experience gained from two operations in the Gulf and the current combined opera-
tion Sharp Guard in the Adriatic.
7. The Council informs the Assembly that maritime assets can also be FAWEU.
In accordance with its terms of reference, the PC is tasked to compile a list of FAWEU and a ques-
tionnaire was prepared and distributed to nations. The aim was to produce a list of FAWEU from which
apggpriate force packages for use in funre planning could be developed. A detailed progress report on
FAWEU activity has been forwarded for the information of ministers. Meanwhile, the piocess of checking
the individual contributions with the nations concerned is proceeding. It is intended that the complete list
of FAWEU should be ready for the next ministerial meeting in autumn.
As far as the maintaining and furthering of amphibious capabilities as a component part of a Euro-
pean rapid action force is concerned, the Council considers that the United Kingdom/lrletheilands Amphi-
bious Force is a readily available large unit that is already available for military tasks under WEU aus-
pices.
8. The Council considers that the fight against drug trafficking at European level is the responsibility
o!_the Egropeq4 Union pursuant to the " provisions on co-operation in the fields of justice and homb
affairs " in the Treaty on European Union.
WEU remains fully prepared to play its r6le in accordance with the Treaty on European Union and
the Maastricht declaration to respond to requests from the European Union concerning its decisions and
actions having defence implications.
9. The Council takes note of the Assembly's recommendation to " seek to develop co-operation in the
domain of naval procurement - hulls as well as systems - through the Western European Armaments
Group ".
This recommendation could be the subject of a preliminary examination by the Eurolongterm Sea
Sub-Group, whose aim is to promote effective long-term military planning by establishing a sound
conceptual basis for co-operation between WEU nations with a view to determining military capabilities
and equipment requirements beyond a ten year time-frame. In the meantime, work continues in the
WEAG towards the opening of defence markets through competition and the maximisation of opportuni-
ties for European collaboration through the harmonisation of iequirements.
Since the main tasks of the WEU Satellite Cenffe are aimed at:
treaty verification;
various aspects of crisis-monitoring;
environmental monitoring,
which all have a maritime and naval dimension, the Council can assure the Assembly that this
dimension will be taken fully into consideration when developing the WEU Satellite Cenffe and deciding
on the WEU earth observation system.
10. The Council fully endorses the Assembly's recommendation to create and award, in conjunction
with national authorities, a WEU campaign medal to those who participate in operations under the aegis
of WEU. The presidency is preparing a proposal in this respect.
99
DOCUMENT 1432
RECOMMENDATION 563'
on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union
for the fi.nancial year 1994'
i
The Assembly, i
O Considering that:
(a) the Council has communicated to the Assembly the budgets of the ministerial organs for the
financial year 1994;
(b) thebudget of the Secretariat-General comprises flve sections, of which section D relates to the ,
study on medium- and long-term studies on space and section E to the Planning Cell;
(c)the Torrej6n Satellite Centre has entered its second.experimental phase and the Ministerial i
Council is proposing to discuss the future of the Cenfie towards the end of 1994;
(d) the Council has allocated WEAG an operating budget for the financial year 1994 under a special
procedure and that this budget is financed by thirteen countries;
(e) the Council still has not undertaken the study recommended earlier by the Assembly leading
to possible approval of a private health insurance scheme instead of the French social security
system, 
i
RpcorralreNDs rHAr rns CouNcn-
1. Communicate to it any decisions that are taken on the operation of the Torrej6n Satellite Cenfte
after completion of the experimental phase at the end of 1994;
2. Communicate to it the final arrangements for the preparation and management of WEAG's budget;
3. Take the necessary measures for WEU staff in Paris to be affiliated to a private health insurance
scheme upon termination of the current agreement with the health insurance branch of the French
national social securiry scheme.
l. Adopted by the Assembly on l5th June 1994 during the first part of the fortieth ordinary session (5th sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Covi on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration (Docum ent I 425).
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL'
to Recommendation 563
l. The Council will keep the Assembly duly informed by means of regular reports on the decisions it
will take on the operation of the WEU Satellite Centre after the completion of the experimental phase.
2. The Council infqms the Assembly that the 1994 WEAG budget has already been approved by the
National Armaments Directors (NADs), the Budget and Organisation Committee and the-eouncil. Calls
for contributions were also issued after the approval.
As for the remaining budget-balance of the Permanent Secretariat of WEAG in Lisbon, this has
been transferred to WEU Brussels and will be reimbursed in 1994 (or carried over to 1995 if member
states prefer).
The WEAG budget is in preparation.
3. The Council considers that the necessary measures to be taken for WEU staff in Paris to be affilia-
ted to a private health insurance scheme should be considered in the general context of relations with the
host country; the Council could ask the Head of Administration of the WEU Institute for Security Studies
to consider this question in greater detail.
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RECOMMENDATION 564'
on the rdle andfuture of nuclear weapons2
The Assembly,
(i) Welcoming the large reductions in both the United States and Russian nuclear arsenals as a conse-
quence of the START I and START II treaties and the end of the cold war;
(ii) Conscious that START I and START II will not be fully implemented before the year 2003;
(iii) Noting that the United States is at present making a full reassessment of its nuclear posture and is-
showing true political determination to prtpare a new reduction in strategic arsenals in the framework of
a future START Itr treaty;
(iv) Noting, however, that Russia, for its part, is increasingly tempted, mainly due to the decline of its
conventional forces, to make its strategic nuclear capability the centrepiece of its defence policy;
(v) Assessing present political instability in Russia and the former Soviet republics and the ensuing
dangers;
(vi) Noting that there are still doubts about whether Russia really wishes to ratify and implement the
START II treaty;
(vii) Noting that, notwithstanding the end of the cold war and the signing of the historic nuclear arms
reduction treaties, the mutual relationship of deterrence between Russia and the western nuclear powers is
still topical, including the possibility of first-use of nuclear weapons which is still the keystone of the
doctrine of deterrence everywhere;
(vili) Noting that, notwithstanding recent efforts to establish confidence between the former cold war
adversaries at the level ofpolitical leaders and experts, there is still an astonishing lack ofreciprocal confi-
dence, wish for transparency and mutual understanding in many other circles;
(ix) Conscious that if greater account is not taken of lingering suspicions, prejudices and fundamental
differences in military doctrines and diverging interests in foreign policy, the establishment of new rela-
tionships of security, stability and confidence between the members of the Atlantic Alliance on the one
hand and of the Russian Federation on the other may be jeopardised;
(x) Hoping, in this respect, that Russia will agree to join the partnership for peace proposal proposed by
the Atlantic Alliance;
(xi) Welcoming the bilateral agreements reached between the United States and Russia and the United
Kingdom and Russia to detarget nuclear arms, even if the value of these agreements is symbolic rather
than intrinsic;
(xii) Believing that other measures, such as taking most strategic missiles off alert status and separating
nuclear warheads from their missiles should be envisaged;
(xiii) Expressing in general the wish that the theory of mutual assured destruction (MAD) should be
replaced by a policy of mutual assured co-operation (MAC);
(xiv) Noting that it would be totally illogical to start the implementation of a European common foreign
and security policy (CFSP) including the framing by WEU of a common defence policy " which might in
time lead to a common defence " without closely examining the r6le of the French and British nuclear
forces in the definition of a common defence policy of the European Union;
(n) Welcoming the work of the permanent Anglo-French Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and
Doctrine which among other things has confirmed that there are many points of convergence in the assess-
ments made by the two countries;
(xvi) Aware that the existence of a formidable nuclear arsenal in Russia continues to determine the struc-
ture and deployment of the nuclear forces of France, the United Kingdom and the United States;
l. Adopted by the Assembly on l6th June 1994 during the first part of the fortieth ordinary session (6th sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. De Decker on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1420).
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(rvii) Noting that, regarding proliferation, there are doubts about whether the possession of nuclear
weapons by the offlcial nuclear weapon states plays a r6le in deterring third countries from procuring their
own nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass desffuction;
(miii) Recognising that, particularly in the United States, the weight of nuclear deterrence as a means of
preventing war tends to diminish while extended nuclear deterrence is also losing credibility;
(xix) Noting that the 700 United States B-61 nuclear gravity bombs remaining in Europe after NATO's
October 1991 decision play a purely political and symbolic r6le;
(xx) Noting that, increasingly, nuclear deterrence in circumstances today is truly credible only if the vital
interests of a nation or group of nations are under direct threat from the power to be deterred;
(xxi) Noting that, in regard to the common security policy of the European Union and in the framework
of WEU, a study should be made on what France and the United Kingdom consider to be their vital inter-
ests which are protected by their nuclear means;
(xrii) Regretting that there is not sufficient cohesion in the defence policies of European countries and,
despite bold general declarations, there is not yet cohesion and understanding between our countries
regarding the development and future of their strategic relationship with Russia, although this would be
indispensable for introducing any lasting system of security in Europe;
(xxiii) Welcoming the granting of associate status to the Central European countries of the Forum of
Consultation;
(xxiv) Emphasising, however, that WEU's policy of stronger security links with its Central European part-
ners will contribute little to Europe's security if it is not accompanied by frequent political and military
consultations with Russia and the other European republics of the CIS aiming at the establishment of a
strategic relationship based on a thorough understanding of, and respect for mutual interests;
(xru) Noting that it is of the greatest importance to intensify and further improve international co-opera-
tion in the struggle against proliferation, in particular by extending the non-proliferation treaty in 1995,
improving the missile technology control r6gime and establishing a follow-up organisation with extended
membership as a successor to Cocom;
(xxvi) Aware that none of these existing or future non-proliferation r6gimes can guarantee that a country
with sufficient financial resources and zeal will not acquire ballistic missiles or weapons of mass des-
truction;
(xxvii) Noting that there is an urgent need for a coherent and co-ordinated policy among official nuclear
weapon states to cover contingencies in which a proliferant thfud country might threaten to use a nuclear
weapon;
(xxviii) Recognising that there is a need to define a coherent European counter-proliferation policy,
drawing inspiration from the discussions which are already being held in the framework of the Atlantic
Alliance following the recent United States initiative;
(xxix) Recalling the results of the Assembly's Rome symposium on anti-missile defence for Europe (20th-
21st April 1993) and in particular the Assembly's recommendation that the Council decide on the basis of
a careful risk assessment whether and to what extent it will be necessary to mandate European industry to
conduct a feasibility study regarding the requirements for a cost-effective anti-missile protection system
for Europe;
(xxx) Taking note of the fact that the WEU Council, in its reply to Recommendation 540, has pointed out
that nuclear questions are not, at the present time, on its agenda;
(xrri) Insisting, however, that the preceding considerations should be an incentive to redefine the r6le of
nuclear weapons for the security of Europe, realising that they cannot be disinvented and, if only for that
reason, they will continue to be deployed and will continue to play an important r6le in the foreseeable
future in international relations,
Recouupttos rHAT rue Couttcu-
l. Establish a sffategic study group within WEU:
- 
to examine the r6le and future of nuclear weapons for European security including the different
aspects of intra-European extended nuclear deterrence;
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- 
to examine the r6le all the WEU member states might play in defining a future European nuclear
sffategy;
- 
then to study the possibility of creating a nuclear co-ordination body within WEU;
- 
to examine the military aspects of an active European counter-proliferation policy;
- 
to examine the possibilities of Europe helping the CIS to dismantle its excess nuclear warheads
following the bilateral agreements and unilateral decisions reached between the United States and
the republics of the CIS which possess nuclear weapons;
2. Take steps to intensify relations with the European republics of the CIS, in particular Russia and
Ukraine, in particular to ensure that the definition of a European defence identity does not arouse new sus-
picion or provoke reactions which might run counter to the final goal of creating a collective European
security order;
3. Ensure that the abovementioned initiatives are pursued in an atmosphere of absolute transparency
with Westem Europe's North American allies in order to make certain that they support the development
of a European security and defence identity.
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL'
to Recommendation 564
1. Under the present circumstances there is for European defence, for the forseeable future, no
alternative for a strategy - to protect peace and prevent war or any kind of coercion 
- 
based on conventio-
nal and nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of any
aggression incalculable and unacceptable.
Europeans have a major responsibility with regard to defence in both the conventional and the
nuclear field. In addition to their r6le of national deterrent, the British and French nuclear weapons contri-
bute to the global deterrence of the North Atlantic Alliance and Europe in accordance with the declaration
of the North Atlantic Council of 1974 in Ottawa, and the The Hague platform of WEU of 1987. NATO's
new strategic concept of 1991 has recognised that " the independant nuclear forces of the United Kingdom
and France, which have a deterrent r6le of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of
the allies. "
In the Kirchberg declaration, ministers recalled the longer-term perspective of a common defence
policy within the European Union, which might lead in time to a common defence compatible with the
alliance. In this spirit, they tasked the Permanent Council to begin work on the formulation of a common
European defence policy with a view to presenting preliminary conclusions at the next ministerial meeting
in the Netherlands.
As far as the examination of military aspects of a European non-proliferation policy are concerned,
the Council informs the Assembly that with the alliance policy framework on proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction issued at the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Istanbul on 9th June
1994, NAIO has been directed to consider the areas to reinforce ongoing prevention efforts, to reduce the
proliferation threat and to develop the protection against it.
In accordance with the strategic concept, the alliance also serves as a transatlantic forum for allied
consultations on any issue that affects the members' vital interests, including possible developments
posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common
concern.
In this context, the Council believes that WEU meetings on non-proliferation should take place on
an ad hoc basis and back-to-back with NAIO's Defence Proliferation Group, when there is a r6le for WEU
to contribute to work on proliferation.
Furthermore, the Council refers to efforts in the field of non-proliferation within the framework of
the CFSP, notably the joint action regarding the extention of the Non Proliferation Treaty.
Considering that " the examination of the possibilities of Europe helping the CIS to dismantle its
excess nuclear warheads following the bilateral agreements and unilateral decisions reached between the
United States and the republics of the CIS which possess nuclear weapons " is an issue of common
concern, the Council draws the Assembly's attention to the language of paragraph 9 of the Kirchberg
declaration:
" Ministers, in the context of the growing r6le of WEU for promoting peace, security and stability
in Europe, agreed on the importance of developing dialogue and exchanges of information on issues
of common concern between WEU and Russia.
Ministers welcomed the Moscow trilateral statement on 14th January 1994 on the elimination of
nuclear arms from Ukraine as an important contribution to security and stability in Europe. They
agreed that the fulfilment of these commitments widens the basis for the development of dialogue
and exchanges of information with Ukraine on issues of common concern. Ministers instructed the
Permanent Council to examine appropriate ways in order to achieve this objective. "
2. The Council is of the view that developing dialogue and exchange of information with Russia and
Ukraine will lead to full understanding on the part of our interlocutors of the nature of the developing
European security and defence identity.
3. The Council recalls that the relations between WEU and NATO continue to be based on transpa-
rency and complementarity, as already often underlined in WEU's ministerial communiqu6s and declara-
tions.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on26th October 1994.
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I. Introduction
The reactivation of WEU was completed
with its member states' adoption of the WEU
declaration of Maastricht in November 1991. A
first and particularly fruitful phase in the history
of the reactivated oganisation came to an end with
the Kirchberg declaration and the switch from
annual to six-monthly presidencies of the WEU
Council.
With enlargement to include nine Central
European associate partners, 24 countries now sit
on the Council for consultation and joint thinking
on the conditions for European security, including
its operational aspects. This major step forward
towards constructing the security dimension of
Europe is the outcome of a political initiative of
the utmost importance, developed in the context
of the rapprochement between the states of Cen-
tral Europe and the European Union. WEU is thus
in the forefront ofthe process ofpreparing for the
accession of these states to the Union and, as a
consequence, to WEU. It is also called upon to
contribute towards implementing other forms of
9th November 1994
co-operation - the partnership for peace and the
stability pact - whose aim it is to defuse conflicts
in the continent of Europe.
Lastly, the Kirchberg declaration reflects
The Hague platform, in that the Ministerial Coun-
cil has directed the Permanent Council to begin
work on defining a common European defence
policy. The preliminary conclusions will be pre-
sented to the Ministerial Council to be held in
Noordwijk in November 1994. WEU is thus
embarking once again upon deepening the doctri-
nal and operational concepts of a European defen-
ce, viewed as an essential element of the Atlantic
Alliance and as the military tool designed to sup-
port joint actions defined and conducted by the
European Union under the common foreign and
security policy.
In setting up a Politico-Military Working
Group, the Council has also acquired the means of
conducting thinking within WEU on European
requirements for the effective use of multinationaljoint force packages, where appropriate under its
command. WEU will thus help to gear the allian-
First part of the fortieth annual report
of the Council to the Assembly
(1st January to 30th lune 1994)
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ce's command structures to the demands for rapid,
flexible reaction and to the modalities for making
the alliance's collective assets available on the
basis of consultations within the North Atlantic
Council.
As regards the new operational missions
defined in the Petersberg declaration, a basic
document on peace-keeping operations has been
presented to ministers, who have taken note. In
planning the organisation and supervision of
Mostar police under the administration mandate
given to the European Union, WEU has once
again demonstrated its flexibility and readiness to
exercise responsibilities outside the strictly mili-
tary field.
WEU is now in a position to become an
operational organisation that can meet the expec-
tations of its member states and, within the frame-
work of its institutional autonomy, cafiy out any
mandates it may be given.
II. Activities of the Permanent Council
and the CouncilWorking Group
Apart from those meetings where circum-
stances dictated that a specific subject be addres-
sed, the Council's agendas have continued to
contain an item devoted to the report on working
group meetings and an item on topical questions.
The Permanent Council has paid particular
attention to the preparation of draft decisions for
submission to the Ministerial Council and to their
implementation once adopted. In the context of
relations between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance,
the Council unanimously welcomed the spirit of
the deliberations of the heads of state and govern-
ment of the alliance and their intentions and ini-
tiatives set out in the summit declaration, in parti-
cular the full support given to the development of
a European security and defence identity within
the renewed transatlantic partnership and the
strengthening of the European pillar of the allian-
ce through WEU.
The Council also welcomed the readiness
of the alliance to make available its collective
assets, on the basis of consultations in the North
Atlantic Council, for Western European Union
operations undertaken by the European allies in
pursuit of their common foreign and security
policy.
In the spirit of complementarity and trans-
parency needed for the effective implementation
of the work of both organisations, the Council
kept regularly on its agenda all the issues which
had emerged from the summit.
The Council agreed on the text of the terms
of reference for a Politico-Military Working
Group (PMWG) operating under the Council's
authority, as part of the follow-up to the declara-
tion by the Council of Ministers in Luxembourg
and to the alliance summit, especially aspects of
the emergence of a European security and defence
identity (ESDD.
The Council discussed relations between
WEU and the European Union, and more specifi-
cally the implementation of Annex fV, concerning
working relations between the WEU Secretariat-
General and the EU Council Secretariat as well as
relations with the European Commission.
The Council has been kept directly infor-
med on the activities of the WEU Institute for
Security Studies, the establishment of the Satelli-
te Centre in Torrej6n and the work of the Planning
Cell. It has continued to acknowledge the vital
importance of the institutional dialogue with the
Assembly, and followed with great interest the
debates and votes of the second part of the thirty-
ninth ordinary session. Lastly, the Council took a
number of administrative and budgetary decisions
on the basis of opinions submitted by the Budget
and Organisation Committee.
Apart from preparing the ground for the
Permanent Council's discussions, the Council
Working Group's agenda ranged over specific
questions conceming the implementation of the
modalities document in the status of association,
evacuation planning, the formulation of criteria
for receiving high-ranking officials, staff recruit-
ment procedures, use of the WEUCOM network,
the possible purchase of the WEU building in
Brussels, the residual functions of the Agency for
the Control of Armaments, the arrangement of
meetings of the Council and its working groups as
well as participation in the session of the WEU
parliamentary Assembly.
(a) Topical questions
(i) Situation informer Yugoslavia
The Greek Representative, on behalf of the
presidency of the Twelve, has regularly briefed
the Permanent Council on the activities and
d6marches of the European Community aimed at
reaching a peaceful settlement of the conflict in
former Yugoslavia.
The Permanent Council has closely moni-
tored developments on the ground, its discussions
focusing on the implementation of the Danube
embargo, participation of naval forces of WEU
member states in the Adriatic embargo, and
WEU's police contribution to the EU's adminis-
tration of the Mostar district. The Experts Groups
and the Mostar Working Group, in co-operation
with the Planning Cell, dealt mainly with this pos-
sibility.
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The presidency has regularly briefed the
Council on developments in the WEU Danube
operation. The Council discussed the " Han
Kubrat " incident involving a convoy carrying
some 5 000 tonnes of fuel which, on 5th March
1994, refused to stop when challenged. The fin-
dings of the enquiry carried out by the Bulgarian
authorities showed that this was clearly a criminal
act in which the threat of environmental terrorism
prevented any intervention by force. Following
this incident, Bulgaria and Romania have taken
additional administrative and legal measures to
prevent any reculTence.
The Council also closely followed the
conduct of the WEU/NATO combined operation
Sharp Guard to strengthen the embargo in the
Adriatic.
The main point of focus of the Council's
discussions on the situation in former Yugoslavia
was the WEU police contribution to the European
Union administration in Mostar.
Following the Washington agreement bet-
ween the Croats and the Bosnians, WEU was
approached for a possible contribution to the EU
administration of Mostar, as envisaged by this
agreement. WEU has, at the request of the EU,
focused on the possibility of a contribution to the
supervision of the local police forces, their future
organisation as a single, unified force and some of
the ways in which WEU could contribute to the
discharge of police duties.
WEU's involvement is contingent upon the
negotiations on Mostar between the European
Union's troika and the parties on the spot. Through-
out the negotiations, the presidency has kept in
close touch with the EU bodies and has been
involved in the negotiations with the parties on
the ground. Likewise, WEU has taken part in the
preparatory mission decided on by the European
Union.
At this mission's request, WEU sent two
senior police experts to Mostar to act as advisers
to this mission, to examine the conditions under
which WEU might contribute police forces and to
promote confidence-building measures between
the local forces to help create those conditions.
The Mostar Council Working Group also
discussed draft personnel requirements, initial
costs for establishing the WEU police element in
Mostar, organisational aspects and the distribu-
tion of financial responsibilities between WEU
and the EU.
(ii) Situation in Rwanda
The WEU Permanent Council met on 17th
and 21st June to discuss the situation in Rwanda.
A number of member states confirmed their
readiness to contribute to the initiative to alleviate
the terrible sufferings in Rwanda, subject to a new
decision from the United Nations Securiry Coun-
cil, taking into account the time needed to gather
the necessary resources for the effective deploy-
ment of the expanded UNAMIR II.
In this context, the Council has decided to
give WEU's support to the efforts of its member
states by co-ordinating their contributions.
To this end, the Council confirmed the
mandate given at its frst meeting to the Planning
Cell and instructed it to act as a contact and co-
ordination point between contributing states and
the headquarters commanding the operation.
The Council welcomed the readiness of
certain African states to contribute to the interna-
tional humanitarian efforts in Rwanda.
The Council continued to monitor the situa-
tion in Rwanda in the light of the decisions of the
United Nations Security Council.
(iii) Relations with the countries of Central
Europe
At their meeting in Luxembourg on 22nd
November 1993, ministers reaffirmed the impor-
tance they attached to WEU's relations with Cen-
tral European consultation partners. In this
context, ministers requested the Permanent Coun-
cil to reflect on an enhanced status and its content,
including the Franco-German proposal of 12th
November 1993, for those consultation partners
who had already concluded or would conclude a
Europe Agreement with the European Union.
Thereafter, the Permanent Council undertook to
define the precise modalities by which its rela-
tions with its consultation partners could be quali-
tatively enhanced.
On 17th January, the Counsellor's Group of
the Forum of Consultation met to prepare for a
meeting at ambassadorial level on 25th January;
that meeting provided an opportuniry for a detai
led exchange of views on their preferences as
regards the content of the enhanced status likely
to be offered them.
In the light of these discussions, the WEU
Council formulated proposals on an enhanced sta-
tus to be submitted to consultation partners.
The enhanced status which was subse-
quently proposed reflected the Council's wish
firstly to bind these countries more closely into a
security relationship with Westem Europe and
secondly to enhance theirrelations with WEU, the
defence component of the European Union, at a
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time when they were developing their links with
the European Union itself in the perspective of
becoming a member of the Union in the future.
The last meeting of the Forum of Consulta-
tion before formal approval of the status of asso-
ciation took place at ambassadorial level on 3rd
May 1994.
The Forum had a final exchange of views
on the proposed enhanced status and prepared the
meeting of the Forum of Consultation at ministe-
rial level to be held on 9th May 1994 in Luxem-
bourg. Partners discussed the ministerial agenda,
the draft communiqu6 and organisational arrange-
ments.
Meeting in Luxembourg on 9thMay 1994,
the WEU Council of Ministers and the ministers
for foreign affairs and defence of the nine partners
in the Forum of Consultation agreed on the status
whereby the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of
Hungary, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of
Lithuania, the Republic of Poland, Romania and
the Slovak Republic will become associate part-
ners of WEU.
Following the WEU Ministerial Council,
the first Permanent Council meeting with the
associate partners took place on 27th May. The
Council " at 24 " has met three times since the
new status entered into effect. Its agenda has
covered topical questions, information on WEU
activities, the follow-up to the Kirchberg declara-
tion, the European security environment and the
situation in former Yugoslavia.
Several government representatives from
the states of Central Europe paid courtesy calls on
the WEU headquarters: on 27th January, the
Lithuanian President, Mr. Algirdas Brazauskas;
on 3rd February, the Polish Prime Minister, Mr.
Waldemar Pawlak; on 14th February, the Latvian
Prime Minister, Mr. Valdis Birkovs and, on 8th
March, the Hungarian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Mr. Geza Jeszenszky.
On 6th-8th April the Secretary-General
paid a visit to the President, the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, his deputy and the Minister of
Defence of Bulgaria.
The Institute for Security Studies has conti-
nued to play an important r6le in WEU's contacts
with the countries of Central Europe.
III. Activities of the intergovernmental bodies
(a) Council working groups
At each of its meetings, the Council took
note of the results of its working groups' activities
since the previous meeting. The summary records
were discussed as necessary.
(b) WEU Institute for Security Studies (ISS)
The Institute Director attended all those
Council meetings where the agenda warranted his
presence. The Institutes's quarterly reports to the
Council provided an opportunity for exchanges of
view on the current work of the ISS.
(c) WEU Satellite Centre
The Centre's Director attended Council
meetings to brief the Council on the progress of
the Centre's activities during its experimental
period.
IV. Activities of the SpecialWorking Groap
The Special Working Group had only one
meeting during the first half of the year. The meet-
ing focused almost exclusively on the enhanced
status to be offered to the consultation partners.
The group discussed the four main subjects in
connection with the offer: the nature of the enhan-
ced status and the document to be agreed, the
scope ofthe enhanced status, the arrangements for
enhanced political consultations and participation
in WEU's activities.
The results of the SWG's discussions were
thereafter submitted to the Council for further
consideration.
The SWG also had an exchange of views
on the document of WEU's r6le in peace-keeping
and on anti-missile defence, notably in the light of
the decisions of the NATO summit.
V. Activities of the Defence Representatives
Group
Pursuant to the mandates given by the Per-
manent Council, the Defence Representatives
Group, in close co-operation with the Planning
Cell, focused on the following issues:
- 
Forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU)
and humanitarian missions
- 
WEU involvement in peace-keeping mis-
sions
- 
Air-maritime co-operation
- 
WEU command and control
- 
Strategic mobility
Forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU) and
humanitarian missions: [n close co-operation
with the nations replying to the defence planning
questionnaire (DPQ) and an additional WEU-
related questionnaire, a full list of FAWEU indica-
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ted by the nations, including certain forces identi-
fied as especially suited for humanitarian opera-
tions, is being compiled and will be completed for
the next ministerial meeting. Further to the propo-
sal from one of the partners on force modules for
humanitarian operations, the Planning Cell has
undertaken to contact the military authorities in
the various states to finalise the list of these
forces.
WEU involvement in peace-keeping mis-
sions: The DRG finalised its examination of the
operational document drawn up by the Planning
Cell which formed part of the report to ministers
on WEU's r6le in peace-keeping.
Air-maritime co-operation: The DRG fina-
lised its work on WEU operation plan Combined
Endeavour (which is designed to provide a
mechanism for the generation and deployment of
WEU maritime forces in accordance with the
Petersberg declaration). The operation plan was
endorsed by the CHODs at their meeting on
29th March 1994, and was approved by the Coun-
cil of Ministers.
WEU command and control: The DRG has
examined the analysis made by the Planning Cell
of the possible structures for the Command and
Control of WEU operations. The DRG placed this
subject among the priorities on its agenda.
Strategic mobility: The DRG supported the
Planning Cell in producing the WEU strategic
study by providing co-ordination. Details of the
study are contained in the Planning Cell's report.
Among the other specific tasks carried out
by the group, mention should be made of:
-the preparation of the agenda for the
Chiefs of Defence Staff meeting on 29th
March 1994,
- 
examination of the follow-up to be given
to the CHOD and ministerial meetings,
- 
examination of the issue of generic plan-
ning,
- 
examination of future DRG activities,
- 
the issue of vacancies in the Planning
Cell.
VI. Activities of the Planning Cell
Further progress has been made in the areas
of the Planning Cell's overall organisation and
planning capability. The Planning Cell's main
effort was in long-term planning activity concer-
ning the future modus operandi of the WEU. In
addition the Planning Cell has been involved in
several areas of contingency activity including
Sharp Guard, Mostar and Rwanda.
In more detail, the work of the Planning
Cell has centred on the following topics:
WEU operation plan Combined Endeavour
$fEU OPLAN 001): The aim of this OPLAN is
to provide a mechanism for the generation and
deployment of WEU maritime forces (WEU-
MARFOR) in response to a specific requirement
of the WEU Council in order to accomplish mis-
sions in accordance with the Petersberg declara-
tion. During their meeting on 9th May, the minis-
ters approved the document.
List of FAWEU: One of the Planning Cell's
terms of reference is to compile a list of FAWEU,
and a questionnaire has been prepared and distri-
buted to nations. The aim was to produce a list of
FAWEU from which could be developed appro-
priate force packages for use in future planning
and in which specific forces for employment in
humanitarian operations could be identified.
Meanwhile, the process of checking individual
contributions with the nations concemed is pro-
ceeding.
WEU-related aspects of the adaption of
alliance structures: After the meeting of NATO
ministers in January, the Planning Cell immedia-
tely began an intemal study on the needs and the
possible ways ahead to implement the combinedjoint task force (CJTF) concept which emerged
from the summit declaration. Mandated by the
Council, the Planning Cell made a preliminary
analysis of the impact of CJTF on the WEU ope-
rational concept and submitted it to the Council in
February. The Council decided to continue the
work in a specific CJTF politico-military working
group. In accordance with its terms of reference,
the Planning Cell is authorised to take part in the
meetings of the group to support its work.
WEU strategic mobility study (WSMS):
The study is being conducted in two phases.
Phase 1 evaluates the WEU's current strategic
mobility capabilities. Phase 2 of the study will
define a WEU strategic mobility concept to
improve WEU's current capabilities in the field of
strategic mobility. During phase 2, it will be
essential to co-ordinate the Planning Cell's work
with that of NAIO's new Movement, Transporta-
tion and Mobility Management Advisory Group(MAG), in order to comply with the CHODs
directive that the WEU strategic mobility capabi-
lity should be complementary to and compatible
with that of NATO. At their meeting on 29th
March 1994,the CHODs endorsed the methodo-
logy for the study and supported the Planning
Cell's participation in the NATOMAG.
WEU involvement in peace-keeping mis-
sions: The Planning Cell drafted the operational
part of the document " WEU involvement in
peace-keeping missions ". This document des-
cribes basic principles, the conditions for any
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WEU involvement, the missions and tasks of
peace-keeping forces, generic planning conside-
rations and the characteristics and composition of
forces. The operational part was finalised and
integrated into the overall paper of the DRG.
WEU humanitarian missions: The field of
humanitarian missions remains a key area of
future work for the Planning Cell, building on the
recommendations made in the report CM (93) 19
to ministers onZZnd November 1993. A data base
for contingency planning, created in parallel with
the work on the list of FAWEU, is at an advanced
stage. Some preliminary links with other intema-
tional organisations are already well developed,
particularly with the United Nations Department
of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) and the Euro-
pean Community Humanitarian Organisation
(ECHO).
WEU generic evacuation planning:In the
area of humanitarian missions, the Planning Cell
received a mandate from the Permanent Council
in September 1993 to prepare a report on a pos-
sible contribution by WEU in the field of evacua-
tion planning of the EU. In parallel with this
work, the Planning Cell developed a draft generic
plan on evacuation. In January the report, together
with a second draft of the generic plan, was sent to
the CWG. Currently, a third draft plan is being
studied in capitals. In this context, the Planning
Cell has undertaken a study of lessons learned in
the Rwanda evacuation operation.
WEU - command and control: A " first step
analysis of command and control of WEU opera-
tions " was distributed in March to all military
delegates as a starting point for further debate.
The matter is particularly relevant in the context
of the emerging CJTF concept. In this initial
phase, the C2 study is being conducted at a purely
technical level.
Exercise activity: In accordance with WEU
exercise policy, the Planning Cell is in close liai-
son with the United Kingdom Planning Staff for
CPX Purple Nova 1994 (humanitarian missions).
It will be the first time that such an exercise is
planned and conducted within a WEU framework.
Spain is the host nation for the trinational (with
France and Italy) FTX Tramontana (evacuation).
Other WEU member nations may also participate.
Within both exercises, the Planning Cell's aims
include the analysis of command, control and
communications structures for WEU evacuation
operations and a study of HQ SOP and ROEs.
Rotation of Planning Cell personnel and
review of internal organisation: CHODs had invi-
ted the Planning Cell and the military delegates to
examine the timetable and procedures for the rota-
tion of Planning Cell personnel and, by lst Octo-
ber 1994, to review the intemal organisation of
the Planning Cell. In March, the Planning Cell
submitted to military delegates its analysis of the
rotation of Planning Cell personnel. It presented
the means to achieve rotation with a minimum of
discontinuity and included a timetable for the way
ahead. This document was forwarded to the
CHODs for their consideration. With regard to the
review of its internal organisation the Planning
Cell will present a detailed report in July/August
t994.
WEU headquarters ADP (automatic data
processing) plan: At their meeting in December
1993, the Communications Information System
Committee (CISC) recommended that informa-
tion from the Secretariat-General and the Plan-
ning Cell related to the ADP plan should be gathe-
red by a team tasked with the subject. The CIS
section of the Planning Cell was tasked to lead the
team. In the short term the objective is to conclude
the organisational and functional studies, in order
to define Planning Cell and Secretariat-General
requirements. Later, with the co-operation of
national ADP experts, the security requirements
and the technical concept will be defined. The
final goal is to identify an implementation strate-
gy for the ADP plan. Work with the Secretariat
started on 1 lth March 1994 anda series of actions
are ongoing in order to complete the plan as soon
as possible.
Contingency activity: The Planning Cell
presents weekly written reports to the Permanent
Council with the aim of informing the Council
about developments in the situation in the former
Republic of Yugoslavia, current operations like
Deny Flight, Sharp Guard and the ongoing Danu-
be embargo operation.
In December L993, the Planning Cell sub-
mitted a general plan to the Council for the pos-
sible contribution by WEU to the EU Administra-
tion in Mostar in the field of medical assistance,
underlining that, as the situation changes, the plan
will have to be updated based on accurate infor-
mation provided by forces in the field andlor fact-
finding missions sponsored by the EU. In April,
under the aegis of the EU, two members of the
Planning Cell joined an advance party to prepare
for a the EU administration for Mostar. Their spe-
cific responsibility was to assess the security envi-
ronment.
Most recently, in the context of the Rwanda
activities, the Planning Cell, as mandated by the
Council acts as a contact and co-ordination point
between contributing states and the headquarters
commanding the operation.
Linkage with other institutions and fora:
Planning Cell personnel have been involved in a
wide range of other activities including:
- 
active participation in the WEU peace-
keeping seminar in Luxembourg
(February 93);
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- 
attendance of relevant courses at the
NATO School in Oberammergau;
- 
attendance of meetings within the rele-
vant fora of:
- 
the United Nations,
- 
NAIO, including regular informal wor-
king level discussions with designated
POCs within IMS and SHAPE,
- 
the European Union, and
- 
WEU fora, including WEAG (Western
European Armaments Group), WELG
(Western European Logistic Group),
Eurolongterm and Eurocom.
VII. Activities of the Space Group
(i) The group's meetings were partially devo-
ted to monitoring progress with the setting up of
the Satellite Centre on the site and in the building
provided by the Spanish Government at the Torre-j6n airbase. The group heard regular reports by
the Director of the Satellite Centre on its recent
activities.
The Council and member states continued
to give the Centre a number of experimental tasks,
and prototype dossiers have been produced.
The group also furthered its discussions on
the need for contacts between the Satellite Centre
and NATO and the possibility of acquiring
imagery commercially from new sources.
(ii) Having assessed the Consortium's MSFS
report, the SMT produced a final report which
was discussed by the Space Group. In the light of
the conclusions of this report, the group presented
a calendar of activities and decisions for the
approval of ministers.
Subsequently, meeting in Luxembourg on
9th May l994,the WEU Ministerial Council:
" ... tasked the Space Group to prepare, for
their spring 1995 meeting, a proposal for
decision, including the preparation of a
draft memorandum of understanding
containing the detailed specifications, to be
concluded between the present WEU mem-
ber states. "
In the meeting following the WEU Ministe-
rial Council, the Space Group focused its atten-
tion mainly on the follow-up of the decisions
taken by the WEU Council of Ministers on the
activities of the Space Group.
(iii) Lastly, the group furthered its discussion on
the regulations applying to future equipment pro-
curement.
VIIL Activities of the Open Skies
Working Group
During the last six months, the Open Skies
Experts Group has made substantial progress.
Standard operating procedures (SOPs) for
WEU as a group of states parties under the Open
Skies Treaty have been developed in further
detail. When fully agreed, the SOPs will be refer-
red to WEU ministers for approval. The group is
confident that negotiations can be finalised by
November 1994.
Since the SOPs also have implications for
other states parties to the treaty, the group asked
WEU ministers' permission that the presidency
give a briefing on those principles at the Open
Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC) in
Vienna to other states parties to the treaty. The
acting presidency has explained and defended its
views with regard to the kind of group of states
parties its members form on 16th May in Vienna.
Two trial flights have taken place at the ini-
tiative of the United Kingdom in order to test the
draft SOPs in as realistic a situation as possible.
The United Kingdom, Germany, France and the
acting Netherlands presidency were involved in
the flights, and other WEU members were invited
to be present at the mission planning consultations
and the demonstration flight. The trials proved to
be very useful and resulted in several practical
recommendations that have found their way into
the SOPs.
IX. Activities of the Meditenanean Group
At the three meetings of the Meditenanean
Group held since December 1993, there was dis-
cussion and adoption of general terms of refer-
ence which will provide the framework for the
group's future activities; the topics to be discussed
will be defined and agreed on a case-by-case
basis.
In its future activities, the WEU Mediterra-
nean Group will take account of the implications
for its work of:
- 
the entry into force of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, the implementation of the
CFSP, WEU's r6le as the defence compo-
nent of the European Union and measures
aimed at ensuring close co-operation bet-
ween the European Union and WEU;
- 
the close working relations between
WEU and NATO, based on transparency
and complementarity.
At the Council's request, the Mediterranean
Group will undertake an analysis of such ques-
tions referred to it by the Council and may be
12
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assigned aspects of the work of other groups
coming within its field of competence. The group
may continue to call, via the Council, on the
expertise of the Institute for Security Studies.
Having considered the stage of the deve-
lopment reached in the dialogue with the Maghreb
countries, the group proposed that Egypt be inclu-
ded in this dialogue and that the dialogue be pla-
ced on a multilateral basis at experts level. It sub-
mitted for ministers' approval the terms of refe-
rence which it approved at its meeting on 2lst
April 1994, as well as a mandate for the dialogue
with non-WEU Mediterranean countries.
The group had an exchange of views on the
practical modalities of the twice-yearly sessions
of the group with experts nominated by the
governments of the non-WEU countries participa-
ting in the dialogue to be organised following the
ministerial mandate given to this effect on 9th
May 1994.
X. Transfer to WEU of certain Eurogroup
activities
(i) At the direction of the WEU Council at 13,
the prime aim of Eurocom is to promote interope-
rability between tactical communications systems
of the land forces of the WEU nations. A subsi-
diary aim is to exploit opportunities for interde-
pendence in systems and equipment development
and production, thereby making the best uses of
national resources. So far, Eurocom has pursued
these aims by agreeing and documenting the
necessary operational requirements and system
parameters recorded on baseline documents:
- 
a document which defines operational
concepts, requirements and perfoflnance
characteristics;
- 
a document which defines basic system
parameters and one which defines the
enhanced system;
- 
a document which defines interoperabil-
ity test specifications.
(ii) The aim of Eurolongterm is to promote
effective long-term military planning by establi-
shing a sound conceptual basis for co-operation
between WEU nations with a view to determining
military capabilities and equipment requirements
beyond a lO-year time-frame.
Upon transfer to WEU from lst January
1994, Eurolongterm has given priority to its orga-
nisation in WEU context and to the identification
of its way ahead. The Eurolongtenn Steering
Group is currently drafting new terms of referen-
ce for its activities.
(iii) The transfer to Western European Union of
Eurogroup's publicity activities became effective
on lst January 1994. Since their transfer, these
activities have been the responsibility of the
Council Working Group on Transatlantic Publici-
ty Activities (CWG/IPA). The chairmanship will
continue to rotate among these nations on lst July
each year. The current Norwegian chairmanship
ends on 30th June 1994. The United Kingdom
assumes the chairmanship on 1st July 1994.
The transatlantic publicity activities offer
various opportunities to convey European views
to a range of audiences. They have been structu-
red around the following activities:
- 
a seminar in Europe in the spring, organi-
sed by the chairmanship;
- 
a ministerial-level conference in
Washington in June, also organised by the
chairmanship;
- 
panel tours to North American cities in
the autumn, co-ordinated by the chair-
manship with the assistance of other
nations.
Since the transfer became effective, the
Council Working Group on Transatlantic Publici-
ty Activities has met six times at the WEU Secre-
tariat under the Norwegian chairmanship.
During these meetings, the group has dis-
cussed its planned activities in 1.994, their budge-
tary aspects and the choice of the chairmanship.
The group prepared the annual seminar in Europe,
held in BodO (Norway) from 31st May to 1st June
1994. The goup has also prepared the Washing-
ton conference on WEU-European security and
defence identity and the strengthening of transat-
lantic security, held on 20th-21st June. The group
has also discussed the organisation ofpanel tours
to North America in autumn 1994.
XI. Activities of the Western European
Armaments Group (" at 73 ")
The WEAG National Armaments Directors
met at WEU in Brussels on 18th March 1994,
under Danish chairmanship. In a discussion on the
future development of European co-operation on
armaments matters, they confirmed the need to
develop and enhance that co-operation, realising
that it would call for not only a determined
commitment on the part of nations but also further
political guidance from defence ministers. NADs
also agreed that the Euclid programme could
benefit from the creation of a research cell, which
might be the first step towards establishing a
European Armaments Agency.
Further work should be undertaken, how-
ever, before NADs could reach a conclusion on
this issue for submission to defence ministers.
fi3
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The 13 WEAG defence ministers were to meet on
14th November 1994, prior to the WEU Ministe-
rial Council, to examine WEAG activities.
Current activities
The main results of the current work of the
three panels and various working groups in the
first half of 1994 were:
- 
Following the ministerial decisions of
May and November 1993 and agreement
on the practical arrangements, the Perma-
nent Secretariat in Lisbon was closed
down on lst April 1994, and the Euro-
pean Armaments Secretariat is now estab-
lished within the WEU Secretariat.
- 
It was formally established that the
WEAG Staff Group, while retaining its
normal functions for the benefit of the
WEAG under the authority of NADs,
would also be the group responsible for
informing the Council on WEAG activi-
ties.
-WEAG Panel f has continued to promote
co-ordination and collaboration on Euro-
pean annaments matters. A more effi-
cient form for the equipment replacement
schedule (ERS) was produced by the use
of data processing.
- 
The Euclid programme now has 42
research and technology projects appro-
ved by Panel II, of which 22 have
contracts placed-*iF 
-ry{utt-ry. A Euclid
symposium is to be held in Noordwijk on
Znd-3rdNovember 1994.
- 
WEAG Panel /I/ has pursued its work on
investigating the future of the European
defence indusuy, including cross-border
competitions and technology transfer,
and on analysing the data provided for the
assessment of the European defence
equipment market, the aim being to pre-
sent a report for consideration by the
NADs in the autumn.
- 
The ad hoc Study Group on the Arma-
ments Agency has continued its work on
this issue, with the aim of presenting its
second report to NADs in the autumn.
The objective would be to provide advice
on the legal mechanism for the establish-
ment of such a body under the modified
Brussels Treaty and on the structure for
armaments co-operation in this field,
including the handling of Euclid and
other armaments-related tasks which
might be centralised.
XII. Activities of the Agency for the Control of
Armaments (ACA)
ln 1994, the Agency for the Control of
Armaments continued with its remaining tasks
associated with atomic, biological and chemical
weapons, in compliance with the Rome declara-
tion of 1984.
The Rome declaration stated, inter alia, that
" the commitments and controls concerning ABC
weapons would be maintained at the existing level
and in accordance with the procedures agreed up
to the present time ".
In the fust half of this thirty-ninth year of
controls within the WEU framework, the legal
sources used tojustify the levels ofcontrol and its
procedures have remained unchanged.
The Agency has called on member states to
provide the information defined in Protocol No.
fV to the modified Brussels Treaty. In accordance
with the view expressed by the Council', the
request for information to member states was
made with reference to the ACA questionnaire,
but only conceming ABC weapons.
The Agency has conducted two permitted
tests for the non-production of chemical weapons
in plants located in the continental territory of the
member state that has undertaken not to manufac-
ture this type of weapons. On completion of these
tests, the Agency forwarded the certificates speci-
fied by a resolution adopted by the Council2.
These certificates state that the Agency, in the
course of conducting the conffol measures, has
observed nothing in conflict with the undertak-
ings not to manufacture chemical weapons.
In selecting the plants that might be the
subject of non-manufacture tests the Agency has,
as every year, forwarded two requests for infor-
mation to the competent authorities of the mem-
ber state concerned, one on the plants that manu-
facture products included in the list of substances
subject to control, the other on plants that might
use such products.
No tests have been conducted in relation to
atomic and biological weapons.
XIII. Activities of the WEU Institute
for Security Studies
During the period lst January to 3fth June
1994 the Institute organised three seminars:
" Factors shaping the development of a European
l. 659th meeting of the Council, 26th March
tcR (86) 61.
2. @9th meeting of the Council, I lth December
tcR (73) lel.
1986
1973
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common foreign and security policy ", " The rein-
forcing of the dialogue between Europe and the
Maghreb on foreign and security policy issues "
and " Security issues facing an enlarged European
Union ", which was held in Niinisalo, Finland.
The Institute also organised two meetings of
the task force on Russia and the CIS, two meetings
of authors of the Chaillot Paper on " The implica-
tions of the Yugoslav crisis for Westem Europe's
foreign relations " and a meeting on " Recent
experience ofconflict prevention in Europe ". The
Institute and the RAND European-American Cen-
ter for Policy Analysis held a joint meeting on
" The challenges to European security in 1994".
Lastly, the Institute wrote a report on " Regional
stability measures in the Balkans " for the group of
neighbouring states of the lntemational Conferen-
ce on the Former Yugoslavia at the request of the
co-Chairmen of the Conference and olganised a
working group to examine the draft report.
Four documents were sent to the Council:
" Development of the Institute into an academy " ;
" Enhanced status for Central European coun-
tries 
- 
the contribution of the WEU Institute " ;
" WEU's relations with Maghreb and Eastern
Mediterranean countries" ; and " Developing
relations betweenWEU and Russia and Ukraine " .
Roberto Tadra left the Institute at the end
of June on completion of his three years as a
research fellow.
Institute fellowships were awarded to
Femanda Faria (Portugal) and Fr6d6ric Oberson
(France), who spent three months and two months
respectively at the lnstitute.
Mr. Eitvydas Bajarunas (Lithuania) and
Mrs. Mare Haab (Estonia) spent the months of
April/Ir,Iay and May respectively at the Royal Ins-
titute of International Affairs, London, as study
award holders.
Training and information meetings were
held by members of the research team for Perma-
nent Representatives, members of the Council
Working Group, officers from the Norwegian
Defence College, the Foreign Affairs Committee
of the Bundestag, diplomats from Central Europe,
and students from Staffordshire University, the
School of Public Affairs of the American Univer-
sity (Washington, DC), the CHEAR, the IIIEDN
and the Mediterranean Institute for Strategic Stu-
dies.
During this period the Institute published
Chaillot Paper 13 on Ukraine, Russia and Euro-
pean security: implications for Western policy,by
Peter van Ham, Chaillot Paper 14, Lessons of
Yugoslavia, by Nicole Gnesotto and Chaillot
Paper 15116, Preventing armed conflict in Euro-
pe: lessons from recent experience, by Gabriel
Munuera. The newsletter was also published in
April.
XM Administrative que stions
In the first half of the year the Council Wor-
king Group prepared the Permanent Council's
discussions and decisions on an amendment to the
WEU staff rules, the adjustment of salaries and
pensions of the staffof the WEU Assembly forthe
period lst July to 31st December l99Z,regulatory
and legal questions associated with the renewal of
all Secretariat-General contracts of employment
and the position of seconded, nationally paid
WEU Secretariat personnel.
The annex to the first part of the fortieth
annual report of the Council has already been
published in Volume I (June 1994) as Docu-
mentl422 dated 24thMay 1994.
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Draft Resolution
on co-operation between European space research institutes
The Assembly,
(i) Considering that space research is essential for meeting the challenges of guaranteeing the scienti-
fic standing, economic competitiveness and political autonomy of Europe;(ii) Reaffrrming that only an integrated Europe will be able to take up the challenge of space;(iii) Considering that European co-operation in certain sectors of space is an example of the achieve-
ments to which our countries can aspire by uniting their efforts;(iv) Noting with satisfaction that space research has enabled our continent to attain a high level of tech-
nology and goals which were almost inconceivable quite recently;
(v) Believing that this considerable progress is largely due to the existence and the r6le of the European
Space Agency;
(vi) Welcoming likewise the remarkable work done by the national space research institutes;
(vii) Noting the present need for ever more investment, which is increasingly difficult for states to meet
in isolation, is encountering ever tighter budgets;
(vlil) Noting furthermore that the absence of an overall strategy on a European scale is leading to the
duplication of efforts by the various countries;
(ix) Considering that this dispersion is leading to competition, excess capacity and overlapping pro-
grarnmes and infrastructures;
(x) Believing that WEU member states must co-ordinate their research policies if they wish to use avai-
lable funds more efficiently, thus avoiding their dispersal and contributing to the creation of new syner-
gies;
(xi) Considering that Europe is lagging behind to some extent in the military uses of space as compared
with the United States;
(xii) Taking account of the fact that there is insufficient co-operation at present in military space
research and that such co-operation is essential for the security and political independence of Europe;
(xiii) Believing that it is essential to exploit existing synergies between the civil and military sectors of
space in order to give impetus to the technological and industrial development of space applications;
(xiv) Welcoming moreover the major contribution of national space research institutes to following up
and evaluating feasibility studies for the future European space-based observation system;
(m) Warmly appreciative of the initiative of the various European space research institutes in moving
towards a convergence of their work on aeronautics,
INvrrss rHE GovERNMENTS oF MeNasBn CouNrnms
1. To create a study group composed of representatives of governments and national space research
institutes with the following aims:
(a) lay the foundations for an overall European space strategy;
(b) promote a more rational use of available resources, be they economic, technological, human or
infrastructure, in order to avoid as far as possible excess capacity, competition, and, in short,
duplication of effort and expenditure;
(c) establish the bases for close co-operation between national space research institutes similar to
that already existing between them in the aeronautics sector;
(d) foster greater harmonisation between the national space research institutes and ESA so as to
achieve greater coherence in existing programmes and derive optimum advantage from closer
co-operation between these institutes;
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(e) give priority to the military space sector in order to develop European independence in space
matters and also to take account of the fact that military applications of space in large measure
coincide with civil applications;
A study the possibility and expediency of amending the ESA Convention so as to enable ESA
also to devote its efforts to certain very specific areas of the military space sector;
(g) refle*ton the need to establish a co-ordinated strategy for the national space research institutes,
ESA, the European Union, WEU and other organisations concerned with space in order to
achieve a more efficient use of available resources;
(h) take steps to ensure that the national space research institutes develop closer working relation-
ships with establishments working in related or complementary branches and that they main-
tain the same type of relationship with industry in order to enable the results of their research
to be ffansferred and applied;
(i) invite WEU associate member countries, associate partners and observers to participate in this
study group.
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Exphnatory Memorandum
(submilted by Mr. Galley, Rapporteur)
I.Introduction
l. It is now recognised that space is a key fac-
tor of power in the modern world and must be
regarded as a major platform for nations to
demonstrate their scientific, technological and
industrial capabilities. It is therefore extremely
important in every respect for Europe to play an
active r6le in space research.
2. The volume of European public expendi-
ture on space has not to date equalled that of the
United States. Europe has nevertheless developed
very substantial expertise in many space sectors
thanks to the successes of ESA (European Space
Agency), the ambition of certain national space
prograrnmes and the very high level of expertise
among the scientific community. Europe's achie-
vements in space matters are therefore very posi-
tive and enable our continent to be ranked among
the frst on the world technological scene.
3. European co-operation in space matters is
an example of the best our countries are able to do
when they join forces. Indeed, ESA is a remar-
kable example of success in European integration
and collaboration.
4. However, Europe cannot rest on its laurels.
lt must strengthen its cohesion and increase its
efforts to meet, under optimum conditions, the
challenges thrust upon it by a period in which
achieving or maintaining a degree of competitive-
ness is the more difficult as growing numbers of
large new countries are demonsffating their inten-
tion of gaining a leading position. This situation,
together with budget constraints everywhere,
calls for ever-increasing levels of investment
which cannot readily be borne by each state in
isolation. The space challenge can only therefore
only be met effectively at the scale of Europe as a
whole.
5. Various European countries have often
large national programmes which are advancing
in parallel with European co-operative pro-
grammes. There is a perceptible trend towards a
proliferation of effort by each country in an
attempt to carve out for itself the best or even the
largest " slice " of a space Europe. This situation
is indicative of the relative absence of an overall
strategy in the area of space research.
6. For this reason, the Technological and
Aerospace Committee has decided to devote a
report to co-operation between European space
research institutes.
II. Whnt is at stake in space research?
7. Various reasons (national prestige, support
for advanced science and technology, industrial
and commercial factors, the decisive r6le of space
technology in security and defence matters, etc.),
may be at the root of involvement in numerous
space prograrnmes, but ultimately space research
is essential above all, as has already been stressed,
for meeting the scientific and technological chal-
lenges that will allow us to build our future and
thus safeguard our scientific edge, our economic
competitiveness and our political independence.
8. However, space must not be regarded as an
area apart; many of the results of space research
find application in industrial production and
scientific and technological know-how. They thus
contribute to maintaining industrial and technolo-
gical centres in Europe.
9. Major challenges face our countries today
and in the immediate future. Military space, an
area in which our continent lags well behind the
United States, must be considered as the main sec-
tor of our activity, not only in order to be able to
develop our autonomy in defence matters, but
also because military space applications, in large
measure, overlap with civil applications. Europe
must follow this course in order to allow the space
industry to maintain a degree of competitiveness
vis-d-vis the space industry of the United States.
10. Launch systems, for which space Europe
has had outstanding industrial and commercial
success, space-based communications, which
have a very large growth potential and earth
observation, the applications of which are very
wide-ranging indeed, are so many areas in which
it is essential for us to have expertise.
11. Scientific prograrnmes, even if not directly
linked at the outset to commercial markets, are the
source of space equipment and applications and
the laboratories for the space industry; this justi-
fies a more ambitious approach commensurate
with the excellence of the skills and knowledge
available.
12. There are still further areas which may act
as catalysts in the development of the European
space industry and open up new prospects. Your
Rapporteur is thinking in particular of research
activities linked with a weightless environment,
which seem interesting for high added value
industrial applications; optical intersatellite links
providing high information flow by low power
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transmission; space-based radio communication;
mini-satellites, space robotics, rendez-vous sen-
sors, etc.
13. The whole range of space-based applica-
tions is therefore a source of major industrial and
commercial opportunities, either existing or
potential. It is imperative for Europe to provide
backing for their development and testing, to
enable our industry to compete on the market for
the new products or services, some of which are
mentioned in very futuristic studies but which
evade us today.
I I I. N atia nal framew orlcs
(a) Gennany
(i) DAM (Deutsche Agenturfiir Raumfahran-
gelegenheiten)
14. Germany founded the German Space
Agency (DARA Deutsche Agentur fiir Raumfahr-
tangelegenheiten) as a cenral management orga-
nisation of German space matters in the sufllmer
of 1989; the federal government is the sole share-
holder. As it has developed, DARA has been
steadly invested with growing responsibilities: the
Federal Ministry for Research and Technology
(BMFT), for example, has delegated responsibili-
ty for managing its space prograrnmes to DARA '.
15. DARA s legal status as a company with
limited liability (GmbH), guarantees the neces-
sary flexibility and the desired proximity to indus-
try.The Cabinet Committee on Space Activities'?
is responsible for advising the federal government
on space policy decisions as well as fundamental
strategic and planning aspects. Funds are made
available to DARA from the budgets of the res-
ponsible ministries. The Cabinet Committee's
work is prepared by a State Secretaries' Commit-
tee on Space chaired by the Secretary of State in
the BMFT3.
16. DARA s functions can be summarised as
follows: to draw up plans for German space pol-
icy for approval by the federal government by
planning German participation in international
prograrnmes and projects, planning national pro-
l. Today, DARA manages approximately 500 current pro-
jects and studies and awards contracts to around 130 insti-
tutes and frrms (the close partner in this context is the DLR).
2. Under the chairmanship of the Federal Chancellor, the
Cabinet Committee has the following members: the Head of
Federal Chancellary, the Foreign Minister, the Ministers of
Finance, Economy, Defence, Transport, Research and Tech-
nology and Posts and Telecommunications.
3. The Technical and Scientific Advisory Board is made up
of representatives of the scientific community and industry.
The specialist advice provided by the Board ensures that
scientific and economic requirements are taken into account
by DARA when drawing up and implementing space pro-
grarnmes.
t20
jects with due consideration for European, bilate-
ral, and multilateral programmes, providing tech-
nological, economic, and financial recommenda-
tions, analyses, and project proposals; to
implement German space programmes and to
award contracts and grants to industry and to
scientific and research bodies by advising the
federal ministries and public institutions invol-
ved, promoting, directing and monotoring pro-
jects, evaluating their results, planning and co-
ordinating operating facilities, providing
initiatives to promote commercialisation, alloca-
ting funds from the space budget in accordance
with its statutory authority and determining finan-
cial requirements; to represent German space
interests in the international arena, particularly
within the European Space Agency.
17. Germany participates in most areas of
space activities. In manned space flight, attention
in 1993 should focus on the MIR mission, a joint
project of the former Soviet Union and Germany
and the national D-2 Spacelab mission, with the
participation of NASA, ESA, CNES and a consor-
tium of Japanese firms. In space exploration, the
German programme is concenffated on the provi-
sion of instruments and additional flight opportu-
nities through participation in long-term multila-
teral and bilateral projects. In launch rockets,
German progranrmes have always been conclu-
ded as a part of European co-operation in ESA.
Germany is also very active in satellite communi-
cations, earth observation, space flight and space
flight systems. It is possible for management of
military space programmes to be assigned to
DARA.
18. The 1994 prograrnme budget is around DM
1.37 billion, 74Vo of which is allocated to ESA.
(ii) DLR (Deutsche Forschungsanstalt fiir
Land-Und Raumfahrt e.V )
19. Today, the DLR4 is the main scientific and
technical research institute in Germany, with
approximately 4 000 collaborators (1 170 in the
space sector) and a budget of DM 700 million(some 340 million of which are devoted to
space). It has research centres in Berlin-Adler-
shof, Braunschweig, Gdttingen, Ktiln-Porz, Lam-
poldshausen, Oberpfaffenhofen and Stuttgart.
20. DLR is a multi-mission research organisa-
tion engaged in aeronautics (45Vo of total human
resources), space (35Vo) and energy-related
research (20Vo).
4. The DLR (Deutsche Forschungsanstalt ftir Luft-Und
Raumfahrt e.V) was created in 1969 from the merger of
Aerodynamische Versuchsanstalt G6ttingen e.V., Deutsche
Versuchsanstalt fi.ir Luftfahrt and Deutsche Forschungsans-
talt ftir Luftfahrt; until March 1989 it went by the name
Deutsche Forschungs- und Versuchsanstalt fiir Luft- und
Raumfahrt e.V. (DFVLR).
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21. In essence, DLR's r6le is to bridge the gap
between basic research in academia and technol-
ogy development by industry, to operate large test
facilities for the benefit of scientific and industrial
users and to provide expertise for national autho-
rities.
22. DLR's technical expertise lies with the ins-
titutes of its five scientific research departments:
Flight Mechanics/Guidance and control (Institute
of Flight Mechanics, Institute for Flight Guidan-
ce, Institute for Flight Systems Dynamics and
Robotics, Institute for Aerospace Medicine,
Aerospace Psychology Section, Transport Research
Division); Fluid Mechanics (Institute for Theore-
tical Fluid Mechanics, Institute for Experimental
Fluid Mechanics, Institute for Propulsion Techno-
logy, Institute for Design Aerodynamics); Mate-
rials and Structures (Institute for Structural
Mechanics, Institute for Aeroelasticity, Institute
for Materials Research,; Institute for Space Simu-
lation, Institute for Structures and Design); Tele-
communications Technology and Remote Sensing(Institute for Telecommunications, Institute for
Radio Frequency Technology, Institute for Optoe-
lectronics, Institute for Atmospheric Physics, Ins-
titute for Planetary Research, Institute for Space
Sensors) and Energetics (Institute for Technical
Physic s, Institute for Technical Thermodynamic s,
Institute for Physical Chemistry of Combustion,
Institute for Chemical Propulsion and Chemical
Engineering).
23. The scientific-technical facilities include
the German Space Operations Centre (GSOC) in
the research centre at Oberpfaffenhofen and the
division crew operations and astronauts office,
central data processing, flight operations and
wind tunnels, applied data technology, and the
German remote sensing data cenfre (DFD).
24. DRL's involvement in space research and
development is closely co-ordinated with the Ger-
man space effort. Under national space policy, co-
operative European and bilateral programmes are
the preferred modes of operation. Less than one
third of Germany's space budget is reserved for
purely national activities. The domestic space
programme currently does not foresee the crea-
tion of national space orbital infrastructure or
space transportation assets. Unlike CNES, there-
fore, DLR is not engaged in technology work for
fully-fledged space systems, but concentrates on
specific areas of strength.
DLR's space competence relates mainly
- 
space vehicle and experiment operation:
the German Space Operations Centre(GSOC) of the DLR is responsible for
preparing and staging manned and
ummanned space projects with the tasks
of communication with space missiles via
ground station and data-relay satellites;
measuring orbits, predicting place and
speed, as well as planning out-orbital cor-
rections; determining and controlling the
orientation of satellites and probes in
space. Because of DLR's unique expe-
rience with manned Spacelab flights, the
BMFT made an offerto ESA in 1987 that
gives GSOC the responsibility for all
manned space laboratory flight opera-
tions within the Columbus prograrnme;
substantial national advance funding was
made during the period 1987-92 with the
installation of the Manned Space Labora-
tories Control Centre (MSCC) consisting
of a control centre building equipped
with a basic flight operations infrastruc-
ture, as well as a high-bay area to house
operations mission sequence simulators
(OMSS) for the attached laboratory and
the free flyer. EPOS (European proximity
operations simulator) test facility for ren-
dez-vous and docking of spacecraft will
be developed jointly by the DLR and
ESA which is affiliared to rhe MSCC.
The GSOC operates mobile rocket
launches for carrying out Germany's
high-altitude research rocket programme
and, in addition to space missions, the
GSOC also conducts research and deve-
lopment work to support these pro-
grammes in the field of future technolo-
gies (particularly dynamics and control of
space-travel structures).
- 
Space propulsion systems testing: there
are 5 test facilities at DLR's test site at the
Institute for Chemical Propulsion and
Engineering in Lampoldshausen. The
Institute's main objectives are the provi-
sion and operation of test facilities for
space propulsion systems and research
and development in energetics and pro-
pulsion technology. A major objective of
the Institute is the design and contract test
facilities for space propulsion systems
which are operated on behalfofEuropean
space agencies (ESA, CNES) and in co-
operation with the European space indus-
try. Test facilities are provided for the
development and qualification of liquid
propellant rocket engines and complete
stages of rocket launchers, including pro-
pulsion systems for satellites and inter-
planetary space problems. Work focuses
on development and qualification of the
900 KN Vulcain hydrogen/oxygen engi
ne designed to power the main stage of
Ariane 5. An important activity of the
Institute, partly in co-operation with the
CNES, is research and development in
energetics and propulsion technology.
25.
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tzl
DOCUMENT 1434
5. DLR's remote sensing activities are not solely of a civilian
nature; radar-related work is being co-funded by the Ministry
of Defence.
6. The DFD has so far been involved in balloon launches in
the South of France and Sweden and, as a part of the national
Atmos programme, a stabilisation system for the Mipas
(Michelson interferometer passive atmospheric sounder) bal-
loon was developed and represents a new generation measu-
ring equipment in environmental research. Mipas was selec-
ted by ESA as a sensor for the polar platform.
7. The German Government took the initiative which led to
the development of the space laboratory spacelab under the
supervision of ESA in 1983. The first flight was on board the
NASA space shuttle. The fust German Spacelab mission, D-
1, followed in 1985 and D-2 in April 1993.
8. A variant of MOMS will be flown on the European polar
platform.
- 
Remote sensings : DLR has developed a
variety of optical and microwave sensors
which were successfully flown and ope-
rated on various shuttle missions. DLR
has established a national remote sensing
data centre to serve users nationally and
worldwide. In addition, a processing and
archiving facility (PAF) has been set up
under ESA contract as part of the Euro-
pean Earthnet infrastructure. Concerning
data interpretation, DLR is one of Euro-
pe's leading authorities in remotely sen-
sed data product generation and it has
special expertise in Algorithms for radar
image interpretation. DLR remote sen-
sing efforts are currently organised in two
institutes (one for optical and one for
microwave remote sensing) and in the
German remote sensing data centre
(DFD) in Oberpfafenhofen 6.
- 
Microgravity: Germany's scientific com-
petence in microgravitational research is
internationally recognisedT. The payload
for the D-2 April 1993 mission included
facilities to be used by the astronauts, and
instruments operated automatically. One
might recall the semiconductor experi-
ments, in which two different heating
facilities were used within the Medea
payload (material sciences experiment
double-rack for experiment modules and
apparatus); Anthorack, a special medical
research facility developed by ESA (for
this laboratory Germany provided some
important experiments), the robotic tech-
nology experiment (Rotex), and the newly-
developed photographic system MOMS-
02 (modular optical multispectral scan-
ner)8. For supporting the spacelab pay-
load elements Anthorack, and Medea on
D-2, DLR developed lgltqnd supportprogramme equipment (GSPE) to acquire,
process and store realtime measurement
data. DLR is the host of ESA s European
Astronaut Centre (EAC).
26. To conclude we have to remember that
DARA and DLR advise national defence and
intelligence authorities on the use and potential of
space-based observation means. Moreover, DLR
is involved, on behalf of the German Government,
in WEU's satellite observation study and data
interpretation.
(b) Spain
27. Spaindoesnothaveaspecificnational space
plan. Activities related to space are spread among
several organisations (ministries, public research
centres, universities etc.); there is no centralised
government body in charge of a national policy on
space matters. The CDTI (Centro para el Desar-
rollo T6cnico y Industrial) represents Spain in
ESA; the CICYT (Spanish Commission for
Science and Technology) is an interministerial
agency for co-ordinating and funding research
and development projects within the research and
development national plan. This national plan
gives institutional support for scientific, technical
and industrial initiatives in various disciplines,
among them space activities.
(i) INTA
28. INTA (National Institute for Aerospace
Technology) is an independent organisation with
a legal personality and its own assets which falls
within the area of responsibility of the Secretary
of State for Defence. Since its foundationin 1942,
it has become the true Spanish cenfte for the deve-
lopment of aeronautics technology to which space
technology has been added.
29. Under the Science Act of 1986, the [nsti-
tute acquired the status of public research body
specialising in research and development in
aerospace technology and was given specific
functions allowing it to administer and implement
national and sectoral programmes assigned to it
by the CICYT (Spanish Commission for Science
and Technology), the Ministry of Defence or
other relevant government departments.
30. INTA s mission is to raise technological
standards in the Spanish aerospace industry in its
specialised fields through its own research and
technology development programmes or pro-
grammes undertaken in collaboration with indus-
try and other centres of research and develop-
ment, with emphasis on areas of interest; INIA
must also have the necessary means at its disposal
to manage aeronautical and space programmes of
national interest at the request of government and
particularly of the Ministry of Defence; it must
provide quality services through various esta-
blishments for experimental testing and through
specialisation; lastly, it should encourage advan-
ced technology transfer, while providing efficient
backing to industry and government and in pani-
cular the Ministry of Defence.
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31. At 31st December 1993, INTA employed
I 364 staff; its investments stood at 12 billi-on 569
million pesetas (666 million in 1989). Increases in
investment over the last five years demonstrate
the effort made to equip the Institute with facili-
ties adapted to the r6le it was soon to play in the
development of Spain's aeronautical and space
industries and of its armed forces.
32. The principal research and development
activities of the INTA laboratories are centred
around four major technology programmes: Mini-
sat, Capricornio, SIVA and SAR. A large number
of research activities have been undertaken in
parallel with these major prograrnmes.
33. The aim of INTA's mini-satellite program-
me (Minisat) is to provide the Spanish aerospace
sector with the means of designing, manufactu-
ring, testing and operating a full space-based sys-
tem and its associated ground sector so as to
enable space-based devices of 100-200 kg weight
to be placed in orbit. ln 1993, technical research
began on the TTC (tracking, telemetry and com-
mand) antenna to be installed on Minisat and pro-
viding ground control of the platform and on
board instruments; the development of instru-
ments to be carried on board the satellite has also
begun.
34. Three scientific experiments will be
conducted from the first Minisat (launch schedu-
led for 1995): EURD (an instrument for studying
diffuse radiation from outer space in the far ultra-
violet band); CPLM for studying the physical
deformation of a liquid bridge subject to different
acceleration conditions within a weightless field,
and LEGRI (a technological demonstration devi-
ce designed to test the feasibility of constructing a
new generation of telescopes).
35. The aim of the Capricornio programme is to
provide INIA and the Spanish aerospace industry
with the technology necessary to develop a micro-
satellite launcher for exclusively civil applica-
tions. In view of the increasingly marked tendency
towards ever smaller and cheaper satellites,INIA
has selected a microsatellite launcher capable of
launching a payload of 50 kg to an altitude of 600
km in polar orbit. The development phase as such
will boost work on propellants in Spain; the esta-
blishments of the Institute working in this area
have received additional support to this end.
36. The present programme envisages the
development of a wholly national two-stage solid
propellant demonstration vehicle. Thanks to this
vehicle, it will be possible to conduct in-flight tes-
ting of all Capricornio's basic technologies. A
study has begun of a launch site on the Canary
Islands.
37. SIVA (integrated aerial surveillance sys-
tem) will supplement military satellite observa-
tion capabilities.
38. The synthetic aperture radar (SAR) pro-
gramme begun by INTA in January 1993 aims to
develop technology for producing high-quality
SAR images; initially this technology will allow a
prototype system to be designed, manufactured
and tested on board an aircraft with a view to
obtaining certification of this technology. It is
proposed, in a second phase, to design and produ-
ce a system for use in space that could be installed
on a small-size platform of the Minisat type.
39. INTA is establishing a vast programme of
research in advanced materials. In collaboration
with the DLR, it has launched a programme for
reciprocal certification of materials, procedures
and measurement techniques used by the two ins-
titutes for composite materials. The aim of the
programme is to arrive at a joint method for certi
fying materials used in space which might benefit
ESA in its work.
40. At ESA s request, studies have begun for
developing a rendez-vous mechanism and a Ku
band antenna for communications from the polar
platform. In the framework of the Eureca pro-
gramme and in co-operation with other European
centres, a start has been made on the I-Ares pro-ject (an experimental model for a planetary
vehicle for exploring Mars). Furthermore, a pro-
grarnme for building a space manipulation arm is
underway, again managed by INTA in collabora-
tion with other European research centres. This
arm will be used fof maintenance and repair of
satellites in orbit. INTA, together with DLR, has
also embarked on a programme for developing
intelligent composite material sffuctures.
41. In space technology, the Institute has com-
pleted the connecting cabling, manufacture and
certification testing of energy sources for the Golf
and Virgo insffumentation of ESA s Soho scienti-
fic satellite.
42. In the course of 1993,INTA has continued
its technical and scientific participation in develo-
ping the X-Spectrum (Russian astronomic obser-
vatory). It has carried out the environmental tes-
tingiof the mirrors of the telescope used for the
Sodan experiment (detection of X-ray astrophysi-
cal sources) and has also collaborated with the
Danish Space Research Institute in continuing to
develop a mass memory unit for this experiment.
43. As to the Integral satellite, besides partici-
pating in the scientific side, INTA is responsible
for the design and manufacture of the real time
image processing system of the optical chamber.
44. In the field of space antennae, the Institute
has been involved particularly in the design and
manufacture of the TTC S band antennae of the
Italsat satellite and the Eureca platform. It hopes
to acquire technological means for designing TIC
antennae for Ku band communication satellites.
These technologies are being obtained in the fra-
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mework of ESA s advanced systems and techno-
logies prograrnme (ASTP).
45. The Institute has generated its own research
in asffophysics and the atmosphere. In terms of
energy use in space, it has become the official cer-
tification body for the solar batteries used in ESA
space programmes.
46. It should also be noted that the Instinrte has
provided substantial backing, both in terms of
technology and management, to the Spanish His-
pasat satellite communication systeme (INIA is a
l57o shareholder in Hispasat SA). Technical
supervision of the Helios progralnme has been
assigned to INTA by the Spanish Ministry of
Defence as has management of the CICSAT (ini-
tial capacity of satellite communications) pro-
gramme which is to start using the full potential of
the Hispasat system for the communications
infrastructure of the armed forces.
47. The El Arenosillo experimental cenffe, the
southern and westermost launch site in Europe,
has taken part in many scientific and technologi-
cal campaigns for studying the structure and com-
position of the atmosphere. For the last 17 years,
this activity has been supplemented by the joint
organisation with the ASI and the CNES of
annual campaigns using large stratospheric
research balloons launched from Sicily which
drift over the western Mediterranean towards the
Iberian peninsula.
48. Under international agreements, INTA
owns or is responsible for three space stations: the
Canaries space station, one of the most important
installations of which is the Maspalomas station
integrated into the ESOC network and ESA's
Earthnet network, the Robledo space station
which belongs to the network for monitoring
NASA space vehicles and, lastly, the Villafranca
station, which depends on the ESOC network and
is managed by INTA.
(c) France
49. The French space prograrnme is currently
the most wide-ranging in Europe. France makes
the largest national contribution to ESA and has
the most important civil space programme as a
nation and in terms of bilateral co-operation.
Moreover, France has the most ambitious military
space programme in Europe.
(i) CNES (Centre National d'Etudes Spa-
tiales)
50. Created under a law dated 19th December
1961 as a scientific and technical establishment of
9. Made up of two geostationary satellites, the first launched
in September 1992 and the second in July 1993, and linked to
a ground sector.
an industrial and commercial nature, the CNES
has led France's space programme since 1st
March1962.
51. The essential tasks of the CNES ate, on the
one hand, to analyse the long-term challenges and
trends in space activities in order to submit propo-
sals for action and means of implementation to the
French Government and, on the other hand, in
application of government decisions on space
policy, to conduct major development pro-
grammes both at national level and in the frame-
work of ESA.
52. In the pursuit of its tasks, the CNES has
many and diverse r6les. [n association with the
scientific community, it implements a progralnme
of basic research in space matters based on the
laboratories of the Centre National de la
Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) and the universi-
ties; it develops partnerships with French space
users (the national headquarters staffs of the
armed forces, France Telecom, Meteo France,
etc.); it seeks to develop expertise and innovative
capacity in industries by awarding them prime
contractorship and implementation of pro-
graflrmes whenever possible and starting research
and technology programmes through them. The
CNES also has an important r6le in operational
use and evaluation oftechnical assets, as it encou-
rages the formation of companies for marketing
the space-based applications which may be either
public limited companies in which the CNES is a
shareholder (such as Arianespace, Spot Image,
Novespace, etc.), or economic interest groupings
of which it is a member (Satel Conseil, Prospace,
etc.). Lastly, and in conjunction with the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs, it represents France in ESA.
53. ln 1994, the CNES employed 2 446 staff
across its various establishments in Paris, Evry,
the Toulouse space centre (preparation and deve-
lopment of programmes, use of operational sys-
tems, heavy equipment) and the CSG (Guyana
Space Centre).
54. The budget for 1994 stands at a little over
F 11 000 million (+l%o as compared with 1993),
more than F 9 200 million is met through state sub-
sidies, and the remainder from its own resources.
This global budget is shared between participa-
tion in ESA programmes (47.95Vo, + l.l1Vo),
bilateral co-operation (5.657o, + 0.l3Vo), the
national prograrnme (19.44Vo, 
- 
L.3Vo), functional
technical programme support (l5.O6c/o, + O.I2Vo)
and general operating costs ( I I .90 Vo, 
- 
O.lOVo).
55. The activities of the CNES are divided into
three main areas: space transport, applications
prograrnmes and scientific prograrnmes.
56. In space transport, the CNES is prime
contractor for the Ariane family of launchers
developed in the framework of ESA, which has
given Europe a high-perfonnance means of Eans-
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port. The CNES, with the CSG, also provides
Europe with one of the best situated and most
modern space bases in the world 
- 
the Kourou
base, located in Guyana.
57. For applications programmes, mention
should be made of the Spot earth observation
satellites in which Belgium and Sweden also par-
ticipate; Spot 1, 2 and3 are in orbit (the latter ope-
rational since November 1993) and Spot 4 is in
the process of development with an anticipated
launch date during the last quarter of 1991 and
from mid-1995 if necessary.The Spot 5 program-
me is in preparation with the aim of providing a
continuous service after Spot 4.
58. The CNES, in co-operation with the Euro-
pean Commission, Belgium, Italy and Sweden, is
developing the on board " Vegetation " insffumen-
tation for Spot 4 which is of great interest for moni-
toring natural ecosystems and agricultural systems.
59. Mention should also be made of the Tele-
com 2 communications satellite family (A was
launched on 16th December 1991, B on 15th
Apil 1992 and C is to be launched in 1995, follo-
wed by D with a scheduled launch date of 1996\.
60. With regard to military space, the CNES is
participating in the studies of the future military
communications system by satellite, Syracuse 3,
and in the military observation satellites Helios 1
and 2 (which will share the platform and the inte-
gration and test equipment of Spot 4 with the par-
ticipation of Italy and Spain). Spain has just with-
drawn from the Helios 2 programme for
budgetary reasons.
61. To conclude with applications pro-
grarnmes, the CNES is also involved in monito-
ring a definition of new generation platforms for
the geostationary Spacebus 3000 satellites; in
conjunction with ESA, it is developing the test
programme for Silex (interorbital optical links) on
board the Artemis satellite; it is in charge of the
Argos space sector (data localisation and gathe-
ring system) of which third generation instru-
ments are being developed which will be installed
on the American NOAA advanced Tiros N satelli-
te platforms and last but not least it is one of the
founders and suppliers of the space sector of the
Cospas-Sarsat programme, in which there is wide
international co-operation.
62. The CNES's scientific programmes are, for
the most part, carried out in a framework of mul-
tilateral co-operation in ESA or bilaterally with
the United States, Russia and other countries such
as Italy or Japan. The national programme speci-
fically covers the " balloon " programmes, space
geodesy, weightless flight and ground activities in
support of space-based programmes. In order to
participate in such missions, the CNES requires
the back-up of the CNRS laboratories, universi-
ties or other bodies.
63. In astronomy, solar physics and planetary
exploration, the CNES participates in the Ulyssei(ESA), Iso (ESA), Soho (ESA), Cluster (ESA),
C_assini and Huygens (ESA-NASA), Magellan(Venus study/NASA), Galileo (Jupiter
studyA.{ASA) missions and in the Russian Mars
94-96 programme (exploration of Mars). Further-
more, the CNES. participates, by providing the
rmage compression system, in the Clementine(DoD/I.[ASA) mission which will make a carto-
graphic study of the moon and the asteroid Geo-
graphos; it is also involved in the first flight of the
Pronaos submillimetric telescope (for studying
cosmic rays and areas of star formation) and pro-
vides the on board Sygma telescope for the Rus-
sian Granat satellite.- French participation in the
XMM (ESA) programme is based on a major
development contribution to the Epic camera.
U. In terms of programmes for studying our
own planet, its climate and more generally its
environment, the CNES pursues a policy of balan-
ce and complementarity between its contribution
to the ESA s ERS and Envisat 1 programmes and
bilateral co-operation. It is conducting, jointly
with NASA, the Topex-Poseidon oceanographic
mission (whose performance is now proving tb be
twice as good as anticipated); in co-operation with
Russia it has developed the Scarab instrument for
measuring the earth's radiation, launched on 25th
January 1994 on board the Russian Meteor 3
number 7 satellite and also to be carried on Envi-
sat 1. It should also be noted that the Polder ins-
trumentation (imaging radiometer polarimeter)
will be installed in 1996 aboard NASDA s Adeos
satellite (first co-operation with Japan) and that
the IASI infrared atmospheric probe,0 (studied in
co-operation with the ASI) will form part of the
nucleus of the payload of the M6top satellites of
the future European low orbit meteorological net-
work. The CNES is also beginning a study of the
stratosphere using the French-Canadian Wind ii
instrument.
65. In addition to all of the above, the Stella
laser reflector satellite (Spot 3), the Doris positio-
ning system (Spot 2, and4 are also to be used with
the European Envisat-1 mission) and participation
in the Danish Oersted study mission of the earth's
magnetic field, for which the CNES is developing
a scalar magnetometer, are contributing to the
progress of research into the core of the earth.
66. As to microweight, CNES teams are cur-
rently involved in research prograrnmes and are
participating in the main missions listed below,
which are either being implemented or scheduled
for the coming years: Antares (July-Auglst 1992)
and Altar? (July 1993) on the MIR space station
10. By-providing temperature and humidity profiles and pro-
Iiles of certain minor constituents, this wil-l meet both the
requirements of the world climatic research programme and
the need for operational digital prediction ofihe weather.
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(manned fllights, physiological, biological and
materials testing) and the Cassiop6e flight (sche-
duled for 1996); IML l/lnternational Micrograv-
ity Laboratory 1 (manned flight, physical and life
sciences, January 1992) and Microgravity Labo-
ratory 2 on Spacelab which, in the framework of
co-operation between the CNES and NASA, will
carry the Ramses electrophoresis instrumentation
in the development of which the CNES has been
associated with a consortium of French, Spanish
and Belgian industries brought together in the
Eureca Space Bio Separation project; Mephisto
(October 1992 andMarch 1994) on a USMP plat-
form of the American space shuttle; Eureca-l
(August 1992) on a platform launched and reco-
vered by the Bion 10 shuttle (December 1992-
January 1993); Gezon (April 1994) and the Ibis
biology laboratory (October 1994) on Russian
recoverable capsules.
67. Lastly, the national programme has two
major focuses: the network of Spot satellites and
the system for exploiting them and the research and
technology prograrnme. Action in the framework
of the research and technology programme under-
taken in 1994 will contribute to achieving three
major objectives: (i) improving competitiveness in
radiocommunications, maintaining the technologi-
cal edge in earth observation and developing
advanced insffumentation; (ii) continuing the effort
already undertaken in the priority areas of new uses
of the orbital infrastructure; (irl) developing basic
and prospective research techniques linked to futu-
re launch equipment (propulsion etc.). Such action
is accompanied by studies providing a permanent
research basis which helps to maintain the techni-
cal and technological base necessary for all space-
based activities.
68. The national programme also includes an
important component of scientific research thanks
to the balloon prograrnme (in particular in the fra-
mework of the campaigns and research pro-
grammes backed by the European Union) and
national support actions for space-based transport
programmes (Ariane, MSTP).
(ii) ONERA (Office National d'Etudes et de
Re che rche s Ad ro s p atiale s )
69. ONERA is a scientific and technical public
body of a commercial and industrial type under
the supervision of the Ministry of Defence and
financially independent.
70. ONERA's task is to develop and guide
research in aerospace matters; to plan, design and
implement the necessary means for carrying out
its own research and testing for manufacturers; to
ensure dissemination of the results and encourage
their use by the aerospace industry; to facilitate
the application of these results outside the aeros-
pace area whenever possible and to assist with
training policies.
71. Apart from its basic (24Vo of its activity)
and applied (55Vo) tasks, ONERA plays an impor-
tant r6le between science research bodies and
industry; its position, in short, is that of scientific
and technical expert to official departments.
72. ONERA's activity extends to a number of
areas, the main ones being aircraft (317o of its
activity), space (16.8Vo) and military systems(l1Vo\. Other activities cover turbomachinery,
helicopters and tactical and strategic missiles.
73. 1993 funding stood atF 207 million provi-
ded in large measure from grants from the French
Ministry of Defence (68.47o) and the regions
(2.8Vo), the remainder being obtained from
conftacts and through self-financing.
74. At lst January 1994, ONERA employed
2 320 staff at its Chatillon, Chalais-Meudon,
Palaiseau, Fauga-Mau zac and Modane-Avrieux
centres, the Toulouse Centre for Study and
Research, the Lille Fluids and Mechanics Institu-
te and the ONERA-Ecole de l'Air research labo-
ratory.
75. With regard to space, one can mention the
testing of cryogenic propellants (Mascotte assem-
bly), the ASSM (aerodynamics of segmented
solid motors) programme and the TOP (thrust
oscillations programme) which give rise to theo-
retical research and testing by CNES. The Prepha
programme (research and technology programme
for advanced hypersonic propulsion) for space
launchers and hypersonic vehicles in the next cen-
tury studies the possibility of super-ramjet propul-
sion; there has been aerodynamic testing of space
shuttles.
76. ONERA is also involved in satellite pro-
grammes and projects: the transportable test
bench using the synthetic aperture radar technique
has been delivered to the CELAR to complete the
Siros simulator and thus aid the definition of
requirements for future military satellites.
77. The Ramses (multi-specral airborne radar
for signature research) station has been improved
and has been involved in several inflight testing
campaigns; progress has been made in discretion
radar; lastly, a study of a system which might be a
European one for monitoring space-based activity
from the ground has been completed: this led to
the launch of a new operation which aims to deve-
lop over three years a specific experimental space
watch radar. In parallel, studies on an optical sys-
tem capable ofindentifying objects in space, have
been carried out.
78. ONERA constantly uses and improves
upon a range of aerospace test facilities at world
level with their associated instrumentations. In
particular, a bank of research and industrial wind
tunnels covers all of France's requirements and
meets the needs of major foreign manufacturers.
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Discussions have begun with agreed European
organisations with a view to greater co-operation
in the area of heavy equipment. ONERA is a3lVo
shareholder in the ETW (European trans-sonic
wind tunnel), sited in Cologne.
79. In 1993, its international volume of busi-
ness accounted for approximately ll%o of ONE-
RA's total budget; in space matters, it co-operated
with European bodies while funding of its own
research was met either by a French state body or
by a European agency (ESA, !\fEU.
80. Its most important activities are still bilate-
' ral exchanges in Europe and co-operation actions
are sometimes long term but more often short
term, since they tend to be terminated when fun-
ding dries up and states' annual budgets can often
be unpredictable.
81. In this context, the main partner country is
Germany and the DLR co-operates in some 40
areas with ONERA;among those worthy of men-
tion are the studies on unmanned operations and
flexible structures in an ESA framework, the
parallel theoretical research in the framework of
the MSTP programme and analysis of materials.
Bilateral co-operation with the United Kingdom
has mainly taken place with the DRA (Defence
Research Agency) in the framework of the
AFDRG (Anglo-French Defence Research
Group). Co-operation with other Western Euro-
pean countries is on a modest scale.
82. ONERA has particular areas of responsibi-
lity in instrumentation used for scientific pur-
poses. The research is funded by the CNES or
ESA but ONERA makes a contribution to it from
its own resources. Examples of this are the grating
spectrometer (an insffument for measuring com-
ponents present in small quantities in the atmos-
phere) which was aboard the American shuttle(Atlas project) and will also be used on board
MIR; this instrument has been developed in close
co-operation with the IASB (the Belgian Institute
for Space Aeronomy).
83. As to third countries, ONERA has links
with Australia, Canada, the People's Republic of
China, Israel, Japan, Russia and the United States.
kl) Italy
(i) L'ASI (Agenzia Spaziale ltaliana)
84. In just a few years, Italy has evolved into
one of Europe's key space powers with the third
largest contribution to ESA and has invested in
ambitious national projects. With a large budget
deficit, Italy has recently been forced to rein in its
spending on space, but has still managed to pour
huge sums into important programmes.
85. In May 1988, the Italian Parliament establi-
shed the Italian Space Agency, ASI (Agenzia Spa-
ziale ltaliana) with the legal status of a public cor-
poration. Its activities are conducted under the
supervision of the Ministry for the Co-ordination
of Scientific and Technological Research.
86. The agency has the responsibility of pro-
moting, co-ordinating and managing national pro-
grammes and bilateral and multilateral co-opera-
tion programmes, promoting and supporting
Italian scientific and industrial participation in
ESA programmes in harmonisation with national
programmes.
87. A national space plan (Piano Spaziale
Nazionale) was established to promote, support
and control a co-ordinated programme for the
scientific, technological and commercial applica-
tions of space activities as well as to promote new
technological capabilities in the Italian Aerospace
Industries'r. The PSN is defined by ASI for a five-
year term, with annual up-dating, for the approval
of the Ministry of University and Research and
final approval of CIPE (Interministerial Commit-
tee for Economic Planning).
88. Through the eighties, the Italian civil space
budget rose significantly and reached almost $500
million in 1993, shared between ESA and national
activities.
89. Major national programmes have been
developed in many fields such as telecommunica-
tions with the Italsat programme which is a
domestic preoperational communication satellite,
with a highly-sophisticated communications pay-
load, working at 20130 GHz.
90. For space infrasffucture, the Tethered satel-
lite (TSS)'2 has been created. This is a co-operati-
ve prograrnme with NASA'3 for a reusable multi-
disciplinary facility to conduct space experiments
in earth orbit. The first Italian astronaut, Franco
Malerba, flew as payload specialist with the frst
TSS mission.
91. In space geodesy, a geodesic satellite was
developed to improve the performance of the sys-
tem for measuring movement of the earth's sur-
face in co-operation with NASA. Lageos IIra
1 l. A minimum of l5Vo of the annual plan budget is earmar-
ked for scientific research activities.
12. TSS-1 is a spherical satellite, with two fixed booms; the
Tethered system consists of two elements, the " deployer "
(TSS-D) that permits the tether to be deployed and retrieved,
and the satellite (TSS-S), the two elemenrs being intercon-
nected by a 20 km thin conducting tether.
13. NASA was given responsibility for the development of
the cable deployment and retrieval mechanism, for enginee-
ring activities at system level and for the integration of the
scientific experiments located on the shuttle. For its part, ASI
took responsibility for the development of the satellite sys-
tem and of the core equipment and the integration of the
scientific experiments carried on board the shuttle.
14. The Lageos II spacecraft is composed of two separate ele-
ments, i.e. the satellite and its propulsion stage LAS (Lageos
Apogee Stage).
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(laser geodynamics satellite). Lageos is designed
to provide a reference point for laser ranging
experiments that will monitor the motion to the
earth's crust, measure and understand the wobble
in the earth's axis of rotation, collect information
on the size and shape of the earth and determine
more accurately the length of the day.
92. For space science, Sax, an X-ray asffonomy
satellite, was set up in co-operation with NIVR
(Netherlands) to perform spectroscopic, spectral
and time variability studies of celestial X-ray
sources in the energy band from 0.1 to 200 Kev.
93. The Iris (Italian research interim stage), a
solid-fuelled perigee stage, within the framework
of space transportation, is an upper stage used in
conjunction with NASA's space shuttle. Iris is
capable of boosting a 1000 kg payload into high
orbit (5 900 km) starting from the space shuttle's
nominal parking orbit of 296 km; the system
contains two modules, the Iris spinning stage
(ISS) and the airborne support equipment (ASE).
94. For remote sensing, X-SAR was created to
elaborate a co-operative progftrrnme with DARA
and NASA to develop an x-band synthetic apertu-
re radar to be flown on board the shuttle with the
spaceborne imaging radar-C (SIR-C) as part of
the space radar laboratory (SRL) for multispectral
radar observation.
95. There is a ground infrasructure, which is
the I-PAF, a multimission facility, located at
ASUCGS Matera, for archiving, processing and
distributing remote sensing data.
96. There are other important activities under
development and realisation, such as microgravity
- 
Carina 
- 
a re-entry capsule for microgravity
experiments; telecommunications with Italsat 2;
for earth observation the IASI has been created
and this is a co-operative progmmme with CNES
for the development of a sounder for meteorology
and atmosphere chemistry; for robotics the Spider
(space inspection device for extra vehicular
repairs); for space infrastructure, logistic modules
have been created for the space station, in co-ope-
ration with NASA and the last one is a scientific
prograrnme, Cassini/fluygens which is an inter-
planetary mission to Saturn and Titan.
97. Italy, with roughly an lSVo contribution to
ESA s total budget, is the third member country
after France and Germany. It participates in many
ESA prograrrunes, the most important of which
are the following: for telecommunications, the
Artemis/DRS programme, and EMS programme
(mobile communications payload to be flown on
Italsat F2); for earth observation, the ERS 1/ERS
2, Envisat l, Metop 1, polar platform and meteo-
sat second generation prograrnmes; in-orbit infra-
structure, the Columbus attached laboratory pro-
gramme; for space transportation, Ariane 5 and
MSTP prograrnmes and finally for the scientific
programme there is a significant Italian scientific
and industrial involvement in the horizon 2000
programmes, and in particular in Soho, Cluster,
ISO, XMM.
98. Italy is equipped with operational facilities
such as the Centro di Geodesia Spaziale " Giusep-
pe Colombo " in Matera for space geodesy, remo-
te sensing and robotics. In Trapani-Milo (Sicily),
ASI has developed a modern stratospheric bal-
loons launch in a favourable geographic position
which guarantees long duration flights on the
Mediterranean sea from Sicily to the western Spa-
nish coast; besides the Odissea prografirme, co-
operation between ASI, CNES and INTA for
trans-Mediterranean flights during summer
months and a collaboration memorandum with
NASA, many technological and scientific activi-
ties have been planned.
(ii) CIM (Centro ltaliano di Ricerche Aeros-
paziali)
99. CIRA was established on 9th July 1984 by
the Campania region and the main Italian aeros-
pace industries with the aim of developing scien-
tific and technological research and testing in the
aerospace sector in order to implement the
PRORA (national aerospace research program-
me).
100. CIRA's tasks are twofold, consisting in:
- 
acting as a catalyst for national aerospace
research and technology by providing the
industry with research and development
support, encouraging the development of
applied research and technology acquisi-
tion, providing public authorities with
assistance in approval and control and
developing basic research;
- 
international relations, acting as a point
of reference for other research centres.
101. In January 1994, CIRA employed 149
staff't.
IO2. Many research activities are being develo-
ped at CIRA in several scientific areas such as
aerothermodynamics, sub-transonic aerodyna-
mics, flight mechanics and control, propulsion,
vibration and acoustics, crash analysis, high-tem-
perature resistant materials and structures and
aerospace technologies.
103. Activities in fluid dynamics began in early
1987 when the Italian Ministry for Research and
Technology appointed CIRA as co-ordinator of
the Italian contribution to the Hermes fluid dyna-
mics research and development programme of
ESA. The renewed interest in hypersonics and the
involvement of CIRA in the Scirocco plasma
15. Staff numbers are expected to rise to 500 over the next
hve years.
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wind tunnel project brought about the formation
of a hypersonics section; activities are presently
grouped around three main areas:
- 
manned atmospheric re-entry; CIRA is
active in the European Hermes re-entry
shuttle (currently included among the
MSTP) particularly in experimental
research;
- 
supersonic civil ffansport;
- 
the winged launcher.
104. CIRA is also involved in other lesser
research activities on specific problems, among
them the study of irreversible thermodynamics
with special emphasis on the impact of real gas
effects, and numerical investigation of fundamen-
tal problems (under ASl-contract).
105. In flight mechanics and control, the activi-
ties of the relevant departments have mainly been
focused on stability analysis and automatic iontrol
of vehicles and dynamic system modelling and
analysis, in relation both to aeronautics and space.
At the request of ASI, CIRA participated in a joint
research programme to study the feasibility of a
flight control system for microgravity experi-
ments. In space matters, research is centred around
two main themes: guidance and control problems
for reusable re-entry modules (problems dealt with
include aeroassisted orbit transfers and re-entry
phase of these modules) and orbital altitude
conffol of spacecraft with maneuvrable flexible
structures (particular attention has been paid to the
modelling phase of these mixed structures).
106. As to CIRA s operating capabilities, the
CIRA PWT (plasma wind tunnel) is one of the
largest and most advanced facilities in the world
for manned vehicle trajectory studies and is a
development facility for materials and structures
for all possible configurations of space transport
systems. Ths facility is, moreover, a research and
development tool applicable to supersonic propul-
sion systems development and obrothermodyna-
mic research studies. The project is co-funded by
ESA and the Italian Ministry for Scientific and
Technological Research. The facility will be ope-
rational by mid-1997.
lO7. The CIRA myogenic propulsion plant
(CRYP) facility is a test bench for development and
approvals testing of CRYP propulsion systems.
The facility has been designed with reference to
approvals specifications for the IOX turbopump in
Ariane 5's Vulcain MK11 engine. The CRYP test
facility will be available from July 1997.
(e) The Netherlands
108. In the Netherlands, various organisations,
industies and scientific institutes are active in space
research and the development of space systems.
(i) NIVR (Nederlands Instituut vor Vliegtui-
gontwikkeling en Ruimtevaart / Netherlands
agency for aerospace programmes)
109. Founded in 1946 by the Netherlands
Government, the NIVR is a semi-governmental,
non-profit-making agency with the general aim of
promoting industrial aerospace activities in the
Netherlands.
110. This general aim is translated into the follo-
wing tasks for NIVR: to advise the Netherlands
Government on all policy aspects of aerospace
industrial activities; to initiate and monitor aero-
space development programmes carried out by
the Dutch aircraft and space industry funded by
NIVR and using financial resources provided by
the government; to initiate, monitor and fund
aerospace research and technology prograrnmes
carried out by the National Aerospace Laboratory(NLR) and other research institutes as well as by
Dutch industry; to represent the Netherlands
Government in international projects in which the
Dutch aircraft and space industry participate and
for which NIRV provides the financial resources;
to act as the Netherlands' national space agency,
participate in the national space consultations pro-
cess and provide delegates and/or advisors for the
Netherlands delegation to the ESA Council,
boards and committees.
111. NTVR thus acts as a managment agency for
government-sponsored aerospace research and
development. The agency itself does not execute
research and development activities, but monitors
the definition and execution of research and deve-
lopment activities conducted by the Netherlands
industry and laboratories, both in national projects
and in international collaborative projects. As the
Netherlands national space agency, NIVR has many
contacts with sister organisatioirs and especially
with NASA, the CNES, DARA, ASI and others.
ll2. Responsibility for the general policy of
NIVR is shared by government (Ministries for
Economic Affairs, Transport and Public Works,
Defence, Finance, Foreign Affairs and Education
and Science), industry and the scientific communi-
ty all of which are represented on the NTVR Board.
113. Since the development of successful aero-
space prograrnmes is impossible without advan-
ced research, NIVR also sponsors a programme of
aerospace research, mainly carried out at the
NLR. This programme provides for continuous
research in the various fields of aerodynamics,
structures, materials, flight mechanics and space
sciences.
Space Programmes
ll4. This NIVR policy is implemented by exe-
cuting national satellite programmes and by parti
cipating in ESA programmes. So far, two national
satellites have been launched: the astronomical
129
DOCUMENT 1434
Netherlands satellite (ANS) in co-operation with
NASA, launched in 1974 and the infrared astro-
nomical satellite (IRAS) in co-operation with
NASA and the British Science Research Council,
in January 1983.
115. The success of ANS and IRAS has greatly
contributed to the Netherlands' knowledge and
reputation in space research, space technology
and industrial space activities. Following these
space projects, it was decided to take a modest
participation in the Italian X-ray satellite Sax to
which Dutch scientists and companies contribute
the wide field cameras and the attitude control
system. NIVR is responsible for programme
management of the Dutch share and co-operates
with SRON (Space Research Organisation
Netherlands) and the ltalian Space Agency (ASD.
116. The major part of the Netherlands' space
activities is in the framework of participation in
ESA programmes.
lll. Part of the Dutch contribution to the ESA
earth observation programme is to supply (in co-
operation with DARA) the Sciamachy insffument
for the Envisat-l satellite. Development of this
instrument will be the most important national
space project of the mid-nineties.
118. To stimulate national technological deve-
lopments, NM is conducting a multi-year NIVR
space technology programme (NRT). Partly
financed by the NRT programme, studies and pre-
developments are carried out by industry and
research organisations.
119. NIVR also monitors the space activities
sponsored by the Netherlands Defence Depart-
ment. In this connection a NIVR senior project
officer is a member of the WEU study manage-
ment team which supervises industrial study/
development efforts to define a European earth
observation satellite system for crisis-manage-
ment and treaty verification.
I2O. Funding for space programmes in the
Netherlands is provided by various government
departments. The Netherlands space budget for
1994 (240 million Dutch guilders) is made up as
follows: contibution to ESA and Eumetsat: 193
million; NIVR technology programme: 13 mil-
lion; SRON space research: 20 million;participa-
tion in SAX and Sciamachy: 14 million.
(ii) SRON (Space ResearchOrganisationNether-
lands / Stichting Ruimteondenoek Nederlmd)
I2l. SRON has a total staff of approximately
150 with 90Vo of its budget funded by the Nether-
lands Organisation for Scientific Research
(NWO) and lOTo commissioned research.
122. SRON is a foundation within the frame-
work of the NWO. It is responsible for the space
research programme which is carried out by the
three laboratories for space research, located in
Utrecht, Leiden, and Groningen (collectively
referred to as the National Space Research Insti-
tute). Activities comprise the design, develop-
ment and manufacture of space instruments and
data-processing and interpretation 
- 
the latter in
close co-operation with university groups.
123. Additionally, SRON co-ordinates all space
research activities on a national level, advises the
Dutch Government in all matters concerning
space research and, as the Netherlands Space
Research Agency, endorses co-operation in inter-
national scientifi c programmes.
I24. SRON's laboratories are mainly engaged in
X-ray and garnma-ray asftonomy. At present, this
includes inter alia the following projects: the
development of wide field X-ray cameras (two
WFCs are being developed for the Italian X-ray
satellite SAX, to be launched in 1994); the deve-
lopment of an infrared short-wavelength spectro-
meter for the ESA ISO (infrared space observato-
ry) satellite; development of a low-energy
transmission grating for cosmic X-ray specfrosco-
py with the NASA satellite AXAF (advanced X-
ray astrophysics facility); the development of a
reflecting grating spectrometer for the ESA " X-
ray multi-mirror " cornerstone (XMM) mission;
analysis of data obtained from Comptel (Comp-
tom telescope, launched April l99l), one of the
four instruments in the NASA garnma-ray obser-
vatory Exosat (European X-ray observatory satel-
lite, 1983-1986), IRAS (infrared astronomical
satellite, 1993) and Comis.
125. Through its present involvement in the
development of infrastructures like GOME (for
ERS-2, to be launched in 1994), Scimachy and
MIPAS (for Poem) SRON prepares itself for a
future rdle in earth observation programmes.
126. SRON co-ordinates and stimulates other
space research activities in the Netherlands, such
as microgravity research, and earth oriented space
research (solid earth physics, oceanography,
atmospheric physics). Presently, SRON is funding
some 17 experiments in the field of life sciences
and materials sciences.
(iii) NLR (Nationaal Lucht- en Ruimtevaartlabo-
ratorium / National Aerospace Laboratory )
127. The National Aerospace Laboratory (M-R)
is the central institute in the Netherlands for
aerospace research. It provides scientific support
and technical assistance to aerospace industries
and organisations, civil and military aircraft ope-
rators, and government agencies concerned with
aviation and space flight. In space flight, NRL
takes part in ESA programmes. NLR co-operates
closely with Fokker in various space-related pro-jects supported by the Netherlands Agency for
Aerospace Programmes (NIVR).
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128. The annual turnover ofNLR is around 141
million guilders. About 70Vo of turnover stems
from research under contract to industries and ins-
titutes and3l%o stems from a government subsidy
for NLR's basic research programme. NLR
employs a staff of about 900, of which two-thirds
are gtaduates from universities or advanced tech-
nical colleges.
L29. The laboratory operates a series of large
wind tunnels, including the transonic HST aid
supersonic SST that are used extensively in test
prograrnmes for the development of Ariane laun-
chers and the former ESA programme Hermes.
130. NLR operates facilities for research in
structures and materials used in space projects.
Expertise in load and use monitoring is combined
with structural response analysis and materials
characterisation to perform damage tolerance
assessments. Advanced dynamic and non-linear
analysis and test systems are applied to solving
problems associated with design and verification
of spacecraft structures.
131. Materials science and engineering projects
include evaluation of properties of metallic, com-
posite and hybrid materials, also at elevated tem-
peratures.
I32. For the development and application of
space technology, NLR uses special facilities for
testing and simulating satellite units and subsys-
tems. Test and simulation systems are developed
for attitude and orbit confrol systems. In the area
of thermal control, research takes place on two-
phase flow and heat transport systems in a low-
gravity environment. Several studies are perfor-
med on instrumentation of fluid physics
experiments in microgravity.
133. NLR acts as national point of confact for
the dissemination of remote sensing data to Dutch
users. Optical and microwave remote sensing sys-
tems are developed and are operated from NLR's
Mefto II and Queen Air 80laboratory aircraft.
I34. Recent work in space technology includes:
development of test and simulation assemblies for
the attitude control systems of ISO and SAX;
development of on-board attitude control softwa-
re for SAX; studies on the modelling of dynamics
simulation; development of a two-phase quality
sensor, support ofindustry to produce heat ffans-
port components for in-orbit demonstration; deve-
lopment of telescience equipment including tele-
operated optical diagnostics instrumentation; data
acquisition and control equipment for microgravi-
ty experiments in Maser flights; development of
an ejectable fluid physics experiment in a Maser
flight; research in space automation and robotics;
participation in definition studies for the Colum-
bus user support organisation; development of a
satellite ground station (Artemis) for monoriting
vegetation and rainfall in Africa, operated by the
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisa-
tion.
135. NLR's extensive computer network featu-
ring a supercomputer is used for theoretical
research, especially in computational fluid dyna-
mics and structural design of aircraft and space-
craft. The network is also used for processing data
from wind tunnel tests and flight tests. Standardi-
sed connections to national and international net-
works are available.
(f) The United Kingdom
(i) British National Space Centre (BNSC)
136. The British National Space Centre (BNSC)
was established as a result of an administrative
decision by the British Government in 1985. It
acts as a focus for the civil space interests of the
Department of Trade and Industry, the Cabinet
Office, the Department of the Environment, the
Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Common-
wealth Office, the Department of Education and
Science, the Meteorological Office, the Science
and Engineering Research Council and the Natu-
ral Environment Research Council.
I37 . The Secretary of State for Trade and Indus-
try has overall governmental responsibility for
United Kingdom civil space policy, but other
departmental ministers are involved in major
policy decisions where they have funding respon-
sibilities.
138. Most BNSC activities are carried out with
ESA (607o of the annual budget of f,160 million;
the United Kingdom is the fourth contributor).
The Cenhe has some 230 staffat its London head-
quarters and technical centres. The Rutherford
Appleton Laboratory co-operates with research
establishments, companies and universities in the
study of astronomy, solar/terrestrial physics, earth
observation and advanced space communications
systems. It also co-operates with universities in
the design, development and building of space
instruments. The Space Department of the Royal
Aerospace Establishment, RAE (part of the
Defence Research Agency, DRA) is active in
research and development on spacecraft and
remote sensing, mission analysis, orbital dyna-
mics and ground facilities. BNSC's national pro-
gramme of research and development in satellite
telecommunications is managed by DRA's Satel-
lite Communications Division at Defford.
139. Among the main areas of space activities of
interest to Britain are earth observation, satellite
communications, space science and space trans-
portation. Earth observation, with 5O7o of United
Kingdom space expenditure, is the centre-piece of
British space policy.
140. ERS-I carries two instruments developed
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in Britain: AMI, the active microwave instrument
is an integrated radar system that operates both as
a SAR and as a scatterometer and enables ERS-1
to see through clouds as well as in darkness and
ATSR (along track scanning radiometer), an
advanced four-channel infrared imaging radio-
meter.
l4l. ERS-2 will include a replica of the ATSR
with additional land channels (ATSR-2). There
are plans for BNSC partner SERC (Science and
Engineering Research Council) to fly instruments
like HIRDLS (high resolution dynamics limb
sounder), SAFIRE (spectroscopy of the atmos-
phere using far infrared emission) and EMLS
(enhanced microwave limb sounder), on NASA's
EOS (earth observation system) series of satel-
lites.
I42. Britain contributed two complementary
atmospheric analysis instruments for UARS
(NASA s upper atmosphere research satellite), the
improved stratospheric and mesosphereic sounder(ISAMS) and the microwave limb sounder
(MLS).
I43. Britain's Meteorological Office (BMO),
partners in BNSC, will fly AMSU-B instrument
(advanced microwave sounding unit), a five-
channel microwave radiometer, for the next gene-
ration of NOAA satellites. Measurements of
water vapour from Envisat-l will be given greater
accuracy by MHS (microwave humidity sounder)
being developed by BNSC partners in the Meteo-
rological Office. Also for the future, Britain is
defining and studying designs for a new instru-
ment, OMI (the high resolution optical mapping
instrument), as candidate for a bilateral mission
with France.
144. The Earth Observation Data Centre
(EODC) at Farnborough is the national centre for
acquiring, processing, storing and disseminating
remotely sensed data; EODC was developed for
the BNSC and it incorporates an important inter-
national space facility, one of the four ESA PAFs
(processing and archiving facilities)'6.
145. Space science represents 26Vo of the United
Kingdom's space expenditure. BNSC funding
through SERC (Science and Engineering Resear-
ch Council) supports the universities and RAL
(Rutherford Appleton Laboratory) in developing
and producing instruments for science missions
and interpreting their data.
146. International collaboration is an essential
element in the United Kingdom's space science
programme and is undertaken primarily through
16. A private sector company, NRSC Ltd. (National Remote
Sensing Centre) will operate EODC on a progressively more
commercial basis, initially with financial support from
BNSC.
ESA. However, in some bilateral programmes
with, for example, Germany, Japan, Russia and
the United States, current and projected space
science programmes are:
- 
X-ray astronomy, the current prograrnme
includes analysis of data from past mis-
sions and exploitation of their Germany-
United Kingdom-United States ROSAT
mission (X-ray satellite) for which Bri-
tain provided the wide field camera. Bri-
tain is also leading a European consor-
tium to build an X-ray telescope (Jet-X)
for the planned Russian Spectrum-X mis-
sion, and has provided the X-ray instru-
ments for Japan's Yohkoh mission, which
is studying high-energy aspects of solar
flares. RAL and universities have a major
involvement in all three instruments
(camera, spectrometer and optical moni-
tor) selected by ESA for its XMM mis-
sion. In the field of optical astronomy and
astrometry, the Hubble space telescope
(ESA-NASA) carries a United Kingdom
designed faint object camera and the Uni-
ted Kingdom is involved in the proces-
sing of data from the Hiparcos mission.
- 
In infrared astronomy, cuffent activities
are devoted to the development of instru-
ments for ISO (infrared space observato-
ry) with a United Kingdom contribution
to all four instruments; United Kingdom
participation in the ESA First mission is
also planned.
147. In solar-terrestrial physics, the United
Kingdom is involved in ESA s missions Ulysses,
Soho (with the coronal discharge spectrometer)
and Cluster (with the fluxgate magnetometer,
plasma analyser and digital wave processing pac-
kage).
148. The United Kingdom has a major involve-
ment in the NASA/ESA major planetary Cassini'
Huygens mission; the University of Kent has the
leading rOle in the ESA surface science package
for the Huygens Titan probe and Imperial Colle-
ge, London, for the dual technique magnetometer
on the NASA Cassini orbiter, together with other
contributions which reflect the range of British
expertise in the planetary and solar-terrestrial
field.
149. Satellite communications represent l27o of
United Kingdom space expenditure. Through
BNSC, the United Kingdom takes part in a num-
ber of ESA satellite communications pro-
grarnmes, like the DRTM (data relay and techno-
logy mission), in the two elements Artemis will
provide a pre-operational data relay capability
and demonstrate links with land mobile terminals,
optical intersatellite data linking and electric pro.
pulsion) and DRS; the ASTP-4 (advanced sys-
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tems technology programme) and ARTES
(advanced research in telecom system) PSDE.
150. BNSC, at the national level, has encoura-
ged and supponed a number of innovatory appli-
cations via ESA s large experimental Olympus
satellite, has sponsored feasibility studies of aero-
nautical and integrated cellular/land mobile com-
munications via satellite.
151. The Ministry of Defence, a BNSC partner,
sponsors a comprehensive military satellite com-
munications programme. Three Skynet-4 satel-
lites currently serve the needs of the United King-
dom's armed services and there is a widespread
ground segment. Feasibility studies for Phase 2 of
Skynet-4 are under way and the Ministry of
Defence's communications research and develop-
ment programme is co-ordinated with BNSC's
national prograrnme; both are executed through
the Defence Research Agency (DRA). DRA ope-
rates as a corporate organisation, supplying on a
commercial basis to the Ministry of Defence and
a range of other customers an expert, comprehen-
sive, scientific, and technical service. It has a
headquarters at Pyestock, and its four main opera-
ting divisions are Portsdown, Fort Halstead, Mal-
vern, and the Royal Aerospace Establishment at
Farnborough, as well as the Royal Signals and
Radar Establishment (RSRE) at Defford.
152. Technology and transportation pro-
grammes account for 3Vo of United Kingdom
space expenditure. BNSC supported research to
help develop the performance, life and reliability
of spacecraft (particularly in earth observation),
and to support and encourage the United King-
dom space sector.
153. The United Kingdom is a minor player in
ESA s launcher programmes, involved only in the
Ariane-4 research and technology accompani-
ment programme.
154. Your Rapporteur regrets that he cannot
include any information about space research
establishments in Belgium and Portugal, as no
reply has as yet been received from these estab-
lishments.
IV The European Space Agency (ESA)
155. European co-operation in space matters
dates back to the early 1960s. ln 1962, six Euro-
pean countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, in asso-
ciation with Australia) came together in ELDO
(European Launcher Development Organisation)
and, in the same year, the same six countries,
together with Denmark, Spain, Sweden and
Switzerland, formed ESRO (European Space
Research Organisation). Some ten years later, in
Brussels, in July 1973, the European Space
Conference in which the ministers of these ten
countries participated, agreed in principle to
create ESA (European Space Agency)'7 replacing
ELDO and ESRO.
156. The member states assigned ESA the task
of providing for and promoting collaboration
among European states in space research and
technology, exclusively for peaceful purposes
(Article 2 of the convention).
157. ESA is developing a European space pro-
grarnme with the aim of bringing it to a successful
conclusion. Its expertise covers the areas of scien-
ce, earth observation, communications, space sec-
tor technologies including orbiting space stations
and platforms and earth-based infrastructure,
space transportation systems and microgravity
research. Its r6le is also to co-ordinate the agen-
cy's own actions and the national programmes of
its members so as to integrate them progressively
into the European programmes. Finally, ESA also
has an industrial rOle in developing and imple-
menting a policy appropriate to its prograrnmes
while ensuring that each member receives a fair
financial return on its investments and an equi-
table share of technological spin-offs.
158. ESA s activities fall into two categories:
compulsory and optional programmes. Compul-
sory prograrnmes are concerned with studies for
future projects, technological research, joint tech-
nical investments, information systems, ffaining
programmes and the development and use of
scientific satellites. All member states contribute
to these on the basis of national income. Pro-
grarnmes described as optional are of interest only
to some of the member states who decide freely on
the extent of their participation in them. Optional
prograrnmes include earth observation, communi-
cations, space transportation, space stations, plat-
form projects and microgravity research.
159. In the pursuit of its programmes, ESA
devotes the main part of its budget to contracts
with industrial firms in the member countries. Its
policy ensures that each member receives a fair
financial return on its investments and an equi-
table share of technological spin-offs. Thus each
unit of account from a member state contributed
to the agency's budget should, strictly speaking,
come back to that country in the form of an indus-
trial conffact.
160. The headquarters of ESA is in Paris, where
its general directorate is based. However, the
organisation has several other establishments
(ESTEC, ESOC, ESRIN, EAC) and a launch base
at Kourou (in French Guyana).
17. keland joined the organisation and the founder members
were joined on lst January 1987 by Austria and Norway.
Finland will become the fourteenth member state on lst
January 1995 and co-operatation contracts have been conclu-
ded with Canada.
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161. Situated at Noordwijk, in the Netherlands,
the European Space Research and Technology
Centre (ESTEC) is ESA s largest establishment.
Scientific, communications, earth observation,
microgravity research projects and projects for
manned orbital infrastructure and unmanned plat-
forms for which responsibility has been given to
European industry are managed from ESTEC, the
true nerve centre of ESA. ESTEC also has res-
ponsibility for defining future scientific satellite
or applications prograrnmes and programmes for
the development of the new technologies neces-
sary to achieve them.
162. The European Space Operations Centre
(ESOC) in Dannstadt (Germany) is responsible
for monitoring that orbital space vehicles are wor-
king properly.
163. Despite its name, the European Space
Research Institute (ESRIN) is primarily ESA s
data management centre for information from
remote sensing satellites. Situated in ltaly, at Fras-
cati, not far from Rome, ESRIN is responsible for
processing, archiving and disributing data obtai-
ned from a large number of ground-based stations
throughout the world. Moreover it is responsible
for several services such as European Space Infor-
mation Service (ESIS) or the Information Retrie-
val Service (IRS)
l&. As the most recent of ESA's establish-
ments, the European Astronauts' Cenffe (EAC) in
Cologne (Germany) is responsible for recruiting
and training men and women who will participate
in a few years time in flight missions on the
Columbus Laboratory linked to the international
station " Freedom ".
165. Scientific prograrnmes are as follows: of
the ten satellites and scientific probes launched by
ESA between 1975 and 1990, five are at present
operational or in orbit. These are the international
ultraviolet explorer (IUE) which, launched in
1978 in the framework of a NASA, ESA and Uni-
ted Kingdom joint programme, is still continuing
in 1994 to supply data to a scientific programme
despite some minor deterioration due to its obso-
lescence; the Giotto probe (launched in 1985); the
high precision parallax collecting satellite (Hip-
parcos)r8, an astronomy satellite for determining
with greater precision the positions and parallax
of more than I 000 stars in our galaxy; the Ulysses
probe (launched in October 1990 in the frame-
work of a joint ESA/NASA mission) which is to
take measurements above the poles of the sun; the
Hubble space telescope (outcome of a joint
ESA/NASA project launched in 1990) which is
one of the most ambitious astronomy projects
ever conceived and which, despite a defect in its
18. Communication with the satellite was terminated on 15th
August 1993 at the end of a remarkable mission lasting over
three years.
mirror, corrected in spectacular fashion at the end
of 1993, has obtained far better results than those
of ground-based observatories.
166. ESA foresees the following programmes
for the future: the infrared space observatory
(ISO) programme, (launch scheduled for Septem-
ber 1995) with a low-temperature cooled telesco-
pe equipped with four scientific instruments. The
unit will take pictures and carry out photometric,
spectroscopic and polarimetric observation. The
Horizon 2000 programmes whose four " corners-
tones " missions, namely the solar terrestrial
science prograrnme (STSP), the X-ray multi-mir-
ror mission (XMM, to be launched in June 1999)
and the First (far infrared and submillimetric
space telescope) missions devoted to submillime-
tric wavelength ashonomy and Rosetta (envisa-
ged as a collaborative project between ESA and
NASA with an anticipated launch date in 2003,
the aim of which is to bring back to earth samples
taken from the head of a comet) are the basic ele-
ments of ESA's scientific programme. STSP
brings together two missions, Soho (the solar and
heliospheric observatory with an anticipated laun-
ch date in July 1995) which will carry out resear-
ch on the internal structure and dynamics of the
sun and Cluster (scheduled launch date in Decem-
ber 1995) which includes four satellites with a
payload of ten instruments, whose aim is a three-
dimensional study of turbulence and small-scale
structures of the plasma surrounding the earth.
167. Lastly, mention should be made of the Cas-
sini/Huygens planetary exploration mission of
Saturn and Titan (undertaken jointly by ESA and
NASA) which will include a NASA probe orbi-
ting round Saturn, linked to ESA s Huygens probe
which will be released into Titan's atmosphere'e
and Integral (international gamma ray laboratory)
a garnma-ray astronomy mission based on the ser-
vice module coflrmon to )OVIM20.
168. For observation of the earth, ESA relies on
the following prograrnmes:
- 
Meteosat2', Europe's frst geostationary
meteorogical satellites, equipped with an
imaging radiometer allowing pictures to
be taken in the visible and infrared spec-
trum and in the water vapour wavelength
designed basically to take pictures of the
19. The particular interest in Titan derives from the fact that
its atrnosphere has properties closer to that of the earth than
any other body in the solar system.
20. This project will be conducted jointly with Russia and
NASA. The Russians are to provide the launcher (Proton)
free of charge in exchange for observing time. NASA is to
take part in the development of the payload (spectrometer)
and might contribute one or two ground stations in addition
to the ESA stations.
21. Ownership of Meteosat satellites was transferred to the
European organisation Eumetsat from the time of its forma-
tion in 1987. ESA continues to be responsible for their
exploitation and technical management.
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earth, broadcast meteorogical data and
collect environmental data recorded by
unmanned stations on the ground; Meteo-
sat 6 was launched on 20th November
1993.
-ERS-1 (European remote sensing): a
European radar satellite placed in polar
orbit by Ariane in July 1991. Since then,
thanks to its main instrumentation, a syn-
thetic aperture radar (AMI) (active
microwave instrument), a wind scattero-
meter, a radar altimeter (RA) and a radio-
meter and sounder (ATSR-M) (along-
track scanning radiometer and
microwave sounder), ERS-1 carries out
detailed observation of the structure of
the earth's surface. Production of the
second flight model, ERS-222 has conti-
nued with a launch date in prospect at the
end of 1994.
- 
Envisat and Metop: these are two series
of missions in polar orbit developed by
ESA: a first and initially experimental
series of environmental study platforms(Envisat) and a meteorogical series
(Metop), oriented rather towards opera-
tional observation. Envisat, one of the
most wide-ranging and ambitious satel-
lites ever produced by ESA (with a pay-
load three times greater than those of the
ERS satellites) has a projected launch
date of 1998. The flrst meteorogical mis-
sion will not, however, be launched until
the year 2000, following a joint
ESA/Eumetsat programme.
- 
The Meteosat second generation (MSG)
programme is being conducted in close
co-operation with Eumetsat and the first
satellite launch is envisaged for the year
2000.
169. In communications, ESA has been present
since 1979 in the geostationary arc through expe-
rimental orbital test satellites (OTS), then preope-
rational European communications satellites
(ECS) constituting the first generation of Euro-
pean telecommunications satellites developed by
ESA'?3. In addition to the ECS, there are the
Marecs (Maritime ECS) satellites designed by
ESA to provide communications capabilities with
moving vehicles and in particular with ships at sea
and leased to Inmarsat (international maritime
satellite organisation) for the period of their use.
Lastly, the Olympus satellite (launched in July
22. ERS-2 should provide continuity of data transmitted by
ERS-I and also offer new possibilities for monitoring the
ozone layer on a global scale.
23. The European space communications organisation,
Eutelsat, is responsible for the exploitation of the ECS, rena-
med Eutelsat I after their entry into operational service.
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1989 by Ariane rocket with a payload consisting
of four different missions: direct satellite broad-
casting, Ku band communications, Ka-20l30 GHz
band commuications and a beacon for propaga-
tion studies) was withdrawn from service in
August 1994 following a failure.
170. ESA's principal objective in proposing a
prograrnme of data-relay satellites, essential for
maintaining continuous and immediate contact
between ground control teams and European orbi-
tal infrastructures, is to ensure Europe's total
independence in data transmission from orbiting
satellites or platforms to ground stations in Euro-
pe.
l7I. In this area, the Artemis (advanced relay
technology mission) satellite should be launched
at the end of 1996 with an optical laser beam com-
munications payload on board, along with satel-
lites in low earth orbitz, a demonsffation commu-
nications payload for the mobile service for land
vehicles and a data-relay payload for preparing
the operational data-relay system (DRS). ESA
foresees placing up to two geostationary data-
relay satellites in orbit (the first in 1999); these
will contribute to optimising the future European
orbital infrastructure and will be compatible with
other similar networks (the American TDRS and
the Japanese DTRS) in the framework of interna-
tional co-operation.
172. Finally, in order to ensure that Europe has
the necessary means of maintaining its capabili-
ties and commercial competitiveness in the sector
of communications by satellite, ESA has propo-
sed the Artes (advanced research in telecommuni-
cations systems) programme 25.
173. Reference must be made in connection with
manned space flight and microgravity of the firstjoint German/ESA/Spacelab mission in October
1985 carrying 75 microgravity and life sciences
experiments; participation in Astro-1 missions
(December 1990), SLS-1 (Spacelab space scien-
ce, June 1991), IML-I (January 1992), Atlas-l(April 1992), the USLM-I (United States micro-
gravity laboratory) flight in June 1992, the joint
mission with the Japan Spacelab-J in September
1992 and lastly the Spacelab D2 mission in April
1993. The European unmanned retrievable plat-
form, Eureca (European retrievable carrier), an
ideal laboratory for microgravity studies, was
retrieved on 24th June 1993 by the Endeavour
space shuttle after eleven months in low earth
24. Artemis's optical payload will communicate with an opti-
cal terminal on board Spot-4. Manufacture of this terminal
led to Spot-4 being supplied with the first complete model,
offering good optical, thermal and mechanical precision.
25. Activities within the Artes programme fall into the follo-
wing categories: promotion of new improved services in
communications by satellite; co-operation with users;
improving industrial competitiveness and international co-
operation.
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orbit. In 1993 also, the European microgravity
research programme, Emir-1, was adopted.
174. European participation in the large interna-
tional space station " Freedom ", agreed by the
Council of ESA meeting in the Hague in 1987,
took the name Columbus programme. The atta-
ched laboratory prografilme had to be adapted to
the constraints arising from the decisions taken at
the Council meeting at ministerial level in Grana-
da at the end of 1992 and the evolution of the
international space station programme that took
place in 1993. Two series of studies on possibili-
ties for technical co-operation and future partner-
ship between the ESA member states and Russia
were carried out in the framework of the " future
station Columbus " programme unit. The first of
these series dealt with a limited range of contribu-
tions by ESA to the Russian MIR-2 space station,
the second with possible wider co-operation after
the year 2000 and the consffuction of MIR-2, in
relation to major components of orbital infrastruc-
ture.
175. The Ariane prograrnme (the first flight of
which was on 24th December 1979) gave ESA its
own reliable launcher, making it independent in
terms of space ffansportation. The initial Ariane 1
gave way to the more powerful Ariane 2 and 3
from 1984 and these were withdrawn in turn with
the arrival on the scene of Ariane 4 in 1988. The
latter are available in six models, including a basic
version and five other models equipped, depen-
ding on the satellite mass to be placed in orbit,
with two or four high tech solid or liquid propel-
led booster engines. Ariane 5, with a radically dif-
ferent architecture, will be a new generation laun-
cher, shorter and squatter, capable ofgiving rise to
a new family of rockets adapted to the satellites of
early next century. ESA has opted for a rocket in
two stages: a lower stage, identical for all mis-
sions and an upper stage that can be adapted to the
mission and the payload to be placed in orbit.
176. Given the evolution of projects for future
space-based infrastructure, the concept of a win-
ged re-entry vehicle which figured in the Hermes
programme has been abandoned. The revised
Hermes prograrnme is now known as the manned
space transportation programme (MSTP) and
envisages further research and predevelopment
work on which will be based the decisions to be
taken as regards Europe's capability in equipment
and cargo transportation and in carrying out
repairs in orbit.
177. ESA is developing a range ofco-operative
relations in Europe and with the United States,
Russia and Japan. In Europe, in accordance with
the wish expressed at the Granada conference,
complementarity with various international orga-
nisations (Eutelsat, Eumetsat) has been sought.
Priority has been given to relations with the Euro-
pean Commission through strengthening regular
contacts and improving consultation and co-ordi-
nation. Promising new areas for co-operation
have been identified such as navigation, promo-
ting remote sensing in developing countries and
training.
178. ESA is, in short, at the root of a massive
European effort in space matters to which, it
should be sffessed, the CNES has contributed in
large part. There is possibly no other area as Euro-
pean as space technology. Last, but not least, ESA
has no mandate to concern itself with the non-
civilian use of space. In fact, whether or not its
convention permits it to deal with this area is not
a legal problem but basically a political one. Not
all ESA member countries are interested in mili-
tary space, but it is obvious that in maintaining a
watertight partition between civil and military
space (military space systems such as Helios or
Eumilsatcom are developed outside ESA) does
not encourage the most rational use of the avai-
lable financial means and technological capabili-
ties and often, moreover, stands in the way of
synergies which would allow an integration of
military and civilian objectives.
179. The problem is there and a solution must
therefore be considered as soon as possible in
order to derive the greatest possible benefit from
our financial and technological capabilities.
V The state of European co-operation
180. From this general overview, certain aspects
can be discerned which are of interest to our
national space research institutes.
1 8 1. It should be stressed at the outset that these
institutes, intended as wholly national bodies, are
intended first and foremost to be of service to
national interests.
182. At European level, there is still a degree of
divergence as regards the evolution of the space
sector in individual countries and the political
importance accorded to this sector, as revealed by
major differences between space budgets and
their allocation between ESA programmes and
national prograrnmes.
183. National space research institutes are often
multidisciplinary and engaged in other fields of
research such as, for example, aeronautics and
energy. Their size, budgets, aims and the links
they have with the military sector vary considera-
blv.
184. A degree ofoverlap is evident in European
space-based activities, both between various
national prograrnmes and between these and ESA
programmes. There is a great deal of duplication
in infrastructure, training and remote sensing and
co-operation with third countries.
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185. Your Rapporteur feels, however, that it is
necessary to stress existing examples of co-opera-
tion and collaboration between national space
research institutes outside ESA programmes.
Among these, the programmes already considered
in the descriptive account of the national space
research institutes are worthy of note: Spot, Vege-
tation, Helios,Iasi, Sax, etc.
186. Moreover, in the framework of research
and technology programme 9.1 of the Euclid pro-
gramme, devoted to a feasibility study of optical
and/or radar monitoring satellites, teams from
state organisations with the task of identifying
problems likely to prove sensitive in the future
have been formed and trained. The following
teams are contributing their particular expertise to
this programme: ETCA and the University of
Lidge (Belgium), DLR (Germany), Alenia Spazio(Italy), NLR, TNO and Fokker (Netherlands),
NDRE (Norway), INETI (Portugal), INTA
(Spain) and ONERA (France). Each country par-
ticipates equally and where there are no govern-
ment establishments in the area concerned indus-
tries have been selected.
187. WEU is also involved in bringing the natio-
nal space institutes closer together: WEU studies
on satellite systems are monitored by the study
management group in which engineers from the
state bodies referred to above participate. More-
over, additional studies have been launched in
order the better to identify needs; ONERA and
DLR are working on synthetic aperture radar and
INTA, NLR and ONERA on problems relating to
optical payloads.
VI. The future of European space research(forms of research and interactian)
188. Your Rapporteur believes convergence bet-
ween ESA and the national space research insti-
tutes is necessary in order to bring greater cohe-
rence to the programmes undertaken and
maximise the advantages that might be obtained
from wider co-operation between national space
centres. Measures must be taken now to imple-
ment a co-ordinated sffategy between the various
national space research institutes, ESA, the Euro-
pean Union, WEU and other organisations such as
Eumetsat, Eutelsat, etc.
189. Countries will have to abandon policies
that seek to maintain their presence in the diffe-
rent sectors, an attitude which leads to resources
being spread between numerous programmes ins-
tead of developing synergies. Individual countries
must concentrate on doing what they know how to
do best.
190. Co-ordination of the research policies of
member states is essential if it is hoped to achieve
more efficient use of funds allocated to research;
such co-ordination could contribute to the emer-
gence of new synergies and avoid fruitless disper-
sal of effort. When acting thus it is, however,
necessary to ensure that a distinction is drawn bet-
ween an unnecessary overlapping of effort and
useful parallel researih.
l9l. Since space technology now has a crucial
r6le in defence and security matters (the C3I
concept in space on a planetary scale) and given
the high cost of military space programmes,
increased European co-operation in military space
matters is proving to be an essential condition for
our security and political independence. Defence
Europe must make a single and coherent collecti-
ve response to the challenge of military space. To
this end, co-ordination between the military and
civil uses of space is essential for the technologi-
cal and industrial development of space applica-
tions. The national space research institutes must
be able to find a solution to this problem.
192. In the context of strengthening co-opera-
tive ties with counffies embarking on space pro-
grammes and consequently potential partners or
customers of Europe, joint rather than competitive
action must be envisaged. It would also be desi-
rable, starting from existing know-how in research
and development of new space technologies, to
encourage the creation at European level of new
innovative commercial structures in conjunction
with financial and industrial circles. The models
adopted by the CNES in this area might be taken
as an example.
I93. Due to the complexity and variety of pro-
blems tackled, research activities cover disci-
plines and technologies extending beyond what
might be strictly defined as the boundaries of
space. Your Rapporteur considers it necessary for
the national space research institutes to develop
working ties with establishments covering related
or complementary disciplines and to maintain
very close ties with the industrial fabric in order to
be able to apply and transfer the results of their
research.
I94. The national space research institutes must
identify research sectors of mutual interest in
order to define joint activities. Exchanges of
scientific personnel and joint raining can streng-
then interaction.
195. All space agencies and research institutes
are therefore encouraged to take these considera-
tions into account and to envisage new forms of
co-operation.
196. The aeronautics research institutes of seven
European countries (France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United King-
dom) have taken the initiative of starting a process
of convergence of their activities in aeronautics.
Several of these institutes are also working in the
space sector. The convergence of work in aero-
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nautics is favourable to closer relations in space
matters and could serve as an organisational
model.
197. The Maastricht Treaty sets out the need
for co-ordinating efforts in terms of technology
policy and research.
198. For some time now, the Commission has
made use of observation satellites, the informa-
tion from which enables it to implement its
various sectoral policies, in particular, agriculture,
environment and development aid. Moreover, the
Institute for Remote Sensing Applications pro-
vides scientific backing for such applications and
directs high technology research on environmen-
tal change. The Commission also maintains close
and regular co-operation with ESA and, additio-
nally, participates as an observer in the Commit-
tee for Earth Observation by Satellite (CEOS).
Moreover, in co-operation with ESA, it has star-
ted a new activity 
- 
the Centre for Earth Observa-
tion (CEO).
199. Lastly, the Commission should also encou-
rage co-operation between the national space
research institutes; such co-operation, as has
already been noted, should ifat all possible, avoid
excess capacity and the major difficulties arising
from abusive application of the principle of fair
return and encourage a more integrated approach
to space research.
VII. Conclusians
200. It is clear that space research has generally
developed in relation to national interests and
with the aim of achieving supremacy or at least of
obtaining a certain political standing.
201. Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet Union,
in large measure, brought an end to bipolarism
and at the same time to the space race. D6tente,
too, has also opened up wider possibilities for
international co-operation; to all the above must
be added the arrival of new countries on the space
scene and the emergence of new commercial
opportunities.
202. In any event, space policy remains a matter
for states and it does not seem likely that this
situation will change very much in the immediate
future; nor would it be realistic or desirable to
seek to bring about such change.
203. In the framework of space policy, the
defence sector is acquiring very specific importan-
ce as this sector is essential to national sovereign-
ty. It retains considerable interest despite the gene-
ralised process of disarmament and the reduction
of military budgets in most of our countries.
204. If this interest is sustained, it is mainly for
two reasons: first, a consequence of disarmament
is a new type of armed forces, technologically far
more sophisticated and, second, verification of
disarmament agreements calls for ever more com-
plex means.
205. These two factors give space a leading r6le.
On the one hand, it is an attested fact that the use
of space for military ends is a source of high-tech-
nology generation for civil use, a situation which
could, nevertheless, be reversed. On the other,
from a political as well as from a purely economic
point of view, there is a general consensus on the
need for and expediency of international co-ope-
ration in space matters, mainly because of the
considerable difficulty of meeting the major
expenditure involved in space projects. However,
other reasons also weigh in favour international
co-operation; participation in industrial consortia
and joint ventures; participation in international
bodies and networks in order to expand markets;
maintaining industrial positions; exchange of per-
sonnel, etc.
206. European co-operation in space matters has
largely been conducted through programmes
undertaken in the framework of the European
Space Agency to which should be added other co-
operative programmes between various European
counries. In this connection, it should be recalled
that the Maastricht Treaty highlighted the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity which, when applied to the
situation under consideration, might be summari-
sed as follows: whenever a project might be car-
ried out jointly, the country concerned should
endeavour to propose this to its European allies
with a view to partnership. If, however, a project
derives solely from national concerns, the country
concerned should implement it alone, leaving
open the possibility, however, of subcontracting
certain aspects of the project to its partners.
207. Moreover, your Rapporteur considers the
agreement between six European research insti-
tutes on the possibility of closer co-operation in
aeronautics as being of very great interest. The
progress of this agreement should doubtless be
followed most closely in the hope of drawing use-
ful lessons for space research.
208. All the aims to which reference is made
throughout this report should contribute to prG.
moting the European space industry. Even if it
may appear to be very difficult and quite illusory
to standardise the political ambitions of each of
the European countries in this sector, co-operation
between space research institutes should be
strengthened and areas of interdependence identi-
fied as soon as possible.
209. In order to enable the various countries to
maintain their position and fulfil their ambitions
without jeopardising existing investments and
expertise already acquired, it is necessary to sus-
tain and intensify efforts in space research as a
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guarantee for the future. Indeed, space pro-
grammes themselves, their development and
implementation depend in large measure on exper-
tise that has been accumulated through research.
2I0. Such efforts also imply the need to main-
tain a strong basic research potential on a Euro-
pean scale (for example, in universities) essential
for guaranteeing the credibility of the national ins-
titutes and European indusbry.
2ll. One of the major constraints weighing
upon public support for space research is that of
finance. It would therefore be extremely risky for
expertise to be dispersed too widely when Euro-
pean resources are limited. The purpose of joint
action should be to reduce excess capacity and to
identify future needs.
212. Thus, the first consequence offinancial res-
trictions should be rationalisation of the use of
resources and concentration of effort.
213. Lastly, it should be suggested that in the
future our committee might study the possibilities
for co-operation between space research institutes
in our own countries and in those of Central and
Eastern Europe; the main objective of such co-
operation would be to direct the work of these ins-
titutes into peaceful channels and to foster their
integration and that of their scientists into the
international community.
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Ghssary
AFDRG 
- 
Anglo-French Defence Research Group
AMI 
- 
Active Microwave Instrument/Insffument actif hyperfr6quences
AMSU 
- 
Advanced Microwave Sounding UniUSonde perfectionn6e i hyperfr6quences
ANS 
- 
Astronomical Netherlands Satellite/Satellite astronomique n6erlandais
ANTHORACK 
- 
Medical research facility developped by ESA for D 
- 
2 mission
ARGOS 
- 
Systbme de localisation et de collecte de donn6es
ARTEMIS 
- 
Advanced Relay Technology Mission (ESA)
ARTES 
- 
Advanced Research in Telecommunication Systems/Recherche de Pointe sur les Systbmes de
T6l6communications (ESA)
ASI 
- 
Agenzia Spaziale Italiana
ASSM 
- 
Aerodynamics of Segmented Solid Motors/A6rodynamique des propulseurs segment6s i com-
bustible solide (ONERA)
ASTP 
- 
Advanced Systems Technology Programme/Prograrnme de systbmes et de technologies de
pointe
ATSR-M 
- 
Along-Track Scanning Radiometer & Microwave Sounder
AXAF 
- 
Advanced X-ray Astrophysics Facility (NASA)
BMFT 
- 
Federal Ministry for Research and Technology (Germany) Bundesministerium fiir Forschung
und Technologie
BMO 
- 
British Meteorological Office
BNSC 
- 
British National Space Centre
CAPRICORNIO 
- 
Programme de lanceur de microsatellites espagnol
CARINA 
- 
Re-enffry capsule for microgtavity experiments (ASI)
CASSINI-HUYGENS 
- 
Mission ESA-NASA d'exploration plan6taire de Saturne et de Titan
CDTI 
- 
Centro para el Desarrollo T6cnico y IndustriaUCentre pour le d6veloppement technique et
industriel
CGS 
- 
Centro di Geodesia Spaziale (I)
CICSAT 
- 
Capacidad Inicial de las Comunicaciones por Satelites
CICYT - Comission espagnole charg6e de la science et de la technologie
CIRA 
- 
Centro Italiano di Richerche Aerospaziali
CLUSTER 
- 
Satellites pour l'6tude de la structure d petite 6chelle de la magndtosphEre (ESA)
CNES 
- 
Centre national d'6tudes spatiales
C.N.R.S 
- 
Centre national de la recherche scientifique (F)
COLUMBUS 
- 
Programme de I'ESA sur les vols habit6s
COMPTEL 
- 
Comptom Telescope
CRYP 
- 
Cryogenic Propulsion Plant FacilityfBanc d'essai de propulsion cryog6nique (CIRA)
CSG 
- 
Cenffe spatial guyanais
D-ll2 
- 
German Spacelab missions
DARA 
- 
Deutsche Agentur fiir Raumfahrtangelegenheiten
DFD 
- 
German Remote Sensing Data Centre/Cenffe allemand des donn6es de t6l6d6tection
DLR 
- 
Deutsche Forschungsanstalt ftir Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V.
DORIS 
- 
Systbme d'orbitographie fine et de localisation pr6cise de balises (F)
DRA 
- 
Defence Research Agency (UK)
DRPP 
- 
Data Relay Preparatory Programme (ESA)
DRS 
- 
Data Relay Satellite/Satellite-relais g6ostationnaire
EAC 
- 
European Astronaut Centre/Cenffe des astronautes europ6ens
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ECS 
- 
European Communications Satellite (ESA)
ELDO 
- 
European Launcher Development Organisation
EMIR-I 
- 
Programme europ6en de recherche en micropesanteur (ESA)
EODC 
- 
Earth Observation Data Centre
EOPP 
- 
Earth Observation Preparatory Programme
EOS 
- 
Earth Observation System/Systdme d'observation de la tene (NASA)
EPOS 
- 
European Proximity Operations Simulator/Simulateur europden d'op6ration de proximite (ESA
- 
DLR)
ERS 
- 
Earth Remote Sensing Satellite
ESA 
- 
European Space Agency
ESIS 
- 
European Space Information Service (ESA)
ESOC 
- 
European Space Operations Centre/Centre europ6en d'op6rations spatiales (ESA)
ESRIN 
- 
European Space Research Institute (ESA)
ESRO 
- 
European Space Research Organisation
ESTEC 
- 
European Space Research and Technology Centre/Centre europ6en de recherche et de techno-
logie spatiales (ESA)
ETW 
- 
Soufflerie Transsonique Europ6enne/European Transsonic Wind Tunnel
EURD 
- 
Instrument pour l'6tude du rayonnement diffus provenant de l'espace dans l'ultraviolet lointain
EURECA 
- 
European Retrievable Carrier (ESA)
EUTELSAT 
- 
Organisation europ6enne de tdl6communications par satellite
FIRST 
- 
Far Infrared and Submillimetric Space Telescope
GALILEO 
- 
Mission d'6tude de Jupiter/l.,lASA
GEZON 
- 
Cristallog6nbse sous champ magn6tique (Russie)
GRANAT 
- 
Observatoire )Vgamma (Russie)
GSOC 
- 
German Space Operations Centre/Centre allemand d'op6rations spatiales
HELIOS 
- 
Satellites militaires d'observation de la terre
HIPPARCOS 
- 
High Precision Parallax Collecting Satellite
HIRDLS 
- 
High Resolution Limb Sounder/Sondeur du limbe dynamique i haute r6solution
HISPASAT 
- 
Satellite militaire espagnol
HUBBLE 
- 
T6lescope spatial (programme conjoint ESA-NASA)
IASB 
- 
Institut d'a6ronomie spatiale de Belgique
IASI 
- 
Infrared Atmospheric Sounding Interferometer (ASI-CNES)
IML 1 et2 
-lntemational Microgravity Laboratory
INMARSART 
- 
Organisation Internationale de Communications Maritimes par Satellites
INTA 
- 
Instituto Nacional de T6cnica Aerospacial
INTEGRAL 
- 
International Gamma Ray Laboratory
I-PAF 
- 
Italian processing and archiving facility
IRAS 
- 
Infrared Astronomical Satellite (NL-UK-USA)/Satellite d'astronomie infrarouge (PB-RU-EU)
IRIS 
- 
Italian Research Interim Stage
IRS 
- 
Information Retrieval Service (ESA)
ISO 
- 
Infrared Space Observatory/Observatoire Spatial dans l'lnfrarouge (ESA)
ITALSAT 
- 
Italian pre-operational communication satellite
IUE 
- 
International Ultraviolet Explorer (NASA-ESA-UK)
LAGEOS 
- 
Laser Geodynamics Satellite (ASI-NASA)
MAGELLAN 
- 
Mission d'6tude de V6nusA[ASA
MARECS 
- 
Maritime ECS (ESA)
MARS 94-96 
- 
Etude de Mars (Russie/Coop6ration internationale)
MEDEA 
- 
Material sciences Experiment Double-rack for Experiment modules and Apparatus/Exp6rience
DLR embarqu6 sur D-2
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MEPHISTO 
- 
Etude de la solidification des alliages m6talliques et des semi-conducteurs sur une plate-
forme USMP de la navette spatiale am6ricaine (F)
MSG 
- 
M6t6osat de seconde g6n6ration
METEOP 
- 
Satellite d'observation m6t6orologique depuis I'orbite polaire
METEOSAT 
- 
Satellites m6t6orologiques g6ostationnaires (ESA)
MHS 
- 
Microwave Humidity Sounder
MINISAT 
- 
Programme de minisatellites de I'[NTA
MIPAS 
- 
Michelson Interferometer Passive Atmospheric Sounder/Sonde atmosph6rique passive d
interf6romEtre Michelson
MLS 
- 
Microwave Limb Sounder
MOMS 
- 
Modular Optical Multispectral Scanner (D-2)/Scanner multispectral i balayage optique
modulaire
MSCC 
- 
Manned Space Laboratories Control Centre/Centre de contrOle des laboratoires spatiaux habitds
MSTP 
- 
Manned Space Transport Programme (ESA)
NASA 
- 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NM 
- 
Nederlands Instituut voor Vliegtuigontwikkeling en Ruimtevaart/Netherlands agency for
aerospace programmes
NLR 
- 
Nationaal Lucht- en Ruimtevaartlaboratorium/lrlational Aerospace Laboratory
NOAA 
- 
Agence am6ricaine pour l'6tude des oc6ans et de l'atmosphEre/National Oceanic and Atmo-
sphere Administration
NRSC Ltd 
- 
National Remote Sensing Cenre (UK)
NWO 
- 
Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research
ODISSEA 
- 
Co-operation programme between ASI, CNES and INTA for transmediterranean balloon
flights
OERSTED 
- 
Mission danoise d'6tude du champ magn6tique de la terre
OLYMPUS 
- 
Satellite de t6l6communications ESA
OMI 
- 
High Resolution Optical Mapping Instrument/Instrument de cartographie optique i haute
16solution
OI\ERA 
- 
Office national d'6tudes et de recherches adrospatiales
OTS 
- 
Orbital Test Satellite (ESA)
PAF 
- 
hocessing and Archiving Facility/Etablissement de traitement des donn6es et d'archivage
PNS 
- 
Piano Spaziale Nazionale (I)
POLDER 
- 
Radiomdtre polarimbtre imageur (F-J)
POP 
- 
Programme oscillations de poussde (ONERA)
PREPHA 
- 
Programme de recherche et technologie pour la propulsion hypersonique avanc6e (ONERA)
PRONAOS 
- 
Nacelle ballon d'astronomie submillim6trique (F)
PRORA 
- 
Programma Nazionale di Ricerche Aerospaziali fl)
PSDE 
- 
Payload Spacecraft Development on Experiments Programme
PWT 
- 
Plasma Wind Tunnel (CIRA)
RAE 
- 
Royal Aerospace Establishment (UK)
RAL 
- 
Rutherford Appleton Laboratory (UK)
RAMSES 
- 
Radar a6roportd multi-Spectral d'6tudes de signatures (ONERA)
RKA 
- 
Russian Space Agency
ROSAT 
- 
X-ray Satellite (D 
- 
U.K 
- 
USA)
ROTEX 
- 
Robotic Technology Experiment (D-2)Exrtnence de robotique
RSRE 
- 
Royal Signals and Radar Establishment (UK)
S IIRE I Spectroscopy 9f _the Atmosphere Using Far Infrared Emission/Spectroscopie de l'atmosphdre
utilisant l'6mission dans I' infrarouge lointain
SAR - Synthetic Aperture Radar/Radar d synthdse d'ouverture
SAX 
- 
X-ray astronomy satellite (ASI-NIVR)
SCARAB 
- 
RadiomEtres destin6s d l'6tude du bilan radiatif de la terre (France/Russie)
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SCIAMACHY 
- 
Scanning Imaging Absorption Spectrometer for Atmospheric Cartography
SERC 
- 
Science and Engineering Research Council (UK)
SIGMA 
- 
Systdme d'imagerie garnma i masque al6atoire (France-Russie)
SILEX 
- 
Semi-conductor Interorbit Link Experiment (tdl6communications)
SIR-C 
- 
Space-borne Imaging Radar-C/Radar d'imagerie en bande C
SM 
- 
Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia A6realSystEme int6gr6 de surveillance a6rienne
SOHO 
- 
Solar and Heliospheric Observatory/Observatoire du soleil et de l'h6liosphBre
SPACELAB 
- 
Space Laboratory
SPIDER 
- 
Space Inspection Device for Exffa-vehicular Repairs/Systdme d'inspection spatiale pour les
r6parations extra-v6hiculaires (ASI)
SPOT 
- 
Satellite pour observation de la terre (F-S-B)
SRL 
- 
Space Radar Laboratory/Laboratoire radar de l'espace
SRON Space Research Organisation Netherlands/Stichting Ruimteonderzoek Nederland
STELLA 
- 
Instrument pour la cartographie du champ de gravit6 dans les zones polaires (F)
STSP 
- 
Programme de physique des relations terre-soleil (ESA)
SYRACUSE 
- 
Systdme militaire de t6l6communications par satellites (F)
TELECOM 
- 
Satellite de t6l6communications frangais
TOPEX/POSEIDON 
- 
Satellite oc6anographique scientifique (USA)
TSS 
- 
Tethered Satellite System (ASI-NASA)
UARS 
- 
Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite/Satellite d'6tude de la haute atmosphdre (NASA)
ULYSSE 
- 
Mission polaire solaire internationale (ESA)
USLM-I- US Microgravity Laboratory
YEGETATION - (Commission Europ6enne-F-B 
-I- S) Instrumentpour le suivi des 6cosystbmes
naturels et des systbmes agricoles
WINDII - Mesure des vents et de la temp6rature dans la haute atmosphbre (Canada/F)
XMM 
- 
Mission miroirs multiples dans le rayonnement X
X-SAR 
- 
X-band Synthetic Aperture Radar (ASI-DARA-NASA)
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Amendment I 28th November 1994
Co-operation between European space research institutes
AMENDMENT 1'
tabled by Mrs. Gaiotti di Biase
l. In the draft resolution proper, leave out paragraph (e) and insert:
" take account, in developing Europe's autonomy in defence matters, of the fact that military appli-
cations of space in large measure coincide with civil applications; "
Signed: Gaiotti di Biase
l. See llth sitting, 30th November 1994 (amendment withdrawn).
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Transatlantic co-operation on European anti-missile defenc e
REPORT 
'
submitted on belnlf of the
Technological and Aerospace Committee 2
by Mn Atkinson, Rapporteur
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Dnerr RrcoMNaeNnATIoN
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Drafi Recommendation
on transatlantie co-operalian on European anti-nissile defence
The Assembly,
(i) Recognising the need for Europe to determine the risks for its security of the proliferation of ballis-
tic technologies in the countries of the third world and in panicular in the Mediterranean and the Middle
East;
(ii) Recalling the need for the discussion already started in WEU to be taken further in order to contri-
bute to identifying these risks and their effects on Europe and for giving this discussion real impetus;
(iii) Taking into consideration the need for European countries to reach a joint position on anti-missile
defence, in order to avoid a dangerous delay in relation to the evolution ofthe threat;
(iv) Recalling its earlier conclusions on the need to envisage a system of protection which takes account
of European needs and also of work done in this area by the United States;
(v) Considering the many advantages that co-operation in the widest sense and based on equality bet-
ween the transatlantic partners could obtain for the two sides in the area of anti-missile defence;
(vi) Considering however that certain programmes launched by the United States, such as THAAD,
have reached a very advanced stage, which precludes co-operation from the outset;
(vii) Recalling moreover that the missile technology control r6gime provides for the signatory countries
to strengthen the principles upheld by that agreement through their respective legislations;
(viii) Tattng into account the differences now separating countries that used to be members of Cocom in
identifying the countries which constitute a strategic threat to their security;
(ix) Considering that the countries which are at present establishing the bases of the new Cocom must
reach a consensus, particularly with regard to prohibition of certain fransactions with given countries or
for a specific purpose;
(x) Considering that the system which is to succeed Cocom must have as its main objective to prevent
the countries constituting a true proliferation risk and a real threat to regional stability from procuring
conventional armaments and associated technology;
(xi) Judging necessary that agreements directed to this end should be concluded as quickly as possible;
(xii) Emphasising the importance for WEU to define a joint policy for the exportation of armaments;
(xiii) Taking account of the need to take the necessary steps as soon as possible for preparing a
conference on security and co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM),
RecouuBNos rHAr rrm Couucn
1. Give the Assembly precise information about progress made in the study being conducted by the
Special Working Group on European anti-missile defence;
2. Let the Assembly know whether a meeting of experts has been held in order to prepare an analysis
of risks and, if so, what conclusions were drawn from that meeting;
3. Ask member countries to strengthen in their respective legislations the principles upheld by the
MTCR;
4. Encourage the adoption in member countries of a joint position on the definition of the countries
that constitute a strategic threat to their security;
5. Seek a consensus among member countries on the bases of the r6gime to replace Cocom;
6. Promote among member countries the inffoduction in the very near future of a joint policy towards
the exportation of armaments to third countries;
7. Speed up examination of the development of a European space-based observation system and the
taking of decisions in that respect;
8. Create a study group on a European early warning system;
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2. 
- 
Discuss the possibilities of co-operation between the United States and Europe on anti-missile
defence; such co^-o-peration should be on a basis of equal partnership in development and production and
might cover the following areas:
(a)progranvnes-on_anendo-atmospheric system currently under study in Europe and the United
States and which might possibly lead to joint implementation of a single prograrnme;
( b ) exo-atmospheric systems;
(c) airborne systems, adapted in any event, to European Rafale and Eurofighter combat aircraft;
(d) study of the_possibility for Europe to adopt a joint position on the possible procurement of the
American THAAD programme;
10. Reach qj.oirt position on the various possibilities described above in the interests of Europe and our
transatlantic allies.
11. Establish contacts between WEU and the BMDO for discussion of the problems already described.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mn Atkinson, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
1. [n November 1992, the Technological and
Aerospace Committee adopted the report by Mr.
Lenzer (Document 1339) on anti-ballistic missile
defence, the main aim of which, as the report sta-
ted was "...to draw the attention of the Council
and the public to a problem of a new kind that
makes it necessary for Europe to assess the risks
to its security that may arise from the increasing
proliferation of ballistics technology in third
world countries, particularly those along Europe's
southern and south-eastern flanks".
2. The conclusions ofthe above report revea-
led the need to open up an in-depth discussion
which would contribute to identifying the nature
of these risks and also to understanding their pos-
sible implications for Europe and the urgency for
our continent to reach a joint position on anti-mis-
sile defence, so as to avoid a dangerous time-lag
in relation to the development of the threat.
3. A few months later, in April 1993, the
Technological and Aerospace Committee organi-
sed a symposium in Rome on anti-missile defence
for Europe, which made a very important contri-
bution to the above debate.
4. The first conclusion to be drawn from this
symposium was the need to create a space-based
observation and early warning system, following
which an anti-missile defence system could sub-
sequently be chosen. Furthermore, the conclu-
sions stressed the need for the WEU Assembly to
formulate "recommendations regarding a protec-
tion system with due regard to European require-
ments and taking into account the work already
done by the United States. This might lead to a co-
operative system, perhaps drawing other coun-
tries into what might be a security partnership.
First, however, there would have to be risk assess-
ment and risk description. In a second stage,
WEU member countries should define their secu-
rity requirements and pool the means at their dis-
posal to find an appropriate answer to the diffe-
rent risks. In doing this it was obvious that Europe
also had to consider the American offer of partici-
pation in a global protection system. Technical
options could not replace political decisions. But
a policy could function only if it had operational
leeway and for this it needed technical and mili-
tary options. It was therefore necessary to come to
grips with reality".
5. The Council's reply to Recommendation
533 on anti-ballistic missile defence was fully
consistent with the opinion of the Assembly on
the need for assessment of the risks for Europe of
the development of ballistic capabilities and the
proliferation of ballistics technology in countries
close to Europe's southern and south-eastern
flanks. The Council indicated, moreover, that a
global antimissile protection system (GPS) was
an item for discussion on the Special Working
Group's agenda.
6. In response to the Assembly's recommen-
dation that a European position be established on
the United States' projected global protection
against limited strikes (GPALS), the Council sta-
ted that the establishment of such a position
should necessarily be preceded by an in-depth
study of the questions relating to a global protec-
tion system.
7. The first part of the thirty-ninth annual
report of the Council to the Assembly (lst January
- 30th June 1993) states that the work of the
Special Working Group had been in large measure
devoted to the development of the American ini-
tiatives for a global protection system and to
anti-missile defence in Europe and that "discus-
sion cenfted on the assessment of the risks which
Europe might face and the implications for Euro-
peans of American thinking on this matter. The
group noted with great interest the content of the
contributions made at the Assembly's seminar in
Rome on 20th and 21st April and the conclusions
of that seminar".
8. The subject continued to have priority on
the agenda of the Special Working Group as the
second part of the thirty-ninth annual report of the
Council to the Assembly indicates. This states
that among its tasks the Special Working Group
continued to be engaged in more detailed Euro-
pean thinking on an anti-missile defence system.
9. The report also states that given the change
of direction in American government policy (after
Mr. Clinton's arrival in the White House), the
group decided to stop using the term "GPS" in its
documents and to take over the term "anti-missile
defence" used by the Assembly.
10. Finally the group agreed that WEU should
concentrate on the defence aspects, having regard
to the work carried out in other bodies on non-
proliferation, and recommended to the Council
that a meeting of experts be held to prepare a risk
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analysis. The resulting document would then be
submitted to the Special Working Group.
11. In this context the present report proposes
to present a series of suggestions that might
contribute to establishing transatlantic co-opera-
tion with a view to a European anti-missile defen-
ce, and would also take the fullest account of the
declaration of heads of state and of government
participating in the North Atlantic Council sum-
mit meeting in Brussels on 10th and 1lth January
1994. Since this meeting, which recognised the
existence of a European security and defence
identity and endorsed its development, there has
been steady progress towards greater and ever
closer co-operation between NATO and WEU.
12. In drawing conclusions about the time-
liness and viability of co-operation in the above-
mentioned area, the present document will take
account of work undertaken under the missile
technology control rdgime (MTCR) and the proli-
feration of missile technology; it will analyse the
strategic defence initiative and global protection
against limited strikes and the present policy of
the United States as regards an anti-missile defen-
ce system; lastly, it will study current initiatives
by NATO and the WEU member countries in the
area of anti-ballistic missile defence.
II. The missilc techwlag controlrdgime
MTCD - the proliferaian of missile technologyt
13. Although the committee has already made
a study of MTCR (Document 1305: Arms export
policy, 30th April 1992, Rapporteur: Mr. Aarts) it
is fully relevant at this juncture to recall certain
aspects of this report and bring certain informa-
tion it contains up to date.
14. The first such aspect is that the MTCR is
not a treaty but an unofficial agreement and the
actual controls remain the national responsibility
of the individual participating counffies. It is there-
fore an agreement, the implementation of whose
established rules rests solely on the good will of
the countries party to it.
15. The principles established under the agree-
ment are not intended 
- 
and this is explicitly sta-
ted 
- 
to impede national space programmes or
international co-operation in such prograrnmes as
long as such programmes do not contribute to
delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction.
The purpose of the agreement is to limit the risks
of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(i.e. nuclear, chemical and biological) by conffol-
ling transfers that could contribute to supplying
technology used in the production of such weapons.
16. The agreement, initially signed in April
1987, was revised in early 1993. Although origi-
nally the agreement referred to control of techno-
logies to handle a 500 kg payload over a range of
300 km, the present text makes no reference to
either payload or range. The signatory countries,
and logically therefore, firms inside their territo-
ries, are to refrain from supplying another country
with any hardware or technology for use in mis-
sile manufacture, regardless of payload or range.
17. Your Rapporteur is informed that the follo-
wing countries are at present members of the mis-
sile technology control r6gime: Argentina, Aus-
tria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ice-
land, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and
the United States; these include the seven coun-
tries that signed in 1987. Other states have decla-
red their adherence to the principles of the MTCR
or are in the process of doing so; these include
Brazil, China, the Czech Republic, Indonesia,
Romania, Russia and South Africa. It should be
noted that all the member countries of the Euro-
pean Union and those that will presumably form
part of the Union from 1995 are members of the
MTCR.
18. The MTCR covers transfers of equipment
and technology relevant to missiles. In the evalua-
tion of transfer applications the following factors
will be taken into account:
(i) the prevention of proliferation of wea-
pons of mass destruction;
(ii) the capabilities and objectives of the
missile and space prograrnmes of the
recipient state;
(iii) the significance of the transfer in terms
of the potential development of sys-
tems for producing weapons of mass
destruction;
(iv) the assessment of the end use of the
transfers, including the assurance of the
recipient state that they will be used
only for the purpose stated, that neither
such use nor the items transferred will
be modified or duplicated without the
prior consent of the supplier govern-
ment and that neither the items nor any
replicas nor derivatives will be retrans-
ferred without the consent of the sup-
plier government.
The MTCR provides that governments should
enforce these principles through their respective
national legislations.
19. Despite the fact, noted previously, that
many countries are already party to the MTCR or
have stated their intention ofjoining in future, and
despite the importance of these countries, the fact
of the matter is that this control mechanism,
which is certainly unique of its kind, is not entire-
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ly fulfilling its objectives, even though the MTCR
admittedly constitutes a major obstacle to
attempts by certain countries to acquire such
equipment and technologies.
20. According to data provided by the United
States Defence Department, the current situation
of third world countries in relation to theatre bal-
listic missiles is that shown in the following table:
250 km
to
600 km
Afghanistan (Scud-B)
China (M-11, M-9)
DPRK (Scud-B, Scud C)
Egypt (Scud-B)
India (Prithvi)
Iran (Scud-B, Scud-C)
*Iraq (Scud-B, Al-Hussein)
Israel (Jericho-1)
Libya (Scud-B)
Pakistan (Hafr-Z, M- I l, Hatf-3)
Syria (Scud-B, Scud-C, M-9)
Yemen (Scud-B)
> 600 km
*Iraq (AI-Abbas)
Thiwan (fien Ma)
I 000 km
to
1 500 km
DPRK (No Dong-l)
Israel (Jericho-2)
South Africa (Arniston)
2 000 km
to
5 000 km
China (CSS-2, CSS-5,
JL-l SLBM)
DPRK (Ihepodong-1,
Thepodong-2)
India (Agni)
*Iraq (Tammuz-l)
Saudi Arabia (CSS-2)
> 5 000km China (CSS-3, CSS-4)
In Development
* hohibit€d.
2I. Moreover since the demise of Cocom (Co-
ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export
Controls) at the start of 1994, differences over a
successor organisation to take over its responsibi-
lities are beginning to surface between the former
Cocom members (Australia, Japan and NATO
members except for Iceland), as the Americans
and Europeans are unable to reach agreement on
the aims of export controls.
22. In the first place there seem to be diffe-
rences of opinion about which countries consti-
tute strategic threats. This means that a wide mul-
tilateral consensus has to be achieved which takes
account of specific transactions that may not be
licensed for a given destination or particular end-
use. Moreover there is apparently as yet no agree-
ment on the list of items to be subject to controls.
23. The new successor r6gime to Cocom will
have to be directed towards conventional arma-
ments and their related technology, and concen-
trate on those countries that represent prolifera-
tion risks and threats to regional stability 
- 
which
from the United States' point of view means
countries such as Libya, [raq, Iran and North
Korea.
24. Adherence to the new r6gime will be open
only to countries that already belong to existing
multilateral non-proliferation 169imes, the
MTCR, the Australian Group (biological and che-
mical weapons) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group
and which additionally subscribe to armaments
control standards such as the START agreements.
25. It therefore seems obvious and necessary
for the partners on either side of the Atlantic to
reach specific agreements as soon as possible,
making an effective contribution to controlling
real and potential threats that will inevitably be
amplified if there is no suitable joint response on
our part.
26. The United States is currently opposed to
Russia and other countries of the former Soviet
Union being foundermembers of any new succes-
sor organisation to Cocom, because, according to
Washington, these countries continue to supply
armaments to hostile countries (mainly Russia
which supplies Iran), basically on account of their
desperate need for cash. During his recent visit to
Washington in late September 1994, President
Yeltsin gave an undertaking to end Russian arms
sales once outstanding contracts (some dating
from 1988) were fulfilled.
27. The most recent and obvious example of
such a threat has been North Korea, a country
which has pushed itself far beyond its true econo-
mic capacity in order to acquire a nuclear capabi-
lity together with ballistic missiles such as the
Taepodong I and 2 
- 
the latter, with a possible
range of over 3 000 km, reported to be available
quite soon (and consequently available for export).
28. The European Union for its part is prepa-
ring to draw up regulations for armaments
exports. It is seeking to establish a community
system for armaments exports to third countries.
Your Rapporteur has learnt that work is being
done on product lists on which products are to be
counted as dual-use and the r6gime that should
govern them. The legal principles which are to
apply have yet to be clarified.
29. From the above, it is quite clear that export
controls are not an entirely effective solution for
avoiding ballistic missile proliferation. The
MTCR and the new Cocom will be useful tools,
provided there is no hesitation about their being
interpreted more rigorously and an attempt is
made to win the support of the largest number of
countries possible for their principles.
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30. In short, the range of measures for avoiding
the risk of proliferation, or at least reducing it as
far as possible must be directed primarily towards
prevention, with the assistance o^f political and
economic measures, measures for preventing
technology transfer (MTCR, new Cocom...), pre-
ventive military action and also deterrence mea-
sures implying the threat of reprisals and protec-
tion including active and passive defence.
31. All of the foregoing must be accompanied
by confidence-building and regional security
measures, as this committee has observed already
in the report referred to earlier (Document 1305)
at least as far as Asia is concerned and, to a far les-
ser degree, South America. In the Mediterranean
and the Near and Middle East, the situation is far
more problematic and complex and the idea refer-
red to elsewhere of a CSCM (or Conference on
Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean)
could be helpful in contextualising the problem as
part of the process of analysis and search for a
solution.
III. United Sntes policy
on missile defence systems
32. On 23rd March 1983, President Reagan
announced the strategic defence initiative (SDI), a
long-term technology research programme
consistent with the 1972 anti-ballistic missile(ABM) treaty, to examine the feasibility of deve-
loping defences against ballistic missile attacks
and to attempt to create a space shield which
would render nuclear weapons "impotent and
obsolete". The SDI was devised as an alternative
to the mutually assured destruction (MAD) doc-
trine which, for several decades, had based deter-
rence on the threat of massive retaliation and sub-
sequent destruction of United States and Soviet
societies. The mission of SDI was to redefine
deterrence by giving the United States (and its
allies) the means to protect people and military
assets from Soviet attacks.
33. The Reagan administration established the
SDI programme in January 1984 and in April
1984 the Strategic Defence Initiative Organisa-
tion (SDIO) was chartered to manage the efforts
of the Department of Defence (DoD). The admi-
nistration's first SDI budget submission to
Congress requested $2 billion for FY1985 and
Congress authorised a total of $1.621 billion. By
1985, SDI had become the Department of Defen-
ce's largest single research and development pro-
graflrme.
34. In January 1985, a White House paper
acknowledged that, while the ultimate objective
was still a defensive system which would protect
the population of the United States directly, the
more immediate goal was to make nuclearretalia-
tion more effective. Under this rationale, SDI
would help deter a nuclear attack by complicating
Soviet planners' efforts to destroy American
nuclear forces in a first strike. Together with air
defences, effective defences against ballistic mis-
siles would substantially lower the possibility of
nuclear war.
35. Much of the technology needed for SDI
was already under way before 1983, which allow-
ed the prograrnme to move quickly to a high fun-
ding level. The army already had a substantial
ballistic missile defence (BMD) technology pro-
gramme moving forward in surveillance and
tracking, interceptor missiles and terminal battle
management. The air force and the Defence
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
had several technology development programmes
under way in directed energy weapons (DEW)
and space surveillance. At least 25 Department of
Defence programmes were aggregated and
restructured to form the SDI progftlrnme.
36. A breakthrough in BMD technology occur-
red in June 1984 when Lockheed's homing over-
lay experiment (HOE) successfully intercepted
and destroyed a mock ballistic missile warhead in
the midcourse phase of its flight. This non-nuclear
intercept was the first such experiment demons-
trating the homing guidance system and the
potential of kinetic energy weapons (KEW) to
destroy ballistic missiles and their warheads by
colliding with them at great speeds. HOE, mana-
ged by the army's ballistic missile defence sys-
tems command, represented a decade of research
and development, data-processing and optical
technology. This experiment laid the foundation
for the exo-atmospheric re-entry vehicle intercep-
tor system (ERIS), a technology researched under
the SDI programme.
37. Other key experiments included:
- 
in September 1985, a ground-based direc-
ted energy experiment using the mid-
infrared advanced chemical laser (MIRA-
CL) device conducted at the White Sands
missile range: the target, a Titan booster
rigged to simulate a thrusting booster, was
successfully destroyed by the laser. SDIO
also conducted the first successful
demonstration of the ability to track a
sounding rocket in space with a low-
power, ground-based laser after adjusting
the beam for atmospheric distortion;
- 
in April-June 1986, a series of flexible
lightweight agile guided experiments
(FLAGE): these kinetic energy experi-
ments demonstrated the guidance techno-
logies necessary to intercept a warhead
both in and beyond the earth's atmosphere;
-in July 1986, SDI's first particle beam
experiment irradiated a miniature re-
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entry vehicle with a high-intensity proton
beam, demonstrating that the explosive
contained in the re-entry vehicle was
highly vulnerable to the particle beam.
38. In 1987, the Heritage Foundation published
a study arguing that the SDI programme was still
too vaguely defined. The paper proposed an archi-
tecture for the SDI consisting of a three-tier sys-
tem with space- and land-based components
capable of desffoying ICBMs at various stages in
their flight. This near-term, kinetic-kill, layered
strategic defence system would cost approximate-
ly $100 to $121 and would include:
- 
space-based kinetic-kill vehicles targeted
at the incoming missile's boost phase and
post-boost phase;
- 
a ground-based component, similar to
Lockheed's exo-atmospheric re-entry
interceptor system (ERIS), to shoot down
missiles in the mid-course of their rajec-
tories;
- 
a terminal defence, similar to McDonnell
Douglas's high endo-atmospheric inter-
ceptor (IIEDI), to desfroy those few mis-
siles which get through the other two
layers;
-radar sensors of different types for each
of the three layers, to track and target
ICBMs;
- 
battle management and command,
control and communications (BM/C3)
capabilities to guide and manage the
overall system.
39. The study recognised DEW (lasers and par-
ticle beams) as having the potential to fulfil SDI's
mission but it pointed out that those technologies
would require ten to fifteen years of research and
development before deployment.
40. The SDI prograrnme was given a structure
and a strategy. The goal of the programme was
reduced to "near-term deployment of limited bal-
listic missile defences as a hedge against Soviet
breakout of the ABM treaty" (SDIO report to
Congress on the SDI, April 1988). The "Paul
Nitze criteria" of military effectiveness, surviva-
bility and cost-effectiveness at the margin was
introduced as a prerequisite to deployment. The
administration defined and adopted a specific SDI
deployment concept for the 1990s and beyond,
referred to as "phased development". The sfrate-
gic defence system (SDS) envisaged by the
Department of Defence would be the culmination
of several different SDI deployment phases
consisting of ever-evolving SDI technologies.
41. Phase one of the SDS consisted of space-
based kinetic energy interceptors to attack ballis-
tic missiles and warheads in the boost and post-
boost phases. For that purpose, various sensors
would be used during the various phases of flight,
as recommended by the Heritage Foundation
study:
- 
a sensor system concept called boost sur-
veillance and tracking system (BSTS)
would be used to track missiles in the
boost phase;
- 
for intercept during the post-boost and
mid-course phase outside the atmosphe-
re, two other sensor system concepts
would be required: (i) a space surveillan-
ce and tracking system (SSTS) 
- 
an orbi-
ting satellite sensor; and (ii) a ground-
based surveillance and tracking system
(GSTS) 
- 
a system that launches sensors
into space by rocket booster after war-
ning of an attack from the BSTS;
- 
a ground-based radar (GBR) would pro-
vide a late mid-course and terminal phase
sensor system to track and discriminate
re-entry objects that have survived the
defences in the boost, post-boost and
mid-course phases.
42. An exo-atmospheric re-enfry vehicle inter-
ceptor system (ERIS) would be used on the
ground to complement the space-based intercep-
tor (SBI). The SBI concept was eventually super-
seded by a smaller, low-cost, mass-produced,
individually-deployed space-based interceptor
called Brilliant Pebble. A constellation of these
smaller interceptors would be deployed in space,
revolutionising the SDI architecture (see Appen-
dix I). Reportedly, the phase one system was sup-
posed to take out50Vo ofthe Soviet SS-18s laun-
ched and about 30Vo of the total attack.
Deployment of this system would have to be done
in sub-phases due to budget and technology
conshaints.
43. Follow-on system concepts, to be used in
phases two and three of the SDS included:
- 
space-based neutral particle beam (NPB)
weapons;
- 
a high endo-atmospheric defence inter-
ceptor (HEDI);
- 
an airborne optical system (AOS);
- 
a ground-based radar (GBR);
- 
a space-based laser (SBL);
- 
a ground-based hypervelocity gun(HVG);and
- 
a ground-based laser (GBL).
(see Appendix II).
4. As early as March 1985, the administration
emphasised that the SDI programme was desi-
gned to enhance allied security as well as United
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States security and sollicited allied participation.
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France and Norway
declared that they would not participate in the
SDI. However, their private industry could
contract directly for SDI work. Other countries
signed agreements regarding government and
industrial participation in the SDI: the United
Kingdom signed a memorandum of understan-
ding (MOU) with the United Srates on 6th
December 1985, followed by West Germany in
March 1986,Israel in May 1986,Italy in Septem-
ber 1986 and Japan in July 1987. The Netherlands
signed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) in
July 1987. At the beginning of 1988, eighty
contracts had been awarded to foreign companies
for a total of $I27 .2million (not including foreign
subcontractors).
45. The SDI played a significant r6le in the
United States-Soviet arms control negotiations: it
prompted the USSR to reopen the START talks.
From 1985 onwards, the United States and the
Soviet Union held several rounds in Geneva to
negotiate a strategic arms reduction treaty
(START I) aimed at reducing each side's nuclear
warheads by half. Between 1985 and 1991, Uni-
ted States and Soviet differences over the SDI
programme caused an impasse in the START
negotiations, but SDI was one of the key factors
which led the Soviets to begin serious discussions
on arms reduction and eventually to sign the
START treaty in July 1991. The SDI also played a
significant r6le in the intermediate nuclear forces(INF) negotiations leading to the signing of the
INF treaty in December 1987. The administration
consistently argued that a major objective of the
SDI programme was to provide arms control leve-
rage over the Soviet Union.
46. At the beginning of 1990, responding to
changes in the international and domestic climate,
the SDIO began redefining its plans for the deve-
lopment of strategic and theatre defences. Former
United States defence and space talks chief nego-
tiator Henry Cooper was hired by Defence Secre-
tary Dick Cheney to review the SDI programme
and recommend how it could be revised to meet
the changing international scenario and the new
threats, i.e., the decreasing threat of a massive
Soviet nuclear attack and the increasing threat of a
third world attack.
47. Mr. Cooper developed a plan called global
protection against limited strikes (GPALS). The
goal of GPALS was to protect the United States
completely from an unauthorised, accidental or
third world nuclear attack of up to 200 warheads
or re-entry vehicles. The plan also envisaged the
improvement and co-ordination of theatre
defences with the United States sffategic defence
and emphasised global protection in addition to
deterrence. In July 1990, Henry Cooper became
SDIO's director to carry out his plan and, in
January L991, President Bush endorsed the
change to GPALS.
48. The GPALS anti-missile system concept
consisted of three distinct defensive spheres:
(i) theatre missile defence (TMD), com-
posed of stand-alone defences against
theatre/tactical ballistic missiles;
(ii) national missile defence (NMD), pro-
viding national coverage to the United
States including Alaska and Hawaii, in
about six United States deployment
areas, and involving space and mobile
ground-based sensors as well as about
750 ground-based interceptors (GBIs)-
about half the number required to meet
SDI's phase one objectives;
(iii) global missile defence (GMD) ele-
ments, i.e., the space-based intercep-
tors that would assist the two ground-
based systems. This element would be
a constellation of about 1000 kinetic-kill vehicles known as Brilliant
Pebbles.
49. About 50 space-based sensors would prov-
ide early warning, cueing, some discrimination,
and kill assessment to both the theatre and the
United States system. The two ground systems
would also have GBRs to measure object slow-
down as it hit the atmosphere to help distinguish
light and heavy objects. The system realigned the
GSTS (a ground-based infrared sensor probe that
can be launched on demand in case of attack) as a
technical back-up to both Brilliant Eyes and
GBRs.
50. The first step in the three-tier GPALS plan
was the development of theatre defences because
theatre defence technologies were more mature
than those needed for a United States or global
defence, and also because theatre forces in a chan-
ging international scenario faced a more imme-
diate threat from ballistic missiles than the United
States homeland. The initial plan envisaged an
improved theatre defence deployed in the mid-
1990s and the United States and global systems in
place by the end of the century. SDIO emphasised
that the elements of the GPALS system "could be
deployed sequentially, and need not await the
development of an entire system. Nor would the
deployment of [the] system be contingent on the
technical maturity of follow-on systems", as was
the case with phase one of SDI. However, SDIO
promised that research on follow-on technologies
would continue to be funded. While still relying
on space assets for surveillance and communica-
tion, GPALS represented a shift away from a
space-based shield to a ground-based defence.
51. In 1991, members of the Senate Armed
Services Committee (led by Sam Nunn and John
153
DOCUMENT 1435
Warner) started crafting a compromise which
would push theatre and ground-based ABM trea-
ty-compliant United States defences to deploy-
ment while providing research funds for Brilliant
Pebbles. The result was the Missile Defence Act
of 1991, which for the fust time put Congress on
record as supporting deployment of a United
States missile defence (see Appendix II). The act
endorsed the concept of a limited defence desi-
gned to protect the United States against limited
ballistic-missile threats. One of the key provisions
was a mandate to develop NMD by 1996 or as
soon as the technology would be ready. The single
United States defensive site was to contain 100
GBIs and to be fully compliant with the ABM
ffeaty. The act also called for robust funding for
Brilliant Pebbles and other follow-on technolo-
gies. However, in April 1992, Ifu.dr. Nunn conten-
ded that the SDIO was spending too much on its
plan for space-based assets (Brilliant Pebbles and
Eyes) at the expense of the ground-based systems
that Congress wanted. The FY 1993 Department
of Defence authorisation revised the Missile
Defence Act by dropping the 1996 target deploy-
ment date and reiterating that the goal of the Uni-
ted States was to abide by the ABM treaty. While
the Senate Armed Services Committee urged the
administration to "pursue vigorous changes" to
the ABM treaty, it directed SDIO "to plan the
architecture for the initial, treaty-compliant ABM
site on the basis of the treaty as now constituted
and not as it may be revised". The new target date
for deployment was postponed to 20O2.In April
1992,Mr. Cooper estimated the cost of GPALS at
about $35 billion for 5 to 7 sites, Brilliant Eyes
and BIWC'.
52. With the election of Bill Clinton as Presi-
dent, United States policy on missile defence sys-
tems shifted significantly away from the strategic
emphasis of previous Republican administrations.
Shrinking defence budgets, the lessons drawn
from the Gulf war, major changes on the interna-
tional scene and a new political orientation all
contributed to placing the pursuit of effective
TMD on top of the priority list. The Clinton admi-
nistration put GPALS on hold in favour of TMD
- 
involving the protection of a smaller area
against tactical ballistic missiles (as opposed to
ICBMs) 
- 
while relying more on the non-prolife-
ration treaty (NPT) and on the strengthening of
the MTCR to discourage the proliferation of bal-
listic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.
The main task of theatre ballistic missile defences
was to protect expeditionary forces deployed by
the United States and its allies.
53. In early 1993, the Secretary of Defence
restructured the SDIO and renamed it the Ballistic
Missile Defence Organisation (BMDO). The
BMD programme was resffuctured to respond to
the "here and now" theatre ballistic-missile threat
and to an uncertain, but evolving, threat to the
United States. It was founded upon the President's
endorsement of the 1993 Department of Defence
bottom-up review (BUR) and on the Missile
Defence Act (MDA) of 1991 as subsequently
amended in FY1993 and 1994 national defence
authorisation legislation. As amended, the MDA
directed the administration to "maintain the
option to deploy an ABM system capable of pro-
viding a highly-effective defence of the United
States against limited attacks of ballistic missiles
and to provide highly-effective theatre missile
defences to forward deployed and expeditionary
elements of the armed forces of the United States
and as appropriate to friends and allies". The
BUR, in its assessment of the ballistic missile
threat, pointed out that both deliberate or acciden-
tal launches from China or the former Soviet
Union (FSU) were highly unlikely. As for poten-
tially hostile third world nations, the possibility of
a limited, long-range ballistic missile threat some
time in the first decade of the next century could
not be excluded. The BUR also identified a new,
more urgent threat: the proliferation of shorter-
range ballistic missiles armed with nuclear, biolo-
gical, or chemical warheads. It stated that, "in
recognition of the low probability of a long-range
ballistic missile attack from the FSU or China, but
to preserve a hedge against acquisition or indige-
nous development of a long-range ballistic missi-
le capability by another potentially hostile nation,
national missile defence (i.IMD) efforts were desi-
gnated as a second priority relative to TMD".
54. The overall TMD programme objectives of
the Clinton administration were to field a TMD
capability rapidly by upgrading existing systems
and developing more advanced systems for acqui-
sition later in this decade. The proposed budget to
support those goals was $12 billion for FY1995-
1999. The BMDO requested a budget of $3 250
million for FY1995, including $1 770 million for
TMD research and development and $270 million
for TMD procurement efforts. An array of service
programmes reinforced the joint and combined
nature of the TMD mission. The TMD initiative(TMDI) involved the army, navy and air force and
included several core prograrnmes:
- 
Patriot advanced capability level-3 (PAC-
3), an upgrade of the PAC-2 which was
used against the modified Iraqi Scud mis-
siles during the Gulf war. PAC-3 would
provide greater lethality, range and accu-
racy, and more effective capability
against tactical ballistic missiles. The first
PAC-3 systems should be fielded by
FY1998;
- 
navy lower-tier TMD (Aegis/Standard
Missile-2 Block IVA). The navy and
BMDO have been co-operatively wor-
king to develop an enhancement to the
Aegis/SM air defence system which
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would provide a sea-based tactical ballis-
tic missile defence capability (similar to
that provided by the PAC-3);
-theatre high altitude area defence(THAAD). As the most critical element
in the "core", THAAD represents the first
TMD system which has been designed to
match fully the existing ballistic missile
threat. The THAAD system would allow
multiple shot opportunities to intercept
longer-range and more capable theatre
ballistic-missile threats. It has been deve-
loped for endo-atmospheric and exo-
atmospheric defence and consists of
interceptor missiles, launchers, BM/C3I
units, and a theatre missile defence
ground-based radar (TMD-GBR). It
would provide approximately twenty
times the capability of existing air defen-
ce assets, employing the latest hit-to-kill
technology. The Department of Defence
would like to give THAAD the capability
to intercept short-range or tactical mis-
siles with a range of up to 3 500 km tra-
velling at up to 5 km/second 
- 
only
slightly less than the speed of a strategic
vehicle (6 to 7 km/second). It would ope-
rate as an autonomous weapon system,
but it is required to be interoperable with
lower-tier defences. THAAD thus repre-
sents the centrepiece of a two-tiered
defence system. $495.69 million were
requested in FY1995 for the THAAD
prograrnme and deployment of the objec-
tive THAAD system was planned for
FY20O2. However, a prototypical
THAAD battery as a user-operational
evaluation system (UOES) should be
developed at the end of the demonstra-
tion/validation phase in 1996 for early
operational assessment and possible
deployment should a contingency arise.
Provision of the UOES has been a major
thrust and priority of the TMD program-
me.
55. The abovementioned two-tiered defence
system would rely on a theatre missile defence
ground-based radar (TMD-GBR) as well as on a
command and control centre. The TMD-GBR
would provide surveillance and fire control sup-
port for the THAAD missile system and cueing
support to lower-tier systems such as Patriot. It
would utilise state-of-the-art radar technology in
order to provide a capability to perform threat
classification against theatre tactical ballistic mis-
siles and kill assessment after intercept. As for
battle management and command, control and
communication capabilities, BMDO has taken the
lead to establish an architecture upon which all
the services can build and to ensure an effective
and joint BM/C3I. The National Test Facility
(NTF) at Falcon AFB, Colorado, centrepiece of
the National Test Bed (NTB), is the only facility
under direct conffol of the BMDO and seeks to
provide the comprehensive capability to compare,
evaluate and test alternative SDS key technolo-
gies (such as BIWC3) in a system-level context.
The NTB network of research facilities currently
has sixteen remote nodes linked together and
located throughout the United States.
56. Additional TMD efforts will involve
concept exploration activities for a potential sea-
based upper-tier wide area defence system. Sea-
based upper-tier technologies include the lighr
weight exo-atmospheric projectile (LEAP). The
LEAP-equipped SM-2 would follow the above-
mentioned Block IVA. By the end of 1994, the
BMDO will conduct the first at-sea exo-atmos-
pheric experimental intercepts, designated FIV-3
and FTV-4. Other TMD efforts include defence
for manoeuvring ground forces (corps SAM, a
new mobile air and missile defence system), and a
boost phase interceptor system (airborne boost
phase intercept) which would offer the potential
to destroy attacking missiles over enemy territory
and would be effective particularly against advan-
ced delivery system countermeasures. It is worth
noting that these three programmes are competing
for funds since the TMD programme will only
fund a single new system (starting FY1998).
57. The new TMD prograrnme as a whole has
incorporated some technologies and components
derived from the SDI programme but, for the most
part, space-based elements have been shelved or
put on hold. In August L994, an agreement on
how to structure a demonstrator progranrme for an
endo-atmospheric missile interceptor to destroy
ballistic targets in the boost phase was reached by
the air force, the BMDO and the Office of the
Secretary of Defence (OSD). Despite possible
funding difficulties, Defence Secretary John
Deutch approved the plan which relies heavily on
existing technologies. The United States air force
and the BMDO emphasised that the boost phase
interceptor (BPI) would supplement other por-
tions of a layered ballistic missile defence such as
Patriot or THAAD.
58. In August, the Senate Appropriation Com-
mittee chopped BMDO's budget to $2.5 billion
and changed prograrnme elements: Patriot and the
extended range interceptor (ERINT) risk reduc-
tion programme obtained more money than
requested; THAAD lost money for some flight
tests; sea-based area theatre ballistic missile
defence also suffered a reduction; TMD-GBR
funds were increased to make sure that good radar
systems are available to support THAAD; and
finally, BIWC3I funds were held to FYlgg4levels.
As far as NMD is concerned, the committee
consolidated all national missile defence techno-
logy readiness programmes in a single new pro-
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grarnme element and funding was reduced. Fun-
ding for follow-on TMD technologies was also
reduced compared to the administration's request.
The Senate panel transferred $120 million in
Brilliant Eyes funding to the air force and earmar-
ked $50 million for a high-energy laser research
prograrnme outside of BMDO. The panel decla-
red that early deployment of Brilliant Eyes in the
next five years coupled with no NMD technology
demonstrations would not be consistent with the
BUR. It also recommended that BMDO continue
developing and testing more mature technologies,
such as ERIS and LEAP, rather than concenffating
on miniaturising interceptors and kill vehicles.
This represents a direct attack on Brilliant Pebbles
and a clear indication that United States ballistic
missile defence will increasingly emphasise
ground-based systems to the detriment of space-
based concepts.
IV Anti-missile defence 
- 
architecture
and systems
59. After more than twenty years of technical
investigation of this area, more particularly in the
United States but in Europe too, the nature of the
specific systems required or needing to be develo-
ped has become clear in recent years, together
with their effectiveness and relative interest, allo-
wing a distinction to be drawn between what is
feasible now and areas for research.
60. The table given in Chapter II shows two
types of threat: the frst is the threat of a theatre
attack from missiles with a range of under 1 000
km, calculated statistically as between 300 and
600 km. The other is a strategic threat from mis-
siles with a much greater range.
61. Theatre missiles are normally fired from
mobile launchers. The target area of these mis-
siles is necessarily more restricted if merely for
reasons of their range. Strategic missiles, if not
launched from submarines, as is the case for Rus-
sia, are fred from fixed silos, usually located well
within the borders of the enemy country.
62. Two different defence systems to counter
two types of threats can be envisaged on the basis
of the following systems:
(i) Endo-atmospheric systems, mainly:
- 
American systems: Patriot, the PAC-
3 version of which is currently being
developed from the Erint missile and
Corps SAM currently in the study
phase;
-European systems: the German
TLVS, in its study phase, and the
Franco-Italian SAMP/T, also under
study, based on the anti-aircraft
SAMP/T combining the Aster missile
with either Empar or Arabel radar
systems for naval and earth applica-
tions respectively;
-Russian systems: SA-10 and SA-11
which have been operational for
some years.
63. Endo-atmospheric systems protect the
nerve cenffes of the armed forces: headquarters,
communication centres and military bases and
surrounding areas of from 5 to 15 kilometres.
These systems are designed to counter theatre
missiles of up to a 1 000 km range and their effec-
tiveness is very weak against missiles in the
2 000 km range. The Russian SA-12 is effective
against missiles with a 3 000 km range.
@. These systems are mobile and generally
have a dual anti-missile and anti-aircraft function.
(ii) Endo-exo-atmospheric systems: the
only current project is the American
THAAD programme in its develop-
ment phase. THAAD (theatre high alti-
tude area defence) with its ground-
based radar, is heavy but hansportable
nevertheless. It protects an area of 100-
200 km in diameter against missiles in
the 300-3 000 km range.
(iii)Exo-atmospheric systems: at present
these systems exist only in the study
phase or as prototypes. They are based
on the LEAP (light exo-atmospheric
projectile) concept, which, with a velo-
city of the order of 4 km per second,
can defend an area 2 000 in diameter
against.missiles with a 1 000 km plus
range, in other words strategic and no
longer theatre missiles.
65. In general the systems under study here are
sea-based using for example the SM-2 missile
equipped with Aegis f,tre control. These systems
can be based on land but are difficult to transport.
66. Three or four systems based in the Mediter-
ranean would be sufficient to protect the greater
part of Europe against threats from the south and
south-east. Nevertheless, to be fully effective,
these systems require enormously powerful radar
systems which must have fixed locations. The
ranges of the ship-based Spy radar systems equip-
ped with Aegis are far less effective.
(iv) Boosted interceptor systems: these sys-
tems, unlike those preceding, are air-
borne on Eurofighter or Rafale aircraft
and require very little infrastructure.
Each aircraft in flight can block an
enemy missile in its initial launch
phase if the missile is fired at a distan-
ce of a few hundred kilomeffes or so
from the plane. These scenarios are
theatre scenarios where the dimensions
I
,
I
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of the firing areas are between 200 and
400 km and are within fring range of
their target (600-800 km maximum).
67. Antimissile missiles are relatively light and
allow the plane to undertake other defence mis-
sions at the same time. Moreover, they can be
used against sftategic missiles, provided they are
within range of the firing point, which is possible
if at the same time there is a declared in-theatre
crisis involving the enemy country.
(v)Early warning systems: A1l the systems
studied above operate satisfactorily
provided one has access to early war-
ning systems. The only existing sys-
tems are Russian and American (DSP)
but these only operate with strategic or
long-range theatre missiles. Projects
are being studied in Europe and in the
United States for warning systems that
are effective against all missiles, inclu-
ding theatre ballistic missiles (Esat in
Europe, Alarm in the United States).
These are all space-based systems and
are of varying complexity depending on
the size of the area under observation.
68. One or two geostationary satellites are
enough for continuous observation of a sensitive
launch areaof 2 000 km x 2 000 km. The zone to
be observed can be determined from earth and
changed in a few hours over one third of the earth's
surface observed from an altitude of 36 000 km.
69. This early warning system may include
purposes other than active anti-missile defence.
In particular it permits surveillance of countries
guilty of proliferation by identifying the nature of
their fire: tests or fire against other countries,
including when Europe is not involved. The sys-
tem can also determine the type of missile used.
70. It is thus possible to detect launch areas to
an accuracy of 1-5 km depending on the a priori
information available about the missile launched;
it is therefore possible to confirm that one country
rather than another has launched a missile and to
strengthen the deterrent attitudes European coun-
tries might possibly adopt.
71. Identification of the launch area also allows
operational units to take action against batteries or
to destroy launch systems by means of conventio-
nal bombers or laser or cruise missiles.
72. The early warning system also allows the
target areas and the approximate anival time to be
identified, thus triggering the necessary warning
systems and all possible passive defence measures.
73. Thanks to these different systems Europe
can build one or several defence architectures:
- 
a theatre defence architecture could be
established with a minimum number of
endo-atmospheric systems over each
potential flash-point, preferably associa-
ted with an early warning system. To
these might be added airborne systems(with which some aircraft are equipped)
and three or four THAAD units, depen-
ding on theatre size;
- 
a defence architecture protecting Europe
might be made up of THAAD systems
defending major centres and towns with
three or four sea-based exo-atmospheric
systems and an early warning system
with three fixed ultra long-range radar
systems. Airborne systems may also be
used in the event of initial in-theatre
engagements.
V. Present-day co-operation on theatre missile
defence (fMD)
74. In line with the report to Congress on the
plan to co-ordinate development and implementa-
tion of theaffe missile defence programmes with
allies, the United States Department of Defence
has established a series of priorities for the ballis-
tic missile defence (BMD) programme. The
highest of these involves the development and
deployment of TMD systems to meet growing
threats from ballistic missiles directed towards
United States troops, allies and friends. Accor-
ding to the Department of Defence, the United
States is seeking to co-operate in developing its
anti-missile defence prograrnme in development
and deployment of theatre defences with allies
who share the problems arising from proliferation
of ballistic missiles.
75. The Department of Defence approached
international participation in the development and
deployment of TMD systems by building on bila-
teral research and development programmes,
which aimed to encourage sharing of advanced
technologies and, at the same time, achieve a bet-
ter understanding of political and military factors
capable of influencirg_t!" defence_ architecture in
various regions around the globe. Moreover, such
participation provided America's allies and
friends with further knowledge enabling them to
make their own decisions on the basis of their
anti-missile defence requirements.
76. The result of this co-operation over research
and development programmes has been wider
agreement on the likelihood and impact of the use
of missiles in theatre conflict and on the need for
an effective response to the threat. This latter
point was brought home forcibly by the Gulf
conflict. Indeed, the interest in theatre anti-
missile defence dates principally from that time.
This interest has been shown in unilateral and
multilateral actions, principally through the thin-
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king developed or now being developed by NATO
and by WEU.
77. Israel and Japan, countries facing immedi-
ate threat, might be regarded as cases in point.
Israel, in co-operation with the United States, has
developed a BMD programme based on the
Arrow missile and has prompted Japan, for its
part, to enter into bilateral discussions with the
United States on anti-missile defence, basically in
the light of the threat from North Korea.
78. In the following pages, consideration will
be given to the activities of various European
countries in relation to BMD. Also, in NATO, a
group of member states (Canada, France, Ger-
many, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the United
Kingdom and the United States) has established
an ad-hoc working group under the Conference of
National Armaments Directors, exclusively to try
and find ways of co-operating in TMD pro-
grammes. Additionally, NAf,O has already made
several studies on BMD.
79. The Department of Defence wishes to capi-
talise on all of this interest through all possible
modalities of co-operation through an approach
tailored to varying circumstances, taking account
of national programmes and plans and the capabi-
lities of each nation.
80. Inter alia, the following possible actions
have been identified:
- 
sharing early-warning formulae;
- 
continued bilateral and multilateral co-
operation on research and development;
85. This plan is based on the defence needs
worked out by the political and military authori-
ties. The co-ordination process ensures that TMD
is integrated into the existing air defence and air
space cornmand/control systems. The plan takes
account of the analyses by NAIO's Advisory
- 
improving present anti-missile defence
capabilities;
- 
sffengthening participation in joint deve-
lopment and joint production pro-
grarnmes;
- 
subsequent deployment of advanced
capabilities.
81. All of the above should lead to increased
regional security, cost reduction, an improvement
in security relations and greater operational inter-
operability with regard to national defence procu-
rement and deployment plans.
82. The Department of Defence's TMD pro-
gramme is based on an evolutionary development
of anti-missile defence capabilities. This would
imply improving Patriot capabilities by deploying
the PAC-3 and adding the standard missile Block
IVA on to present Aegis capabilities to provide a
sea-based lower tier defence against short-range
theatre ballistic missiles.
83. The talks that the Department of Defence is
engaged in with countries that operate with Ame-
rican export equipment, produce American sys-
tems under licence or are simply considering joint
development or future equipment purchase are
based on this same sftategy.
84. The Department of Defence's plan to co-
ordinate the development and commissioning of
TMD programmes shown in the following table
seeks to avoid duplication, reduce cost and
increase interoperability.
Test-e 1
Group on Aerospace Research and Development(AGARD) and the BMDO-supported missile
defence architecture studies for Europe, the Middle
East and Japan, along with other reports such as
those prepared by the NAIO Industrial Advisory
Group (NIAG).
Approafi for allied pafiicipation
Time Activity
"Build upon/improve
existing capabilities"
Incremental enhancement
Interoperability
"Qualitative new capability"
"Defence-in-depth"
Now
+
Near Term
I
I
I
+
Longer Term
Identify and consolidate current studies, plans,
programmes
Pursue improved early warning and tracking
capability
Pursue improved communication/data trans-
mlssron
Improve/develop lower tier defences
Expand/improve lower tier defences
Develop/deploy area defense capability
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86. The short- and medium-tenn programme
identifies the potential for immediate low-cost,
low-development, feasible improvements to exis-
ting systems and/or operational concepts that will
result in measurable improvement to early-war-
ning and TMD capabilities. The following table
shows those countries (allies and friends of the
United States) with one or more existing systems
able to provide an infrastructure for an advanced
TMD capability.
Trsr,p2
Fricnds ard allies: existing TMD-related capabilities
Nation TPS-59 Hawk Patriot AWACS Aegis
FPS- I 17
Belgium XXXXXX XXXXXX
C,anarla XXXXXX
I)enmark XXXXXX
Frq XXXXXX XXXXXX
Gernany XXXXXX XXXXXX xxxxxx
CrrerrCe XXXXXX
lr.elcnrl xxxxxx
Italy. xxxxxx xxxxxx
Luxembourg.
Netherlands XXXXXX XXXXXX
Norwav XXXXXX
Pnrtroel XXXXXX
Spain. XXXXXX
Trrrkev xxxxxx
United Kingdom. xxxxxx X>o<xxx
I Tnited Sfrfes xxxxxx xxxxxx XXXXXX XXXXXX xxxxxx
Sweden. XXXXXX
NATO. XXXXXX
F.ovnt xxxxxx XXXXXX
Tcrqel xxxxxx XXXXXX
Iord XXXXXX
Krrwait XXXXXX XXXXXX Contract
Sqrdi Arshic XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX
UAE . XXXXXX
Janan xxxxxx X)O<XXX )O<XXXX XXXXXX
s XXXXXX
Sorrfh K XXXXXX XXXXXX
Tai XXXXXX xxxxxx
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87. Short- and medium-term strategy consists
of building on the capabilities shown in the above
table, in approving them and in introducing fur-
ther new capabilities. Thus, the Department of
Defence considers that the first element of its plan
for international co-ordination should include sta-
tement of all existing early-warning capabilities
and the existing planned and possible future
means of sharing information on these systems.
To summarise, this would include the following:
- 
examination of space-based sensors and
the means of sharing their data;
- 
identifying ground- and sea-based sensor
capabilities for theatre surveillance (Uni-
ted States and foreign) and associated
modifications to enable improved detec-
tion and tracking of missiles;
- 
pursuing a possible modification of air-
borne surveillance systems. The United
States is at present trying to develop a
co-operative programme with NATO,
the United Kingdom and France which
already have E-3 AWACS;
- 
determination of the adequacy of exis-
ting battle management/command,
control, communications and intelli-
gence (BMC) systems;
- 
the identification of evolutionary com-
mand and control operational concepts;
- 
the distribution of improved early-war-
ning information which could signifi-
cantly enhance the performance of
fielded TMD systems, particularly as
the TMD systems themselves are
improved;
- 
planned modification of Patriot beyond
the fielded PAC-2 with consultations
centred on allied plans to incorporate
short-term improvements for PAC-2 and
their planning for PAC-3;
- 
Hawk improvements and the intent of
some of the nations that currently deploy
improved Hawk to upgrade their systems
with the improvements planned by the
United States marine corps;
- 
upgrades will be made to the Aegis
combat system, to support detection,
tracking and engagement of theatre bal-
listic missiles using the SM-2 Block
IVA missile;
- 
Aegis standard missile Block IVA or an
indigenous missile incorporating similar
TBMD capabilities.
88. The long-term plan will be based on the
achievements of the short- and medium-term plan
with the objective of further enhancing lower tier
capabilities and adding the upper tier capability
necessary to account for advanced theatre mis-
siles for both (a) defence-in-depth of military
forces and (b) territorial theatre defence.
89. In the Department of Defence's view, the
earlier allied nations and friends become involved
in the prograrnme, the better the opportunities for
co-operation. When discussions are held early in
the development of a programme, the opportuni-
ties for joint development and production are
greater. Participation later in the programme may
be restricted to licence production, purchase of a
system or development of a system variant with
the addition of allied technology.
90. At the present time, the United States Corps
SAM programme is in the concept definition
phase, providing, according to the American
authorities, an opportunity for international parti-
cipation. It is possible during this phase to har-
monise allied and United States requirements,
define responsibilities and contributions and
negotiate the terms and conditions of requisite
international agreements.
91. Conversely, the THAAD (theatre high-alti-
tude area defence) high-priority programme, now
in its demonstration and validation phase, for the
time being offers little opportunity for foreign
involvement. Although limited participation
might be possible, it would not be possible to
accommodate interruptions for negotiations or
modifications to the prime conffact.
92. Foreign participation would be possible at
and beyond the engineering and manufacturing
development stage. In short, the Department of
Defence considers that initiating early discussions
on co-operation enables both sides to reduce
costs, avoid a duplication of effort and improve
operational concepts. In its view, such discussions
would not be detrimental to. established plans for
improving capabilities in the force structure as
quickly as possible.
93. The present position is that activities with
allies have tended to move from research and
development towards development and procure-
ment programmes.
94. Since 1985, there has been allied partici-
pation in technical co-operation in research and
development programmes. Memorandums of
understanding were signed at the time between
the United States and Germany, Italy, Israel,
Japan and the United Kingdom for strategic
defence initiative research. In addition, memo-
randums of agreement were signed with France,
the Netherlands and the SHAPE technical
centre.
95. The table hereafter shows total foreign par-
ticipation since the beginning of the prografllme.
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TesLs 3
Foreign participotion
340 Contracts
Donmsk
Total Fundlng (U.5. / Forelgn) $1011.89 Mllllon
96. The next table shows the major co- | which refer to research and development acti-
operative programmes with allies; all of I vities.
Test-e 4
Major cost share co-operation arrangements wilh allias
Country Programme Total value$ million
United States/
ally funding
(approximate)
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
Israel.....
Data fusion
2 flight test series
Extended air defence test bed
Artifi cial intelligence
Arow experiment
Arrow continuation experiment (ACES)
System engineering and integration
Theafe missile defence (TMD) test bed
TMD test bed enhancement
TMI) test hed erneriment nrnoremme
26.N
65.0
19.20
3.s0
158.00
322.00
3.15
33.00
5.20
6.00
4.06
5.7
6.50
17.25
32.30
.68
42?ol58Vo
597ol4l%o
58%ol42Vo
80Vol2OVo
$OclolZOVo
72Vol28Vo
75Vol25Vo
72Vol28%o
8O7ol20%o
5O7ol50Vo
75%ol25Vo
75%ol25%o
9OVolll%o
30Vol707o
59Vol4l7o
35Vo165%o
Israel
Israel
Israel
Israel
Israel
Tsrael Hypervelocity launcher programme
Boost phase intercept (BPI)
Free electron laser (FEL) MOA
Hypervelocity gun test
EADTB
EADSIM
Israel.
France
Netherlands
SHAPE...
France....,
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97. Since 1985, the United Kingdom and the
United States have co-operated on BMD research
experiments, flight trials and information
exchanges under an overarching memorandum of
understanding. This co-operation is at both
government and industry level.
98. The United Kingdom Government is now
about to proceed with a study to determine natio-
nal BMD requirements including TMD for pro-
tection of its military forces deployed abroad.
99. The United States Department of Defence
will work closely with the United Kingdom
Ministry of Defence to ensure "that the govern-
ment modalities associated with possible co-ope-
ration on or direct sales of United States TMD
systems are properly reflected in their study
result... American contractors will be invited to
support British industry as part of the United
Kingdom stragegy effort. Their requirements will
necessarily include area defences".
100. Co-operation between the United States
and Germany in anti-missile programmes began
with the implentation of the United States-Ger-
man Roland Patriot agreement in 1984. Current-
ly, the German and United States Defence Minis-
tries are working together to ensure harmo-
nisation of requirements between the German
TLVS (tactical air defence system) programme
and the American Corps SAM. BMDO and the
army will also work closely with the German
Ministry of Defence with respect to their plan for
the incorporation of PAC-3 with their existing
systems.
101. France, in concert with Italy, has an
ongoing effort to develop an improved air defence
system with a TMD capability based on the future
surface-to-air family of missiles. This system will
use the Aster missile and Arabel and Empar
radars.
IO2. Earlier this year, France and Italy suggested
adataexchange agreement with the United States
to facilitate improved operability with Corps
SAM. France is also studying the possibility of
developing an upper tier TMD system.
103. France's defence white paper accords grea-
ter importance to BMD. Accordingly, the French
have embarked on a five-year BMD technology
prograrnme which provides for the possibility of
co-operation with other countries.
lO4. At the beginning of this chapter, reference
was made to the extended air defence ltheatre
defence ad hoc Working Group established by the
NATO Conference of National Armaments Direc-
tors. The group is composed of interested nations
with resources to contribute to TMD and its aim is
to exchange views on the tactical ballistic missile
threat to the alliance and to define future methods
of collaborating in TMD.
105. Topics under discussion at present include
early warning, BMC3 (battle management, com-
mand, control, communications), lethality, infra-
red plume phenomenology, Hawk upgrades and
upgrades to existing air defence systems such as
putting an infrared search and track sensor on
AWACS aircraft.
VI. Opportunitios for co-operalion
106. When we speak of co-operation this
should, in our view, cover development and pro-
duction as pursued in Europe between Europeans.
Europe should adopt a definite position towards
such co-operation if it wishes it to be genuinely
profitable for the continent and to bring all part-
ners together on an equal footing.
lO7. The various systems set out hereafter might
give rise to inffa-European co-operation and co-
operation between Europe and the United States.
(i) Earb warning systems
An early warning system might be imple-
mented at European level under the aus-
pices of WEU or for its use. The system
might thus include a European early war-
ning and data communication network,
interoperable with American systems.
( ii) Endo-atmospheric systems
As we have already seen, international dis-
cussions are now being held on three-way
co-operation between the United States,
Germany and France which would allow
co-ordination of the SAMP/T, TLVS and
Corps SAM programmes or even the joint
development of a single programme, inter-
national Corps SAM.
(iii) Endo-exo -atrnospheric sy stems
Given that the development of THAAD is
already very far advanced in the United
States, collaboration in this area is hardly
feasible. Europe might envisage purchasing
systems from the United States although
this transaction might not cover the early
warning or command systems.
( iv ) Exo-atmospheric systems
In this area co-operation may be envisaged
between European countries and possibly
with the United States. This would involve
the installation of an interceptor system
against strategic missiles directed against
Europe. Without dismissing the possibility
of American participation, it might reaso-
nably be thought that co-operation between
Europeans might prove adequate and satis-
factory.
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(v) Airborne systems
In this instance also, collaboration with our
ffansatlantic allies is possible, with a view
to developing a missile and airborne optical
sensors adapted to European Rafale and
Eurofighter aircraft.
108. In short, it should be stressed that WEU
should first stimulate a debate on a European
early warning system to follow up the studies
which have already been started on developing a
European space-based observation system; this
European early warning system, which would
naturally be implemented through co-operation,
should be followed by another system of exo-
atmospheric and airborne defence corresponding
to agreed priorities, either for protecting Europe
itself or its troops in-theatre.
109. The success or failure of our action in the
face of this challenge will no doubt depend on the
achievement of the foregoing through European
and/or ffansatlantic co-operation.
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APPENDIX II
Tesr-s 1-2
Fundamental Missions of Strategic Defense
T*re2-I
Phase I System Concepts
Enhance Deterrence
- 
Deny Soviet confidence in ability to plan or execute a successful attack
- 
lnfluence Soviet correlation of forces
Limit Damage to the U.5., its Forces and its Allies
- 
Protect U.S. assets from Soviet attack
- 
Preserve U.S. ability to sustain and support its allies
- 
Defeat limited or unauthorized attacks
Deny Soviet War Aims
- 
Deny "maintain continuity of CPSU control"
- 
Deny "defeat and occupy NAT0"
- 
Deny "neutralize the United States"
- 
Deny "dominate the postwar world"
System element Function
Boost Surveillance and Tracking System(BSrS) - 
Detection of missile launches
- 
Acquisition and tracking of boosters
and PBVs
- 
Kill assessment
Space-Based Surveillance and Track-
ing System (SSTS)
- 
Acquire and track PBVs, RVs, and
ASATs
- 
Discrimination
Ground-Based Surveillance and Track-
ing System (GSTS)
- 
Acquisition
- 
Tracking
- 
Discrimination
Space-Based Interceptor (SBI) Disabling of boosters, PBVs, RVs and
ASATs
Sensors on carrier vehicle (CV) could
provide enhanced mid course sensor
capability
Exoatmospheric Reentry Vehicle Inter-
ceptor System (ERIS) - 
Disabling of RVs in late midcourse
Battle ManagemenUCommand and Con-
trol, and Communications (BIWC3) - 
Man-in-theJoop confrol
- 
Engagement management
- 
Maintaining ffack data
- 
Target assignment
- 
Communications
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Tmre2-2
F ollaw -on Syste m C onc epts
System elements Functions
Space-Based Neutral Particle Beam
(I.IPB) Weapon - 
Interactive discrimination
- 
Disabling of boosters, PBVs, RVs
and ASATs
High-Endoatmospheric Defense Inter-
ceptor ([DDD - 
Disabling of RVs after reentry
Airborne Optical System (AOS)
- 
Midcourse and terminal acquisition
and tracking
Ground-Based Radar (GBR)*
- 
Terminal acquisition and tracking
- 
Discrimination
Space-Based Laser (SBL)
- 
Disabling of boosters and ASAf,s
- 
Interactive discrimination
Ground-Based Hlpenrelocity Gun ([IVG)
- 
Disabling RVs in terminal phase
Ground-Based Laser (GBL)
- 
Disabling of boosters
* GBR is being considered as an option for Phase I
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APPENDX III
Missile Defense Act of 1991
Goal
. Deploy an ABM system, including one or an adequate additional number of ABM sites and space-based
sensors, that is capable of providing a highly effective defense of the US against limited attacks of bal-
listic missiles.
. Maintain sfrategic stability.
. Provide highly effective theater missile defenses to forward deployed and expeditionary elements of US
forces and to US friends and allies.
I nitial D eployment ( I N M D )
. Develop for deployment by the earliest date allowed by the availability of appropriate technology, or by
FY 96, a cost effective, operationally effective, and ABM treaty compliant ABM system at a single site
as the initial step toward deployment of the ABM system described in the 1991 Missile Defense Act
- 100 ground-based interceptors (the design of which will be determined by competition and down
selection)
- fixed, ground-based ABM battle management radars
- optimum utilization of space sensors including sensors capable of cueing ground-based ABM inter-
ceptors and providing initial targeting vectors.
Limited Defense System (NMD)
. Development of systems, components and architectures for a deployable ABM system capable of pro-
viding a highly effective defense of the US against limited strikes, but below a threshold that would
bring into question strategic stability
- includes activities necessary to develop and test systems, components, and architectures capable of
deployment by FY 96 as part of an ABM treaty compliant initial site defense system
- for purposes of planning, evaluation, design, and effectiveness studies, such programs, projects and
activities may take into consideration both the current limitations of the ABM treaty and modest
changes to its numerical limitations and its limitations on the use of space-based sensors.
Theater Missile Defenses (TMD)
. Aggressively pursue the development of advanced theater missle defense systems with the objective of
down selecting and deploying such systems by the mid-1990s.
. Capable of defending forward-deployed and expeditionary elements of the armed forces of the United
States.
. Cooperation with friendly and allied nations in the development of theater defenses against tactical or
theater ballistic missiles.
AB M Treaty Ne gotiations
. Congress recognizes the president's call for "immediate" concrete steps to permit the deployment of
defenses against limited ballistic missile strikes and the Soviets undertaking to consider such proposals
from the US on non-nuclear ABM systems.
. Congress urges the president to pursue immediate discussions with the Soviets on the feasibility and
mutual interests of amendments to the ABM treaty to permit
- additional gtound sites and interceptors
- increased use of space sensors for BIWC3
- clarification of development and testing
- flexibility for advanced ABM technology.
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Spac e-based Interc eptors ( GM D )
. Conduct research on space-based kinetic-kill interceptors and associated sensors that could provide an
overlay to ground-based ABM interceptors.
. Robust funding for research and development, for follow-on technologies, including Brilliant Pebbles,
is required.
. Deployment of Brilliant Pebbles is not included in the initial plan for the limited defense system archi-
tecture.
. Report on conceptual and burden sharing issues associated with deploying space-based interceptors(including Brilliant Peb'cles) for the purpose of providing global defenses against ballistic missile
attacks.
Review of Deployment Options Deployment Plan
. InterimreportdueMay94onprogressof nego- . Within 180 days, submit deployment Plan fortiations. TMD systems and the ABM system established
. Assess progress and consider options to the us by the goals of the 1991 missile defense act'
as now exist under the ABM treaty.
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The devehpment of a European space-based
obsemation system 
- 
Part III
REPORT'
submitted on behalf of the
Technological and Aerospace Committee 2
by Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnerr Rr,cornrEuoenoN
on the development of a European space-based observation system 
- 
Part m
E:<plelnronv MeMonelrDut\,t
submitted by Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur
I. lntroduction
II. Military satellite programmes
(i) Observation and communications satellites
(a) Observation systems
(b) Communications
(ii) National military space prograflrmes in Europe
(a) kance
- 
Syracuse
- 
Helios
(b) The United Kingdom
(c) Spain and Italy
- 
HispasaVSecomsat
- 
Sicral
II[. Prospects for co-operation in Europe
(l) Co-operation between WEU countries
- 
Inter-state co-operation
- 
WEU's main observation system
(li) Other military space prograrnmes
(a,) NATO and space
(b) Industrial co-operation
IV. Conclusions
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Lopez Henares (Chairman); MM. Lenzer, Borderas (Altemate for Mr. Palacios) (Vice-Chair-
men); MM. Nata,Atkinson, Biefnot, Blaauw, Mrs. Blunck, MM. BOhm, Coviello, Curto,Mrs. Gelderblom-Lankhout, Mrs. Gai-
rado,MM. Jeambrun, Ir Grand, Litherland (Alternate: Alexander), Lorenzi, Marshnll, Pogas Santos, Pozzo, Roger (Altemate:
Galley), Sarens, Theis,Sir Donald Thompson, MM.Valleix, Wolfgramm.
N.B. Tfte names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Recommendation
on the development of a European space-based obsemation system 
- 
Pan III
The Assembly,
(i) Stressing the importance of control over space beyond the earth's atmosphere in the global mana-
gement of crises;
(ii) Noting that Europe still does not have operational means of observation and detection by satellite
with the military capabilities necessary for strengthening its defence;
(iii) Stressing the need for the WEU countries to equip themselves with independent space-based means
of observation and detection in order to be able to take appropriate measures in the event of crises affec-
ting Europe's interests;
(iv) Concemed over the future implications for European security of the proliferation of ballistics tech-
nology in the Meditelranean region;
(v) Recalling Recommendations 410,482,523,533 and 555 in which the Assembly requests that the
Council:
(a) set clear European space policy objectives and priorities;
(b) reachdecisions on further steps for establishing a full-scale European verification satellite sys-
tem;
(c) design the planned system in such a way as to contribute to the security of WEU member coun-
tries and to be useful to other organisations with a European, Atlantic or international vocation;
(d) assess without delay the risks to Europe stemming from the proliferation of ballistic and
nuclear technology;
(e) take appropriate decisions to avoid the slowing-down or paralysis of activities entrusted to the
study management team and the industrial consortium commissioned to design WEU's main
observation system;
(vi) Stressing the importance of equipping Europe with early-warning and navigational satellite systems
necessary for the efficient operation of a European anti-missile defence system;
(vii) Aware of the high cost of space-based systems and the need for close co-operation between states,
industry and scientific circles for these projects to succeed;
(vili) Noting with regret the absence of consensus in the Council over the necessary development of the
work of the satellite centre and staning the programme for the main observation system;
(ix) Deploring that the Council provides so little and such inadequate information on WEU's space policy,
Rrcoutvlellos rHAr rHE CouNcIL
1. Commence examination of a European space defence policy, taking all aspects of the problem into
account;
2. Take the decisions necessary for the development of the satellite centre and for starting work on the
main observation system, on the basis of a strategic analysis of what is at stake in the medium and long
term;
3. Instruct its Space Group to begin a study of a European space-based defence system, paying particu-
lar attention to the need for communications, early-warning and navigational satellites and their protection;
4. Develop its contacts with the space industries of the member countries and with ESA in order to
obtain information on current programmes and technologies that might be useful for implementing a
European space-based defence system;
5. Foster co-operation in early-warning and navigational satellites with the United States and Russia
on a basis of reciprocity and without jeopardising the independence of European systems;
6. Examine the expediency of creating a European space defence agency in WEU with responsibility
in this area;
7. Keep the Assembly better informed of its decisions on WEU's space policy.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
1. Space questions are a permanent thread
running through the debates and activities of the
Assembly of WEU. In recent years, the interest in
space-related issues has led to quite considerable
progress in terms of practical achievements.
2. In the early nineties, events in Europe and
in the Gulf led to a vigorous resurgence of the
debate on the expediency of Europe' having a
space-based observation system allowing it to
affirm its r6le as a world power.
3. With the signature of the CFE-1 and CFE-
1A agreements, the question of the verification
and control of the process of arms reduction in
Europe assumed paramount importance since on
its reliability depended the success of commit-
ments entered into by the two opposing military
alliances, the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw
Pact.
4. The European states, primarily concemed
by this process, found themselves in a somewhat
uncomfortable position, being dependent largely
on American satellite data2, which led to difficul-
ties over sharing the information thus gathered.
This situation helped to intensify discussions on
the need for Europe to have its own observation
satellites for military purposes.
5. This was the context in which a sympo-
sium, organised by the Assembly of WEU onihe
subject " Observation satellites 
- 
a European
means of verifying disarmament " was held in
Rome on 27th and 28th March 1990, during the
course of which the different aspects of the ques-
tion were examined in depth3. Following this ini-
tiative, the Technological and Aerospace Com-
mittee submitted a report on the findings of the
symposium at the June 1990 session, which was
adopted by the Assembly.
6. In Recommendation 482, resulting from
this report, the Assembly stressed " the need for
Western European nations to develop an autono-
mous European verification satellite capability in
_1, the lvgrd Europe is used here to designate the European
Union, WEU and European members of NAIO.
?. With the exception of France, which has a space policy
independent of those of the then major powers.
3. Observation satellites 
- 
a European means of verifying
disarmament; Symposium, Rome, 27th and 28th Mlrch
1990, Office of the Clerk of the Assembly of WEU.
order to meet their responsibilities in a changing
security situation... ". It recommended that the
Council " decide as a matter of urgency on the
establishment of a WEU satellite image-proces-
sing and interpretation agency; " and " reach deci-
sions on further steps for establishing a full-scale
European verification satellite system without
delay... "0.
7. The Council replied positively to the
recommendation, stating that a group of experts
had been tasked to make concrete proposals and
that a detailed report had been submitted to the
Council and adopted at its meeting of 1Oth
December 1990. It stated also that " the establish-
ment of a WEU satellite centre ... would be an
important factor in European co-operation on
space-based observation. "
8. Moreover " feasibility studies should also
be launched so that a European satellite sur-
veillance system can be set up without delay, with
a view to the verification of arms conffol agree-
ments and to the monitoring of crises and ecologi-
cal problems. "s.
9. The will expressed to make progress in
military space mafters was largely due to the Gulf
crisis and the lessons drawn from it regarding the
use of observation satellites and the conduct of
military operations. Participation of European
forces in monitoring the embargo and subsequent-
ly in air- and land-based actions revealed how
very dependent they were on satellite intelligence
supplied by the United States. This contributed to
awareness of the need to act at European level in
order to be able to respond to future crises using
European space-based means. The relative
detachment of the United States in the face of the
crisis in former Yugoslavia also served to sheng-
then these views.
10. Thus the Council, meeting at Vianden(Luxembourg) on 2Tthlune 1991, decided to " set
up a satellite data interpretation centre whose
immediate task would be to train European
experts ... to compile and process accessible data
and to make those data available to member
states, particularly within the framework of verifi-
cation ... crisis-monitoring and environmental
monitoring. " Moreover, the ad hoc Sub-Group on
Space was assigned the task of pursuing " studies
4. Document l230,25thMay 1990; Rapporteur: Mr. lrnzer.
5. Document 1276,29th May 1991, reply of the Council to
Recommendation 482.
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on the possibilities for medium- and long-term
co-operation on a European satellite observation
system. "6.
11. The Vianden decision and the Satellite
Centre, its structure and operation have already
been mentioned in two previous reports on the
development of a European space-based observa-
tion system. With this third part, the debate is far
from being closed, but it is important to review
European achievements and co-operation in mili-
tary space matters, the better to understand what is
the way forward and the choices to be made to
make this ambitious project a reality, the success
of which will largely depend on a credible com-
mon European security and defence policy worthy
of the name.
II. Milirary satellite programmes
12. The Gulf crisis provided a graphic illustra-
tion of the use of satellites, both civil and military,
in crisis-management and the conduct of military
operations. Intensive use of this medium contribu-
ted greatly to the success of the United Nations
coalition and the very low loss of life and equip-
ment on the United Nations side.
13. Of the range of hardware used, covering a
wide spread of tasks: observation, monitoring,
communications, navigation and meteorology,
two types of satellites played a major r6le: optical
or radar intelligence satellites and communica-
tions satellites.
14. The former enabled continuous monitoring
of Iraqi military forces on the ground, either by
identifying strategic targets (command centres, air
and missile bases, industrial complexes, etc.) or
military detachments in the theatre of operations,
identifying their equipment and the number of
personnel.
15. The latter provided contact between the
(political) decision-making centres and the mili-
tary units based in the Gulf area, thousands of
miles apart, and allowed orders to be relayed and
action reports to be received in real time.
16. This system of observation and communi-
cation satellites operating in tandem emerged as
one of the aspecti necessary for the conduct of
peace-keeping or peace-enforcement missions,
iometimei taking place at vast distances from
decision-making centres and sometimes in geo-
graphic and climatic environments somewhat
hosiile to the direct presence of military units or
their presence in sufficient number (lack of for-
ward positions, for example).
6. Document 1282, l4th October 1991: first part of the thir-
ty-seventh annual report of the Council 
- 
communiqu6 of the
WEU Ministerial Council on 27th June 1991.
(i) Obsemation and communications satelliles
17. The military uses of space are very varied
and can be summarised briefly as follows: infor-
mation-gathering, telecommunications, naviga-
tion (global positioning system), meteorology,
oceanography, space-based surveillance (analysis
and identification of orbiting objects and track-
ing) and early-warning systems (anti-missile,
nuclear explosion detection), in all of which
observation and communications play a very
important r6le.
(a) Observationsystems
18. There are basically two types of observa-
tion system: optical and radar. In the first group
are satellites with visible optical and/or infrared
sensors with various degrees of resolution,
approximately ten metres in the case of the Euro-
pean Spot satellite, one metre in the case of the
Helios I satellite and less than a metre for the
American systems KeyHole, KH 11 and KH 11S?.
Optical reconnaissance satellites are nonetheless
subject to two limitations: first, atmospheric
turbulence imposes a resolution limit of some
10-15 cm; second, and not the least important,
they can be used only in clear weather. These
satellites are primarily strategic intelligence tools.
19. Radar observation provides images of a dif-
ferent nature and texture to those of visible
images. For example, radar imaging allows one to
detect camouflaged or buried targets which would
have remained undetected by optical satellites and
also barbed wire networks or certain decoys.
Resolution varies, that of the American Lacrosse
satellite lies within a range of 0.60 to 3 meffes 8.
The radar satellite's all-weather capability makes
it a prime tactical intelligence instrument and a
neceisary complement of the optical satellite. The
limitations of this system are its high cost, its pro-
cessing requirements on the ground and the diffi-
culty of interpreting radar images.
(b) Communications
20. Satellites provide communications over
very long distances, without requiring rigid infra-
sffucture. The two main types of satellites are tele-
communications and relay satellites. The first of
these may be geostationary,_in other words statio-
nary over a given point of the globe, or non-geo-
stationary; in the case of geostationary satellites,
communications can be transmitted inside its area
of radio-electrical cover; in the case of non-geo-
stationary satellites, communications are disconti-
nuous 
- 
the satellite receives signals from a given
point andrefiansmits them while overflying another.
7. Intemational Defense & Technologies, No. 7, page 26,
December 1991.
8. Idem.
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21. Geostationary relay-satellites transmit bet-
ween low-satellites in low orbit and a satellite
data-receiving station situated at a point on earth.
Thus, three relay satellites orbiting around the
earth provide a constant link between the observa-
tion satellite and a land-based receiving station.
22. Satellite communications have distinct
qualitative advantages over earth-bound commu-
nications as follows:
- 
increased projection capability over very
short spaces of time, while remaining in
contact with decision-making centres;
- 
ability to offer high-capacity, good qual-
ity communications;
- 
ability to guarantee secure links, even in
the event of aggression;
- 
possibility of broadcasting information
to isolated units over vast geographic
areas.
23. Military satellite communications have
existed in Europe for more than twenty years. The
British Skynet programme launched in 1969 was
the first, followed by NATO in 1976, France's
Syracuse system in 1984 and Spain's Hispasat/
Secomsat in 1992.
(ii) National nililary space programmes in Europe
24. Research and development of civil and
military space-based systems is a long-term and
extremely costly process, the outcome of which is
uncertain. For a space programme to be success-
ful, the necessary human, technical and financial
resources must be made available and the aims of
the programme clearly defined.
25. In WEU, only France and the United King-
dom have space-based military programmes that
are operational. These cover telecommunications
and, in the case ofFrance, observation by satellite.
Spain and Italy have also embarked on studies and
programmes for acquiring space-based facilities
for military use in a more modest framework and,
frequently, in co-operation with other countries.
(a) France
26. France's military space policy was specifi-
cally designed to be independent of the space-
based capabilities of the United States and Russia.
Moreover, its telecommunications and observa-
tion satellites provide links between metropolitan
France and French military forces stationed in
many regions of the world thousands of kilo-
metres distant.
27. To these considerations of a political and
military nature are added a major research and
development component, the economic spin-off
from which is substantial and has made France a
civilian and military space power in Europe.
(i) The Syracuse programme
28. In 1964 the French D6l6gation minist6riel-
le pour l'armement started the first studies on
satellite systems for military use. However, it was
not until 1979 that the first French military space
telecommunications programme, known as Syra-
cuse (radio communications system by satellite),
came into operation.
29. This system's first military payload was
taken on board the civilian satellite Telecom I on
1st August 1984. Further launches followed in
1985 (Telecom IB) and 1988 (Telecom IC). The
Syracuse II programme was launched in 1988.
This involved an improved telecommunications
payload on board Telecom II satellites commis-
sioned in late 1991.
(ii) The Helios programme
30. ln 1977 the preliminary studies were car-
ried out for the Samro military optical observation
satellite, in parallel with the launch of the Spot
civilian programme, which obtained 307o funding
from the ministry of defence.
31. 1986 saw the start of the Helios program-
me, which was opened to co-operation from Italy
in 1987 (l4%o) and Spain in 1988 (7%o).'I\efirst
Helios observation satellite is to be launched in
February 1995. A Helios II programme is being
studied, but financial difficulties are an obstacle
to its implementation (costs are in the region of 8
billion francs and, to date, no other European
country has come forward as a partner). Helios II
is scheduled to be launched into orbit by the year
2000 and could have a resolution of 50 cm (com-
pared with 1 metre for Helios II).
32. Alongside the Syracuse and Helios pro-
grammes, France has commenced design studies
for the Osiris and Zenon satellites. Osiris is a
high resolution radar observation satellite for
specific observation tasks, on a continuous basis,
irrespective of atmospheric conditions. Osiris
will be fully complementary to the Helios optical
observation satellites. France wishes other Euro-
pean countries to become associated with the
project, especially Germany, to which overtures
have been made.
33. Zenon is a military electronic surveillance
satellite providing electromagnetic surveillance
for collecting data on the preparation of military
operations and locating radars. Unlike Osiris,
where European co-operation is to be invited,
Zenon, because of its specific tasks, is intended
solely for national use.
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(b) The United Kingdom
34. Unlike France, which is committed to a
complex military space programme, the United
Kingdom has concentrated its efforts on military
space-based telecommunications through the
Skynet programme.
35. Studies were carried out in the sixties on a
system of telecommunications by satellite. In
1969 and 1970,the two satellites in the first gene-
ration, Skynet I, were launched, but the second
launch failed. In January and November 1974,
Skynet II satellites replaced the first generation
which ceased to be operational in 1972.
36. In 1980, the decision was taken to produce
the Skynet IV series, Skynet III having never
materialised.ln 1982, the Falklands war contribu-
ted to revealing the gaps in British satellite com-
munications. Only one Skynet II satellite was
operational at the time and was poorly placed to
cover the route to the Falklands followed by Bri-
tish naval forces. To guarantee communications,
the United Kingdom had to use American space-
based facilities and it would seem that the United
States also provided the United Kingdom with
satellite images of the region.
37 . Awareness of this deficiency contributed to
the development of the Skynet IV system and to a
study being launched on a space-based intelli-
gence satellite, the Zircon programme, which
seems to have been abandoned in 1987'. Three
Skynet IV satellites were launched in 1988, 1989
and 1990 and were used during the Gulf crisis to
provide communications between British forces
stationed in the region and the United Kingdom.
38. ln l994,contracts were signed for the deve-
lopment and launch of two new Skynet IV satel-
lites (series 2) and studies were begun on a new
generation, Skynet V, to replace Skynet IV next
century. According to the United Kingdom autho-
rities European co-operation will be invited for
this new project.
39. Nor has the United Kingdom neglected
space-based observation, as might be assumed
from a comparison of its progress in space-based
technology with that of France. In point of fact,
the British presence in this field is assured by
close collaboration with the United States.
40. This collaboration takes place partly at the
level of industry, the British technology and
defence industries having a long tradition of co-
operation with their American counterparts'0, and
9. According to certain sources, Ztrcolmay have been laun-
ched under cover of a Skynet IV satellite and could well be
operational 
- 
Military Technology, Volume XVI, No. 6/92,
page 17.
10. The United Kingdom was the United States' initial foreign
partner for projects linked to the strategic defence initiative and
has co-operated in subsequent anti-missile defence projects.
partly through intelligence within the framework
of the 1947 agreements on co-ordination of intel-
ligence-gathering. In this area the British authori-
ties probably receive information from various
American optical and radar observation, sur-
veillance and early-warning satellites. The United
Kingdom thus has satellite intelligence at its dis-
posal without having to bear alone the manage-
ment and maintenance costs of a space-based
observation system.
(c) Spain and ltaly
41. (i) The Hispasat/Secomsat programme is
Spain's first space-based telecommunications
project for civil and military use. It consists of
three satellites (two operational and a third in
reserve), together with the ground-based logistics
necessary for receiving and processing the data
obtained. The two satellites were launched by
Ariane rocket in September 1992 and July 1993.
Spain has thus acquired a communications system
similar to the French Syracuse system, in other
words a civilian satellite supplemented by compo-
nents for military use. Hispasat/Secomsat has had
its baptism of flre in Bosnia-Herzegovina where it
relays communications between the Spanish
TJNPROFOR forces and Spain.
42. (ii) T\e Italian Sicral project is a satellite
telecommunications programme with defence and
civil protection applications. Participation of Ita-
lian forces in United Nations operations in Bos-
nia-Herzegovina, Mozambique and Somalia has
revealed the need for a satellite communications
system to monitor their action. The Sicral system
will provide national, European and intemational
cover of Italian armed forces and will be managed
from ground-based military control stations under
the supervision of Italy's combined headquarters.
In principle, it should be operational before the
year 2fi)0.
43. In spite of the efforts and progress achie-
ved, it is clear that no European country alone is
able to acquire a minimal military satellite system
providing adequate space-based cover for its
national defence requirements. Only France is
pushing forward on all fronts, but with increas-
ingly limited resources. Co-operation between
European countries will be an unavoidable neces-
sity if any savings are to be made in the cost of
programmes and overlapping national systems are
to give way to a European military space-based
policy.
III. Prospects for co-operatinn in Europe
44. European countries (in the broad sense)
have developed co-operation networks for mili-
tary and civilian programmes at both state and
industry level with varying degrees of success.
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Europeans are carrying out joint space pro-
grarnmes, both at international level with Intelsat
and Inmarsat, and at regional level with ESA, in
fields ranging from earth observation to meteoro-
logy and including environmental and sea-bed
monitoring, telecommunications, etc.
45. The results are far less impressive on the
military side, largely due to differences in percep-
tion. France sees space-based technology, (toge-
ther with nuclear weapons) as the means of affir-
ming its status as a iegional and international
political and military power, hence its military
space prograrnme, which is backed by a viable
industrial base (A6rospatiale and Maffa, to name
but two companies, are at the forefront of techno-
logy in the field, not merely in Europe but in the
rest of the world as well) and a national vision of
the military use of space r'.
46. The United Kingdom is engaged in three-
pronged development of its military space activi-
ties: the Skynet telecommunications satellite (of
United Kingdom design), NATO (the NATO
satellites are replicas ofthe Skynet satellites) and
co-operation with the United States. This last
aspect enables the United Kingdom to share mili-
tary space technologies and information with the
United States, as for instance in the framework of
anti-missile defence.
47. In June l994,for example, two microsatel-
lites, STRV-IA and STRV-IB (space technology
research vehicles), manufactured by the British
Defence Research Agency were launched by
Ariane rocket, with American Ballistic Missile
Defence Organisation 12 experimental material on
board.
48. Limited financial and technical capabilities
or doubts in the face of challenges offered by the
military use of space make it difficult for the other
European countries to engage in real co-operation
and the formulation, in the longer term, of a Euro-
pean military space policy.
(i) Co-operation between WEU countries
49. Of the WEU member countries, four are
currently engaged in or have plans for military
space-based observation and telecommunications
programmes: France, Italy, Spain and the United
Kingdom. The other members also have a pre-
sence, since all of them participate in the activities
11. Medium- and long-term forecasts for space are drawn up
by the Groupe d'6tudes spatiales (Special Study Group) of
the Ministry of Defence and compiled in a classified docu-
ment, the Plan Pluriannuel Spatial Militaire (long-term mili-
tary space plan). The frst version of this plan dates back to
1984 and the plan is updated every two years.
12. The body which succeeded the Strategic Initiative
Defence Organisation in199l-1992 and which is responsible
for study and design of anti-missile defence in the United
States.
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of the WEU Satellite Centre and the work of the
study management team 13.
(a) Inter-state co-operation
50. The Helios observation prograrnme was the
first real test of European co-operation in military
space-based observation satellites, bringing toge-
ther France, Italy and Spain. The Helios project
was launched by France in 1986, joined by Italy
and Spain (with their respective contributions of
l4%o andT%o ofthefinancing ofthe overall budget
of F 8-10 billion. Helios's specification (resolu-
tion of 1 metre as compared with approximately
10 mefres for Spot) makes it unique in Europe and
it is surprising that France and its Helios program-
me have not attracted the interest of other partners
within WEU 
- 
doubtless because of political and
economic considerations.
51. Nevertheless, the success of co-operation
in the framework of Helios I appears to be a spe-
cial case, considering the fate of Helios II. France
has not, in point of fact, succeeded in finding
other partners for this second generation satellite,
incorporating technologies more advanced than
those of its predecessorro, as Italy and Spain did
not wish to commit themselves to it.
52. The Osiris radar satellite project seems
likely to be of interest to Germany but no concrete
decisions have been taken. Moreover, the cost of
German reunification, which has already had
implications for the budget and various ESA pro-
grarnmes, has put a brake on any major commit-
ments by that country to civilian and military
space developments.
53. However, the possibility acknowledged by
the Constitutional Court's of German military
units being posted outside the NAIO area within
the framework of United Nations operations
raises the issue of communications and intelli-
gence and might be an argument in favour of Ger-
man participation in European observation and
communications satellite projects.
54. The United Kingdom and France also co-
operate in the Eumilsatcom and Inmilsat space
programmes.
55. Eumilsatcom is a programme for a future
military satellite communications system inten-
ded to replace the Skynet and Syracuse systems in
the twenty-first century. Germany, Italy, the
13. The activities of the Satellite Centre and the study. mana-
gement team are described in a previous report of the com-
mittee: the development of a European space-based observa-
tion system 
- 
Part II, Document 1393, Rapporteur 
- 
Mr.
Valleix (Recommendation 555).
14. Helios II was supposed to have a resolution of some 50
cm which would place it at the level of American satellites of
the same category.
15. Decision of l2th July 1994.
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Netherlands and Spain have also been invited to
participate.
56. Inmilsat is an intemational military project
for communications by satellite'6. The United
States is also associated in this project, along with
France and the United Kingdom. Eumilsatcom
and Inmilsat are now in their study phases.
57. However, it must be acknowledged that
despite the number of projects, there are few
examples of inter-state co-operation and those
that exist would appear to result from a case-by-
case approach rather than an overall strategy for
the future, due to the lack of a common perception
of the challenges involved in the military use of
space and its advantages for a defence Europe. In
the framework of WEU, an embryonic form of
space-based co-operation has been started with
the establishment of the WEU Satellite Centre and
the pursuit of a feasibility study on a satellite
observation system.
(b) WEU's mnin observation system
58. Alongside the Satellite Centre, whose pre-
sent tasks are to demonstrate the applications of
space imagery for monitoring disarmament trea-
ties, crises and the environment, to train a nucleus
of analysts for interpreting images and develop
computer techniques for the interpretation of
images and to supply member states with opera-
tional image interpretation products, a study
management team exists, with responsibility for
the feasibility study of WEU's main satellite
observation system.
59. This industrial consortium of thirty or so
European firms led by the German firm, Dornier
(of the DASA aerospace group) is responsible for
the feasibility study which is in two parts (appro-
ved in February and December 1993). The first
examines the choice of possible configurations
and the second makes a detailed technical analysis
including cost estimates of the configurations best
suited to the Cenfre's needs.
60. Final selection is the responsibility of the
WEU Council which is to take a decision on star-
ting the programme for an independent European
satellite system in 1995. At the ministerial mee-
ting held at the Kirchberg European Centre,
Luxembourg, on 9th May 1994, the ministers tas-
ked the WEU Space Group to prepare " a propo-
sal for decision including the preparation of a
draft memorandum of understanding containing
detailed specif,rcations... r' ".
16. Statement on the defence estimates 1994; Chapter IV 
-
defence equipment programme, page 63.
17. WEU Council of Ministers, ministerial meeting of 9th
May 1994 (Kirchberg, Luxembourg); Document 1422,24th
May 1994.
61. According to the conclusions of the first
part of the study, the elements of the WEU system
would be as follows:
(i) The space sector, defined as all satellites in
orbit belonging to the system, comprising:
- 
nominal satellites, operating in low orbit
(660-570 km). This category includes
two optical satellites and two synthetic
aperture radar satellites ;
- 
small satellites (of the optical and SAR
type) operating at very low altitude as
complements to the nominal satellites.
These small satellites may have a resolu-
tion and life-span inferior to that of the
nominal satellites (approximately five to
seven years), but allow a greater number
of images to be taken each day across a
predetermined area. The number of these
small satellites will depend on their life-
span, the tasks assigned to them and their
availability;
- 
data-relay satellites in geostationary orbit
(approximately 36 000 km) for trans-
mitting images and other data gathered
by the low orbit satellites.
62. Clearly, there must be at least two satellites
of each type, or better still, three (two operational,
one reserve) for the system to be exploited effi-
ciently. This would allow several crisis areas to be
monitored on a virtually pennanent basis.
(ii) The ground sector, including ground-based
facilities and installations necessary for control
and use of the system: operating, processing,
archiving and interpretation cenfres; one or more
stations for tracking, telemetry and control of the
data relay and other satellites; means of commu-
nications capable of connecting all the stations,
transmitting data and receiving requests for data
from political and military authorities.
(ii) Other miliury space prograrnmes
63. Apart from the instances of co-operation in
WEU and inter-state co-operation, other players
in the domain of military space in Western
Europe, NATO and the European space industries,
also have contributions to make.
(a) NATO andspace
64. In 1966, the North Atlantic Council deci-
ded to begin a study for a NAIO satellite commu-
nications programme. In 1970, the first satellite,
NATO 2A, was launched (the first phase of the
programme was devoted to research and testing).
ln 1971, phase 2 of the NATO progftrrnme, rela-
ting to ground-based facilities, was completed and
a second satellite was placed in orbit. Phase 3 led
to the development of the ground sector of the
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system which today consists of over twenty fixed
and one mobile station and a fourth satellite was
launched in November 1984.
65. In January 1987, it was decided to build
new satellites based on the model of the British
Skynet satellites: NATO IV. Two of these satel-
lites were launched in 1991 and 1993 and will be
operational until the year 2000, after which it will
be necessary to provide for their replacement.
66. Communications by satellite are taking on
special importance with the changes now being
made in NATO, particularly as regards the use of
its forces in the framework of peace-keeping ope-
rations and the greater need for force mobility.
According to a document produced by the NATO
National Armaments Directors Group (NADs),
interoperability between national communica-
tions systems must be developed at battalion level
and below and between peace-keeping forces in
the field and command centres and sea- and air-
borne support forces. Communications satellites
are the ideal means of meeting these requirements
because of their wide cover and ability to protect
communicationsrs.
67. However, the future of the NATO satellite
system still hangs in the balance. Budget restric-
tions affecting infrastructure projects and the
organisation's new reform programmes have rai-
sed questions about pursuing the NATO V pro-
grarnme, intended to take over from the NAIO IV
satellites. The suggestion that recourse might be
had to existing commercial satellites, such as
those of Inmarsat, seems increasingly plausible in
the absence of any thinking on NATO's space
communications policy beyond the year 2000'e
(the date on which the Skynet IV satellites beco-
me obsolete).
(b) Industrialco-operation
68. The European space industries, although
more involved in civilian than military pro-
grammes, have a very important co-operative r6le
to play. The high cost of space systems, interna-
tional competition between satellite launcher
manufacturers, the appearance of new competi-
tors (particularly in Asia) are so many arguments
in favour of industrial co-operation.
69. This will not necessarily follow automati-
cally, in the absence of a medium-and long-term
policy on civilian and military space matters.
However, responsibility for defining such a policy
lies with states, while industry must put forward
proposals regarding the systems and means neces-
sary to achieve the objectives which have been
decided. At present, Europe has a surfeit of space
18. Space News, Vol. 5; No. 27, page 2; llth-l7th July,
1994.
19. Space News, Vol. 5, No. 35, page l; l2th-l8th Septem-
ber 1994.
industries, sometimes in partnership, frequently in
competition. There are more satellite manufactu-
rers in Europe than in the United States for a mar-
ket l0Vo smaller than the American market2,.
70. Because of this, major European firms have
started a process of acquisition and mergers with
the longer-term objective of creating an industrial
space complex able to meet external competition,
particularly from the United States, on equal
terms. Two examples are worth noting, the acqui-
sition of British Aerospace Space Systems (the
manufacturer of the Skynet satellites) by Matra
Marconi Space (an Anglo-French company SOVojointly owned by Matra D6fense Espace, which
manufactures the Helios satellites, and GEC Mar-
coni) and the possible merger of the satellite divi-
sions of Deutsche Aerospace (Germany) and
A6rospatiale (France), responsible for the Helios
optical systems.
71. Ultimately, this process can only lead to
a more rational approach to space matters in
Europe, as in the case of the Ariane launcher
(Arianespace Consortium) and also the aeronau-
tics industry (Airbus). In regrouping in this way,
European industry is in a good position to achieve
the necessary harmonisation of procedures and
technologies without which European co-opera-
tion in space matters cannot advance further.
72. Space industry associations bringing toge-
ther firms in several countries are also increas-
ingly involved in lobbying governments and the
national and European space agencies (ESA).
73. Eucosat, an association made up of twenty
or so firms and parliamentarians from seven
major countries of the European Union, submitted
a project in June 1994 for a European monitoring
system by dual-use (i.e. civilian and military)
satellite2'. According to Eucosat, existing or plan-
ned observation satellites have certain deficien-
cies in terms of resolution, all-weather capability
(infrared or radar) and the predictability of their
return over a given site. Moreover, present ground
sectors are not adapted to future needs.
74. To be efficient, an observation system has
to be " open ", in other words, capable of exploi-
ting data from civilian and military satellites or
air-borne sensors. The ground component must
provide comprehensive support to the decision-
makers of Europe. The structure of the proposed
system is the classical one: optical and radar satel-
lites, small support satellites and relay satellites.
75. The system would be implemented in three
phases: the first making use of existing civil
and military capabilities (Helios and Spot, for
example), the second being the development of
new sensors and improving the processing and
Defense Magazine, No. 7, page 29; December 1993.
Air & Cosmos, No. 1479, page 5; 4th-lOth July 1994.
20.
21.
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dissemination of information and the third, equip-
ping the system with new satellites, improving the
frequency of passes, data-access time and resolu-
tion. The anticipated time-scale for completion of
the project, more or less in its entirety, is some
fourteen years at a cost ofF 16-20 billion.
76. Eurospace, which groups some thirty Euro-
pean firms, has presented a programme for small
satellites. According to Eurospace, Europe is lack-
ing in launchers suited to small satellites and this
gap must be frlled to avoid this sector being mono-
polised by competitors such as the United States.
The ESSMI (European small satellite missions)
project, although its aims are essentially commer-
cial (small, low-cost satellites are a potential mar-
ket, but one hampered by the lack of suitable laun-
chers) also has military dimensions, particularly in
relation to the projected observation systems (pro-
posed for WEU or by Eucosat), requiring small
supporting satellites with flexible launch methods
according to need, in the event of crisis. However,
for the moment there are no firm projects in view,
either at state level or in ESA, because of financial
restrictions22. In the United States, where the mar-
ket for small satellites is growing, the military
view is that they lend themselves to more flexible
use than the larger systems, as they can be laun-
ched quite quickly, for a specific mission, in the
event of crisis. A system of several small satellites
would also make it possible to mitigate the effects
of possible failure or destruction of the larger
observation and warning satellites'3.
IV Conclusions
77. Space Europe is a thriving and tangible rea-
lity. The launchers, satellite systems and techno-
logies that have been developed confirm the exis-
tence of means and know-how equal, if not
superior, to those of the other space powers. At
the same time, however, technological and com-
mercial success cannot mask one vital issue: the
absence of a European space policy, in both its
civilian and military dimensions.
78. The success of co-operation over the Ariane
rocket, the Spot and ERS-I earth observation
satellites for civil use and other programmes
(space probes, meteorological observation, ocean
research), is undeniable, despite the fact that cer-
tain major projects have been shelved for the time
being (forexample, the Hermes shuttle). However
what is lacking overall is a long-term view and a
political and military analysis of the challenges
presented by the use of space.
79. Space is also an attribute of power, hence
the importance accorded to it by the United States,
22. Space News, Vol. 5, No. 22, page 4;30th May-l2th June
1994.
23. Space News, Vol. 5, No. 30, page 4; lst-7th August 1994.
Russia, France and other nations, such as China,
Japan 2o and India. As the Prime Minister of
France, Mr. Edouard Balladur, stated, in space co-
operation " virtue and necessity coincide since
space is a particularly propitious area for building
defence Europe " 25.
80. However, there is a wide gulf between fine
words and reality, as France's difficulties in
finding partners for its Helios II programme or in
associating Germany in the Osiris radar satellite
project bear witness. Yet both correspond to
a need which is not just national but European
too.
81. Differences of assessment and financial
restrictions mean that space Europe is taking
shape only with difficulty, particularly in the mili-
tary sphere. In the absence ofco-operation and the
development of a space policy, albeit minimal,
efforts undertaken are likely to be affected by
short-term considerations, basically of a financial
order. Space is undoubtedly a high-cost area, it
mobilises technological and human resources
which may be lacking in other sectors, it is often
difficult for public opinion and indeed decision-
makers to grasp any other than the commerical
implications, yet the advantages deriving from its
use are out of all proportion with the results obtai-
ned by the use of more traditional methods.
82. The applications and usefulness of space-
based observation systems in armaments control,
monitoring proliferation, identifying targets and
in telecommunications is already proven, as testi-
fied by their intensive use during the Gulf crisis.
Today, in the face of manifold crises, from former
Yugoslavia to North Korea, space-based techno-
logy comes fully into its own, allowing virtually
day-to-day monitoring of the situation on the
ground, even where a direct presence is difficult
or impossible.
83. This being the case, the challenges must
first be understood before proceeding further. The
high cost of space does not allow wastage at a
time when resources are increasingly scarce.
Although military and civilian dual-use equip-
ment allows savings to be made, the performance
and levels of protection of such equipment26 are
not identical. Furthermore, the missions initially
envisaged (disarmament control in Europe, for
example) have evolved and new uses of space are
opening up, in the area of anti-missile defence, for
example. Detection and early-warning satellites
24. Japan has recently embarked upon the study of a military
space-based observation and anti-missile early waming sys-
tem; Space News, Vol. 5, No. 30, page 4, lst-7th August
1994.
25. Address by Mr. Balladyr, Prime Minister of France, to
the Institut des Hautes Etudes de D6fense Nationale
(IHEDN), Paris, 8th September 1994.
26. Compare Spot's l0 m resolution with that planned for
Helios of 50 cm.
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are an essential element today for setting up an
efficient space-based observation system.
84. In the United States, where early-warning
duties were assigned to DSP (defence supporting
programme) system satellites, launched in the
1970s and now close to the limit of their operatio-
nal life, the Pentagon hasjust proposed a plan for
their replacement by more modern satellites, the
ALARM (alert locate and report missiles) system
to meet the threat of ballistic proliferation. Funds
have been allocated to this end by Congress in the
1995 defence budget2' and the first launches are
scheduled for around 2002-2005.
85. Another factor which must be taken into
account is the possibility of the emergence in the
future of anti-satellite systems, based either on
advanced technologies or on less advanced equip
ment (scrambling systems, use of laser technology).
An important debate is in progress in the United
States28, with crucial implications for the future of
any European space-based observation system.
86. In a recent document from the American
Presidency, entitled " National security strategy
of engagement and enlargement ", reference is
made to the need for " deterring threats to United
States' interests in space and meeting aggression
[against space interests] if deterrence fails " 2e.
According to Mr. Dunbar Lockwood of the Arms
Control Association in Washington, the theatre
high-altitude area defence anti-missile system
could be modified to intercept satellites instead of
missiless.
87. Another important area of action is that of
navigation by satellite. To date only the United
States and Russia have this system of space bea-
cons (Global NavStar and Glonass). These are
constellations of several satellites (roughly 24 in
either system) enabling users on the ground to
determine their exact positions on earth, on the
sea and in the air, to ascertain their speed and to
obtain time reference. During the Gulf crisis,
NavStar was extremely valuable for accurate mis-
sile launches, helping to adjust the trajectory of
the Tomahawk cruise missiles to which observa-
tion satellites had previously fransmitted images
of the terrain the missiles would overfly3'.
27. The total cost of the ALARM project, coupled with the
Brilliant Eyes satellite programme, led by the BMDO 
- 
Bal-
listic Missile Defence Organisation 
- 
is estimated at $11 bil-
lion up to 2015; Space News, Vol.5, No. 32,page 4, l5th-
28th August, 1994.
28. The White House is opposed to any operational develop-
ment of an anti-satellite system but advocates.of the latter are
still continuing to press their case; Space News, Vol. 36, page
7, l9th-25th September 1994.
29. Defense News, Vol. 9, No. 37, page2O, l9th-25th Sep-
tember 1994.
30. Idem.
31. La guerre en orbite, Serge Grouard, Ed. Economica,
page l2l.
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88. With the proliferation of ballistic weapons,
particularly in the Mediterranean region, it is
becoming necessary to consider the need to
acquire an early warning satellite system if Euro-
pe is one day to have an efficient anti-missile sys-
tem (whether from the south or the east, the time
between the departure and arrival of a missile in
Europe would be extremely short 
- 
an argument
in favour of a system of detection from the
moment of ignition of the missile).
89. Any projected space-based observation
system must take account of these factors. More-
over, the area for discussion should perhaps be
widened to that of a European space-based defen-
ce system, including observation (optical and
radar) facilities, relay and communications satel-
lites (providing links between forces answerable
to WEU and those of the NAIO allies), a system
of navigation by satellite, an early-warning
system for anti-missile defence and a satellite
defence system32.
90. This space-based system would be comple-
ted by a ground sector data receiving station and
facilities for processing and ransmission of data to
political and military decision-makers. Conventio-
nal means of detection, radar stations, land or sea
based or airborne (for example, on AWACS),
would be connected to the system allowing infor-
mation received to be handled more quickly.
91. To achieve this, it is necessary above all for
the major objectives of this system to be identified
and the military space-based requirements of all
the countries concerned to be co-ordinated. The
cost of a space-based defence system far exceeds
the resources ofa single counEry and ajoint space
policy is the only means of achieving its imple-
mentation. Recourse to technologies already in
use and developed in the context of the civilian
space sector, such as launchers, optical equip-
ment, radar and various types of sensors, allow
considerable savings to be made, in terms of
money and time. Nevertheless, it should not be
forgotten that the only European civil space orga-
nisation, ESA, has no responsibilities in defence
matters.
92. In order to manage the design and imple-
mentation of a European space-based defence
system, consideration might be given either to
giving ESA defence responsibilities (not an easy
approach, in view of the differing interests and
defence policies of the member countries) or to
creating in WEU or between the European coun-
tries wishing to participate in such a system, a
space-based defence agency with responsibility
for supervising and co-ordinating efforts in this
32. This last point remains controversial but all options
should be considered, above all because of high costs, the
difFrculty of replacing equipment rapidly and the vulnerabil-
ity of that equipment..
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area, conducting studies on the requirements of
the system, making proposals and dealing with
the implementation of the decisions taken by the
participant states.
93. Alongside this technical-type structure,
consideration might be given to establishing a
European military space command, similar to the
United States Military Space Command, formed
by the military authorities responsible for space
matters in the WEU countries or the countries par-
ticipating in the space-based defence system. The
space defence agency would also be responsible
for anti-missile defence in the context of early-
waming satellite systems.
94. There is doubtless a long way to go, but
defence Europe cannot afford not to engage in
serious thinking on the military uses of space if it
wishes to avoid remaining in a dependent and vul-
nerable position in military space matters. Space
is necessary for its existence as a power in its own
right, commanding credibility and respect, and
confident of being able to meet the challenges of
the future in its dealings with its adversaries and
also its allies.
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Draft Recommendation
on the future of the WEU Satellite Centre in Tonejdn
The Assembly,
(i) Welcoming the fact that the WEU Satellite Cenffe has achieved its logistical targets;
(ii) Congratulating the Spanish authorities responsible for building the centre for having provided it
with the means of operating effectively;
(iii) Recalling that this centre is unique as a result of international co-operation and has been designed
to contribute to peace-keeping and intemational security;
(iv) Congratulating the Director and the staff of the centre on the very substantial sterling work they
have done there;
(v) Judging very favourably the number and nature of the treaty verification and crisis-monitoring tasks
assigned to the centre;
(vi) Regretting, however, that environmental monitoring tasks assigned to the centre are few and far bet-
ween;
(vii) Noting that so far certain member states have not tasked the centre at all and wondering about the
reasons for their not doing so;
(viii) Believing that the period for assessing the work of the centre is not long enough for the assessment
to be entirely fair and valid;
(ix) Considering that there is a risk of the satellite cenffe's present temporary status being prolonged and
that it might not therefore be able to carry out its work in the optimum conditions for achieving its aims;
(x) Considering moreover that the centre, although in its infancy, is an important example of measures
to be taken for the progressive creation of a European defence identity;
(xi) Taking account moreover of the fact that the centre will be able to have the benefit of Helios satel-
lite images only after summer 1995 at best;
(xiil Reaffirming that the Torrej6n Satellite Centre must be the cornerstone of a complete European
space-based system covering intelligence, early warning and defence;
(xiii) Believing in any event that the future of the centre should not be indissolubly linked to that of a
European space-based observation system;
(xiv) Insisting on the urgent need for the centre to be as widely supported as possible by public opinion
if it wishes to attain its goals of providing Europe with a useful security instrument in the widest possible
meaning of the term,
RrcouwNos rHAT rne CouNcrI-
1. Take a decision as soon as possible that will guarantee the continuity of the Satellite Centre by
making it permanent, so as to avoid a temporary situation being maintained to the detriment of its work;
2. Establish a method for continuously assessing the work done by the centre so as to optimise its
capabilities at all times;
3. Keep the Assembly informed of the practical details for implementing the memorandum of under-
standing on the Helios satellite signed by WEU and the governments of France, Italy and Spain;
4. Encourage the member states to avail themselves of the services of the centre, especially those
which have not yet done so;
5. Urge member countries to make use of the services of the centre more regularly, in particular by
giving it environmental monitoring tasks (disaster relief, control of water supplies, population movement,
hazardous activities, control of nature of terrain, control of illicit movements);
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6. Establish relations with the European Space Agency in order to determine possibilities for
co-operation between the- two organisations in space-based observation;
7. Study the possibilities of technical and commercial space co-operation with the CIS countries in
order to allow the technical and human resources of those countries to be used for preventive and peace-
ful purposes;
8. Inform public opinion in Europe of the tasks and work undertaken by the Torrej6n Satellite Centre
in order to promote a better understanding of such tasks among the citizens of the European countries and
to obtain their support for the aims of the centre.
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I. The WEU Satellite Centre in Tonejdn 
-
the position todny
1. On27th June 1991, the WEU Council of
Ministers, meeting in Vianden, Luxembourg,
decided, under Article YILI.2 of the modified
Brussels Treaty, to establish a Satellite Centre:
" With the aim of intensifying space co-operation
within WEU and giving concrete expression to
that co-operation, ministers decided to: set up a
satellite data interpretation centre whose imme-
diate task would be to train European experts in
the photo-interpretation of satellite-derived data,
to compile and process accessible data and to
make those data available to member states, parti-
cularly within the framework of arms control
agreements, crisis-monitoring and environmental
monitoring. The activities of the centre will be
reviewed no later than three years after it has ente-
red into operation. "
2. The WEU Council of Ministers subse-
quently decided at its meeting in Bonn in Novem-
ber 1991 that the centre for interpretation of satel-
lite data and training was to be located in Spain.
3. To this end an agreement was signed bet-
ween WEU and the Kingdom of Spain whereby
Explanatory Memorandum
(subnined by Mn lipez Henarus, Rapporteur)
TasLe 1
Spain would make available land situated at the
Torrej6n air base and a building thereon for the
headquarters of the Satellite Centre. This agree-
ment was signed in Paris on lst December 1992
and submitted two months later to the Spanish
Parliament for ratifi cation.
4. The centre's facilities were officially inau-
gurated by the Spanish Minister of Defence and
the Secretary-General of WEU on 28th April
1993. The Technological and Aerospace Com-
mittee had the opportunity of visiting these faci-
lities in November of the same year and noted
with great satisfaction the high architectural
standard of the building and its functional suita-
bility for this first tangible project initiated by
WEU.
5. Thus the centre, under the management of
Mr. Blaydes and a steering committee composed
of a representative from each of the nine member
countries, embarked upon its experimental phase
with a budget ceiling of 38.25 million ecus.
6. This first or experimental phase includes
staff recruitment, building conversion work, ins-
tallation of equipment, staff training and defini-
tion of tasks (Table 1).
WEU Satellite Centre experimental phase
91 92 93 94 95
Ministerial
Decisions
Staffing
Building
Equipment
Training
Tasking
a a
rFW
EEI@
8ffiffiffi
ffi
ffiffiffi
a
ffi 
;
ffiffi
a
ffi
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7. The organogram of the centre is shown in Table 2. Recruitment of staff has now been completed.
TlsI-e 2
14 Sraff
4 Seiior
Interpreters
I
15 Image
Ioterpreters
8. Moreover since March of this year the
centre has had all the equipment necessary for the
experimental phase and the training phase has
been satisfactorily completed. Until now there
have been no outside requests for training, which
is perhaps only to be expected given the cenfte's
present stage of development.
9. The tasks assigned to the Tonej6n Satellite
Cenre for 1994 were as follows:
( i) Treaty verification:
- 
support to CFE and CSCE ins-
pection visits .
- 
support to Open Skies missions
- 
non-proliferation treaties . . . . .
(ii) Crisis monitoring:
- 
preparation for humanitarian aid
- 
support in preventing non-com-
pliance with sanctions . . . . . . .
- 
detection of military movements
( iii) Environmental monitoring :
- 
disaster relief .
- 
control of water supplies
- 
population movement
- 
hazardous activities
- 
control ofnature ofterrain . . . .
- 
control of illicit movements . . .
Photolab
3 staff
4
2
0
10. The various dossiers are made up by inter-
preting and blending data from optical satellites
(mainly Spot and Landsat) and ERS-I radar satel-
lites with other non space-based information.
11. Anticipated future sources of data might
include high resolution satellite and radar and air-
borne imagery.
12. Additionally the centre pays close attention
to collateral information which it regards as most
important. This includes: geographic data: paper
maps and digital terrain data; treaty related data;
data bases of militarily significant installations
and structures; locally generated situation reports
and aerial imagery.
13. Users of the centre in order of priority are:
first, the Council of WEU and its subsidiary
bodies, second, the member states in preparing
WEU actions and decisions and third, the member
states for their own needs. At present, according
to the information available to your Rapporteur,
only three member states (Spain, France and Por-
tugal) have not yet tasked the centre. Apart from
the users referred to above other non-WEU orga-
nisations may task the centre if the WEU Council
sees fit.
14. The procedure followed in relation to tas-
king by a member state is as follows: once the task
has been commissioned the centre prepares a task
5
1
7
0
0
0
0
2
1
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analysis report. The user and the centre then nego-
tiate the details of the task, including any collate-
ral data to be supplied. Next the user committee
fixes the priorities of the tasks and finally the
centre gathers the images, interprets them and
produces the dossier. Any other member state
may request a copy of a completed dossier.
15. The building in which the centre is accom-
modated, as stated above, is ideal for the work
carried out there. The main buildings consist of an
operations centre where image interpreting is car-
ried out, a quality control area, the photographic
laboratory and the archives and documentation
room plus administrative offices. Additionally
there are rooms fitted out as " National Cells ", to
be occupied by staff from the different member
states and which are intended as points of contact
between the latter and the centre.
16. Reference was made earlier to the fact that
the equipping of the centre was completed in early
March 1994by the Falcon consortium consisting
of ten companies, led by the British company
Cray Systems. The information your Rapporteur
has on this equipment indicates that the system
can be fed by satellite scenes arriving at the centre
through various media. After image quality
control, these scenes are fed in to the on-line
library.
17. The library contains all the other informa-
tion in the centre's data-base (a list of this infor-
mation was given previously). Access to this data
base may be gained through one of the centre's six
" Browse " work stations.
18. The scenes for interpreting are sent to one of
the eight dual-screen workstations for processing
high resolution images. In addition to the software
which gives access to the data base these stations
use the Ocapi and Erdas packages for handling and
blowing up the images, taking measurements and
creating new products such as annotated diagrams
of the site to be analysed. A further five worksta-
tions handle quality control and network manage-
ment. All the system facilities are connected up
through a flexible, high-speed network, which also
allows data to be ffansferred to the photographic
laboratory while the digital data is transferred to
films using the high resolution laser film writers.
The processed version of these films and the end
product are produced in the laboratory. Finally one
should add that the centre is capable of interpreting
not only images captured from satellites but also
airborne images.
19. All the foregoing information shows first
that the implementation of the logistical aspects of
the programme 
- 
building, staff, installation of
equipment, training and methodology 
- 
was car-
ried out highly satisfactorily.
20. There is no doubt that congratulations are
due given the progress achieved starting from
nothing. They are especially due to the Director of
the centre and his staff for the work they have
done which is now starting to show results.
21. An assessment still has to be made of the
work done and the results obtained: this assess-
ment should basically be undertaken by the cen-
tre's users, an aspect discussed further below.
22. At the meeting of the WEU Council of
Ministers held at the Kirchberg Centre, Luxem-
bourg on 9th May, ministers confirmed " the aim
of further developing WEU's capability to use
satellite imagery for security purposes. In this
context, they envisaged establishing the WEU
Satellite Centre at Torrej6n as a pennanent body
of the organisation and would take a decision on
this point in the light of the assessment of the
work undertaken by the cenffe during its experi-
mental period. They recognised the need to take
appropriate decisions in November 1994to ensure
the continuity of the centre's work until that
assessment was completed ". Moreover, the
Ministers reaffirmed " their will to set up an inde-
pendent European satellite system. A decision
would be taken subject to assessment of the costs
and merits of the proposed system and of other
WEU alternatives and affordability. To prepare a
possible decision of a launch of such a program-
me, ministers tasked the Space Group to prepare,
for their spring 1995 meeting, a proposal for a
decision, including the preparation of a draft
memorandum of understanding containing the
detailed specifications, to be concluded between
the present WEU member states ".
23. As far as the Torrej6n Centre is concerned
it would be reasonable, before reaching a decision
which would give it permanent status, to have the
result of the assessment of its initial phase and of
the work done. This assessment would be based
on evaluations from the Council and the centre's
users.
24. It must first be recognised that such an
assessment will lack a sufficiently distanced pers-
pective to be entirely fair and valid. Moreover, it
should be sftessed that the risk of the present tem-
porary status of the centre being prolonged is
hardly helpful to the work of the centre and does
nothing to contribute to the peace of mind of the
staffwho work there.
25. [t should also be remembered that the day
before the inauguration of the Satellite Centre, the
Secretary-General of WEU, the French and Spa-
nish ministers of defence and the Italian ambassa-
dor to Spain signed a memorandum of understan-
ding for the Torrej6n Centre to have access to
images obtained from the Helios I satellite; these
images, when processed by the centre, will be par-
ticularly suitable products for implementing its
aims of verifying disarmament treaties, crisis-
management and environmental monitoring.
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26. The Helios I programme, a co-operative
venture between France, Italy and Spain, will use
optical observation satellites for military pur-
poses. The launch, initially scheduled for last Sep-
tember, will now take place around February
1995. In any event the cenffe will not be able to
receive Helios images before autumn 1995. The
centre is presently also studying the practical
aspects of implementing the memorandum of
understanding reached between WEU and France,
Italy and Spain, and is to submit a series of
requests in this connection and await the replies.
27. From the above, it is clear that the assess-
ment cannot possibly take account of work based
on Helios 1 data, which manifestly limits the
scope of the assessment.
28. Finally, it should be added that your Rap-
porteur will not discuss the question of the Euro-
pean space-based observation system as this is the
subject of another report by the Technological and
Aerospace Committee.
II. Conclusions
29. It should be emphasised at the outset that
our particular committee and the Assembly in
general have in recent years constantly reiterated
that the Torrej6n Centre should be the cornerstone
of a complete European space-based system cove-
ring intelligence, early warning and defence. The
Torrej6n Centre might become the integrated
data-receiving and interpretation centre of this
space-based observation system and its earth sec-
tor. Having said this, it must also be stressed that
even in the undesirable event of the space sector
of the future European observation system never
coming to pass, the Torrej6n Centre would conti-
nue to be absolutely necessary.Apart from image
interpretation, its tasks might include all types of
military intelligence work, leading ultimately to
the preparation of a final report with tactical and
strategic value.
30. Recent Iraqi troop movements close to the
border with Kuwait have again demonsfrated the
need for Europe to have its own means for obtai-
ning accurate knowledge of risks and threats to its
security and of their source. Your Rapporteur
wrote to the ministers of defence of the member
states participating in the Torrej6n Centre inviting
their governments to give their opinion on the
future of the centre. Ttvo months after the letter
was sent to the defence ministers, followed by a
reminder a fortnight later, only the ministers of
Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands
and the United Kingdom had replied.
31. Mr. Delcroix, Minister of Defence of Bel-
gium, informed us that he was not able to antici-
pate his government's position on the future of the
Satellite Centre even though it seemed to him rea-
sonable to think that Belgium would agree to
financially acceptable proposals for extending the
experimental phase in order to draw conclusions
from information that was as extensive as pos-
sible. Moreover, the minister asked a number of
questions, inquiring particularly as to whether it
was possible to continue with this experiment in
the absence of a common position on the nature of
WEU's needs and on identifying them; he also
wondered if the decision to give the centre perma-
nent status and the decision as to whether or not to
develop a European space-based observation sys-
tem should be closely linked. Mr. Voorhoeve,
Minister of Defence of the Netherlands, which
now has the Chairmanship-in-Office of WEU,
replied that discussions in the organisation on the
future of the cenffe had barely begun and the cen-
tre's experience in processing and analysing satel-
lite images would, moreover, still be very limited
at the end of 1994. Therefore, in his opinion, at
the meeting on l4th November 1994, the minis-
ters might decide on an interim evaluation of the
work of the centre and, on the basis of this interim
evaluation, take a decision on the future of the
Satellite Cenffe, probably at the ministerial mee-
ting in spring 1995.
32. The French Prime Minister, Mr. Balladur,
expressed himself more openly during his recent
address to the French Institut des Hautes Etudes
de D6fence Nationale (Paris, 6th September
1994), when he stated: " In WEIJ, in a resolutely
multilateral framework, the Torrej6n satellite
image interpreting centre shows the way. From
next year the centre will benefit from Helios satel-
lite imaging. From then on, matters should be
taken further and consideration given to imple-
menting a fully-fledged European space-based
satellite observation system. Europeans have both
the technological capability ani the financial
means. The decision was taken last May by the
WEU foreign affairs and defence ministers to exa-
mine how such a project might be implemented. I
hope that this decision will be implemented in full
in the yqrs to come as precise intelligence and
real time surveillance of situations and their deve-
lopment are now essential factors in present-day
crisis-prevention and management. I am counting
in large measure on the bilateral co-operation
structure created with Germany to give the neces-
sary impetus to these projects. "
33. The Council of Ministers of WEU which is
to meet in Noordwijk on 14th November 1995
will agree to extend the Satellite Cenffe's experi-
mental phase by one year to enable the evaluation
of its work to be completed so that a final decision
can be taken. In any event, your Rapporteur feels
that the decision to be taken next year cannot once
again be a provisional one and should be based on
the obvious need for the centre rather than merely
on its practical use as demonstrated by the evalua-
tion. The evaluation by users and member coun-
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tries, once completed, is to be presented by the
Space Group to the ministerial meeting in May
1995 and will cover both technical and operatio-
nal aspects. According to information in the pos-
session of your Rapporteur, a possible pre-opera-
tional phase is at present being considered for the
period 1996-97 when Helios I will be in operation
and it will be possible to verify the usefulness and
effectiveness of its images.
34. If the centre were to be made permanent a
whole range of problems, not least that of staffrng,
would be resolved; however, additionally and
independently of this fact, there could be regular
evaluations of its work which would contribute to
maintaining operational levels and capabilities
necessary for our security needs and for providing
Europe with efficient independent means in this
area.
35. Our committee, with commendable perse-
verance, has, in recent years, exerted unremit-
ting pressure in favour of Europe's acquiring
autonomous space-based observation capabili-
ties; these, when linked to an early warning sys-
tem, would make it possible for Europe to have
its own defence system; we have stressed both
the political need for such a venture and the pre-
sence of industrial capacities necessary for
achieving it; we have moreover suggested
opportunities for co-operation 
- 
particularly
with our American allies 
- 
which ought to cover
both production and development and be pur-
sued as in Europe between Europeans. At pre-
sent, WEU is on the threshold of a number of
decisions tending in the direction just described.
There is no other way forward if our organisa-
tion is to become the defence arm of the Euro-
pean Union than to progress with caution down
this road, subject to such financial and budgetary
constraints as may be necessary, but with the
firm intention of making sure that space is a
means of political independence for Europe: the
use of space can indeed contribute to security in
the widest sense, extending beyond military
applications to environmental tasks, agriculture
and into areas such as the monitoring of certain
forms of illicit traffic by sea which are currently
giving rise to major anxiety.
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Draft Recommendation
on the evolution of the logistical requirements of the Assembly
to take account of enlargement
The Assembly,
Considering:
(i) That present and foreseeable Assembly requirements now necessitate measures to make it possible
to accommodate in the chamber of the Economic and Social Council the parliamentarians of the member
countries, associate member countries, associate partner countries, observer countries and other countries
invited by the Council to attend Assembly debates, also members of the WEU Council and Secretariat-
General and the secretaries of the national delegations and political groups;
(ii) That for Greek to be adopted as an official language simultaneous interpretation facilities must be
supplemented by further interpretation facilities once the ratification process has been completed;
(iii) That, even after the interpretation facilities for sessions have been transferred to the meeting rooms
in the Wilson wing, the limited number of seats in the official gallery makes it necessary to continue to use
and improve the television area installed in the lobby of the French Economic and Social Council in order
to achieve better television coverage of all Assembly speeches, votes and procedures;
(iv) That the meeting rooms cannot accommodate more than 40 participants, they will be too small once
representatives of all participating countries are present and that it would be necessary to resort to the hire
of meeting rooms elsewhere in Paris;
(v) That offices need to be allocated to all new parliamentary delegations and that this will be possible
only if the remaining offices on the second floor and all the offices on the third floor can be made avail-
able to the Assembly in the immediate future for use during sessions and committee meetings;
(vi) That in the foreseeable future the Assembly will no longer be able to operate properly in its present
location and it will soon become essential to provide the Assembly with new premises;
(vii) Welcoming the progress made on reaching agreement on provisional solutions aimed at alleviating
pressing immediate needs arising from enlargement,
RecouurNos rHAT rnr CouNcu-
1. Take note of this report including in particular Appendix V;
2. Press ahead with the implementation of the measures referred to in Appendix Y in particular :
(a) Take the required action to release the remaining office on the second floor in time to accom-
modate the new Greek Delegation;
(D) Authorise the Institute for Security Studies, in close consultation and agreement with the
Assembly, to proceed expeditiously with the proposed refurbishing of Room A, thus enabling
the Assembly to use this room for meetings larger than those that can be accommodated in
Rooms B and C;
(c) Approve the funds required by the Assembly to proceed with the work necessary to accommo-
date parliamentary delegations in the facilities relinquished finally or temporarily and with the
other proposals contained in Appendix V and conceming in particular the "electronic office"
intended specifically to make more efficient and flexible use of insufficient seating capacity of
the ESC chamber;
3. Support the Assembly and its President in their efforts to promote a comprehensive plan to meet the
future requirements of the Assembly, in particular :
(a) Reach agreement with the French Government for the transfer of the Institute for Security
Studies to altemative premises nearby, thereby releasing the offices on the third floor for the
use of parliamentary delegations, in all categories;
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(b) Altematively, reach agreement now with the French Government for the Assembly to be
installed in new premises suitable for foreseeable future needs;
4. In any case, be prepared to start consultations with the President of the Assembly and the French
Government on a relocation plan for execution immediately following the 1996 review of all European
institutions, in anticipation of new members in various categories joining in that and subsequent years.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(sabmitted by Mn Rathbone, Rapporteur)
I.Introduction
1. At the Presidential Committee meeting
held in Brussels on 4th October 1993, the Chair-
man of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and
Administration was asked to present a report on
the logistical requirements of the WEU Assembly
as of now and the position after the enlargement
of WEU.
2. Any examination of this problem must of
necessity take account of changes in the composi-
tion of the Assembly over its forty years of exis-
tence and measures already taken to adapt its faci-
lities to its progressive enlargement.
3. With the above in mind it is necessary first
to consider the changes in the composition of the
Assembly and improvements made to the Assem-
bly's premises (chamber, conference rooms,
offices of national delegations) and second the
evolution of the Office of the Clerk and adapta-
tions to the premises and other facilities required
as a result of enlargement.
4. For a better understanding of the situation it
is helpful to recall first and foremost the agree-
ments on which the allocation of the various pre-
mises available to the Assembly for its work is
based.
5. The wing of the Palais d'I6na on the avenue
du Pr6sident Wilson was built in 1961, under two
agreements between the French Ministry for
Foreign Affairs and the WEU Council. The first
of these related to the long lease (for a term of 99
years) to WEU of the land on which the building
was to be built and the second to the arrangements
for the construction work involved in building the
premises.
6. The building has six floors. Of these the
French Government owns the lower ground floor
(court-yard level) and one fifth of the basement
while WEU owns the four upper floors and four-
fifths of the basement.
7. Before Spain and Portugal's accession to
WEU, the areas belonging to WEU were allocated
as follows:
4/5 of basement: Bar/restaurant, equipment
storage and archives
Ground floor: Meeting rooms, offices of
national delegations
First floor: Office of the Clerk
Second and Paris-based organs of the
third floors: Council.
8. In 1989 improvement works were authori-
sed by the Council to enable two new member
countries, Spain and Portugal, to be accommoda-
ted satisfactorily. As the agencies responsible for
security questions had been disbanded in the
meantime, the premises were reallocated as fol-
lows:
Basement: Bar/restaurant, equipment
storage, archives, archi-
ves, rest-room, bank and
travel agency, telephone
booths
Ground floor: Meeting rooms
First floor: Office of the Clerk
Second floor: Offices of national delega-
tions and of the Clerk
Third floor: Institute for Security
Studies.
9. The two agreements referred to in para-
graph 5 should have been supplemented by a
third agreement between WEU and the French
Economic and Social Council establishing terms
for the use of the chamber and other areas of the
Palais d'I6na during plenary sessions of the
Assembly.
10. In fact this agreement was never signed and
the allocation of the chamber and other areas to
the Assembly is done by tacit agreement and
according to practices that have evolved over time
and are confirmed each session by mutual agree-
ment.
11. It should be emphasised that on 2nd
December 1960, the Assembly, in recommending
that the Council authorise the financing of the
new building for WEU, had specifically recogni-
sed that:
"... the failure to utilise the fifth floor for
WEU will have the following undesirable
consequences:
(i) inadequate accommodation for natio-
nal delegations and political groups in
the Assembly;
(ii) no margin for an expansion of the work
of WEU in the future, nor possibility of
accommodating the WEU staff at pre-
sent in London should it be decided at
some future date that all WEU staff
should be placed together ...."
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II. Evolution in the composition of the
As sembly and adaptations
required to the premises
(a) Chamber
12. Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty
provides that the Assembly of WEU shall be com-
posed of the representatives of the Brussels Trea-
ty powers to the Consultative Assembly of the
Council of Europe. It should be recalled
that the number of representatives of these coun-
tries ranges from 2 to 18 and that within these
lower and upper limits the number of repre-
sentatives allocated to each is proportionate to the
size of its population. Thus, from the outset, the
Assembly was composed of 89 representatives
and 89 substitutes, broken down as follows:
-Belgium 7+ 7
-France 18 + 18
- 
Germany 18 + 18
- 
Italy 18 + 18
-Luxembourg 3+ 3
-Netherlands 7+ 7
- 
United Kingdom 18 + 18
13. This composition remained unchanged
until 1991, when Spain and Portugal became
members of WEU and were entitled to the follo-
wing seats (corresponding to the number they
held in the Council of Europe):
- 
Spain
- 
Portugal
12+12
7+ 7
14. Following the accession of these countries
the number of representatives rose to 108 and 108
substitutes.
15. Under Rule 17 of the Assembly's Rules of
Procedure, a number of parliamentary observers
are invited to attend the plenary sessions of the
Assembly. Their number was very small until after
the Maastricht declaration of l0th December 1991,
after which it rose substantially. The post-Maas-
tricht situation can be summarised as follows:
15. I . Three member states of the European Com-
munity (Denmark, Greece and lreland) have been
invited to join WEU; of these Greece alone has
signed an accession agreement which is still in the
process of being ratified. The number of represen-
tatives for these countries is as follows:
- 
Greece 7
- 
Denmark 2
- 
Ireland 2
15.2. The status of associate member has been
offered to three other NAIO member states (Ice-
land, Norway and Turkey). The number of repre-
sentatives for these countries is as follows:
-Norway
- 
Turkey
- 
Iseland
5
t2
3
15.3. On 30th November 1993, at the eighth sit-
ting of its thirty-ninth ordinary session, the
Assembly adopted the necessary modifications to
its rules for the new statuses that were to take
effect on the date of ratification of the protocol of
accession of the Hellenic Republic. In the mean-
time, all the countries concerned have permanent
observer status.
15.4. This status has also been granted to the nine
countries of the Forum of Consultation created fol-
lowing the Petersberg declaration of 19th June
1992: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hun-
gary, Lawia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the
Slovak Republic. These countries each send two
parliamentary representatives to the Assembly'.
15.5. Five other countries (Austria, Finland, the
Russian Federation, Sweden, and Ukraine) may
continue to be invited to the sessions as was the
case in 1993. Each of these countries would have
two representatives.
15.6. The present position is that there are a total
of 287 parliamentarians (108 representatives,
108 substitutes, 61 permanent observers and
l0 guests). To this number must be added
- 
for the purposes of allocating seats in the cham-
ber, representatives of the Council, the Secreta-
riat-General and the guest speakers, together with
honorary members and secretaries of national
delegations and political groups 
- 
in all 82 people.
16. As the plan showing the use of the CES
chamber shows (see Appendix I) given the maxi-
mum number the chamber can accommodate (228
seats) it has not been possible since the accession
of Spain and Portugal to allocate a seat to all par-
ticipants. Hence only 14 seats (6.l4Vo) could be
allocated to substitutes not standing in for titular
members, 51 seats (22.377o) to pennanent obser-
vers and 23 seats (I0.09Vo) to honorary members,
secretaries of national delegations and secretaries
of political groups. The three central rows in the
chamber comprising 32 seats (14.03Vo) continue
to be reserved for members of the Council, the
Secretariat-General and official speakers.
17 . On the date of ratification of Greece's pro-
tocol of accession the composition of the Assem-
bly will be as follows:
- 
10 founder members or members of
more recent accession (115 representa-
tives and 115 substitutes)
- 
3 associate member countries (20 repre-
sentatives and 20 substitutes)
- 
2 observercounffies (4 representatives)
- 
9 countries, associate partner countries
(30 delegates)'.
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18. To these must still be added the observers
that the Assembly may admit to the chamber
under Rule 17, whose average number can be
estimated at around 16. These observers attend
the Assembly without being entitled to vote but
may speak if authorised to do so by President of
the Assembly.
19. Hence in future there will & 414 delegates
(including representatives of the Council, the
Secretariat-General and the official speakers). As
there are 228 seats, only representatives of the
associate member countries and observer coun-
tries and the delegates of associate partner coun-
tries can be accommodated in the chamber in
addition to the representatives of the 10 member
countries. Observers other than pennanent obser-
vers can be allocated 16 seats and the Council,
Secretariat-General and official speakers 32 seats,
as previously. However the number of seats allo-
cated to secretaries of national delegations and
political groups will need to be reduced to 23,
while substitutes not standing in for titular mem-
bers and honorary members will be able to occupy
any available seating in the official gallery.
(b) Simultaneous interpretation equipment
20. Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure of the
Assembly states that speeches given during ple-
nary sessions in the official language of each
member state must be simultaneously interpreted
into the other official languages. As the CES is
not equipped for simultaneous interpretation, at
each session of the WEU Assembly mobile three-
place interpretation booths have to be installed in
the official gallery. Originally there were five
booths but their number rose to seven after Spain
and Portugal's accession and will increase further
to eight after the accession of Greece. It is under-
stood that permanent and other observers have to
address the Assembly in one of the eight official
languages.
2L It should be stressed that the CES premises
cannot in any event accommodate further mobile
interpretation booths. The installation of the
eighth booth for the Greek language interpreters
will, moreover, entail a reduction in the number of
places available in the official gallery where, for
safety reasons, 70 people at most can currently be
accommodated. Hence the gallery will in future
be able to accommodate only 40 or so people at
most and access to it will be more difficult.
(c) Closed-circuil television viewing area and offices in the
premises of the French Economic
and Social Council (CES)
22. To make up for the loss of available seating
in the official gallery due to the installation of the
Spanish and Portuguese interpretation booths, a
closed-circuit television area where debates can
be followed on screen has been set up in the
lobby. However the number of seats in this tele-
vision area, which was increased to 100 for the
December 1993 session can be further increased
but at the expense of other facilities. This arran-
gement has the disadvantage of the fact that the
camera is trained throughout on the presidential
tribune and the audience is therefore unable to
see speakers addressing the Assembly from other
points in the chamber. A temporary improvement
was achieved during the last session by having a
technician train a camera on the speaker,
although this only offered coverage ofone area of
the chamber. The system could be improved by
having roving cameras home in on the speaker,
wherever he or she happened to be in the
chamber.
23. As Appendices II.1 and I[.2 show, the
offices allocated to the sittings office and the
French language verbatim reporters and summary
reporters are located next to the chamber and on
the mezzanine floor. During sessions, two open-
plan areas are created in the lobby, one for the
offrce of the sergeant-at-arms, which is also used
as a VIP suite for official speakers, and the other
for the bureau of the Socialist Group. The two
other political groups 
- 
the Federated Group of
Christian Democrats and European Democrats
and the Liberal Group 
- 
respectively have the use
of a room next to the chamber and a conference
room in the CES basement.
(d) Conterence rooms
24. These conference rooms are largely for the
use of the Presidential Committee, the Standing
Committee and the committees of the Assembly,
the compositions of which are as follows:
- 
Presidential Committee 20 members
- 
Standing Committee 42 members
- 
Defence Committee 34 members
- 
Political Committee 34 members
- 
Technological and AerospaceCommittee 26 members
- 
Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Administration 26 members
-Committee on Rules of
Procedure and Privileges 26 members
- 
Committee for Parliamentary
and Public Relations 26 members
25. The figures above relate only to titular
members. There are the same numbers of alter-
nates for members of the Standing Committee
other than members of the Presidential Commit-
tee and for the other committees of the Assembly.
The political groups also hold their meetings in
these rooms, in particular during the Assembly
sessions. Their composition is as follows:
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- 
Federated Group of
Christian Democrats and
European Democrats : 99 members
- 
Liberal Group : 34 members
- 
Socialist Group : 7l members
26. Until 1990, the organs of the Assembly
were able to hold meetings outside plenary ses-
sions in three conference rooms on the ground
floor of the Assembly building. The arrangement
of these rooms was as follows:
Room A: 34 seats around the table,
52 seats for observers,
3 two-place interpretation
booths;
Room B: 26 seats around the table,
1 mobile two-place interpreta-
tion booth;
Room C: 28 seats around the table,
20 seats for observers,
3 two-place interpretation
booths.
27. After Spain and Portugal's accession to
WEU, the Council authorised work to reorganise
the Assembly's premises, including the conver-
sion of Rooms B and C so as to make use of all the
ground-floor space where the offices of the natio-
nal delegations were situated. Major works were
thus carried out in 1989 and 1990, with the result
that the Assembly currently has three conference
rooms (see Appendix III.1 ground-floor plan)
with accommodation as follows:
RoomA: Layoutunchanged.
Rooms B and C each with:
40 seats around the table,
20 seats for observers,
7 three-place interpretation
booths.
28. Rule 2l (b) of the Rules of Procedure of the
Assembly merely requires the Office of the Clerk
to provide simultaneous interpretation in commit-
tee from all the official languages to French and
English, consequently making use of only two
booths. The presence of the 7 booths in rooms B
and C should allow all possible requirements by
national delegations for simultaneous interpreta-
tion towards their own languages to be met, given
that the cost of recruiting interpreters would be
met by them.
29. The accession of Greece and the resultant
need to add Greek as a passive language for inter-
pretation into the Assembly's working languages
(French and English) therefore entails only minor
adjustments to the simultaneous interpretation
equipment in the conference rooms. Moreover it
should be noted that further expansion of interpre-
tation requirements is not anticipated 
- 
unless
there is a funher dramatic increase in the number
of members.
30. However the amendment to Rule 40 of the
Rules of Procedure will involve admitting Greece,
Norway, lceland and Turkey to membership of the
committees in the following numbers: an additio-
nal20 members (10 representatives and 10 alter-
nates) for the Political and Defence Committees;
an additional 16 members (8 representatives and 8
alternates) for the other permanent committees
and an additional S members (2 Greeks,2 Norwe-
gians, 3 Turks and I Icelander) for the Standing
Committee. It seems clear that the 40 available
seats around the table and the 20 observer seats in
each of Rooms B and C (Room A is basically not
suitable for such meetings because of the limited
number of intelpretation booths) would not be
sufficient to cope with very large attendances in
certain parliamentary work such as joint commit-
tee meetings or meetings of the Standing Com-
mittee. In the present circumstances converting
these rooms or the construction of new ones with
greater accommodation capacity cannot be envi-
saged due to the lack of available space, quite
apart from any cost considerations. Recourse
must therefore be had as necessary to renting sui-
table conference rooms in Paris: examples might
be the Palais des Congrds, Porte Maillot, the
Centre du Commerce Ext6rieur, avenue d'I6na.
The cost of hiring rooms suited to the needs of
the Assembly might be reckoned at between
F 17 000 and25 000 per day.
(e) Naional delegaion offtces
31. Until the June 1990 session the national
delegations were accommodated in part of the
ground floor, the remainder being occupied by the
conference rooms. The larger national delegations
each had an office arcaof 25-29 m'while the three
Benelux countries had office areas of approxima-
tely 20 m2 each. The use of this space to enlarge
the conference rooms forced the Assembly to
transfer the delegation offices to the second floor
which had become vacant as a result of the win-
ding down of the agencies responsible for securi-
ty matters. Thus the nine national delegations
acquired a larger area and either one large or two
or three smaller offices were allocated to each
depending on its size. However these arrange-
ments are far from satisfactory for the national
delegations when the Assembly is in session.
Appendix III.3 contains a plan of the current dis-
tribution of the various offices among the national
delegations. This also shows the offices on the
same floor allocated to the staff of the Office of
the Clerk.
32. The accession of Greece will mean that this
country must be allocated at least one office com-
parable to that of the Spanish delegation. Office
202 on the second floor, which is at present only
occasionally used by the Institute for Security
Studies will be allocated to the Greek Delegation,
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which is effectively the last delegation it will be
possible to house in the Assembly's premises.
33. The associate members, permanent obser-
vers and the countries of the Forum of Consulta-
tion have no accommodation at all at present.
However some provision should be made in
advance of their status becoming officially effec-
tive. Making available the third floor of the
Assembly building, occupied by the Institute for
Security Studies would be the only practicable
solution. Such a solution would necessitate the
French Govemment making other suitable pre-
mises close to those of the Assembly available to
the Institute, so that the latter could continue to
use the same conference rooms as it uses at present.
34. This problem has been raised several times
by the Presidents of the Assembly in meetings
with the French authorities. On the most recent
occasion, the President of the Assembly, Sir Dud-
ley Smith, in his letter of 13th October 1993 to
Mr. Lamassoure, Deputy Minister for European
Affairs, recalled this request for the third floor of
the Assembly premises to be made available. Mr.
Lamassoure replied on 30th November, acknow-
ledging the very real problem that existed but
stressing that "the matter is one that the Council
and the Assembly must resolve together, since it
is a question of allocating space within premises
owned by WEU. France cannot take the place
either of the Council or of the Assembly in
reaching a possible solution".
35. One cannot reasonably object to this posi-
tion, but it does seem clear that the Council and
the Assembly can only reach agreement over the
use of the third floor once it is unoccupied, in
other words once the lnstitute has moved to other
premises which only the French Government is in
a position to provide for it.
36. It is clear that a decision on the matter is
urgently required, as the Institute's move into new
premises and the alterations to the offices on the
third floor need to be completed very quickly, in
other words before permanent observer, associate
member and Forum of Consultation member
country status take effect.
37. Thus as the plan (Appendix III.4) shows,
the third floor consists of 32 offices. Most of these
would need to be allocated to the national delega-
tions of the new countries (associate members,
permanent observers and member countries of the
Forum of Consultation). The alterations required
to them would depend on the state in which they
were handed over to the Assembly. In any event
they would need to be properly equipped, in the
same way as the delegation offices on the second
floor. Apart from furniture, a relay system for
each delegation to listen to the debates would
have to be provided and two video/message dis-
play screens installed in the third floor corridor.
III. Evolution of the Office of the Clerk of the
Assembly and new requirements arising from
enlargement : premise s and other facilifies
necessary for the work of the Office of the Clerk
(a) Permanent staff
38. Up until 1989 the Office of the Clerk of the
Assembly had 31 permanent staff in grades A, B
and C. This staffing level had been attained by
gradually increasing the permanent staff comple-
menr from 2l in 1959 to 25 in 1962,26 in 1964,
27 in 1965 and 28 in 1966. It fell to 27 in 1984
(due to the withdrawal of two hors grade posts)
and rose to 31 in 1988. tt was at this juncture that
a new, more rational structure of the Office of the
Clerk was introduced, the merits of which were
acknowledged by the committee of experts com-
missioned in 1990 to carry out a study of the orga-
nisation of the Office of the Clerk of the Assem-
bly. This structure is still in place today (see
Appendix IV).
39. It should be recalled that this committee
comprised three officials with an indepth know-
ledge of the way parliamentary assemblies oper-
ate. Its members were in fact the Head of the
Sittings Services of the Council of Europe and
senior parliamentary administrators, one each
from the British House of Commons and the
French Assembl6e Nationale.
40. On completion of their analysis, the experts
reached the following conclusions:
"The Office of the Clerk of the Assembly
...works well but in precarious conditions
which may have a considerable impact on
any development in the Assembly's r6le. If
it works well, this is mainly due to the stan-
dard and devotion first of its senior staff
and then of the staffas a whole. All the offi-
cials are motivated and spare neither effort
nor time.
The question is whether they could do even
more if circumstances required. This is not
certain...
The standard of work in the Office of the
Clerk is therefore closely linked with the
Assembly's r6le in WEU and the very r6le
of WEU. It can already be foreseen that this
will grow in the years ahead, thus raising,
here and now, the question of strengthening
the staff of the services."
41. Subsequent to the accession of Spain and
Portugal to WEU and in accordance with the opi-
nion expressed on llth April 1990 by the com-
mittee of experts as cited above, staffing levels
rose to 32 in 1990 and 34 in 1 99 1 . These increases
represented a gradual implementation of the
experts' opinion which recognised the need for
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three categories of new posts to be created within
the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly, as fol-
lows:
"- a secretariat for the Political Committee
consisting of a grade A5 secretary and a
grade B3 assistant. This is essential to
allow the Clerk Assistant, now Secreta-
ry of the committee, to carry out his
new tasks in full;
- 
a grade A3lA4 head of the research and
documentation service and a grade B3
assistant. The creation of an efficient
research and documentation service spe-
cific to the Assembly is essential to
allow the presidency and the commiffees
to give a new dimension to their work.
This service should not have a cumber-
some structure but a dynamic organisa-
tion using modern technology for the
retrieval and processing of documenta-
tion so as, in particular, to ensure a com-
puterised link with existing sources of
documentation (national parliaments,
specialised institutes etc.). However, the
attribution of enough staff from the out-
set is a condition for the success of this
operation;
- 
another assistant for the administrative
services, mainly in order to cope with
the increase in the quantity of work
involved in managing the Assembly's
relations with its members. Favourable
consideration should also be given to the
recruitment of a permanent driver."
42. With reference to the experts' opinion,
three Grade 83 posts have still to be created. Two
of them have been reinstated in the 1994 budget
which has now been confirmed by the Council.
The current staffing level will therefore be 36 in
the second half of 1994.
43. Furthermore the same experts had anticipa-
ted that the r6le of the WEU Assembly might
evolve towards:
"- enhancement of the ability to study, cri-
ticise and make proposals to the WEU
Council;
- 
greater participation in the East-West
security dialogue by contributing to
intergovernmental relations with links at
the level of people's and national repre-
sentations. In this context, the r6le of the
presidency of the Assembly, in particu-
lar, should increase considerably as
should that of the committees;
- 
making the WEU Assembly the leading
media instrument for informing public
opinion about the progressive establish-
ment of European defence;
- 
enlargement of WEU to include new
member states as the logical consequen-
ce of the two points above. Portugal and
Spain have already acceded to the treaty.
This is particularly important since the
European Parliament can examine
defence questions only in part."
44. This forecast was confirmed in the minis-
terial declarations that followed the Maastricht
Treaty and in the Petersberg declaration. Certain
essential points are worthy of mention here.
Maastricht declaration, 1Oth December
t99r:
"The member states ... are determined,
taking into account the r6le of WEU as the
defence component of the European Union
and as the means to strengthen the Euro-
pean pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, to put
the relationship between WEU and the
other European states on a new basis for the
sake of stability and security in Europe."
Petersberg declaration, l9th June 1992:
"In their Maastricht declaration of 1Oth
December 1991, the member states of
WEU proposed that states which are mem-
bers of the European Union be invited to
accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed
in accordance with Article XI of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty, or to become obser-
vers if they so wished. Simultaneously,
other European member states of NATO
were invited to become associate members
of WEU in a way which would give them a
possibility of participating fully in the acti-
vities of WEU.
Ministers agreed that, in view of the pro-
found changes in Europe of the last few
years, intensifying the relations between
WEU and the states of Central Europe will
contribute to stability and the emergence of
a new peaceful order in Europe based on
partnership and co-operation, greater secu-
rity and confidence, as well as disarmament.
The enhancement of WEU's relations with
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania
should reflect the specific relations which
exist and are developing between these coun-
tries and the European Union and its member
states. Other appropriate forms of co-opera-
tion could be set up as required in the light of
the development of these relations.
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Ministers advocated the development of
relations between the WEU Assembly and
the parliaments of the states concerned.o'
45. These projected future developments, taken
into account by the experts, justify the creation of
new Grade A posts, particularly in connection
with the organisation of the secretariats of the
three committees whose work is primarily politi-
cal and the translation service. It should be stres-
sed that in the initial draft budget for the financial
year l994,the Assembly had already asked for the
creation of a ffanslator post, two other secretarial
posts and a post of usher/messenger/driver, but
that this request had had to be withdrawn as a
result of the restrictions on the budget imposed by
the Council.
46. Account must also be taken of the fact that
in the event of the third floor of the building being
allocated to the Assembly, the Office of the Clerk
would become responsible for providing all the
services relating to management and safeguarding
the building which are currently the responsibility
of the Institute for Security Studies. This includes
management of the security service comprising
six security officers, the telephone exchange, the
buildings maintenance service and supervision of
the management of the bar/restaurant. The staf-
fing needs of these services cannot be quantified
exactly at present, however in this connection an
effort must be made to achieve the same cost
effectiveness ratio as that of the current organisa-
tion of the Institute for Security Studies.
47. The 36-strong staff of the Office of the
Clerk is at present structured as follows:
Grade A/L officials: 17
Grade B officials: 16
Grade C officials: 3
48. In staffing, efforts are always made to
achieve a balance of nationalities. Such efforts
should continue. But it should be noted that top
priority must continue to be given to appointment
of the best person for the post.
49. Until 1990 the staff of the Office of the
Clerk occupied the offices on the first floor under
difficult conditions since these offices were inade-
quate for providing all members of the staff with
normal, acceptable working conditions. More-
over, some of these offices had to be vacated
during the plenary sessions to accommodate the
staff of the various temporary services set up
during the sessions.
50. The situation improved slightly when the
second floor of the Assembly building was made
available to the Assembly, for the offices alloca-
ted to the secretariats of two committees and the
translation service were accommodated there, as
well as the national delegations.
51. It is impossible at present to draw up a fina-
lised plan for the use of all the accommodation
areas available to the Assembly in the event of its
acquiring the third floor of the building. A review
would need to be conducted at the appropriate
time of the arrangements for all services, penna-
nent and temporary, on the assumption that the
Office of the Clerk would at that point have suffi-
cient room for its needs, despite the fact that
during sessions some offices on the first floor
would continue to be allocated to temporary staff.
Allocation of offices to the new national delega-
tions and to certain services of the Office of the
Clerk are shown, as a working hypothesis, on the
third floor plan in Appendix III.4.
(b) Temporary staff
52. During sessions, as the organogram shows
(Appendix V) the Assembly is obliged to set up a
number of services of a specifically parliamentary
nature, such as:
- 
a sittings office: French and English lan-
guages
- 
verbatim reporting: English, French,
German, Italian, Dutch, Spanish and
Portuguese languages
- 
summary reporting (French and English
languages)
- 
interpretation: seven teams of three inter-
preters and
- 
miscellaneous services including: doc-
tor, ushers, messengers, maintenance
technician, security guards, etc.
53. Moreover to meet the additional workload
certain permanent services such as the press off-
ice, the reprographics department, the postal ser-
vice etc. have to be supplemented by taking on
temporary staff.
54. Finally, after sessions, the translation ser-
vice is supplemented by teams to prepare the offi-
cial report of the proceedings in the French and
English languages from the verbatim records in
the official languages of the Assembly.
55. Approximately 125 people are recruited to
the services referred to in paragraph 52, another
15 or so to supplement the permanent services
referred to in paragraph 53, and 29 temporary
staff to the translation service referred to in para-
graph 54.
56. As explained above, these staff work under
cramped conditions both in the offices in the vici-
nity of the chamber made available to the Assem-
bly by the CES and in the first-floor offices vaca-
ted for the purpose by the permanent staff. The
situation improved when the Assembly obtained
the use of the second floor (the translators are
accommodated in the national delegation offices
once the sessions are over) and other offices on
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the mezzanine floor made available by the CES
after recent improvement works. The mobile
interpretation booths in the chamber are very
uncomfortable for the interpreters (unsuitable sea-
ting, absence of proper ventilation) and very
cramped, and there is no rest room nearby for
their occupants.
57 . The present allocation of offices for tempo-
rary staff belonging to the different services is
shown on the floor plans in Appendices II and III
of this report. This situation could be improved if
the Assembly had the use of the third floor, but it
must be borne in mind that the verbatim reporters
and summary reporters cannot be accommodated
in offices too far away from the chamber. Given
this constraint, it might be possible to accommo-
date both the French and English verbatim repor-
ters and the summary reporters on the CES mez-
zanine floor and to transfer the other reporters to
the first floor offices, which, as in the past, would
have to be vacated by the permanent staff. The
problem would involve a wholesale reorganisa-
tion of office arrangements for both permanent
and temporary staff, as explained in paragraph 51.
58. Following a decision by the Presidential
Committee meeting on 16th June 1994, a proce-
dure was put in place to arrive at temporary and
provisional solutions for problems encountered
by the Assembly to accommodate the arrival of
new representatives. A delegation of civil ser-
vants composed of representatives of the Clerk's
Office, the Secretariat-General with the participa-
tion of the Institute met on 19th July in Paris and
1st September in Brussels to prepare proposals.
These were accepted during a meeting between a
delegation of parliamentarians led by the Presi-
dent of the Assembly, the Secretary-General and a
representative of the Dutch permanent delegation
representing the country holding the chairman-
ship of the WEU Council of Ministers on 26th
September 1994 in Brussels and finalised by the
Presidential Committee of the Assembly at its
meeting on27th September 1994. The results of
these successive discussions is presented in
Appendix V attached to this report.
IV. Conclusions
59. The considerations set out in the earlier
sections of this report lead to the conclusion that
the Assembly's facilities are inadequate to meet
present needs. If the third floor of the Assembly
building were to be made available, the Assem-
bly's facilities 
- 
other than the conference rooms,
which could be hired as the need arose 
- 
could be
adapted to meet requirements arising from
Greece's accession to WEU and the introduction
of the new associate and observer statuses, inclu-
ding that of associate partner countries. It would
not be possible to deal with any future enlarge-
ment of the Assembly as there is no additional
space either in the Assembly building or in the
area occupied by the CES.
60. Any conversion work to the building to
meet current needs would involve extraordinary
expenditure under various budget heads, the
extent of which it is impossible to evaluate at the
present time, but which would certainly not
amount to less than F 2 million. Once the deci-
sions were taken therefore, the Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Administration would
need to draw up a supplementary budget covering
this extraordinary expenditure in accordance with
the procedures implemented when approved
works were carried out in 1989.
61. The point must also be made that, of all
the European parliamentary assemblies, the
WEU Assembly is the only one which is so
poorly accommodated that it does not provide
parliamentarians or staff with normal working
conditions.
62. It is common knowledge that very superior
facilities are available at the European Parlia-
ment's three seats in Strasbourg, Luxembourg and
Brussels and that the Council of Europe is very
well accommodated in the "Maison de l'Europe".
The NAIO Assembly, which is not an institu-
tional assembly, has a secretariat whose perma-
nent headquarters is in Brussels and holds assem-
bly sessions in the parliaments of its member
countries.
63. The WEU Assembly is therefore the only
one facing the problems of an inadequate Assem-
bly building, which affects its work substantially;
only the governments of the member countries
can resolve this problem. The present report
offers an essential basis for discussion and serious
consideration of the question to enable a viable
solution to be put to the Assembly.
64. It should be stressed that this report takes
account of the situation of the Assembly as defi-
ned in its Charter and Rules of Procedure. It goes
without saying that any change in these provisions
leading to a simplification of the logistical pro-
blems raised by this situation (eg: a reduction in
the number of official languages) would allow the
consequences of enlargement to be considered in
a different light. This would also be the case if any
amendment were envisaged to Article IX of the
modified Brussels Treaty which deals with the
composition of the Assembly. However this
assumption can be discounted under present poli-
tical circumstances, at least until the revision pro-
vided for in 1996 under the Maastricht Treaty.
65. In any event, if the Presidential Committee
were to decide to consider a possible modification
of the Assembly's Charter and Rules of Procedure
along the lines described above, the matter would
fust have to be placed before the Committee on
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Rules of Procedure and Privileges for a report to
be submitted to the Assembly. The Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Administration would then
have to take steps to assess the financial implica-
tions in order to prepare the appropriate supple-
mentary budget.
66. The considerations and conclusions set out
above take account of WEU's evolution as this
can be envisaged on the basis of decisions taken
by the Council of Ministers and the directions in
which these decisions would seem to point.
However in the longer term, in other words look-
ing forward over the next five years, it is possible
to foresee that the enlargement of the European
Union would make it necessary to strengthen the
structures of the WEU Assembly.
67. It is highly likely that such enlargement
will involve other countries like Austria, Cyprus,
Finland, Malta, Sweden and Switzerland joining
the European Union, along with some countries
that currently make up the Forum of Consult-
ation.
68. This is tantamount to saying that one must
reckon on a considerable increase in the number
of representatives and substitutes making up the
Assembly who will have the same rights as its
present members.
69. The problems set out above will therefore
take on a new dimension 
- 
whether in relation to
the availability of seats in the chamber, the capa-
city of the seat of the Assembly to accommodate
the new members, the need for further restructu-
ring of the staff organisation of the Office of the
Clerk or improvements in working facilities.
70. The future development of the Assembly
must be considered in the much wider frame-
work of the evolution of WEU and the European
Union.
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APPENDIX I
Table showing use of Economic and Socinl Council chamber
Country
Till June l99l After accessionof Spain and Pornrgal
After accession
of Greece
No. of
delegates
Seats
allocated
No. of
delegates
Seats
allocated
No. of
delegates
Seats
allocated
I. Representatives
l. Member countries
Germany 18 t8 l8 t8 18 18
Belgium 7 7 7 7 7 7
Spain . 12 t2 t2 12
France . 18 l8 18 18 18 l8
Italy . 18 18 18 18 18 l8
Luxembourg 3 3 3 3 3 3
Netherlands . 7 7 7 7 7 7
Portugal . 7 7 7 7
United Kingdom . t8 18 18 l8 18 18
G 7 7
2. Associate member countries
Iceland 3 3
Norway . 5 5
Turkey . t2 t2
3. Observer countries
Denmark 2 2
Ireland . 2 2
Srrh-total 89 89 108 108 139 139
II. Substitutes . 89 89 108 t4 135
III. Associate partner counties 30 30
IV. Observers . t0 10 s9 51 t6 l6
IV. Council, SG and guest
speakers 24 32 32 32 32 32
VI. Sec. Nat. Del. .. .. .
Politicalgroups ...
Honorary members
10 t0 20
5
25
23
32
5
25
18
5
Grand total 222 230 357 228 4t4 240
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APPENDIX II
1. Palais d'Iina 
- 
Chamber level
Allocation of ffices as of December 1993
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3. Palais d'Iina 
- 
Basement
Allocation of offices as of December 1993
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Organogram of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly
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APPENDIX IV
Organogram of the Offtce of the Clerk of the Assembly
Notes
[.] Service organised/Staffrecruited during sessions of the Assembly.
Posts underlined are those it is proposed to create in 1995.
* Posts proposed forregrading in the 1995 budget.
(1) The Clerk and his assistant are responsible for the secretariat of the Presidential Committee and the
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.
(2) The duties of Head of the Committee Service are exercised by the Clerk Assistant for Political
Affairs together with his assistant.
(3) This post is normally filled by the assistant in the English Translation Service.
(4) The duties of Head of the Administration and Finance Service, Head of the Personnel Section,
Security Ofhcer and Secretary of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration are car-
ried out by the Clerk Assistant for Administration and Finance together with his assistant.
(5) These duties are exercised by the translator/interpreter in the French section of the Translation
Services.
(6) The Deputy Head of the Adminisfration and Finance Service is responsible for General Services.
(7) The assistant to the Deputy Head of the Adminisfration and Finance Service is also the assistant for
the Mail and Archives Service.
(8) The staff responsible for storing and accounting for equipment is responsible for the reproduction
of documents.
(9) The duties of Head of the Translation and Publications Service are exercised by the most senior
reviser who, since lst October 1986, has been the English reviser. He is helped in the exercise of
these duties by his assistant.
(10) The assistant in the Private Offrce of the President is responsible for the reception desk.
(11) The Clerk Assistant (Political Affairs) and his assistant are responsible for the secretariat of the
Standing Committee.
(L2) The assistant to the Secretary of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations is also the
assistant to the Research Office.
(13) The Clerk Assistant (Administration and Finance) supervises protocol work and the reception desk.
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APPENDIX V
Summary of conclusions of the meeting on lst September 1994
concerning problems with the WEU building in Paris
W E U H e adquarterc, B rus s e ls
4, rue de la Rdgence,
1000 Brussels
Present: Clerk of the Assembly, Mr. Burgelin
Clerk Assistant of the Assembly,
Mr. Loutz
Head of Administration of the Institute,
Mr. Vaineau
flead of Administration of the
Secretariat-General, Mr. Messineo
The Clerk of the Assembly pointed out that
the Assembly's position had been set out in docu-
ment UEO/CP (94) 28, dated 30th May 1994, and
that he was not in a position to express a different
opinion. However, he had understood that the aim
of the secretariat's representative was to find a
temporary solution to the urgent problems that
were being faced. The purpose of the Clerk's
remarks therefore was to enlighten the secretariat
and assist it in presenting solutions to the Assem-
bly which the latter could accept provisionally.
The three major problems presented by the
Assembly were the following :
1. reception capacity of the ESC
chamber;
2. reception capacity of meeting rooms in
WEU's Paris building;
3. the Institute providing office space for
the parliamentary delegations.
1. Reception capacity of chamber
The following two proposals were conside-
red feasible by the Clerk of the Assembly,
although the cost and practical implementation
aspects would have to be looked into:
(a) the installation of an electronic ffice
in the chamber, which would enable
identification of the parliamentarian in
each seat and requests to speak and
vote. It would therefore be possible not
to assign a seat to each representative.
Given the consistently high level of
absenteeism, the chamber could thus
be used by significantly more repre-
sentatives than the actual number of
seats would suggest. This installation
required the approval of the Economic
and Social Council which, given its
own interest in the matter, could be
requested to contribute to the cost, but
the response to this request could not
be anticipated;
(b) the removal of the temporary interpre-
tation booths in the galleries and use of
the permanent booths in WEU's mee-
ting rooms. This would free conside-
rable. space in the gallerig.s 1ng would
require an audio-visual link between
the booths and the chamber.
2. Meeting rooms in the WEU building
The Clerk of the Assembly expressed satis-
faction with the use of rooms B and C, built in
1990. As regards the third room (A), the Director
of the Institute had drawn up a proposal to trans-
form it into a conference room able to accommo-
date approximately 100 people. This met the Ins-
titute's future needs for WEU events organised in
Paris, which would be attended by representatives
of24 or even 28 countries.
According to the Director of the Institute,
the cost of the work to be done for this conversion
should be relatively limited (F 460 000) given that
the present number of interpretation booths (3)
would be maintained.
The Clerk of the Assembly considered that
these changes would also be beneficial to the
work of the Assembly. He requested that detailed
plans be forwarded to him for approval and that
arrangements be made for interpretation booths in
room B to be used by room A during meetings of
the Assembly. He expressed some reservation
concerning the use of the infrared system for
interpretation.
On this last point, the Institute considered
that the most effective system had to be acqui-
red in order to achieve the highest sound quality
since using the infrared system enabled maxi-
mum flexible use to be made of the space avail-
able.
As far as funding was concerned, the ope-
ration could be carried out under a supplementary
budget for 1994 put forward by the Institute,
without having to resort to additional contribu-
tions from member states, given that the Institute
had a sufficient credit surplus at the close of the
1993 financial year.
3. Parliamentary delegations' ffices
On its accession to WEU as a full member,
Greece had to have a permanent office at its dis-
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posal. The proposed solution was to allocate
office 202 to the Assembly which, under a deci-
sion taken by the Council in 1990, had been set
aside for the Secretary-General. If this office
were transferred to the Assembly, the Institute
would take steps to accommodate the Secretary-
General and his colleagues during sessions.
This left 14 national delegations which
may need to use offices, either solely during
sessions or also during committee meetings.
Under a temporary arrangement, it was concei-
vable:
(a) to use office 317 during sessions and
committee meetingst;
(b) to put the Institute's reading room and
library at the disposal of delegations
during sessions;
For the Assembly
Clerk Assistant,
R. Lourz
Clerk
H. Buncet.nl
(c) to clear the room currently occupied by
the telephonists with a view to it being
used by the Assembly;
(d) to consider in due course putting the
bar-restaurant area at the Assembly's
disposal'.
The Clerk of the Assembly remarked that
the parliamentary delegations would probably be
dissatisfied with the abovementioned proposals
but that the fact they could evolve should make
them acceptable.
For its part, the Institute believed that the
implementation of these proposals would cause
considerable disruption but that it could support
them given the temporary nature of the measures
which would help the Council and the Assembly
to come to a final arrangement.
Done at Brussels, lst September 1994
For the Institute
Head of Administration
G. VerNelu
For the Secretariat-General
Head of Administration
F. MrssNso
1. Text in italics deleted at the meeting on26th September
1994.
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Draft Recommendation
on a European securily policy
The Assembly,
(i) Stressing that the aim of WEU is to achieve the effective strengthening of European security and
that institutional concerns must in no case weaken efforts to this end;
(ii) Recalling that the modified Brussels Treaty is one of the essential bases for ensuring this security;
(iiil Regretting, therefore, that the Council has failed to take advantage of the opportunity of the
fortieth anniversary of the veaty, which also coincided with that of the tenth anniversary of the reactiva-
tion of WEU, to draw the attention of the public at large to progress achieved by WEU since 1984;
(iv) Convinced that the development of a European defence policy by the Council of WEU is conditio-
nal upon the achievement of a European security policy based on a common perception of risks and dan-
gers and on a joint concept regarding the means of countering them;
(v) Deploring the lack of information from the Council regarding its co-operation and contribution in
this respect in the framework of the CFSP and NATO;
(vi) Recalling Recommendations 556,558 and 559;
(vii) Rejecting paragraph 3 of the reply of the Council to Recommendation 559, in which the latter
refuses to provide the Assembly with information on work undertaken in the framework of the CFSP on
questions relating to the modified Brussels Treaty;
(viii) Yoicing its protest that the Council transmitted to the Assembly the first part of the fortieth annual
report on its activities only on 9th November 1994 anddeploring that the WEU Secretary-General no lon-
ger sends the Assembly his information letter;
(ix) Aware that it is crucial to settle the substantive issues relating to the development of a European
security and defence policy and that the Council seems to be giving priority to studying these questions;
(x) Convinced nevertheless that the Council should not defer discussion of institutional problems in
this connection until 1996, leaving the initiative in the interim to other European institutions;
(xi) Recalling the decision of the European Council to create a study group in preparation for the 1996
intergovemmental conference which is to start work in June 1995 with the participation of two members
of the European Parliament;
(xii) Reaffrming that the supervision of security and defence policy in Europe is a prerogative of the
national parliaments;
(xiii) Insisting therefore that the WEU Assembly should participate fully in the preparations for WEU's
planned review of the present provisions of the Maastricht Treaty concerning the common foreign and
security policy, in accordance with declaration ID8 of the WEU member countries annexed to the Maas-
tricht Treaty;
(xiv) Fearing that the refusal of certain countries participating in the CFSP to accede to the modified
Brussels Treaty might diminish the effectiveness of co-operation between the CFSP and WEU;
(n) Fearing also that the refusal of the WEU Council to admit all the European NATO member coun-
tries to full membership of WEU may complicate the implementation of WEU's r6le as the European
pillar of NATO;
(xvi) Wishing WEU to act as a political driving force vis-i-vis the authorities of the European Union
and the Atlantic Alliance and not consider that its main task is to carry out decisions taken by these two
organisations;
(mii) Recalling nevertheless that since the Council has promised the European Union to provide assistance
in policing the town of Mostar, it is of the ufinost importance for the latter to honour its commitrnents in full;
(niii) Deploring that meetings of the WEU Council are divided into four different categories of partici-
pant countries 
- 
full members, associate members, associate partners, observers 
- 
raises the problem of
multi-speed co-operation within WEU and the attendant risk of its political action being paralysed by ins-
titutional infighting, as was the case over the issue of Rwanda;
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(xix) Wishing WEU to examine subsequent accession by its associate partners by basing itself essential-
ly on the criteria of the modified Brussels Treaty;
(xx) 
.Stressing that ilis WEU's primary responsibility to ensure that, in the framework of harmonisingprocedures with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance for linking these countries with Euro-
Atlantic structures, security considerations are a means of speeding up this process and not a pretext for
holding it back;
(xxi) Recalling that the Assembly cannot grant associate member and associate partner delegations rights
which exceed the status the Council has granted them;
(roli) Stressing that the enlargement of WEU towards the East is intended to reinforce the security and
stability of Europe as a whole and not to create new divisions;
(z-r,iii)Recalling in consequence the importance of sfiengthening the collective security system in the frame-
work of the CSCE and of establishing a stable partnership with Russia and the other members of the CIS;
(xxiv) Wishing qhe prgbfems raised by the harmonisation of the presidencies of WEU and the European
Union to be settled quickly in order to ensure the continuity of WEU's political action;
(xrv) Recalliqg the impgrtant r6le of its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations in reinforcing
the impact of the work of the Assembly with parliaments, public opinion and the governments of the mem--
ber countries,
Rncouunuos rHAT rHe CouNcu-
l. ln accordance with its declaration IDS annexed to the Maastricht Treaty, create a special working
gloup tasked with studying institutional questions relating to the preparation of the 1996 inlergovemmen--
tal conference;
2. Decide that this working group will begin work in early 1995 and that the Assembly will be asso-
ciated with it;
3 Play lhe rOle of a political driving force vis-i-vis the authorities of the European Union and theAtlantic Alliance with a view to developing guidelines for linking the Central and Eastern European coun-
tries with Euro-Atlantic structures;
!. Open up real prospects of accession to the modified Brussels Treaty for associate partner countries,
irrespective of whether or not they belong to other European organisations;
q In so doing, ensqre that any future enlargement of WEU does not weaken the scope of Article V of
the modified Brussels Treaty;
6. On the same basis, examine whether conditions have been met for granting Slovenia associate part-
ner status;
7. Include in its present studies the French Prime Minister's proposal for drafting a white paper on
lqopean security and ensure that the outcome of its examination bf the development of a Euiopeandefence policy provides the main source of inspiration for the thinking process to be conducted in tne fra-
mework of the CFSP and NATO;
8. Inform the Assembly of the areas and the content of its co-operation with the CFSP and NAIO;
9. Contribute actively to the success of the conference on the stability pact in Europe;
10. Work out a joint position with a view to its contribution to the CSCE ministerial conference in
Budapestand.inform !ry$gembly gf the action taken to follow up its declared intention of 9th May 1994
of strengthening the CSCE " to avoid the emergence of new divisions " and to work for " a reasbnable
division of labour with the CSCE ";
11. Make its views known in a more convincing and visible manner in the United Nations and arrange
for wEU to speak with one voice in the security council of that organisation;
!? Follow closely the problems _o-f security in the Mediterranean and inform the Assembly of the actionit has taken on Recommendation 538 as it undertook to do in its reply to that recommendation;
13. Inform the Assembly of the results of studies undertaken by the Council on unresolved questions
relating to the harmonisation of the presidencies of wEU and the European Union;
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14. Avoid the effectiveness of WEU's action being jeopardised by the development of work conducted
with different forms of participation within the organisation and at different speeds in specific areas;
15. Study the conditions in which the WEU Council might meet as a European security and defence
council, either as necessary or on the occasion of meetings of the European Council;
16. Organise a regular exchange of senior civil servants between " WE(J " departments established in
ministries for foreign affairs and defence and in the private offices of the heads of govemment of member
states;
17. Comply immediately with its obligations under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty by sub-
mitting its annual report to the Assembly so that the latter can reply before the report loses its topicality,
account being taken of the fact that this is not the first time that the report has arrived very late;
18. Continue to inform the Assembly of all activities under the modified Brussels Treaty, even if exer-
cised in other European or ffansatlantic bodies.
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Draft Order
on a European security policy
The Assembly,
(i) Considering:
(a) the document on a status of association of WEU with the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Latvia, the Repu-
blic of Lithuania, the Republic of Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic;
(b) the declaration further to the document on associate membership of WEU of 20th November
t992,
which texts were transmitted by the Council to the Assembly following the ministerial meeting held at
Kirchberg, Luxembourg, on 9th May 1994;
(ii) Considering that the declaration referred to in paragraph (b) above states that it " does not entail any
changes to the document on associate membership adopted in Rome on 20th November 1992;
(iiil Taking the view therefore that this declaration does not contain elements requiring a re+xamination of
the measures drawn up by the Assembly for the participation of delegations of associate member countries;
(iv) Recalling nevertheless its Recommendation 558; .
(v) Recalling also Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty which states that the WEU Assembly is
composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council
of Europe;
(vi) Noting that the " document on the modalities ", dated 3rd May 1994, stipulates that:
" The provisions of this document apply as from today.
The status will formally be achieved when:
- 
the Hellenic Republic, currently an active observer, becomes a member of WEU and the Repu-
blic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey, currently active observers,
become associate members of WEU;
- 
the associate partner has signed a Europe Agreement with the European Union.
In the meantime the associate partners will be considered as active observers to WEU with respect
to the provisions of their new status. ";
(vii) Recalling the decision taken by the Presidential Committee on 18th October 1994to enlarge the per-
manent observer delegations of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia from
two to four members and to invite the nine associate parlner counfries each to appoint one observer to the Poli-
tical, Defence and Technological and Aerospace Committees and to the Committee for Parliamentary and
Public Relations without prejudging the eventual adoption of a status for the delegations of these counffies;
(viii) Considering the brief assigned by the Presidential Committee to the Political Committee to propose a
substantive text on the adoption of an appropriate status for the delegations of countries that became asso-
ciate parfirers prior to the question being placed before the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges;
(ix) Recalling its Order 85 on the enlargement of WEU and in particular paragraph (vii) of the preamble
drawing attention to the fact that " any reasonable enlargement of the number of parliamentary delegations
participating in the Assembly will be impossible without major adjustments of the Assembly's accommo-
dation and budget ";
(x) Noting with surprise that, despite its repeated approaches to the Council, the latter has not taken
action on the pressing demands formulated by the Assembly in this respect;
(xi) Regretting also that the Council has not provided any information on the arrangements for financial
contributions by the associate partners to WEU's budget;
(xii) Stressing the need nevertheless to avoid any further delay in making offrcial participation of parlia-
mentarians from states which have become associate partners of WEU,
INvrres ms CoMrr{rrree oN RULEs or PnocBounn lxo PnIvn-ecBs
To study the creation of a specific " associate partner " status for the representatives of associate
partner states.
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I. Introduction
1. The task of beginning work on the defi-
nition of a common European defence policy,
entrusted to the Permanent Council of WEU
in Luxembourg on 9th May 1994, marks the
beginning of an ambitious and difficult enter-
prise, as it closely affects areas in which the
sovereignty of the states concerned has so far
been absolute.
2. However, as stated in its Recommendation
558 adopted on 14th June 1994, the Assembly of
WEU is convinced that now is the time for WEU
to undertake this task as a matter of priority. It
therefore warmly endorses the Council's initiative.
The Assembly nevertheless recalls that the best
studies by diplomats and military experts are not
enough to get a project off the ground, realisation
of which depends primarily on the political will of
the member countries. Hence in assigning this
task to the Permanent Council, the Council cannot
absolve itself of its own political responsibility,
namely the pursuit of a European security policy,
having been created expressly for that purpose in
accordance with Article VIII, paragraph l, of the
modified Brussels Treaty.
3. A European defence policy and, even more
so, a European defence is dependent on the achie-
vement of a European security policy based on ajoint perception of risks and threats to European
security, and a joint concept of the ways in which
this security should be guaranteed, including ins-
titutional questions 
- 
in short, on harmonisation
of political interests and objectives in external
security matters. It is clear that all these necessary
conditions for the creation of a common policy
have not as yet been met. One must therefore
work towards creating the conditions necessary
for a common European security policy. This falls
to WEU both under its founding treaty and under
the Maastricht Treaty, given that any direction
Europe is preparing to take in external security
policy matters will inevitably have implications in
the defence field.
4. In order to remove the obstacles that conti-
nue to stand in the way of development of a true
common European security and defence policy,
these must first be identified and their causes esta-
blished so that the appropriate means of overco-
ming them can then be sought. The present report
therefore proposes to make a contribution to the
Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Soell, Rapporteur)
work that is essential if Europeans wish to take
control of their own security to meet the chal-
lenges of the future and avoid Europe's being
unable to act or react in the event of a crisis (as in
the case of the conflict in former Yugoslavia, in
Somalia or Rwanda); at the same time this report
can be regarded as an initial contribution to the
preparation of the intergovernmental conference
on the review of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty
scheduled to begin in 1996.
5. This report, moreover, provides an oppor-
tunity to reaffirm the vital responsibility of the
parliaments of our member countries in develo-
ping a European security and defence policy. A
demonstration of this responsibility was the collo-
quy held by the WEU Assembly in Paris, on 17th
October 1994, on the subject " organising our
security " to which were invited the chairmen of
the foreign affairs and defence committees of the
national parliaments of the WEU member coun-
tries, associate members, associate partners and
observer countries together with a delegation
from the two houses of the parliament of the Rus-
sian Federation. This first colloquy of its type,
organised on the initiative of Mr. Baumel, Chafu-
man of the Defence Committee of the Assembly,
allowed a very lively debate to be held around
addresses given, inter alia, by the ministers of
defence of France and the Netherlands; it was thus
regarded as an initial step towards strengthening
co-operation between our parliaments, and one
which would be followed by other meetings of a
similar nature.
II. Dffiring interests and attempts
to achieve harmonisation
6. A rough comparision of the defence white
papers published recently by three WEU member
countries (France, the United Kingdom and Ger-
many) can provide a useful insight into the simila-
rities and differences that exist at present between
these three countries in their views on security
and their policy objectives in security and defence
matters.
7. The primary objective of France's defence
policy, as set out inthe 1994 French defence white
paper, is " to defend France's interests ". This
states specifically that:
" The primary objective of France's defence
policy is therefore to defend the country's
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vital and strategic interests and those
with a bearing on France's internatio-
nal responsibilities and position in the
world... "
8. The second objective is summarised under
the heading: Build Europe and contribute to inter-
national stability. " ... France's ability to maintain
its position in the world will be linked in large
measure to its ability to influence the building and
the future development of Europe. " In the context
of building Europe in security and defence mat-
ters, the French white paper states that " two
extreme options are to be ruled out: sole reliance
on ad hoc coalitions and the option of trying to
create an integrated military organisation in a
federal-type European framework ".
9. " ...the building of defence Europe is
dependent on the willingness of three states
(France, the United Kingdom and Germany) to
harmonise their view of their security interests by
deepening their co-operation and, as necessary,
pooling their military assets... Specific relations
should also be developed with our other part-
ners ... " Among such partners the white paper
specifically mentions Belgium, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Spain and Sweden.
10. In matters relating to the international fra-
mework of France's defence policy, the European
ambition 
- 
which provides the context for the
wish to strengthen WEU 
- 
is placed before the
description of a renewed Atlantic Alliance which,
according to the white paper, " must also become
a place for asserting the European defence and
security identity ".
11. The French white paper makes several refe-
rences to the country's interests in relation to the
security and stability of specific regions of the
world such as Africa, for example, where France's
action " is more an acknowledgement of its inter-
national responsibilities in an area where it can
exercise its influence than a strategic concern ".
12. Moreover, " ...the new democracies of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, with whom a series of
bilateral agreements have been concluded in a
matter of years, will have greater priority in the
allocation of the resources of military co-opera-
tion ".
13. As to the United Kingdom,the Secretary of
State for Defence, in a statement on the 1994
defence budget, defined national defence policy
in the following terms:
" From our immediate security perspective,
perhaps the key factor will be the evolution
of Russia; and we have a keen interest in
the continuing independence and integrity
of the new democracies of Central and Eas-
1;rn 
nurore.
The United Kingdom's defence policy is
designed to support our wider security poli-
cy, which is to maintain the freedom and
territorial integrity of the United Kingdom
and its dependent territories, and its ability
to pursue its legitimate interests at home
and abroad. "
14. However:
" As our political and economic interests
become increasingly linked to those of our
international partners, so our security inter-
ests will increasingly be pursued in a multi-
lateral context. ... Thus, whilst our defence
and security policies are likely to retain
specifically British elements with a com-
mensurate ability for national action, and
whilst healthy bilateral defence relation-
ships with the United States, our European
partners and with others will remain impor-
tant both for constructive policy-making
and for our own defence effectiveness, the
multilateral dimension will increasingly
influence our judgments about the pro-
grammes we choose to implement. It may
also affect the types of operation in which
our armed forces become involved and the
scale of their commitment. "
15. Chapter 3 of Germany's white paper on
national security and the situation and future of
the Bundeswehr, published in April 1994, defines
the " values and interests " of Germany in the fol-
lowing terms:
" The values laid down in the Basic Law
guide the interests on which Germany
bases its action in the field of security
policy. By establishing a constitutional
mandate to safeguard peace, to work
towards European unity, to settle conflicts
by peaceful means and to join a system of
collective security, the Basic Law has laid
major cornerstones for determining Ger-
man security interests.
German security policy has to take account
of constant political factors and parameters
with a long-term effect: the geopolitically
central location of Germany, as the country
with the most neighbours in Europe; its
economic situation as an industrialised
nation dependent on exports and firmly
interwoven with the world economy; and
finally the experiences of German and
European history. All this sets standards for
the objectives, substance and procedures
of German policy and plays a part in the
way in which it is perceived by Germany's
neighbours.
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German foreign and security policy is gui-
ded by five central interests:
- 
preservation of the freedom, security and
welfare of the citizens of Germany and
the territorial integrity of the German
state;
- 
integration with the European democra-
cies in the European Union, for demo-
cracy, the rule of law and prosperity in
Europe mean peace and security for Ger-
many, too;
- 
the lasting transatlantic alliance, based
on a community of values and similar
interests, with the United States as a
world power, for the potential of the Uni-
ted States is indispensable for intematio-
nal stability;
- 
the familiarisation of our neighbours in
Eastern Europe with western structures
in a spirit of reconciliation and partner-
ship and the creation of a new co-opera-
tive security order embracing all the
states of Europe;
- 
worldwide respect for international law
and human rights and a just world econo-
mic order based on market principles, for
the security of the individual states is
guaranteed only in a system of global
security with peace, justice and well-
being for everyone.
Germany is not impacted by all risks to the
same extent. Its security is directly affected
by how the situation in Central, Eastem and
Southeastern Europe develops. It is indi-
rectly affected by unstable conditions in the
Meditenanean, the Middle East and South-
western Asia. Germany's security is also
affected by destabilising developments in
other pans of the world. "
16. While these three documents all allude in
one way or another to the importance of European
and transatlantic co-operation, it is nevertheless
clear that the aims of the policies of the countries
in question are defined in terms of purely national
interests. Only the German white paper regards
the promotion of the integration of European
democracies into the European Union as one of
the country's essential interests. However, in the
ioregoing documents there is nothing to imply
that the harmonisation of national interests consti-
tutes an important goal^ nor is inspiration drawn
from the objectives of the common foreign and
security policy described in Article J.1 of the
Maastricht Treaty.
17. One could no doubt go on to examine the
position of the other WEU member countries in
this regard 
- 
to arrive at the conclusion published
at the end of July by an expert of the WEU Insti-
tute for Security Studies ', which states that
" what has been missing up to now is an identity
of interests between the states of the Union in
matters of security policy and a common strategic
concept regarding when and where it would be
essential to make a commitment in the area of
military management of crises ".
18. In this situation the proposal presented by
Mr. Lellouche on behalf of the delegation of the
French National Assembly to the European Com-
munities, according to which the European Union
should prepare a white paper on European de-
fence ', is interesting, but it should be used to
exert pressure on the European countries concer-
ned to harmonise their ideas and policies not only
from a strictly military viewpoint but also from a
security angle in the broadest sense. It would the-
refore seem that the initiative announced at the
end of August by the French Prime Minister
Edouard Balladur 3 for drafting a white paper on
security in Europe which would highlight Euro-
pe's specific interests and define the means neces-
sary for defending them in liaison with the Atlan-
tic Alliance is a move in the right direction.
19. In this connection, your Rapporteur sup-
ports the analysis of the WEU Institute for Secu-
rity Studies expert in the article referred to above
according to which:
" ... Above all it is necessary to agree on a
concept of security policy specific to the
Union which takes account of the whole
range of possible political, economic and
military reactions. This can but be based on
the precise determination of joint interests
in security matters towards given regions
(Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans,
the Mediterranean, North and Central Afri-
ca). The simple enumeration of objectives
in matters of peace policy and stability that
are general and therefore not binding to any
great extent, such as those mentioned so far
in the framework of the common foreign
and security policy, is of little use. "
20. It should be recalled once more in this
context that the WEU Council's obligation to
agree on common principles extends to any region
of the world where a situation arises that might
constitute a threat to peace.
21. Public debate on the method or methods for
achieving the desired objective, in other words
l. Mathias Jopp: Langer Weg 
- 
Kiihnes Ziel: Gemeinsame
Verteidigungspolitik in Europa Archiv, F olge 13 -14 I 1994,
page 391.
2. Europe and its security 
- 
an information report received
by the Presidency of the National Assembly on 3lst May
1994.
3. The Figaro, 2nd September 1994.
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reaching agreement on a common concept for
organising European security, is growing more
intense: the larger the European Union and WEU
become, the more these two organisations and the
Atlantic Alliance are opening up towards the East,
as 1996, the year in which the intergovernmental
conference to review the Maastricht Treaty is due
to start, approaches.
22. This debate concerns both the basic sub-
stance of security policy and fundamental institu-
tional questions, two aspects that are closely lin-
ked. On matters of substance, three main concepts
are still competing even if they are considered to
be complementary.
23. The first is the concept of a collective secu-
rity system according to which crisis-manage-
ment and prevention are based on rules of co-ope-
ration between all the participants in the system.
This is the principle on which the United Nations,
the CSCE and other forms of regional organisa-
tions of the United Nations are based. The second
approach is to ensure security by defensive
alliances such as WEU and NATO, while the third
favours security through integration of a group of
states, as proposed by the European Union.
24. In Recommendation 559, the Assembly
asked to be informed of the results of the study on
mutually reinforcing institutions, recently comple-
ted within the framework of the " security " group
of the common foreign and security policy, which
establishes criteria for better co-operation between
the United Nations, the CSCE, the European
Union, WEU, NATO and the Council of Europe in
confl ict-prevention and crisis-management.
25. The Council's reply to this recommenda-
tion is revealing. First it informs the Assembly
that " the Council has already taken several initia-
tives in the field of crisis-management and
conflict prevention in the context of the emerging
common foreign and security policy (CFSP) " and
then states that " the Council cannot report on
the results of the work undertaken by working
groups of the European Union dealing with CFSP
matters ".
26. The Assembly cannot accept this refusal to
provide information which fails to accord with the
obligations of the Council under Article IX of the
modified Brussels Treaty. The Assembly must
remind the Council that it still has responsibility
for supervising the application of the treaty as a
whole and that it must reply to recommendations
and questions concerning the application of the
treaty even if exercised in a framework other than
that of WEU and especially when the Council
contributes to the work of another organisation.
So far, the Council has always accepted this prin-
ciple, and in the past has even transmitted certain
Assembly recommendations to other organisa-
tions, NAIO for example, in order to be able to
reply to them. Quite recently the Council, in its
answer to Written Question 326 put by Mr. Goe-
rens, stressed " its determination to exercise its
powers, even though 
- 
in order to avoid duplica-
tion 
- 
it may acknowledge that certain work is
best conducted within the context of NATO or the
European Union ".
27. In the same answer, the Council also stated
that it did not " consider its competences to be
modified since the reactivation of WEU " and that
it had " moreover, replied to all the Assembly's
recommendations andwill continue to do so inthe
future. " Nevertheless this answer is not entirely
unambiguous. Hitherto, the Council has always
drawn a clear distinction between the exercise of
its competences and its competences as such.
Thus the transfer of the exercise of its social and
cultural responsibilities to the Council of Europe
affected the Council's activity and not its respon-
sibilities as such, as the Council itself stated in its
annual report on its activities in 1959. Its decision
in 1970 to cease its activities in economic matters
was taken in accordance with the same principle.
28. It is all the more surprising to learn now,
though the Council's answer to Written Question
326,that:
" The Council is of the view that WEU,
which ceased to exercise its economic com-
petences in1970,does not have the compe-
tence 4 to deal with the issues of financial
compensation for the riparian countries
implementing the Danube embargo. "
Unless this is mere legal sloppiness in the drafting
of this answer, it would mean that the Council has
abandoned the distinction between the exercise of
its powers and those powers in themselves, which
would have extremely serious consequences at a
time when WEU must give practical expression to
its r6le as an integral part of the development of
the European Union and as the European pillar of
the Atlantic Alliance.
29. Nor can the Assembly accept that, in the
answer referred to above " the Council devotes
special attention to questions and recommenda-
tions relating to WEU's direct responsibilities 5,
and merely indicates to the Assembly the organi
sation primarily competent for other issues which
are raised ". What are these " direct responsibili
ties " if the Council is maintaining at the same
time that its competences have not been modified
since the reactivation of WEU? The Assembly
therefore insists that the Council continue to
provide information on all of its activities in the
areas of its responsibilities and, in this connection,
specifically recalls paragraph 8 of Recommenda-
tion 558.
4. Rapporteur's italics.
5. Rapporteur's italics.
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30. This information is the more necessary as
the raison d'Otre of the traditional defence
alliances such as NATO and WEU seems to be
increasingly called into question, both within
and without. An example that might be quoted of
such questioning from outside is Russia's atti-
tude towards NATO following the dissolution of
the Warsaw Pact and the wish of the majority of
Central and Eastern European countries to
become members of NATO in order to benefit
from the reliable protection of the American
umbrella.
31. For Russia, there is no longer any place for
traditional NATO missions, namely to ensure the
defence of Europe, as there is no longer an enemy.
On the basis of this reasoning, Mr. Kozyrev,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia, recently
proposed making the CSCE the central organisa-
tion for maintaining security and stability on the
European continent. If the CSCE were to co-
ordinate NATO and WEU efforts, the latter would
then become subordinate to the CSCE.
32. The Russian proposal to develop the North
Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) in close
liaison with the CSCE is, however, the conse-
quence of an evolution which started in NATO
itself according to which the latter might be trans-
formed into a Euro-Atlantic security system based
on a strategic concept giving precedence to a
wider vision of stability and security. Under this
new philosophy it becomes difficult to make the
distinction between an enlarged NATO mandate
and the global approach of the CSCE 6. The intro-
duction of the partnership for peace, offered to all
NACC and CSCE member countries, reinforces
this trend and places participants in peace-
keeping measures either under the authority of
the United Nations or under CSCE responsi-
bility.
33. Another reason why the traditional mis-
sions of the alliances are being called into ques-
tion is because the Secretary-General of the Uni
ted Nations is tending to restrict the right of
legitimate individual and collective defence gua-
ranteed by Article 51 of the United Nations Char-
ter and to strengthen instead the rights and powers
of the Security Council. This tendency is reinfor-
ced, as far as the Atlantic Alliance is concerned,
by a reduction in the importance accorded to
mutual assistance obligations in the event of
armed aggression in favour of a wider interpreta-
tion of Article 4 of the Washington Treaty which
allows NATO to intervene " out of area" to main-
tain and enforce peace within the framework of
crisis-prevention and management. Although
NATO stresses its independence in relation to the
6. Werner Bauwens, Bruno Colson etc.: The CSCE and the
changing r6le of NATO and the European Union, NATO
Review, No. 3, June 1994.
United Nations in this area, it has to be admitted
that NATO action not authorised by the United
Nations is hardly conceivable.
34. Questioning from inside is evident in Euro-
pean efforts to substitute for the traditional
alliances in Europe an integration of states in a
new type of entity in which decision-making
through intergovernmental co-operation would
gradually give way to supranational procedures
and decisions by qualified majority. Some are
even calling for a new transatlantic treaty to take
the place of the present alliance.
35. Divergences between advocates of retai-
ning an intergovernmental system and those of a
supranational system remain, as also between
those who favour first deepening the European
Union and those who stress the importance of
enlarging the Union or who are convinced that it
is possible to go deeper without abandoning enlar-
gement.
36. Even before this enlargement of the Euro-
pean Union becomes a reality, a new debate has
recently arisen, particularly in France and Ger-
many, on the expediency of a multi-speed Europe,
to consist of circles of co-operation of varying
intensity. The Rapporteur is however of the opi-
nion that the aim of further advancing matters
European cannot be achieved by creating a central
nucleus, since even among the small number of
participants in such a nucleus, differing interests
still persist.
37. Study of the various proposals put forward,
among others by Mr. Lamassoure, the French
Minister for European Affairs, for a new founding
contract', by the French Prime Minister, IvIr. Bal-
ladur, for a Europe organised in three concentric
circles 8 and by the Christian Democrat Group of
the German Parliament e, influenced in part by a
study published in 1994 by the Bertelsmann
Foundation on " Europe 96: reform programme
for the European Union " reveals that these pro-
posals merit careful analysis above all in the area
of the organisation of security and defence.
38. It is not the Rapporteur's intention to dis-
cuss the timeliness or otherwise of launching a
public debate on the usefulness of creating a
nucleus in the context of building Europe and
designating the countries of which it might
consist when preparations are underway in three
Scandinavian countries for difficult referendums
on entry into the European Union and the coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe are wonde-
ring whether they will be accepted into the Euro-
pean and Atlantic institutions, when and under
7. Le Monde, 31st May 1994.
8. Le Figaro, 30,th August 1994.
9. Ir Figaro, 6th September 1994; Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, 6th September 1994.
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what terms. However the initiatives referred to
above have the merit of raising fundamental pro-
blems and enabling them to be debated publicly
before government civil servants and officials in
Brussels begin their work. The Rapporteur
would nevertheless wish to stress, first, that he is
not in favour of the creation of an exclusive club
of member states; second that the criteria for the
advancement of Europe should be defined by all
participant states; third, that those who remain
outside the discussions will have no right to
contribute to the decisions to be taken; fourth,
that the national parliaments must participate in
the work on reform and fifth that a nucleus exists
in security and defence matters, namely WEU
(see paragraph 49 below).
39. It will first be noted that none of the ideas
or projects put forward in the recent past pro-
poses a complete merger between the European
Union and WEU in the foreseeable future. While
the Institute for Security Studies expert 'o does
not foresee the incorporation of WEU in the
Union until after 1998,* at the earliest ", if cer-
tain conditions are met, the CDU/CSU document
is asking for the 1996 conference to lead to a
" reorganisation " of relations between WEU
and the European Union with a view to " trans-
forming NATO into a balanced alliance between
the United States, Canada and Europe, as a unit
capable of acting. "
40. According to the study by the Bertelsmann
Foundation the most that would be achievable
in the foreseeable future would be a mixture
of intergovernmental co-operation on the one
hand and supranational crisis-management and
intervention on the other. In this context, the
authors of this document are asking that WEU
be " finally consolidated as the security and
defence instrument of the European Union and
as such as the European pillar of the Atlantic
Alliance ".
41,. The thoughts expressed by the French
Prime Minister, Mr. Balladur, tending towards
" pursuing efforts to make Western European
Union a true European alliance that will enable
the European Union to ensure, itself, the security
of its members " " follow the same lines.
42. However, at the end of the day, while there
is general agreement on the need for the European
countries to acquire an identity of interests and a
capability of acting together in matters of security
and defence, an in-depth examination of how this
might be achieved is still lacking and none of the
projects referred to above provides a recipe for
identifying the real difficulties and overcoming
them.
10. See paragraph 17 above.
11. Le Figaro, 30th August 1994.
III. Organising European security 
-
an in s titutio nal pr oble m?
43. In practical politics, it can be observed that
the constitutional approach represents the essen-
tial means of promoting Europe's security and
defence identity. There is general agreement in
thinking (although this conviction is not well-
founded) that the harmonisation of positions andjoint decision-making will be facilitated if the
process of co-operation extends beyond the pure-
ly intergovernmental stage. While the Maastricht
Treaty has retained the intergovemmental compo-
nent and Title V on a common foreign and secur-
ity policy has strengthened the hand of the presi-
dency, it has introduced the decision-making
process by qualified majority in certain cases, in
particular for implementing joint action and has
granted the European Commission 
- 
the main
supranational component of the Union 
- 
rights of
initiative and of participation. It is certain that
advocates of a tighter community approach to
decision-making regard the treaty in its present
form merely as a stage on the road towards a true
community system.
44. On the assumption that interests relating to
key fields which have until now been the exclus-
ive province of national sovereignty could be bet-
ter harmonised in a European Union evolving
towards a community, moves were started in the
period between the adoption of the Single Euro-
pean Act in 1986 leading up to the conclusion of
the Maastricht Treaty in December 1991, to
encourage the Twelve to co-ordinate their posi-
tions more closely on the political and economic
aspects of security in order finally to create, with
the Maasfficht Treaty, a true foreign and security
policy, comprising the whole range of questions
relating to the security of the European Union,
including the eventual framing of a common
defence policy.
45. Concerning areas relating to the security
dimension, the European Council stated at its
Lisbon meeting on26th and2Tth June 1992 those
that might, from the entry into force of the Maas-
tricht Treaty, give rise to joint action, namely:
- 
the CSCE process;
- 
the policy of disarmament and arms
control in Europe, including confidence-
building measures;
- 
nuclear non-proliferation issues;
- 
the economic aspects of security, in par-
ticular control of the transfer of military
technology to third countries and control
of arms exports.
46. For considering the elements which will be
necessary to the Union in the framework of the
common foreign and security policy, the Euro-
pean Council, at the same meeting, formed an ad
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hoc security working group within the Political
Committee in accordance with Article J.8, para-
graph 5, of the Maastricht Treaty. The status and
tasks of this group, like those of the common
foreign and security policy Political Committee,
have still not been made known to the WEU
Assembly. Nor does your Rapporteur know whe-
ther the WEU ministerial organs are co-operating
with the aforementioned groups and to what
extent. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that
the security working group is closely examining
several areas of European security including risk
assessment, the implications for European security
of developments in Central and Eastern Europe,
the situation in the Mediterranean and the Magh-
reb, disarmament and arms control. The defence
implications of much of its work are undeniable.
47. In talks your Rapporteur had with the new
Secretary-General of the Council of the European
Union, Mr. Trumpf, on 13th October t994,
brought him no specific information about the
new sffuctures of the common foreign and secur-
ity policy, nor about the way co-operation might
work between that body, the WEU authorities and
the European Commission. It appeared, however,
that the new Secretariat-General of the Council
considers itself to be at the same level ensuring
continuity and upholding European interests in
face of a strong presidency of the Union. Subse-
quently, the Secretary-General of the Council of
the Union should be invited to explain in detail to
the Political Committee the working of the secur-
ity structures created within the Union.
48. However, in the context of a gradual trans-
fer to the European Union of powers hitherto
belonging to WEU as sole organisation respon-
sible for European security and defence, we are
witnessing an assignment of responsibilities in
security matters to the CFSP and of those with
defence implications to WEU.
49. However, in view of the fact that security
and defence are closely intertwined, it is difficult to
imagine that the assignment of the former to the
common foreign and security policy and the latter
to WEU can succeed in the long term if it is hoped
to advance towards procedures allowing Euro-
peans to reach joint positions on these matiers and
to act together. Suffice it to recall that the structure
of the Political Division of the WEU Secretariat-
General now includes a " Defence Policy " section
as well as a " Politics and Planning " section, indi-
cating that the WEU ministerial organs are aware
of the importance of these close links and of the
need to harmonise and co-ordinate security and
defence aspects in a single institutional framework.
50. However, the governments of the Twelve
preferred a different solution and decided that it
fell to the Council of the European Union to exa-
mine, case by case, whether security questions
discussed in the framework of the CFSP had
implications in the defence area and whether deci-
sions should be taken on the basis of Anicle J.4 of
the Maastricht Treaty, in other words, whether
WEU should be called in'2.
51. Admittedly, the European Union and WEU
have agreed on arrangements to facilitate co-
ordination of the work. However, the provisions
contained in Chapter IV, Appendix IY of the
document on the implementation of the Maas-
tricht Treaty '3 entitled " Relations between the
Union and WEU " envisage only " mutual infor-
mation " and " cross-participation " of collabora-
tors from the two secretariats at CFSP and WEU
meetings and it is hardly likely that such arrange-
ments can resolve the fundamental problem.
52. All full members of WEU are of course
represented at the Council of the Union and in the
CFSP institutions and it will therefore be up to
them to make sure that WEU positions are duly
taken into account. But is this situation satisfac-
tory? This, however, is not the real issue. It should
be recalled first and foremost that the CFSP
includes two European countries that are not pre-
pared to become members of WEU: Ireland and
Denmark. Moreover, in 1995 Austria, together
with Finland, Norway and Sweden, depending on
the results of the referendums to be held in the lat-
ter two countries, will become members of the
European Union; Norway alone has stated its
intention to apply for accession to the modified
Brussels Treaty.
53. Furthermore, the two European members
of NATO which are not members of the European
Union (namely Turkey and Iceland) whose acces-
sion to the European Union is not to be expected
in the foreseeable future are associate members of
WEU, with all the afferent rights excepting those
under Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty.
54. Additionally, WEU has granted nine Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries associate part-
nership status, offering these countries a wide
range of options for co-operation and participation
in the work of its Council and subsidiary organs.
The European Union has, for its part, concluded
Europe Agreements with only six of these coun-
tries, while agreements on a free trade area have
been signed with the three Baltic countries.
55. Under such circumstances several ques-
tions arise: given that the countries which belong
to the CFSP group of the European Union and
those of the WEU group are not the same, the pro-
blem of a multi-speed Europe emerges in relations
between these two organisations, raising an issue
which has not yet surfaced in public debate.
12. See Chapter IV, Appendix I, of the document on the
implementation of the Maastricht Treaty.
13. Document l4l2,8thApril 1994.
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56. There is undeniably a nucleus in European
defence and security matters 
- 
namely WEU. This
nucleus includes the full member countries, in
other words the signatories of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty and the countries that have acceded to
the treaty. Mutual assistance obligations under
this treaty and the development of joint positions
in the event of a threat to peace bind the member
countries together more firmly than obligations
under any other European or Atlantic ffeaty cur-
rently in force.
57. It should therefore first be noted that, as
compared with the European Union and the CFSP,
WEU member countries have reached a more
advanced stage of co-operation, thanks to the
reactivation of WEU which has led to full appli-
cation of the treaty. Moreover, WEU's intergo-
vemmental system has not prevented its member
countries from taking a large number of decisions
of a political, structural and operational nature.
WEU is not yet fully operational but it is making
progress thanks to the homogeneity of its mem-
bership.
58. Co-operation in the CFSP framework is not
yet as close or as advanced, partly because it is
founded on a treaty entailing far vaguer obliga-
tions and partly because its participants include
one neutral country (and soon perhaps four) and
one NATO member country, Denmark, which
refuses nonetheless to take part in closer co-ope-
ration in defence matters in the framework of
WEU.
59. The parallelism between WEU and the
CFSP and the procedures envisaged for interac-
tion between them should not therefore act as a
brake or block WEU's political action should
agreement in the CFSP framework appear impos-
sible or if CSFP decision-making is reduced to the
lowest common denominator.
60. With a revision of the treaties in prospect
during the intergovernmental conference n t996,
several matters therefore have to be seftled: fust,
WEU must be made fully operational and able to
act. [t must then be ensured that the organisation
can continue to develop its political action in
autonomous fashion and according to its own
rules, even after 1998. Your Rapporteur shares the
opinion expressed by the French Ambassador to
WEU on 29th September last in Brussels in an
address given at the Centre for European Policy
Studies which holds that the problem of merging
WEU and the European Union as such is a secon-
dary problem; what matters is that there should be
something going on in WEU so that there is some-
thing to merge with the European Union. Any pre-
mature attempt to replace the modified Brussels
Treaty or incorporate it wholly or partly into a
new treaty of European Union between sixteen
member states would endanger WEIJ " acquis "
and cause the mutual obligations of the partners to
be weakened. For this reason it might be interes-
ting to have more details of ideas, recently referred
to in the United Kingdom press '0, which suggest
that defence policy might become the founh pillar
of the Union, which would be separate from the
CFSP.
61. Thfud, it should be stipulated that several
WEU member countries will be able to take inde-
pendent political initiatives, either on WEU's own
behalf or on behalf of the European Union,
without first having to have received a mandate
from the latter, contrary to the present provisions
of the Maastricht Treaty. Should the European
Union be unable to reach agreement on an initiat-
ive from WEU, the latter should be free to forge
ahead.
62. Mr. L6otard, Minister of Defence of France,
stated very pertinently, during the colloquy that
the Assembly organised in Paris on 17th October
1994:
" I believe that in future WEU will gain
greater credibility and political efficiency.
Those who hesitate about this organisation
developing a r6le of its own should realise
that Europe's credibility on the internatio-
nal scene depends on that. "
In developing a true joint security and defence
doctrine which might be set out in a white paper
on security, WEU should, as the French minister
emphasised on this occasion, receive a mandate
from the highest European authorities.
63. To facilitate decision-making in areas
within its purview and to achieve the necessary
political impetus, the WEU Council should be
constituted, when necessary, as the " European
security and defence council " at the level of
heads of state and of government that might meet
when necessary on the occasion of meetings of
the European Council.
IVThe problems of enlargingWEU
64. To follow a coherent European security
policy based on the nucleus formed by WEU,
solutions must be found to problems stemming
from the fact that neither the member countries of
the Union and the WEU member countries, nor
the European members of NAIO and the mem-
bers of WEU are one and the same. Before the
Maastricht Treaty was concluded the WEU Coun-
cil's policy on admitting new member countries
was rightly based on criteria stating that enlarge-
ment should not prejudice in any way the " acquis ",
cohesion or homogeneity of WEU but should
contribute to strengthening European security. In
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this context, the Assembly had immediately sup-
ported Portugal and Spain's request for accession
to WEU.
65. When Turkey and Greece also made known
their wish to accede to the modified Brussels
Treaty (in summer 1988 and December 1988 res-
pectively), the Assembly expressed its firm view
that the two countries should first settle their bila-
teral disputes to avoid any weakening of WEU's
internal cohesion and particularly of the scope of
Article V of its treaty. However with the conclu-
sion of the Maastricht Treaty, Greece was invited
to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty, while
WEU had to abandon the policy referred to above
and was obliged to stipulate in the Petersberg
declaration of 19th June 1992 that the founding
treaties of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance would
not be invoked in disputes between member states
of either of the two organisations.
66. The weakening of the scope of Article V of
the modified Brussels Treaty will therefore beco-
me a reality once the process of ratification of the
protocol of accession of Greece to WEU is com-
pleted. Moreover the continuing conflict between
Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia and the crisis that has developed
recently between Greece and Albania, along with
Greece's ambiguous position towards the conflict
raging in former Yugoslavia, are together likely to
increase WEU's difficulties in reaching agree-
ment between the ten on a security policy.
67. As to WEU's relations with the European
members of NAIO that are not members of the
European Union, the WEU Council had to draw
the consequences of the decision it took at Maas-
tricht to link full membership of WEU with mem-
bership of the European Union. Article J.4 of the
Maastricht Treaty considers WEU solely as an
integral part of the development of the European
Union without referring to the nature of its rela-
tions with the Atlantic Alliance. Conversely,
declaration I of the WEU member countries
appended to the Maastricht Treaty states that
" WE(J will be developed as the defence compo-
nent of the European Union and as the means to
strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic
Alliance" ".
68. However, it appears that the same impor-
tance is not being attached to this second aspect of
WEU's r6le as to the first. For this reason the
WEU member countries decided to invite the
European members of NATO not members of the
European Union to become, not full members, but
associate members only of WEU. This decision
specifically concerns Iceland and Turkey. To date,
Iceland has not applied to become a member of
the European Union but political discussion
within the country reveals that a change of heart
towards the Union is in progress, influenced by
the decision of the Scandinavian countries to join.
If Iceland were to apply this would not present a
major problem for the European Union. However
the situation with Turkey is different. Although,
since 1987, the latter has applied to join first the
European Community, then the European Union,
the prospects of its being admitted in the fore-
seeable future are hardly realistic. The association
agreement between Turkey and the European
Community dates from 1964 and the European
Union is currently engaged in negotiations for
establishing a customs union with Turkey in 1995.
69. Turkey's importance to European security
has not lessened, despite the end of East-West
confrontation and of the Soviet threat against the
south-east flank of the alliance. Rather, Turkey's
r6le and influence continue to grow, as evidenced
by the development of its relations with Russia,
with the Islamic countries bordering on Russia
and in the Caucasus, with the countries of the
Near and Middle East and of its Balkans policy.
At the summit meeting in Istanbul that ended on
t9th October 1994 between the heads of state of
six Turkish-speaking republics 
- 
Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Turkey, Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan 
- 
discussions included the diverse
hostilities in the region, particularly in Nagorno-
Karabakh, and the hope was expressed that the
United Nations and the CSCE would play a more
effective r6le in these matters, which incurred the
irritation of Moscow 
'6.
70. Again, under fire on account of human
rights violations and/or for its handling of the
Kurdish problem, Turkey is experiencing a num-
ber of difficulties in obtaining recognition as a full
member of the Western European group of demo-
cracies. Additionally, the unresolved status of
Cyprus (which has applied for membership of the
European Union) and the other differences that
still exist between Turkey and Greece continue to
weigh upon the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance
and against Turkey's efforts to draw closer to the
European Union and to WEU. A petition submit-
ted to the President of the Assembly of WEU on
25th June 1994 by Mr. Monnot, a writer, even
requests that Turkey be refused associate member
status in wEU.
71. It remains to be seen whether the recent
appointment of Mr. Mumtaz Soysal as Minister
for Foreign Affairs should be regarded as a sign of
change in Turkish policies towards the West, and
if so, a change in which direction. In any event, it
must be entirely in Westem Europe's interest for
Turkey again to become a factor of stability in the
region and for it to retain as close links as possible
with westem security and defence structures.
15. Rapporteur's italics.
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72. Similar considerations, it would appear, led
the WEU Council to agree at its Kirchberg meet-
ing on a declaration intended to strengthen the sta-
tus of WEU associate members, while stressing
that this declaration did not entail any changes to
the " Document on Associate Membership "
adopted in Rome on 20th November 1992.
73. The Council therefore decided that associ-
ate members had " full rights to nominate forces
answerable to WEU ", to " nominate officers
to the Planning Cell " and that they should be
" connected as soon as possible to the WEUCOM
network for all communications concerning mee-
tings and activities in which [they] panicipate ".
Lastly the Council invited the Assembly to " exa-
mine further the present arrangements for the par-
ticipation of parliamentarians from associate
member countries ". All these declarations cannot
meet the aspirations of Turkey which has always
pressed to be admitted to full membership of
WEU. The meeting on 24th June 1994 between
the President of the Assembly and the President of
the Grand National Assembly of Turkey together
with the letter sent to the President of the Assem-
bly by two Turkish parliamentarians on 14th June
1994 testify to this.
74. It should be stated from the outset that the
Assembly cannot substitute for the Council when
the latter is unable to reach a clear decision.
Among the member countries, opinions are divi-
ded on the substantive issue of whether member-
ship of WEU should continue to be linked solely
to membership of the European Union. The dis-
cussion embarked on in the Political Committee,
and at the plenary session when Recommendation
558 " was adopted requesting the Council to
" reconsider the WEU declaration II annexed to
the Maastricht Treaty with a view to allowing the
European members of NATO which are not mem-
bers of the European Union the right to accede to
the modified Brussels Treaty ", demonstates that
there was no unanimity among parliamentarians
on this question either.
75. Furthermore, in accordance with the brief it
was given by the Presidential Committee, the
Political Committee carefully examined the
Council's invitation to review the arrangements
the Assembly made for the participation of parlia-
mentarians from associate member countries on
the basis of the Council's declaration further to
the document on associate membership of WEU
of 20th November 1992 published on 9th May
1994. The Political Committee reached the
conclusion that this declaration included no fac-
tors calling for a reexamination of the arrange-
ments agreed by the Assembly in Document 1416
17. See the report by Mr. Ferrari on WEU in the process of
European Union 
- 
reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of
the Council, Document 1417, lOth May 1994.
regarding the participation of parliamentarians
from associate member countries.
76. However, the development of the Euro-
pean Union and WEU's relations with Turkey will
constitute a crucial element in any European secu-
rity policy and must therefore remain on the agen-
da; when preparing " Maastricht II ", the Euro-
pean countries members of the European Union
must know whether they wish to regard Turkey as
an integral part of the area the future Union is to
occupy and the WEU member countries must
decide to what extent they are ready to integrate
Tirrkey into the structures guaranteeing Europe's
external security.
77. The proposal put forward by the French
Prime Minister, Mr. Edouard Balladur, in his
speech on 8th September 1994 to course partici-
pants at the French Institut des hautes 6tudes de
d6fense nationale (IHEDN) 
'8, which inclined
towards participation by the Central and Eastern
European countries concerned in a European
Council meeting devoted to discussion of a white
paper on European security, highlights another
institutional aspect of a European security policy,
namely harmonisation of WEU, European Union
and NATO policies towards the Central and Eas-
tern European countries.
78. At an informal meeting of the European
Union foreign affairs ministers on llth September
1994'e, the sixteen discussed the overall guide-
lines prepared by the German presidency, the aim
of which was to bring ten Central and Eastern
European countries closer to the Euro-Atlantic
structures, namely the European Union, WEU and
NATO. These guidelines envisage rapprochement
of the countries concerned 
- 
the four Visegrad
countries, Romania and Bulgaria, the three Baltic
countries and Slovenia, 
- 
according to three
models described below.
79. 
- 
The first option advocates parallel
admission of all of the countries concerned to the
three organisations.
- 
The second allows the possibility of
separate accessions, according to the specific
interests of the applicant countries.
- 
The third involves a stage-by-stage pro-
cedure for individual accessions over a specified
period but requiring all countries involved to
attain membership status of the three organisa-
tions within roughly ten years.
80. It is clear that discussions on such an
approach, details of which are not known to your
Rapporteur, are only at a very early stage. It should
therefore be recalled that a parallel approach by
Le Monde, 9th September 1994.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Znitrng, l2th September 1994.
18.
19.
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WEU, the Union and NAIO to the Central and
Eastem European countries is at the moment still
a very long way off and that the objectives of this
policy of convergence are far from being clearly
formulated.
81. The decision taken by the WEU Council at
Kirchberg, on 9th May 1994, granting the nine
countries of the Forum of Consultation, namely
the four Visegrad countries, Bulgaria, Romania
and the three Baltic countries the status of asso-
ciate partner of WEU does not concern Slovenia.
The recent differences between Italy and Slovenia
on minorities and other questions of neighbourli-
ness should be settled quickly in order to avoid
them having negative repercussions on questions
of security and preventing this former Yugoslav
Republic from also obtaining a status of associate
partner in WEU. The European Union on the
other hand is linked by " Europe Agreements "
only to the Visegrad countries, Bulgaria and
Romania, while the three Baltic countries have for
the time being concluded free trade agreements
with the Union. However at its Corfu meeting on
26th June 1994, the European Council recalled
that the goal of the Union remained the conclu-
sion with these countries of Europe Agreements,
intended to help them prepare for accession at
a later date. Hence the Union is in contact with
Slovenia with a view to examining terms for the
conclusion of a Europe Agreement. As to NATO,
the ten Central and Eastern European countries
mentioned are all NACC members and have joi-
ned the partnership for peace while Lithuania has
made an official application to become a full
member of the Washington Treaty.
82. As far as the objectives that the three orga-
nisations concerned are pursuing in their relations
with Central and Eastem Europe, only the Euro-
pean Union has clearly decided that associate
countries that so wish may become members of
the European Union as soon as they are able to
fulfill the appropriate conditions. At its Corfu
meeting, the European Council stated that " the
subsequent implementation (of the Europe Agree-
ments) is one of the essential conditions of mem-
bership " 20.
83. NATO, on the other hand, without opening
up any definite prospect of membership for the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, merely
stated at its summit meeting on lfth-l1th January
1994 " that the alliance, as provided for in Article
10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to
membership of other European states in a position
to further the principles of the treaty and to contri-
bute to the security of the North Atlantic area. "
The communiqu6 continued: " We expect and
would welcome NATO expansion that would reach
to democratic states to our East, as part of an evo-
lutionary process, taking into account political and
security developments in the whole of Europe. "
84. The use of the term " democratic states to
our East " is liable to give rise to all kinds of
conjecture particularly regarding Russia, as the
recent controversy between the German and Uni-
ted States defence ministers on the prospects of a
NATO enlargement to the East serves to demons-
trate 2'.It is now necessary to await the results of
the recent steps taken by the United States in
NATO in order to be able to be more specific
about enlarging NATO towards Eastern Europe
without including Russia 22.
85. Nor does the purpose of the WEU Coun-
cil's decision to grant the nine countries participa-
ting in the WEU Forum of Consultation associate
partner status in WEU emerge sufficiently clearly
from the document issued at the time 23. The refe-
rence made in this document to the decisions of
the European Council and the intention, explicitly
stated, of preparing the countries concerned for
integration into the European Union, and, in the
Ionger term, for their accession, is nonetheless
indicative of the direction taken, but without ope-
ning up a real prospect of the accession of these
countries to WEU.
86. Rather the document states that the status
of associate partner of WEU does not involve any
change to the modified Brussels Treaty, and the
Council representatives continue to stress that it
has no legal effect. Nevertheless the Council has
agreed with the associate partners on a system,
described in detail, which allows them limited
participation in the work of the Council and its
subsidiary organs. The degree of such participa-
tion and of information available to the associate
partners on the activities of the organs of WEU is
very variable, and the only common principle is
that they may not block a decision on which
consensus has been reached by the member states.
87. The complexity of the modalities of the
new status established at Luxembourg is such as
to offer little encouragement to the Assembly
when it takes up the Council's invitation to consi-
der the possibility of participation by associate
partners in its work. In accordance with the man-
date which the Presidential Committee gave the
Political Committee for proposing an operative
text on the adoption of an appropriate status for
delegations or countries becoming associate part-
ners before the matter is placed before the Com-
mittee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, your
Rapporteur has proceeded to reexamine these
questions.
21. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitwg, 12th September 1994.
22. Intemational Herald Tribune, 28th October 1994.
23. Document 1422,22ndMay 1994.20. See Europe No. 6260, 26thhne 1994.
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88. Such an examination nevertheless requires
clarification from the Council on several points:
firstly on the date of implementation of the status.
According to the Document on the Modalities of
3rd May 1994, the provisions apply from that
date; however, it is stipulated that the status will
officially take effect when:
- 
" the Hellenic Republic, currently an
active observer, becomes a member of
WEU and the Republic of Iceland, the
Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of
Turkey, curently active observers, beco-
me associate members of WEU;
- 
the associate partner has signed a Europe
Agreement with the European Union. "
89. This latter condition relates to the Baltic
countries. Lastly there must be clarification of the
meaning of the following statement: " In the
meantime the associate partners will be conside-
red as active observers to WEU with respect to the
provisions of their new status ". Moreover the
financial contribution arrangements arising from
the participation of the associate partners in WEU
activities should be made known once these are
established. In this connection on 15th June 1994,
the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, addres-
sing the plenary session of the Assembly, stated:
[This new status] " will certainly have
financial consequences. One of the presi-
dency's tasks will be to persuade the mem-
ber states' governments to provide the
finance for carrying out these political obli-
gations. I also seJit as the task of every
member of this Assembly to urge their
govemment, and in particular their minister
of finance, to ensure that their country's
financial contributions to WEU are increa-
sed in next year's budget. "
The Presidential Committee's meeting with the
Permanent Council of WEU in Brussels on 27th
September 1994 unfortunately provided no
enlightenment on the position regarding financial
contributions to the WEU budget from associate
partners.
90. Moreover, account must be taken of the
administrative and financial consequences of the
increase in the parliamentary delegations of asso-
ciate partners participating in the work of the
Assembly. Order 85 on the enlargement of
WEU'o rightly emphasised that " any reasonable
enlargement of the number of parliamentary dele-
gations participating in the Assembly will be
impossible without major adjustments of the
Assembly's accommodation and budget. " [Jnfor-
tunately, the Assembly's approaches in this regard
towards the Council have not yet led to results
that might lead it to believe that it will be able to
pursue its future activities stemming from a consi-
derably enlarged membership in normal working
conditions. Furthermore, on 15th June 1994, the
Chairman-in-Office of the Council confirmed to
the Assembly that the entry into force of this sta-
tus was immediate, that meetings of the Perma-
nent Council were being held in the presence of
the new partners and that the latter would also
attend the forthcoming ministerial meeting.
91. ln order not to delay further the participa-
tion of parliamentarians of the states which have
become associate partners of WEU, the Presiden-
tial Committee decided on l8th October 1994 to
enlarge the delegations of permanent observers of
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Romania and Slovakia from two to four members
and to invite the nine associate partner countries
each to appoint an observer to the Political, Defen-
ce and Ti:chnological and Aerospace Committees
and to the Committee for Parliamentary and Public
Relations, without prejudging the adoption of a
status for the delegations of these countries. This
new status, which is to be worked out in detail by
the Committee on Rules of hocedure and Privi-
leges, should enable the representatives of the
associate partner countries to participate in com-
mittee meetings with consultative voting rights
and in plenary sessions of the Assembly without
voting rights. The delegations of these countries
should be constituted in conformity with the provi-
sions in force in the Council of Europe.
92. The Bureau of the Assembly has referred to
the Political Committee a petition submitted by
Mr. Jarolimek, Chairman of the Committee of
Free Czechs and Slovaks in the Netherlands, to
the President of the Assembly, requesting him to
" deny any form of membership of WEU to the
Czech Republic and to the Slovak Republic, as
long as they discriminate, confiscate and do not
prosecute (ex) communist torturers, i.e. as long as
they do not respect the basic human rights and are
unjust ". Identical petitions were presented to the
Assembly by Dr. Radvakova, a chemist, and Mr.
Hajek, a scientist. To decide what action should
be taken on these petitions, the committee reques-
ted the opinion of the Council of Europe on the
grounds for them. The committee was informed
that the problems referred to in these petitions had
been dealt with in full by the Council of Europe. It
is therefore not necessary for the Assembly of
WEU to re-open a debate on these questions.
93. However, while is is necessary to define the
status of the delegations from states which become
associate partners of WEU, one must not lose sight
of the basic task which is to define the conditions in
which associate partners might subsequently be
invited to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty. If
the wish is to avoid different security zones being
24. Adopted by the Standing Committee in Rome on
April 1993, Document 1360.
l9th
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set up in the regions in question, it is not enough to
make accession to WEU dependent merely upon
membership of the European Union.
94. For the conditions fixed by the European
Union for countries wishing to become members
are only partly dictated by external security
considerations. It is necessary therefore to exami-
ne the question more deeply to ascertain what
significance and weight should be attached to
security concerns as compared with other consi-
derations, of an economic nature for example. Is
it not possible to conceive of a situation that
would require accelerated convergence of WEU
and the associate partner countries on account of
overriding security considerations, even before
other conditions for entry had been met? Nowa-
days, the impression often is rather that security
policy arguments are used as a pretext for not
making progress.
95. The WEU member countries have in point
of fact already overtaken the European Union in
terms of their policy towards the East, without
waiting for the European Union to negotiate Euro-
pe Agreements with them. The concern to ensure
consistency between WEU, European Union and
NATO initiatives towards the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe which, according to the
second part of the thirty-ninth annual report of the
Council to the Assembly 25, has until now guided
the work of the Council's Special Working Group,
is wholly justified. Nevertheless WEU cannot dis-
pense with its own assessment of the importance
of the security situation in Central and Eastern
Europe for the security of Western Europe and the
implications for the development of a common
defence policy in its own framework. It is on the
basis of such an analysis that WEU must decide to
what extent convergence with its associate part-
ners can be speeded up. WEU will furthermore
have to present and sustain its conclusions to the
European Union and NATO. To do so WEU may
of course take into consideration studies and thin-
king in these two fora to ensure consistency. As to
current thinking within NAIO, it is worth noting
the recent declaration by Mr. Alexander Vershbow,
Foreign Affairs Adviser to President Clinton, sta-
ting that there is no need to wait until the Central
and Eastem countries are integuted into Europe
before NATO opens up to them 26.
V. Some suggestions for a pragmatic approach
to a European security and defence policy
96. Joint assessment of risks to European secu-
rity remains an essential basis for formulating a
common security and defence policy. Such
Document l4ll, 5th April 1994.
Le Soir, 9th September 1994.
assessment depends in large measure on harmoni-
sing the interests of the various member countries.
To this end, it is necessary first for each country to
be asked 
- 
possibly by questionnaire 
- 
to state its
basic concerns and to specify the areas in which,
in its opinion, a joint, multilateral approach would
be required and those for which states should
retain a national responsibility.
97. In a speech given the University of Leyden
on 7th September 1994, the United Kingdom
Prime Minister, Mr. Major, observed for example
that:
" With France, Britain is one of only two
nations in the Union which still have a glo-
bal reach to their foreign policies. Alone in
Europe, the United Kingdom is a member
simultaneously of the United Nations Secu-
rity Council, the Economic Summit and of
the Commonwealth which now comprises
one third of the world's nations. We have a
deep involvement in all of the continents of
the world. "
and also quoted Hong Kong as an example, as the
United Kingdom regards the territory as being
solely a matter for domestic policy, an argument
which will hold good only until 1997.
98. Staning from a drawing-board where each
member country identified its essential interests
and the areas it felt to be of most direct concern,
areas of approximate convergence of interests
would need to be defined. Agreement would then
have to be reached, based on this definition, as to
what crisis or conflict situation might be likely to
affect European security and other common
interests in such a way as to require joint military
action. In this connection it is possible to draw on
the following criteria set out in the report on the
probable evolution of the common foreign and
security policy (CFSP) addressed to the Euro-
pean Council in Lisbon on 26th and 27th June
1992:
" It is possible at this stage to list certain
factors determining important common
interests ...
- 
the.geographical proximity of a given
regron or country;
- 
an important interest in the political and
economic stability of a region or coun-
try;"
To these criteria might be added other factors to
be determined such as perception of dangers to
the security of citizens of member states etc.
99. There will undoubtedly always be cases
where a particular area of interest will be more
important to some member countries than others.
For this reason there must be agreement, so that
the attitude of all member countries in any given
25.
26.
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situation is governed by the principle of solidarity
that must come to constitute the pillar of their co-
operation. The entire modified Brussels Treaty is
based on this principle, even if the most explicit
reference to the " close community of interests "
of the WEU member countries is in Article I
which deals with economic co-operation.
100. Differences of perception have been obser-
ved in many western European countries as to the
origins of the conflict in former Yugoslavia and a
certain mistrust noted between European partners,
in particular Paris, London and Bonn, as to their
respective intentions with regard to the manage-
ment of this crisis 2'. These differences have
demonstrated how much still remained to be done
to establish unqualified solidarity between all the
member countries.
101. There are numerous ways of reinforcing
this spirit of solidarity which must permeate the
political classes of the nations concerned and not
simply their leaders. From this perspective, the
regular exchanges of senior civil servants taking
place between the foreign affairs ministries of the
CFSP member countries might also be undertaken
within the framework of WEU and should be
extended to defence ministries and possibly even
to the private offices of heads of government.
102. In political terms, the senior political
figures with responsibility in WEU must be made
to understand that the organisation should remain
free to take initiatives in the areas of its remit
when the European Union has not made an expli-
cit request. In particular, the Council must be
reminded that if political initiatives and impetus
were to come from WEU, this could assist the
progress of the European Union as a whole. If,
however, the WEU leadership confines itself to
waiting upon the outcome of deliberations in
other European fora, WEU will rapidly become a
secondary organisation, carrying out subordinate
tasks only, like administering the police force in
Mostar, for which, as the Chairmanship-in-Office
observes in its Luxembourg report on Mostar,
WEU is invariably dependent on the outcome of
the negotiations between the European " troika "
and the parties.
103. WEU has a substantial work of analysis to
undertake on European security matters, exten-
ding far beyond the specific problem of a com-
mon defence policy currently being examined in
the Permanent Council. This policy has been defi-
ned by the Director of the WEU Institute for
Security Studies as: " a common policy with res-
pect to the use of the armed forces of the member
states of the European Union " ". Such analysis is
Matthias Jopp, Europa Archiv, 28th July 1994, No. 13-
Institute Bulletin No. 12, July 1994.
essential but must be approached in a wider pers-
pective. According to information published in
the press 2e, the WEU study concems mainly the
technical aspects, whereas Germany is believed to
be preparing its own study on the more political
problems, and France would also make a separate
contribution. Moreover, the United Kingdom
would no longer be so categorically opposed to
any integration of defence under the umbrella of
the European Union. The foregoing sections have
already referred to the interest there is in coherence
in the thinking of WEU, the European Union and
NATO on enlargementto the East. WEU mustthe-
refore monitor closely progress achieved within the
framework of the conference on the pact on stabili-
ty, the results of which are to be presented at a
second ministeriallevel conference in spring 1995.
To this must be added the assessment of the impli-
cations for European security of developments in
Russia and the CIS countries and the consequences
for the relations of (a possibly enlarged) WEU with
Russia, a subject which will be dealt with in the
report by Mr. Baumel. What implications might
arise from the prospect of a long common border
between Russia and the European Union if Finland
and Norway join? In this respect, one should draw
on Norway's experience of which the observer to
the Political Committee had noted that it was infi-
nitely better to establish clearly-defined borders
than to create grey areas. The result of the Finnish
referendum on 16th October last when the people
of Finland voted by a comfortable majority in
favour of the country's accession to the European
Union has greatly contributed to such clarification,
irrespective of the way in which Finland now
decides to organise its relations with WEU.
104. What interaction is there between WEU
and the European Union over the Maghreb coun-
tries and security in the Mediterranean? To what
extent are WEU members able to reach agreement
on actions directed towards crisis-management
and peace-keeping should situations similar to
those in Bosnia, Somalia or Rwanda arise? Is the
co-operation that has been established between
the United States, Russia and certain European
countries representing the European Union with a
view to establishing a peace plan for Bosnia a sign
of a retum to ad hoc coalitions and the balance of
power politics of former years?
105. During the discussion of the working paper
which your Rapporteur presented to the meeting
of the committee held on 26th September 1994,
one member wished the present report to contain
a description of the world security situation inclu-
ding the Mediterranean and crisis-flashpoints on
other continents. Your Rapporteur naturally reco-
gnises the importance of continuous assessment
of the risks of such crises to the world and their
27.
14.
28.
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consequences for Europe's security. He would
recall however that these questions were debated
in particular in Recommendation 559 on Euro-
pean security: crisis-prevention and management,
adopted by the Assembly in June 1994.In para-
graphs 25 to 28 above, your Rapporteur has
explained the reasons why certain parts of the
reply of the Council to this recommendation can-
not be accepted. However, in this reply the latter
states inter alia: " that the regular meetings of its
working groups and the item " Topical questions "
on their agendas provide opportunities for regular
assessment of risks and threats affecting peace,
security and European interests. It goes without
saying that the Council will draw the conse-
quences of its findings when they are perceived as
affecting European security ".
106. In the same reply the Council states that it
" can assure the Assembly that member states,
through the debates taking place at all levels,
always make maximum efforts to seek political
consensus, especially in the event of crises where
WEU is likely to play a rOle ". Unfortunately this
did not work in the case of Rwanda, nor in that of
Somalia. And what consensus has emerged in
WEU over ending the war in Bosnia which now
seems set to escalate further? Admitting that
WEU has virtually no political r6le whatsoever in
this conflict, the address given by Mr. Voorhoeve,
Defence Minister of the Netherlands, at the collo-
quy organised by the Assembly in Paris on lTth
October 1994, was particularly interesting since it
recalled WEU's responsibility in the management
of international crises, referring specifically to the
crises in North Africa, Algeria, Egypt, the sou-
them Sahara, southem Sudan, Burundi, the Per-
sian Gulf etc. Moreover he did not rule out
WEU's playing a pacifying r6le on the Golan
Heights in the event of a peace agreement being
reached between Syria and Israel; he mentioned
the r6le of Iran in central Asia and, lastly, the pro-
blems in the Caribbean and Haili where he advo-
cated that the WEU member countries contribute
to re-establishing a police force.
107. The minister rightly recalled that the WEU
member countries have neither the will nor the
necessary military means to promote peace in
every area of instability. In this connection he
declared himself in favour of a procedure by
means of which each member country should eva-
luate, case by case," whether our national inter-
ests and values prompt us to get involved or stay
out ". However, does not the development of a
European security and defence policy in fact
make it necessary for joint criteria to be estab-
lished in order to be able to act together?
108. A large part of the thinking on a European
security policy consists in defining the new fac-
tors which, from now, characterise Europe's rela-
tions with NAIO, and above all the United States,
since the development of a European security and
defence identity was confirmed at the last NAIO
summit meeting. However it would appear 
- 
at
least if information published by the press is to be
believed 
- 
that the emergence of this identity and
the strengthening of WEU, its means and autono-
my are at present marking time 30. According to
these reports, the Netherlands, Portugal and the
United Kingdom take a minimalist view of WEU.
Moreover the Assembly learned only from the
Council's reply to Recommendation 556 that the
Permanent Council had created a new Politico-
Military Working Group which has formulated ajoint WEU position on the CJTF (combined joint
task forces) concept, which has been introduced
in the framework of the alliance consultation pro-
cess. According to the last half-yearly report that
the German Government transmitted to the Bun-
destag on WEU's activities, this position of WEU
was communicated to NATO on29th June 1994.
What was the outcome? Other questions arise.
How will the United States react if Europe tries to
commit it to guaranteeing the security of the Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries through an
association with WEU? This would be as unac-
ceptable to the United States as it would be unac-
ceptable to Europeans to give the Americans a
right of veto over the way applicant countries to
the European Union should be dealt with3'. There
must therefore be close co-operation between
WEU and NATO over the policy of enlargement
to the East and WEU must define its thinking in
this regard. According to Mr. L6otard, Minister of
Defence of France, it seems inevitable that the
security guarantees provided by the Brussels
Treaty, on which WEU is founded, and by the
Treaty of Washington in respect of NAIO will be
extended to the new members of the European
Union32. Mr. Kinkel, Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Germany, stated on 6th October 1994 that a
country belonging to the Union wishing to join
WEU should also be admitted to NATO 33. The
proposal of the President of the Russian Federa-
tion might be recalled in this context, suggesting
that a security guarantee be given jointly by
NATO and Russia to the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries. These proposals have been rejec-
ted out of hand by the countries concerned, parti-
cularly Hungary and Poland. It will also be recalled
that the United States has a tendency to seek to
settle world-wide strategic questions through bila-
teral co-operation with Russia, to the detriment of
Western Europe. The increasingly frequent calls
for a new " transatlantic contract " reflect a gro-
wing anxiety: are the insffuments of transatlantic
30. See for example Le Monde, 29th September 1994:
article on the redistribution of r0les between Americans and
Europeans within NAIO.
31. Daniel Vemet, Le Monde, l2thMay 1994.
32. Le Figaro,30th September 1994.
33. Frankfurter Allgemeine Tninng, Tth October 1994.
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security created during the cold war period suffi-
cient to meet the challenges presented by the fac-
tors that now determine international relations?
109. WEU must, furthermore, continue to deve-
lop a coherent concept of its own r6le vis-d-vis the
United Nations, particularly in the context of
peace-keeping and crisis-management. Recent
talks between the United Nations Secretary-Gene-
ral and the representatives of the majority of
regional organisations seem to have yielded no
concrete results. It is important therefore that
WEU should state its position as clearly and
convincingly as possible at the United Nations,
the more so as the decisions it has taken over the
Petersberg missions have lent it credibility as a
player. Moreover, is WEU assured of being able
to speak with one voice in the Security Council
where it is represented by two of its member
countries? The matter needs to be looked into fur-
ther. The Rapponeur would refer in this connec-
tion to Recommendation 549 and to his report on
political relations between the United Nations and
WEU and their consequences for the development
of WEU 30.
110. The same applies to WEU's relations with
the CSCE, which is to hold its next ministerial
conference in Budapest on 5th-6th December
1994. The WEU ministers in their Kirchberg
communiqu9 agre,ed:
" that the CSCE, as the only European and
transatlantic forum covering all of Europe,
must be strengthened to avoid the emergen-
ce of new divisions. To this end, they reaf-
firmed their governments' resolution to
commit the necessary resources and to
continue working for a reasonable division
of labour with the CSCE giving effect to
the concept of mutually reinforcing institu-
tions developed in the 1992 Helsinki
Declaration. "
111. What will WEU's position be and what will
it do to make known these intentions at the Buda-
pest conference? Moreover, how will it react to
the Russian proposals to subordinate its work to
the co-ordination of the CSCE?
112. To return finally to efforts aimed at streng-
thening and improving the effectiveness of the
instruments available to WEU for discharging its
responsibilities, there will also need to be discus-
sion of the problems described below. After the
decision to reduce the term of office of the WEU
Presidency to six months from 1st July 1994, the
Assembly should be informed of the results of the
studies by the Permanent Council on questions
raised by the harmonisation of the presidencies of
the European Union and WEU which are still pen-
ding. It is interesting to note in this connection
that the study published by the Bertelsmann Foun-
dation on Europe 96 contains a programme of
reforms for the European Union that proposes
extending the term of office of the presidency
of the Council of the Union and the European
Council by at least a year in order to ensure conti-
nuity of work. One of the systems under discus-
sion provides, for example, for the replacement of
the alphabetical rotation of the presidency by a
system that would achieve a better allocation of
the presidential terms between the large and small
countries. Another proposal from the French
Senator, Mr. Jean-Frangois Poncet 3s, aims at the
free election of the President of the European
Council for a term of two years. In any event, this
problem must remain on the agenda in order to
achieve a solution that increases the effectiveness
of the work of the organisation. To this end,
WEU's policy planning and decision-making
must also be strengthened and the political section
within the Secretariat-General considerably rein-
forced.
113. When considering the future r6le of WEU
within the range of mutually reinforcing organisa-
tions, one must also consider the risk that certain
institutions are developing within WEU with dif-
ferent levels of participation and at different
speeds; inter alia the Council and its subsidiary
organs can now meet as 24,15,13 (in the case of
WEAG) or nine participant countries. In another
context the following development can be obser-
ved: certain member countries reach agreement
within a bilateral framework and then invite other
member countries of WEU to join them. A case in
point is the creation of the European corps which
was originally a Franco-German initiative. There
has recently been another initiative that aims to
reinforce bilateral co-operation in armaments
matters by setting up a Franco-German anna-
ments agency. These last two initiatives, intended
as they are to facilitate and speed up projects
whose progress is running into difficulties in the
framework of WEU and benefit member coun-
tries as a whole, must obviously be supported.
However, one should avoid such initiatives deve-
loping independently and giving rise to structures
separate from those of WEU.
VI. Implications for the preparation of the
1 99 6 intergovernme ntal conference
ll4. On a procedural level, it should be recalled
that the European Council decided, at its meeting
in Corfu on24th and 25th Jlune 1994, to create a
" think tank " to prepare for the 1996 intergovem-
mental conference, made up of representatives
of the foreign affairs ministries of member states
and the President of the Commission. This is to be
34. Document 1389,8th November 1993.
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chaired by a personality designated by the Span-
ish Govemment and will begin work in June 1995;
the conclusion of this work will be the presenta-
tion of a report in due course to the European
Council meeting at the end of 1995. It has further-
more been decided, following a German proposal,
reception of which was initially somewhat unen-
thusiastic on the part of the majority of countries,
that two representatives of the European Parlia-
ment will participate in the work of the think tank.
115. This procedure, based on the provisions of
Articles N, paragraph2 andl4,paragraph 6 of the
Maastricht Treaty has as yet no equivalent in
WEU, despite the fact that the declaration of the
WEU member countries annexed to the Maas-
tricht Treaty stipulates that: " WEU will re-exa-
mine the present provisions in 1996. This re-exa-
mination will take account of the progress and
experience acquired and will extend to relations
between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance. " It will
again be noted that the WEU declaration distin-
guishes itself from the parallel provisions of the
Maastricht Treaty by its added transatlantic
dimension.
116. If WEU wishes to assert its own thinking
and attitudes in the framework of the 1996 confe-
rence and to avoid being faced with a fait accom-
pli, as was the case in the negotiations on the
Maastricht Treaty, it is essential that those with
responsibility should begin their analysis imme-
diately and ensure that their conclusions are taken
account of from the outset in the work of the think
tank set up by the European Union.
ll7. Given the importance of this matter, the
task of reviewing the existing provisions should
be assigned to a WEU working group created
exclusively for that purpose. The Permanent
Council and its working groups are already too
overburdened with other tasks to be able to take
on this particular work. The new group should be
established at the next ministerial meeting and be
made up of representatives of the foreign affairs
and defence ministries, the Secretariat-General
and a representative of each subsidiary body.
There should also be participation by the WEU
Assembly in this work.
118. This " WEU think tank " must begin work
in early 1995 in order to be ready to present its
views in time to the European Union authorities.
In view of the working relationships established
between WEU and the Union, the two organisa-
tions should inform one another on the progress of
their work, providing, for example, for " cross-
participation " of collaborators from both secreta-
riats at the relevant meetings of the two groups.
However, care must also be taken that the WEU
group keeps the NATO institutions duly informed
of its studies. As to the chairmanship of the WEU
think tank, this should be offered to a personality
chosen in consultation with the Assembly.
ll9. Among the various subjects for examina-
tion, the Assembly should concentrate in particu-
lar on organising control by parliamentary repre-
sentatives over a future European security and
defence system, taking account of experience gai-
ned within the framework of Westem European
Union. It should be noted in this context that the
presidents of the national parliaments meeting in
Bonn on 13th Septem&r 1994 stressed the need
for increased participation by national parlia-
ments in preparing the European Union reform
due in I9963u.
120. It should be recalled in this connection that
in several member countries of the Union, parti-
cularly France and Germany, the constitutional
courts have been called upon to examine whether
the Maastricht Treaty is in conformity with the
national constitution. In France, the Constitu-
tional Council clarified in its decision of 9th April
199237 that the European Parliament did not consti-
tute a sovereign assembly with overall powers and
which might contribute to the exercise of national
sovereignty. [n its decision of l2thOctober 19933E
pronouncing the Maastricht Treaty in conformity
with the Basic Law of the Federal Republic, the
Constitutional Court of Germany stipulated clear-
ly that, in the context of European integration, the
transfer of duties and powers to the European ins-
titutions should not jeopardise the legitimacy of
the Bundestag and its influence on the exercise of
state power in such a way as to violate the prin-
ciple of democracy guaranteed by the Basic Law.
l2l. With a view to developing a series of models
for a system of parliamentary control, the basic
assumption should be that the 1996 conference
will not change the system whereby decisions on
questions with defence implications remain the
exclusive province of national govemments, mee-
ting in WEU in an intergovernmental structure.
Mr. Heathcoat-Amory, Secretary of State for the
Foreign Office of the United Kingdom recenrly
put forward the following arguments in favour of
such an arrangement:
" This arrangement has a number of impor-
tant advantages. The different forms of
membership and relationship embodied in
WEU's variable geometry 
- 
full members,
associate members, associate partners and
observers 
- 
are essential to accommodate
the different positions and interests of cur-
rent, and imminent, European Union mem-
bers in the defence field. WEU's institutio-
nal separation also offers a way of getting
36. Frankfrrrter Allgemeine Znitung,l4th September 1994.
37. Joumal officiel de la R6publique frangaise, llth April
1992,page 5354.
38. Zeitschrift Europiiishe Grundrechte, l8th October 1993,
No. 17, pages429-448.
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around the practical problem of taking
account of the extra-European obligations
and interests of various Union members.
The time is not yet ripe to try and squeeze
these different interests into a single strait-jacket. This would mean either forcing
states into false positions, which will prove
untenable in the long run, or weakening the
nature of the mutual defence commitment
which lies at the heart of WEU. We have to
recognise that common defence is deadly
serious. It must be a matter of deeds, not
words, of deep-reaching solidarity, not sim-
ply the highest common denominator 
-
especially at a time when Europe faces new
risks and new responsibilities.
NATO shows beyond any doubt that in the
defence field intergovernmentalism is not
second best; it is what works. I do not belie-
ve that any realistic observer can think that
European governments are ready to delega-
te decisions on defence, which are ultima-
tely decisions about the lives and deaths of
their soldiers, to a supranational body or,
even less likely, to majority voting. ""
Under these circumstances, the Christian Demo-
crat Group of the German Parliament's idea of
granting the European Commission the powers of
a European government, while the European Par-
liament would have the character of a legislative
body on an equal footing with the Council, the lat-
ter being called upon to take on the r6le of second
chambet cannot serye as a realistic basis of dis-
cussion for organising a defence Europe.
122. It is furthermore interesting to note that an
earlier document, prepared in August 1993 by the
same parliamentary group, stressed the need to
consider another bicameral system based on
representation of national parliaments at Euro-
pean level, thus forming a European Senate. In a
recent articlea, Mr. Jean-Frangois Poncet took up
this concept in the following terms:
" ... For as long as there are no political par-
ties, trades-unions, professional associa-
tions at European level, for as long as there
is no European government and opposition,
democratic legitimacy must continue to be
provided largely through national states.
This means that the dual nature of the
Union, its supranational and intergovern-
mental structure, must be maintained for
many years to come. This is why it might
be useful to create a European Senate
representing the national parliaments ... "
39. The next step for Western European Union: a British
view, The World Today, July 1994.
40. FranKurter Allgemeine Z,eitung, l9th September 1994.
Therefore, to avoid the public debate running off
course, it is essential very quickly to develop and
present convincing models which propose that
national parliamentarians are represented in a
European assembly such as that of WEU, an
essential instrument of democratic control for any
defence organisation that continues to be based on
a system of intergovernmental co-operation. For
unlike the European Parliament, only the national
parliaments and their committees can exercise
direct control over governments and have the right
to participate in the decision-making process.
123. In this instance, it would perhaps be appro-
priate to draw on the relevant provisions of the
European Defence Community Treaty, Anicle 38
of which provides for " the constitution of an
Assembly of the European Defence Community,
elected on a democratic basis ... based on the prin-
ciple of the separation of powers and having, in
particular, a two-chamber system of representa-
tion.
L24. But before proceeding with these various
trains of thought, one basic question must be rai-
sed: in two or three years, will the time really have
come to exercise the right laid down in Article XII
of the modified Brussels Treaty to terminate a
treary which has only in recent years again shown
its worth; would there not then be a risk of endan-
gering the gains achieved by the reactivation of
WEU and the success of all the efforts to make it
operational? The more dynamic the organisation
shows itself to be and the more successful its
activities, the less reason there will be to call its
treaty basis into question.
VII. Conclusion
125. Political Europe is currently being recrea-
ted on several fronts. The difficulty of bringing all
of these together to achieve a single structure is
the result, for the time being, of the lack of a clear
vision in relation to several fundamental aspects
essential to the final design of a coherent struc-
ture. In the first place, the outer limits and size of
the structure are not clearly defined: these depend,
inter alia, on developments in the regions borde-
ring on Europe. Then there is the problem of the
dimensions of the different buildings making up
the overall structure which have to meet different
requirements and accommodate inhabitants
drawn from different families.
126. Under these circumstances, both flexibility
and firmness are necessary. In matters concerning
European security and defence, any initiative
which seeks to reform the present system must be
directed by a need to strengthen and improve the
security of European citizens and preserve the sta-
bility of Europe. As to opinions on the rdle of
WEU in the context of building a unified Europe,
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the situation today is very different to the period
prior to the negotiations over Maastricht I. WEU
is now in a position to claim substantial gains in
several areas that have been acknowledged as such
and should not be jeopardised by experiments
based solely on institutional considerations.
I27 . To avoid revised conceptions relating to the
building of a Europe of security and defence lea-
ding to a weakening of that security, the Assembly
and the Council should co-operate more closely in
the coming years and the Assembly in particular
should be more closely associated with the thin-
king and the results of the research and studies of
the Council, its subsidiary bodies and its working
groups. In the words of the Chairman-in-Office of
the Council, addressing the plenary session of our
Assembly on 15th June 1994:
" On the question of the Assembly's parti-
cipation, I have said on several occasions
that it is up to the relevant presidency to
ensure that the procedures are pragmatic
and to consult the Assembly at an early
stage of decision-making. That will also
be possible within the new group set up by
the Council to consider the common Euro-
pean defence policy to be put before the
1996 intergovernmental conference. This
task is expected to take eighteen months.
It will be quite possible in that period for
your Assembly to offer its own input to
the Council, for the Council to refer back
to the presidency of the Assembly and for
this to result in very effective co-opera-
tion. "
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Amendment I
28th November 1994
A European security policy
AMENDMENT 1'
tabled by Mr. de Puig and others
l. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 6 and insert:
" Make arrangements without further delay for granting Slovenia associate partner status; "
Signed: de Puig, Martinez, Fassino, Benvenuti
l. See 9th sining, 29ttr November 1994 (amendment agreed to).
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Amendment 2
28th November 1994
A European security polity
AMENDMENT 2'
tabled by Mr. Soell
2. In paragraph 11 of the draft recommendation proper, before "WEU" insert "the member
states of ".
Signed: Soell
l See 9th sitting, 29th November 1994 (amendment fell).
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Amendments 3,4, 5r617 and 8
2Eth November 1994
A European security policy
AMENDMENTS 3,4,51 6,7 and E'
tabled by Mr. Blanuw on behalt of the Liberal Group
3. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from " countries " to the end of the
paragraph and iniert " taking into account the progress made on the way to EU membership; "
4. Leave out paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper.
5. In paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, after " European security " insert " in connec-
tion wittrthe Noordwijk preliminary conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence
policy ".
6. In paragraph 9 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " the success of the conference on
the " and insert " a meaningful ".
7. In paragraph 11 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from " alrange " to the end of the
paragraph and iniert " for WEU members to act in a more co-ordinated fashion in the Security Council of
that organisation; ".
8. Leave out paragraph 13 of the draft recommendation proper.
Signed: Blaauw
l. See 9th sitting, 29th November 1994 (amendments 3 and 4 negatived; 5, 6 and 7 agreed to; 8 withdrawn).
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Amendment 9
28th November 1994
A European securily policy
AMENDMENT 9'
tabled by Mn De Decker
9. Leave out paragraph (m) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.
Signed: De Decker
Explanatory Memorandum
Only countries which are members of both NATO and the EU may become full members of WEU.
To act otherwise would be tantamount to disrupting the balance provided for in the Maastricht Treaty and
would prevent WEU from continuing to be the defence component of the European Union.
l. See 9th sitting, 29th November 1994 (amendment negatived).
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Document 1440 10th November 19921
WEU's relatians with Russia
REPORT 
'
submitted on behalf of the Political Commifree 2
by Mn Baumel" Rapporteur
TABLEOFCONTENTS
Dnnrr RScoMMENDATIoI.T
on WEU's relations with Russia
DncFr Onoen
on WEU's relations with Russia
ExpreNerony MSMoRANDLTM
submitted by Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur
[. Intoduction
tr. The situation in Russia
Itr. The foreign policy of the Russian Federation
lV. Some guidelines for the development of relations between WEU and the
Russian Federation
V. Conclusions
AppeNox
Maps
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. de Puig (Chairman); Lord Finsberg, Mr. Roseta (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Alegre, Sir Andrew
Bowden, MM. Caballero, De Hoop Scheffq Ehrmann, Fassino, Feldmann, Goercns, Homs I Ferret, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr.
Kaspereit (Alternate: Baume[),1-ord Kirkhill, MM. Kittelmann, van der Linden, dc Lipl<owski, Miilkr P&tiavx, Mrs. Prestigia-
cgmg, MIt!, Puche Rodriguez, Reddemann, Rodeghiero, Rodrigues (Alternate: Mn- Aguiar), Salvi, Selv4 Seeuws, Seitlingec
Soell, van Velzen, Vingon, Ward, Wintgens, Woltjer.
N.B. Tfte namcs of those taking part in the vote are pinted in italics.
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Drafi Recommendation
on WEU's relalions wilh Rassia
The Assembly,
(i) Considering the importance of the Russian Federation, the main successor to the Soviet Union as a
world power, for the management of international relations and in particular for the establishment of an
order of stability, security and peace at world and European level;
(ii) Gratif,red that Russia is no longer a threat to the security of Western Europe, but recalling neverthe-
less that, in terms of conventional and nuclear afinaments, it is still the greatest military power in Europe
and still has the largest army and the highest defence budget of all the countries of Europe;
(iii) Recalling that after the withdrawal of the last military units from the states of Cenfral Europe, Rus-
sia still maintains roops in at least ten member countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States(crs);
(iv) Considering that the Russian Federation is, on the one hand, at a difficult juncture in the consolida-
tion of its internal political, economic and social situation and, on the other hand, at a stage where it is
defining its r6le in the world with particular regard to its place in a new security architecture in Europe;
(v) Convinced that such a security architecture in Europe is inconceivable without the participation of
the Russian Federation in the process of concerting approaches in the various international bodies desti-
ned to strengthen confidence, stability and collective security, particularly in the framework of the CSCE,
NACC and the partnership for peace;
(vi) Also convinced that the improvement in the domestic economic situation in Russia is an important
factor for strengthening political stability and security on the Eurasian continent;
(vii) Believing it essential to consolidate democracy and respect for human rights in Russia;
(viii) Calling consequently for the conditions to be created without delay for Russia to be associated with
the work of the appropriate international organisations for economic and financial co-operation;
(ix) Wishing relations between the Russian Federation and European authorities and countries partici-
pating in the process of European integration to be governed by the principle of partnership and co-opera-
tion;
@ Welc_oryrng, tlrerefore, the conclusion of an agreement of partnership and co-operation between the
European Union and Russia;
(xi) Believing that WEU as defence component of the European Union and European pillar of the
Atlantic Alliance must also improve its relations with the Russian Federation;
(xii) Convinced that the new relations with Russia should result in a permanent system for information,
dialogue and consultation and also co-operation in specific areas of mutual interest;
(xiii) Emphasising the importance of establishing contacts and dialogue between the WEU Assembly and
the two chambers of the Russian Parliament;
(xiv) Consequently welcoming the re-establishment of a regular interparliamentary dialogue in the fra-
mework of these new relations;
(xv) Stressing the importance of the controlled dismantlement of nuclear and chemical armaments on
Russian territory and that of the CIS in conformity with the international fteaties in force;
(xvi) Concerned at the dangers that might stem from possible shortcomings in the conftol of Russian
nuclear arms and the clandestine traffic of Russian nuclear material abroad;
(ruli) Insisting that all activities in crisis-management and the maintenance and re-establishment of peace
in crisis areas in the territory of the CIS should be conducted in conformity with the rules fixed by the Uni-
ted Nations and the CSCE and in co-ordination with those bodies;
(xviii) Also wishing the appropriate western organisations and their member countries to show greater
readiness in providing assistance in maintaining or re-establishing peace in the crisis areas mentioned above;
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(xix) Calling the attention of the Council in particular to the consequences of present developments in the
Caucasus and in the Turkish-speaking republics of the CIS for the future evolution of relations between
Russia and Turkey;
(xx) Wishing WEU to start a specific dialogue with the Russian Federation for harmonising their res-
pective concepts concerning the future development of the CSCE, particularly in the light of the summit
meeting that organisation is preparing to hold in Budapest;
(xxi) Emphasising that outstanding questions between Russia and Ukraine should be settled to the satis-
faction of both sides, respecting the sovereignty and independence of each one;
(xxii) Wishing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to continue to develop in such a way as to
become a factor of security and stability from which all its member countries might benefit;
(ttxiii) Wishing all the problems of neighbourliness between Russia and the countries that have become
associate partners of WEU to be resolved with due respect for the principles of international law and to the
satisfaction of atl the partners concerned in such a way as to increase security and stability in the regions
in question;
(xxiv) Convinced that co-operation between WEU and Russia in the framework of the implementation of
the Open Skies Treaty should be a prelude to the enlargement of this co-operation to other specific areas;
(xxv) Emphasising the importance of establishing close relations between the appropriate Russian
research institutes in security and defence and the WEU Institute for Security Studies,
RSCOIvIIVINNDS THAT TTM COUNCII-
1. Offer the Russian Federation permanent co-operation including a regular system for information,
dialogue and political consultation at ministerial level and at that of the chairmanship-in-office, the Secre-
tary-General and senior officials of the ministerial organs of WEU;
2. Determine, in co-ordination with the Russian authorities, the specific areas in which WEU might
offer the Russian Federation practical co-operation that might include questions within the purview of
WEAG and possibly space questions;
3. Offer its good offices to the Russian Federation:
(a) in its struggle against the clandestine proliferation of Russian nuclear material by creating ajoint WEU-Russia monitoring committee;
(b) for implementing the destruction of Russian arsenals of chemical weapons;
4. Offer, in co-ordination with the CSCE and using the framework of the conference on the stability
pact, its good offices for facilitating the settlement of all problems of neighbourliness remaining between
the Russian Federation and certain countries that have become associate partners of WEU and which
might jeopardise security in the regions in question;
5. Encourage its Institute for Security Studies to increase its contacts and co-operation with the appro-
priate Russian research institutes in the field of security policy;
6. Establish with Ukraine and Belarus similar relations to those proposed in paragraphs I and 2.
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Draft Order
on WEU's relations wilh Russia
The Assembly,
(i) Emphasising the importance of establishing a regular dialogue between the WEU Assembly and the
two chambers of the Russian Parliament in the framework of increasing relations between WEU and
Russia;
(ii) Consequently, wishing the contacts established between the WEU Assembly and the Russian Par-
liament on the occasion of the visit by a delegation from this parliament to Paris from 17th to l9th Octo-
ber t994 and the visit by the Political Committee to Moscow from24thto29th October to be followed by
the establishment of regular meetings outside plenary sessions of the Assembly,
Ir.wrrps rrs Prusror,vnnl CotuNatrrse
1. To take a decision allowing the exchange of views started with the two chambers of the Russian Par-
liament to be pursued on the basis of regular meetings, specifying the regularity and ways and means of
the participation of the committees of the Assembly in such meetings;
2. To ask the President of the Assembly to transmit appropriate proposals to the Presidents of the two
chambers of the Russian Parliament;
3. To study the possibilities of establishing a similar dialogue with:
(a) the parliamentary Assembly of the CIS;
(b) the Parliament of Ukraine;
(c) the Parliament of Belarus.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Baumel" Rapporteur)
I.Introduction
1. Drawing up guidelines for the development
of relations between WEU and Russia might
appear a very ambitious, indeed overly ambitious
project. For until now suffrciently clear points of
reference have been lacking which might form the
basis of a specifically " WEU " policy towards a
country which regards itself as the principal heir
to the defunct Soviet empire, now in the midst of
transformation and still searching for its identity
and r6le on the international scene.
2. During the final phase of the Soviet
Union's existence, initiatives by the WEU Assem-
bly permitted the development of a regular dia-
logue between the Presidential Committee and the
committees with a political function and represen-
tatives of the Supreme Soviet, even before the
WEU ministerial organs had established their ini-
tial contacts at govemmental level with the Soviet
leaders. It should be recalled that this dialogue
was started in April 1987 with the visit by a dele-
gation of the Bureau of the Assembly to Moscow
which had been assessed from the political point
of view in the report presented to the Assembly by
Mr. P6criaux at the plenary session in autumn
1987'. With the collapse of the Soviet Union it
proved difficult, if not impossible, to resume
regular parliamentary dialogue and, for a time, the
attitude of the Russians to WEU seemed to waver
between ignorance and indifference and a degree
of mistrust.
3. However, certain recent indications would
seem to suggest that the Russian authorities wish
to intensiff the dialogue with WEU and establish
special relations with the organisation. The cha-
racter of these remains to be defined, based on
mutual interests that the two parties are to make
known. Under the present circumstances, WEU is
in point of fact the only western organisation
which has no institutionalised relations with Rus-
sia. The European Union has just signed a wide-
ranging partnership and co-operation agreement
with that country which provides, inter alia, for
political dialogue to " bring about an increasing
convergence of positions on international issues
of mutual concern, thus increasing security and
stability; " (Article 6 of the agreement).
l. See the report on recent developments in Soviet external
policy presented on behalf of the General Affairs Committee
by Mr. P6criaux, Rapporteur, Document llll, 15th October
t987.
4. The Atlantic Alliance has also established
relations with Russia, offering the latter participa-
tion within the framework of the North Atlantic
Council. Russia also decided to join the partner-
ship for peace prograrnme which NATO proposed
at its last summit meeting to all states participa-
ting in the work of NACC and " other CSCE
countries able and willing to contribute to this
programme ".
5. WEU has therefore several reasons for
wishing to determine the aim, nature and scope of
the relations which it can and should enter into
with Russia. The first of these is based on WEU's
calling and function as an integral part of the pro-
cess of European Union and as the European pillar
of NATO, which make WEU the nucleus of a
European security and defence identity. In initially
offering the nine Central and Eastern European
countries a Forum of Consultation within WEU,
then a status of association within the organisation,
WEU has demonstrated in a meaningful way how
it intends to shape the outlines of a European secu-
rity order that includes a specific and determinate
number of Cenftal European countries 
- 
a percep-
tibly different concept from that chosen by NATO
through NACC and the partnership for peace.
6. Russia cannot remain indifferent to WEU's
approach at a time when that country is in the pro-
cess of developing its own concepts in relation to
a new European security order, since this approach
includes the three Baltic countries that formed
part of the former Soviet Union and were, until
now, regarded by Russia as " near abroad " coun-
tries in spite of their refusal to join the Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS). Moreover,
WEU's approach does not include countries like
Belarus and Ukraine, or indeed Russia itself and
the other CIS member countries.
7. However, there is another factor strengthe-
ning the need to establish an intensified dialogue
with the Russian Federation: already with respect
to the three Baltic states and Poland, which became
associated partner countries of WEU, but also
with the imminent enlargement of the European
Union to include three Scandinavian countries
and the prospects thus opened to the latter of
becoming either full members or observers of
WEU, the emergence is apparent of a new deve-
lopment whereby the European Union (and per-
haps WEU) and Russia will, in the foreseeable
future, become direct neighbours with a common
border over 2 000 km in length.
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8. However, the question is not merely limi-
ted to relations between neighbours. It is above
all a matter of reaching a more specific mutual
understanding of the way in which Western
Europe and Russia each regards their own and
the other's place, calling and r6le in the world
and in the management of international pro-
blems, with the specific concern of strengthen-
ing international security and stability. Western
Europe and Russia are both at a stage of redefi-
ning their r6le in the world, the first with the
objective of becoming a credible player in world
events on the basis of a true common policy, the
second facing the challenge of once again find-
ing a r6le that enables it to fill the vacuum left
by collapse of the Soviet Union and which
reflects the fact that Russia still represents one
of the major world powers. However, the signals
emitted by the huge geographical area occupied
by the twelve of the successor countries of the
Soviet Union, of which Russia is the powerhou-
se, are still too contradictory and too incoherent
to enable a clear idea to be obtained of the direc-
tion which Russia and the Commonwealth of
Independent States are about to take.
9. The main purpose of the visit the Political
Committee made to Moscow from 24th to 29th
October 1994 was therefore to gather more
detailed information on the political situation in
that country, the working of the various organs
of state and their co-operation and, above all,
the foreign and security policy of the Russian
Federation. The committee's various exchanges
of views with the Vice-President of the Duma,
the appropriate committees of the Duma, the
Council of the Federation, representatives of the
ministry for foreign affairs, defence and co-ope-
ration of the countries of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS), and also representa-
tives of the Institute of Europe and the Institute
of International Relations were most instructive.
These meetings, however, also showed that
many questions were still outstanding and that
much remained to be done to increase reciprocal
knowledge and understanding. This visit should
therefore be considered as the start of a dialogue
that should be pursued in a more regular
manner.
liament, which comprises two chambers, are
relatively limited. However, it is still difficult to
ascertain, in practice, who really governs the
country. A very important question seen from
the outside is who is responsible for defining its
strategic policy in general and its foreign policy
in particular. Is it the President alone and his
minister for foreign affairs? What is the extent
of parliament's influence? What r6le does the
Security Council of the Federation of Russia
play? The constitution is, unfortunately, unclear
on these points. Even at the level ofthe executi-
ve, it is not easy to understand the operation of
the present system where power is shared bet-
ween the President and the government. What is
the r6le of the army which is still deployed in
the majority of Russia's neighbouring coun-
tries?
11. After the departure of the last Russian
military units from Estonia, Germany and
Latvia on 31st August 1994 and signature of the
agreement, on 10th August 1994, between the
negotiators on behalf of Moldova and Russia for
the withdrawal over a period of three years of
the fourteenth Russian army, stationed in East
Moldova, Russia still maintains troops in Bela-
rus (25 000-30 000), in Ukraine (approximately
17 000), in Georgia (approximately 5 000), in
Armenia (approximately 9 000), in Azerbaljan
(approximately 500), in Turkmenistan (approxi-
mately 15 000), in Kazakhstan (approximately
1 000), in Uzbekistan (approximately 5 000), in
Kirgizstan (approximately 3 500) and in Tajikis-
tan (approximately 24 000)'z.
12. However, above all, it is the uncertain
future of the Russian army once repatriated insi-
de the borders of the Russian Federation that is
tending increasingly to cause problems for the
country's domestic policy. During the cold war
period, the Soviet army, on the strength of an
offensive military doctrine, played a leading
r6le; present in all the component parts of the
Soviet Union and in the majority of Warsaw Pact
countries, in 1989 it still numbered 4.2 million
troops. On 5th May 1992, the " official
birthday " of Russia's armed forces, it numbered
only 2.8 million and this figure had fallen to 2.2
million in 1994. Between now and the end of the
year, its number will fall to 1.9 million and then
subsequently to 1.5 million3. Furthermore, the
fact that the troops are available only in part due,
on the one hand, to massive desertion and, on the
other, because the inadequacy of logistical
means and poor maintenance of equipment
reduces even further the operational part of the
army. Troops very rarely receive their pay on
time. Conversely, the new KGB and the military
2. The situation in May 1994; figures taken from The Frono-
mist, 2lst May 1994.
3. Le Figaro, 8th September 1994.
II. The situation in Russia
10. Through the parliamentary elections held
on 12th December 1993 and the adoption of its
first democratic constitution based on a multi-
party system, a market economy and civil rights,
Russia has doubtless taken an important step
towards democracy. The constitution rests on
the principle of the separation of powers, with a
very strong centralised executive power in the
hands of the President, while the powers of par-
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intelligence service, the GRU, have lost none of
their efficiency. Furthermore, the arsenal of stra-
tegic nuclear forces is still in an excellent opera-
tional condition.
13. The crisis in government caused by the
army, the substantial reduction in the defence
budget, the uncertainty as to the future r6le of the
armed forces in a Russia that is no longer invol-
ved in a global confrontation with a strategic
adversary, have all contributed to diminishing
the political and social standing of the army,
inevitably causing tension and discontent among
the military. Material factors are also having a
negative impact. Low salaries and delays in pay-
ment, a lack of decent housing for the families of
officers repatriated from abroad, especially from
Germany, although the latter has financed the
building of thousands of housing units in Russia,
are among the factors exploited by various poli-
tical elements seeking to take advantage of the
anger and disappointment evident within the
army.
14. A case in point is Mr. Zhirinovsky, whose
LDP party may have picked up a third of the
military votea; another is Mr. Aleksandr Rutskoi,
the former Russian Vice-President, who at the
end of May t994 succeeded in bringing together
the opposition communist and nationalist parties
in a " Front for National Unity ", thus sfrengthen-
ing an already powerful extra-parliamentary
opposition. Recent rumours and discussions on
the holding of parliamentary elections, which
might be deferred by two years, for fear that the
advocates of reform obtain an even more
mediocre rating in the event of early elections,
are evidence of the difficulties in which those
close to President Yeltsin find themselves.
15. When the question of deferring the elec-
tions of both parliament and president was
brought up during the visit by the Political Com-
mittee to Moscow in October 1994, it aroused
mostly strong opposition. Mr. Karaganov, vice-
director of the reputed Moscow Institute of
Europe and counsellor of President Yeltsin, for
example, said that the postponement of the elec-
tions would be a major blow to democracy in
Russia. Once deferred, nobody would be able to
say authoritatively when they would be held.
16. President Yeltsin's proposal to convene a
" pan-Russian " assembly to discuss questions of
local management and ways of organising the
4. However, a recent poll conducted by the Friedrich Ebert
Foundation among more than 650 officers in the Russian
army whom they trusted revealed that support for Zhirinovs-
ky, if it had ever been high at all, had plummeted sharply.
According to the poll, which was published in the Moscow
Tribune of 28th October 1994,70Vo distrust him. The highest
ruting (58Vo approval) was scored by General Lebed, Com-
mander of the l4th army, currently stationed in the Transd-
niestr region of Moldova.
legislative and executive powers more rationally
has further added to the confusion. Moreover,
rumours abound that a real hand-to-hand
struggle is being played out between the Presi-
dent and the government on the one hand and the
defence minister and the military authorities on
the others. At the root of this crisis are both the
revelations of fraudulent practices in the army
stationed in Germany until the end of August1994
and the dissatisfaction of the defence minister
with the meagre budget allocated to him. More
important still, however, is the loss of control by
the political authorities to the military, who are
playing an ever-increasing r6le in the foreign
policy decision-making process. Such is the case
in Moldova where General Lebed, Commander
of the Russian army, conducts his own policy
independently of the usual ministry of defence
hierarchy and in Georgia, where Russian soldiers
have set themselves up as defenders of Russia's
geostrategic interests.
17. During its stay in Moscow, the Political
Committee was able to note the keen tension bet-
ween the Duma and the Russian executive, and
particularly the defence minister, when the
defence ministry refused to receive the commit-
tee at political level. A motion of censure against
the government, only just negatived by the
Duma, had repercussions on the programme
planned by the parliamentary authorities for the
committee's visit, and it was therefore not pos-
sible to go to Sotchi as planned to meet represen-
tatives of the peace-keeping forces in Abkhazia.
The last repercussion of this political crisis was
the Russian President's dismissal on lst Novem-
ber 1994 of Mr. Burlakov, First Deputy Minister
of Defence and former Commander-in-Chief of
Russian forces in Germany.
18. The consequences of the acquittal of Mr.
Valentin Varrenmikov, former Soviet under-secre-
tary for defence and one of the authors of the fai-
led coup of August 1991 against the Soviet Presi-
dent, Mikhail Gorbachev, cannot yet be
accurately assessed. It is clear nevertheless that
this decision strengthens the hand of the former
communists and nationalists grouped around Mr.
Rutskoi, with their incessant claims for the re-
establishment of the former Soviet Union.
19. Although there is no immediate prospect of
conservative forces returning to power in Mos-
cow, the political crisis is still disturbing. Even if
there is temporary stability, one cannot exclude
several possible scenarios that might stem from
the present political crisis. Your Rapporteur
would quote four:
(i) President Yeltsin manages to retain
power;
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(ii) Conservatives and/or nationalist
forces take control;
(iii) Pime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin
takes over;
(iv) a chaotic situation arises in which the
army takes over.
20. As to the economic situation in the country,
the indicators and information are conflicting.
What is certain is that the economic crisis is conti-
nuing. The economic system is still marked by
Soviet dirigism, particularly in regional industrial
centres far from Moscow Although a reduction in
the inflation rate has been possible, there is as yet
no prospect of a recovery in industrial production.
Rather the reverse 
- 
according to recent research
carried out in Moscow, industrial production has
again fallen by 27%o for the f,rrst half of 1994 as
compared with the previous year and the Russian
economy is suffering increasingly from insol-
vency. According to estimates by the Vienna
Research Institute in October 19946,30 million
Russians have incomes below the vital minimum
and 9 million are unemployed. Russians have litt-
le confidence in their economy. The Institute's
experts estimate the drain of capital from the
counffy at between $5 and $25 billion since the
collapse of the USSR. In the same period, interna-
tional investment was less than $2.7 billion.
21. The economic system is still far from per-
fect. Economic activity is at times completely
uncontrolled. The state cannot manage adequately
to protect those in the market and prevent colrup-
tion. Many would like to see a more stable sys-
tem. Regrettably, those who trade on the black
market seem to be the first to get rich quick. The
underworld elements (" mafia racketeers ") have
naturally no interest in changing the status quo.
The state's weakness is their strength. The more
their political influence grows, the longer it takes
to achieve reform and to establish the rule of law.
To inspire greater confidence in the market sys-
tem, it is necessary to improve and strengthen the
commercial code so as to support the develop:
ment of a spirit of enterprise within an orderly
environment. Moreover, it is absolutely essential
for the rules of commerce to be underpinned by
state guarantee in order to create an attractive cli-
mate for international investment.
22. Moves to establish a private sector are
underway with the implementation of the first pri-
vatisation phase. In this initial stage, the State dis-
tributed free privatisation vouchers with a face
value of 10 000 roubles to all Russians. [t was
intended that these could be traded for company
shares. An entire new class of entrepreneurs
emerged at a stroke in the commercial and service
sectors and then in industry. The business and ser-
vice sectors are the first to take off since they are
not weighed down by the economic heritage of
the old Soviet Union, as is the case, for example,
with industry. The banking system still needs to
be improved and the tax system modernised. The
first cannot offer a system of financing that func-
tions adequately and the second does not bring in
enough revenue to a state which substantially
lacks the financial means to mitigate the social
consequences of radical economic reforms.
Consequently, social inequality is on the increase.
23. After the first private enterprises went
bankrupt on 13th July 1994, parliament, which is
dominated by opponents of the reform, blocked
the implementation of the second privatisation
wave. In this phase of cash sales, Russians would
have been able to sell their vouchers to interested
investors who in turn would have been able to
raise capital. The government was hoping that a
new class of investors would emerge around
banks and insurance or financial groups. The pro-
gramme has now been referred back to the parlia-
mentary committees concerned for review. On
19th July 1994, President Yeltsin announced that
he would have recourse to a decree if parliament
continued its opposition. A decree might certainly
be one solution; however, given the extent of pri-
vatisation, it would be better to have the support
of the majority of political forces.
24. The description of the process of transfor-
ming a planned economy into a market economy
given by the Prime Minister of the Czech Repu-
blic, Vaclav Klaus, during the annual session of
the Mont P6lerin Society in Cannes'is also valid
for the Russian economy. The process of transfor-
mation should be a mix of spontaneity and delibe-
rate action. In other words, the private economic
activities of thousands of participants in the mar-
ket should be conducted freely in an economic
framework fixed by the state. Economic recons-
truction is not the result of the omnipotence of one
group of reformers or another. It is therefore in the
interest of the West to support further the deve-
lopment of private business. The more private
entrepreneurship emerges and the more private
property rights are awarded, the higher the pressu-
re on the Russian Government becomes to conti-
nue with economic and democratic reforms. Also,
the higher the price will rise for Russia to pay, if it
decides to march backwards.
25. As to the cohesion of the Russian Federa-
tion, completely contradictory signs are also
observable here. There is evidence of both centri-
fugal and centripetal tendencies in a country that
covers more than three quarters of the territory of
the former Soviet Union and houses more than
half its population 
- 
around 148.5 million inhabi-
tants, 8l.5Vo of them Russian. Geographically,
6. Neue Zrjrcher Z.eit'lng, 5th October 1994.
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Russia is still the largest country in the world,
with a vast wealth of natural and human
resources. More than 25 million Russians now
live outside the borders of the Federation. Inter-
nally, Russia seems to have trouble in defining its
identity, whether at national, state or international
level. History offers no precise guidelines, other
than the fact that Russia has never been a nation
state, but has invariably conducted itself as an
empire. With more than 100 nations and races, it
is a multi-ethnic country which today must carve
out its destiny without reference to the past. Of
very recent birth, in one sense it represents the
world's most modern form of state with enormous
reserves of potential. Time alone can tell in which
direction it will turn: towards Europe, the East or
possibly in both directions at once.
26. However, a major preoccupation for its
political leaders is the problem of controlling the
centrifugal forces in evidence in several regions
of the country. From its very foundation, the Rus-
sian Federation has suffered from a degree of
disintegration and is prey to secessionist ele-
ments. The Federation of Russia has 89 parts:
21 republics, six territories,49 regions, two cities
of federal importance (Moscow and Saint Peters-
burg), one autonomous region and ten autono-
mous districts. The statutes of the parts of the
Federation republics are different. For instance,
the republics have a constitution which enables
them to establish their own structures of power.
Thus, several of them have elected a president
who sometimes develops his own ideas on the
future of his territory. The integrity of the country
is threatened, particularly by separatist and natio-
nalist tendencies and especially in the Caucasus,
Siberia and the Urals. This phenomenon illus-
trates Russia's heterogeneity. Moreover, without
being able to offer adequate incentives, the state
can no longer manage adequately to justify to the
different peoples making up the country why a
strong central leadership should be retained. It is
not only the prosperous regions that are beginning
to demand the right to organise themselves more
independentlys. Boris Yeltsin has tried to stabilise
the process by offering the separatist regions
agreements granting very wide autonomy which,
in his terms, would be tantamount to real federa-
lisme. Tatarstan, a republic in the southern Urals,
with a wealth of oil resources, was the first to
conclude such an agreement on 15th February
1994, followed on 3rd August 1994by its neigh-
bout the independent republic of Bachkortostan
which also has oil deposits. The agreements pro-
vide for a greater autonomy in econbmic decision-
making particularly with regard to the exploita-
tion of petroleum resources.
8. For example, on 10th August 1990, Tatarstan asserted its
sovereignty by claiming the right to exploit its own natural
resources (Ramses 1992, page 53).
9. Financial Times,4th August 1994.
27. It is perhaps understandable that a country
as large as Russia should never achieve a distribu-
tion of wealth that is completely equal or develop-
ment that is entirely even. However, the fact
remains that the various discrepencies in supply,
infrastructure and salaries can threaten the stabil-
ity, peace and existence of Russia. Very often,
such differences of economic and social status
underlie a so-called " ethnic " conflict. Russia
undoubtedly has its share of civil strife, disasters
inflicting heavy losses of human life and damage
to the environmentr0 and extreme tension between
different populations, both internally and in the
territories of the newly independent republics.
Several cases of violent hostilities, some of them
dating back to early this century and often exacer-
bated down the years as a result of Stalin's policy
of deportation, have either erupted or are current-
ly threatening to do so. These give rise to waves
of refugees which neighbouring countries have
difficulty in absorbing and which add to problems
of secession.
28. Among the latter one might note in particu-
lar the Chechen rebellion under the leadership of
Dzhokhar Dudayev, a former Soviet airforce
general who assumed the presidency in October
1991 following elections that were probably rig-
ged. An independent Muslim republic was pro-
claimed on 23rd November 1991. Chechnya had
been conquered by the Russian Empire in the
nineteenth century. Although the Russian
Government decreed a state of emergency in the
region at the end of 1991 and maintained an eco-
nomic blocade against the self-proclaimed repu-
blic, refusing to grant it independence, it had,
nevertheless, for a considerable time remained
virtually silent, [rying, without any real success,
to establish an opposition govemment. It changed
its policy at the end of June 1994 stating that Che-
chnya was the major destabilising factor in the
northern Caucasus " and that the time had come to
take definite decisions12. The govemment did not,
however, specify the content of these decisions in
detail, while ruling out Russian military action.
On 8th August 1994,Mr. Dudayev declared him-
self ready to give up power if Russia and the inter-
national community recognised the Chechen
republic's independence. So far, no country has
recognised the break-away republic. Moscow
seems to be supporting the provisional Council,
an opposition group led by businessman Oumar
Avturkhanov. He is to control a part of the terri-
tory of the Chechen republic, namely the Nachte-
retchni district. The Chechen Government has
10. For instance, the recent oil spill in Usinsk due to poor
maintenance of an oil pipeline or the catastrophic shrinking
of the Aral sea, now belonging to Kazakhstan and Uzbekis-
tan, caused by the diversion by Soviet authorities ofits feeder
waters for irrigation purposes.
11. Le Figaro, 3rd August 1994.
12. Neue ZitrcherT*twng,4th August 1994.
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tried to involve Turkey in this dispute by asking
President Demirel to help the Chechen people in
their struggle for independence and freedom13.
Also of note is the independence claim put for-
ward by the national Council of the Balkars
peoplera and the intention Eduard Rossel, Presi-
dent of the Sverdlosvk Oblast Duma, has stated of
creating an independent republic of the Urals'5.
29. There are doubtless limits, both theoretical
and practical, to the pursuit ofthe process offede-
ralisation in Russia. Firstly, although there are
over 100 nations and ethnic groupings on Russian
territory these are numerically too few to consti-
tute a true majority among the populations of the
territories they claim under the right of self-deter-
mination of peoples. Only in Dagestan, Kabardino-
Balkaria, Northern Ossetia, Chechnya, Tchuva-
chia and Tuva do such majorities exist'6. How can
these autonomous republics be prevented from
again splitting up in response to demands from
increasingly tiny and localised nations or ethnic
groupings? It seems highly dangerous to combine
the right of self-determination with that to secede.
The suggestion of allowing all the inhabitants of a
particular region and not just those of a given eth-
nic grouping to vote on its independence would
not resolve the problem. This would ignore the
deportations and displacement of populations car-
ried out during the years of Soviet rule, which
have substantially changed the compositions of
the populations of such regions.
30. We have already noted that regions with
abundant resources were the first to claim inde-
pendence. Others could certainly not survive
without " outside " support from Russia, not
necessarily confined exclusively to those without
a border with a third country. Does agreement on
independent federal status not therefore depend
more on a local concentration of a particular
people than on a traditional demarcation of a
region regardless of its inhabitants? For Russia,
the reply to that question may become crucial to
its survival. Analysis leads to one important
conclusion: Moscow today fully controls only a
part of Russian territory.
III. The foreign policy of the
Russian Federation
31. Following the accession to independence
of fifteen republics that emerged from the collap-
se of the Soviet Union, Russia experienced a
degree of difficulty in deciding whether it should
regard itself as a European, an Asiatic or a Eur-
13. Neue Zircher Zeitung,5th October 1994.
14. RFE/RL News Briefs, 20th-24th June 1994, page2.
15. RFE/RL News Briefs, l6th-2fth May,1994,page2.
16. Christoph Mick, Probleme des Fdderalismus in Russland,
Osteuropa, July 1994, page 612.
asian country or quite simply as a power with glo-
bal ambitions. The determining factors will be the
evolution of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) and the way in which Russia inter-
prets the purpose of this grouping, initially foun-
ded on 8th December l99I by the Minsk accord,
signed by the Presidents of Belarus, Russia and
Ukraine.
32. On 21st December 1991, eleven of the fif-
teen former Soviet Socialist Republics (minus the
three Baltic countries and Georgia) joined the
CIS, envisaged as a voluntary association ofequal
and sovereign states, certain of whose structures
have only gradually come into being. The major
trends in its development are, as is often the case
on this massive continent, contradictory oscilla-
ting between centrifugal and centripetal tenden-
cies. However, the CIS has seen a remarkable
strengthening of its r6le. Initially, it seemed very
weak. After its foundation in 1991, the newly-
independent republics joined the commonwealth
only very reluctantly. They suspected Moscow of
wanting to use it as a means of restoring the posi-
tion of the former Soviet Union. They themselves
viewed the CIS rather as the instrument of a peace-
ful and controlled separation from the former
USSR. Consequently, unlike Russia, which has
always sought to strengthen the CIS, the other
countries were reluctant when it came to conclu-
ding agreements on important matters. The mem-
ber countries could not, for example, reach in-
depth agreement on security questions, economic
and monetary co-operation or co-ordination of
their reform policies. Additionally, the eastern
republics of the old Soviet Union began to evolve
in an opposite direction with their projected parti-
cipation in the Economic Co-operation Organisa-
tion (ECO), originally founded by Turkey, Pakis-
tan and Iran. Turkmenistan is much sought after
by Iran and Turkey. Indeed, the latter is making
enthusiastic overtures to all Turkish-speaking
republics and the Gagauz minority, a people of
Turkish origin in southern Moldova. At the
second summit meeting of the Turkish-speaking
republics 
- 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan,
Turkey, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
- 
the heads
of state affirmed their intention to strengthen their
relations independently of Moscow. While,
admittedly, some 350 agreements have been
signed under the auspices of the CIS, no impor-
tant agreement has yet been signed by all the
member countries. Furthermore, the republics
have often taken the liberty of amending or of
ignoring the decisions of the Council of presidents
or of prime ministers.
33. The basic CIS document is its Charter,
signed on22nd January 1993 in Minsk by seven
countries: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kir-
gizstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. This
stipulates, first, that the CIS is based on the sove-
reign equality of all its members and that it is not
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a state; nor does it include supranational elements.
The Charter contains two important chapters on
collective security and military co-operation and
conflict-prevention between member countries;
these chapters envisage the creation of a Council
at heads-of-state level for defence and protection
of the foreign borders of member countries. It also
established a Council of Defence Ministers and a
high command of the united armed forces. Final-
ly, a CIS parliamentary Assembly was created,
which sits in Saint Petersburg.
34. On several occasions, the member countries
of the CIS have stated that they were prepared to
create a defence union, but they have not yet
concluded an agreement in this sense. Admittedly,
there is the Treaty of Tashkent on collective secu-
rity, but in May 1992, the treaty had been signed
by only six members of the CIS: Armenia,Kaza-
khstan, Kirgizstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbe-
kistan. Later, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Georgia fol-
lowed suit. When Armenia attempted to invoke it,
no reaction was forthcoming from the signatory
countries t7. Today, the treaty, which includes an
article establishing a very restrictive assistance
obligation, has still not been ratified by all the par-
liaments of the signatory states and it has still not
been signed by Moldova, Ukraine and Ttrrkmenis-
tan. Moreover, the new republics, including Russia
but excepting Kirgizstan, have created their own
armies. They have abolished the Soviet army and
replaced it by the " armed forces of the CIS " with
a fairly weak joint military command and without
any operational basis for the time being.
35. What are the factors that militate in favour
of the evolution of the CIS and for sffengthening
its r6le? First, Russia has meanwhile succeeded in
integrating all the new republics, with the excep-
tion of the Baltic countries, into the CIS'8. More-
over, Russia has sought to make the CIS accep-
table to the international community as a regional
or international organisation and has requested
financial support from the United Nations. The
West's reluctance to become involved in the
conflicts raging in the former Soviet republics,
particularly in the Caucasus and Moldova, has
encouraged Russia to try to assign itself a peace-
keeping r6le, with or without the agreement of the
United Nations, with or without the agreement of
the CSCE or with the more or less willing agree-
ment of the other members of the CIS. The fact
that most of the latter refused to take part in
peace-keeping operations with the Russians, in
particular in Georgia or in Tajikistan, even streng-
thened Russia's r6le in peace-keeping in the terri-
tory of the CIS. If Russia were to succeed in
convincing the international community to grant
17. Ramses 1994,page lM.
18. Moldova has never ratified the Treaty of Minsk, the foun-
ding document of the CIS, however, it participates more or
less fully in CIS structures.
the CIS an identical status to that, for example, of
the Organisation of African Unity, which has car-
ried out numerous peace-keeping interventions, it
would have an instrument that enabled it to
conceal its international ambitions behind a res-
pectable organisation.
36. At the institutional level, the Russian
Government in January 1994 stressed the impor-
tance it attached to the CIS by creating a minisbry
for co-operation with its member countries. Both
chambers of parliament created committees for
CIS affairs 
- 
which had not existed under the pre-
vious parliament 
- 
that of the Duma also being res-
ponsible for ties with fellow counfirymen. Vladimir
Shumeiko, President of the Russian Federal Coun-
cil and the interparliamentary Assembly of the CIS
and close to President Yeltsin, requested on 29th
July 1994 that co-operation between the member
countries of the CIS be intensified. In his opinion,
such co-operation would be followed by the crea-
tion of a confederation of CIS member states'e.
37. As regards co-operation in security matters,
Russia has let it be known that it would be ready to
go even further. It has put forward a proposal for a
military alliance that could extend nuclear cover to
the newly-independent countries, specifically by
grouping countries in possession of nuclear wea-
pons (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine), but also
the other CIS member countries nearest to Russia20.
There are reasons for fearing that Russia is increa-
singly succeeding in dominating the CIS, while
reinforcing and restructuring it as an international
organisation. Thus it will find in the latter a very
useful adjunct to its international ambitions.
38. However, Russia's interest in extending its
influence over its neighbours has limits. In the
face of the enormous economic difficulties the
new republics, particularly Belarus and Ukraine,
are experiencing and reacting to a proposal for
monetary union with Belarus specifically, the
Russian Government made quite clear that it
would not be prepared to finance their budget
deficits. This astonishing fact was apparent to all
before the presidential elections in Belarus and in
Ukraine, when all the major opposition candidates
declared themselves in favour of the re-establish-
ment of closer relationships between their coun-
tries and Russia. For similar economic reasons,
Moscow continues to oppose the entry of Tajikis-
tan into the rouble currency area". The Russian
Government is therefore aware that the cost of
19. RFE/RL News Briefs, 25th-29th July 1994/lst-5th
August 1994, page 10.
20. International Herald Tribune, 3lst August 1994.
2l . Demonstrating the struggle within the Russian authorities
to agree on a coherent policy with respect to the CIS member
states is President Yeltsin's harsh comment on those suppor-
ting a tough fiscal and monetary policy that so far has exclu-
ded Tajikistan from the rouble currency area. President Yelt-
sin strongly supported Tajikistan's wish to join the rouble
zone. Financial Times, 22ndOctober 1994.
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maintaining a traditional imperialist policy might
be too heavy for the Russian people to bear. It is
highly unlikely that Russia will succeed in estab-
lishing a thriving democratic state and a market
economy if it continues to fritter a large part of its
resources away outside the country instead of
concentrating on reconstruction at home. It also
seems clear that systematic destabilisation of the
economies on the periphery of Russia would
detract from this goal.
39. Nevertheless, efforts to create a new execu-
tive body of the CIS with the task of strengthening
its economic union, possibly leading to financial
union, have led to a decision by the member coun-
tries at the CIS summit meeting on 21st October
1994 to form an inter-state economic committee.
The supranational body, in which Russia will
control 50Vo of the votes while decisions are taken
by an 8O7o vote, will be based, unlike other CIS
structures presiding in Minsk, in Moscow. The
ultimate goal of the committee is to create a cus-
toms union and a payments union within the CIS.
However, many of the signatory states retained
the right to opt out of the agreement and the
Ukrainian Prime Minister, Mr. Vitaly Masol,
immediately declared that Ukraine would not take
part in the payments union22.
40. Although Russia's interest in a stable CIS
currently seems limited to the desire to see it
develop for its own benefit as an effective econo-
mic entity, the last summit of the CIS member
countries in Moscow proved the continuation of a
trend which has been visible for some time now:
Moscow is making itself more and more the
centre of the CIS, its ulterior motive being that in
future this may lead to full reintegration of CIS
territory around Moscow. Such calls come not
only from Russia but also from various CIS mem-
ber countries.
41. In September l994,Russia's head of foreign
intelligence, Yevgeni Primakou published a report
entitled " Russia 
- 
CIS, must the West change its
approach? ", in which he considered that the CIS
would be the only organisation capable of avoi-
ding nationalist, authoritarian or fundamentalist
tendencies among all the members of the CIS.
42. During talks the Political Committee held
in Moscow in October 1994 with Mr. Medvedev,
vice-Minister for co-operation with CIS states, he
and his aides supported a proposal, initially put
forward by the Kazakh President Nursultan
Nasarbaiev, to form a Eurasian Co-operation
Council with stricter rules of adherence and stron-
ger political and economic ties. Membership rules
would also include the provision of human rights
standards and the condition that member states
must be free of civil war. However, they admitted
that respective plans were far from being achieved
and that even Russia would have difficulties in
meeting the proposed criteria.
43. The causes of CIS's evolution are still to be
assessed, particularly in view of the fact that in
certain CIS regions, centrifugal forces continue to
present the Moscow leadership with difficult pro-
blems: for example, fighting has continued bet-
ween Armenia and Azerbaijan for six years in
Nagorno-Karabakh, an enclave in western Azer-
baijan whose population is roughly 807o Arme-
nian. The Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and the
Azeri enclave of Nakhichevan in Armenia, which
Armenia has claimed since 1987, were created by
the I92l treaty between Turkey and the Soviet
Union. The two parties to the conflict have com-
mitted atrocities which have cost thousands of
lives. Today, Armenia occupies 28Vo of Azenter-
ritory. Armenians living in Azerbaijan had to flee
the country to Armenia while Azeris living in
Armenia moved towards Azerbaijan. In Decem-
ber 1991, the Armenian region declared indepen-
dence. Russia proposed deployment of its buffer
forces, but Azerbaijan demanded that peace-
keeping forces be sent that were drawn from the
CSCE, particularly from the member countries of
the Minsk mediators group. Azeri authorities have
often accused Russia of backing Armenian forces.
A Russian peace plan currently envisages
independent status for Nagorno-Karabakh. The
signing, on 20th September 1994, of an oil
contract between Azerbaijan and a western majo-
rity oil consortium revived tension between Mos-
cow and Baku after the Russian Minister for
Foreign Affairs made it known that he did not
recognise the agreement 23. Clearly, Moscow
wishes to keep strategic control over trade in and
transportation of oil in the region.
44. Several flashpoints exist in Georgia, parti-
cularly in the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions
where violent hostilities broke out in 1993. Until
now, only the Ajaria region has remained at peace
- 
albeit a very uncertain peace. Russia is suspec-
ted of having for a time supported the rebel
regions to put pressure on the government of Pre-
sident Shevardnadze. President Shevardnadze
replaced the first President of Georgia, Zviad
Gamsakhurdia in 1992, under highly suspicious
circumstances. Mr. Gamsakhourdia had been
elected President of Georgia in May 1991. Rus-
sian forces took up positions close to the River
Inguri, with the go-ahead, after the event, of the
United Nations, to monitor a truce between the
Abkhazian secessionists and the Georgian
Governmentz. The conflicts in the Caucasus are
threatening to extend to the Kuban region in the
23. Le Monde,22nd September 1994.
24. On 27st luly 1994, the United Nations Security Council
requested the deployment of Russian forces for peace-
keeping in Abkhazia.22.Financial Times, 22nd October 1994.
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North, which supplies Russia with a large part of
its cereal consumption.
45. A bloody civil war broke out in Tajikistan
in 1992. At the origin of this conflict was a
confrontation between the representatives of the
former Soviet rdgime and the opposition Islamic-
democratic alliance, which has now taken refuge
in Afghanistan. In September 1991, the opposi-
tion succeeded in taking control of the country,
but was then ousted, with support from Russia
and Uzbekistan, by the government of the Presi-
dent of the Supreme Soviet, Enomali Rakhmonov.
Uzbekistan contributed to bringing the situation
under control since it feared that the one million
Uzbeks or so living in Tajikistan might take refu-
ge in Uzbekistan. President Rakhmonov stands
accused of subjecting the population to a highly
authoritarian r6gime. The country is suffering
from the chaotic way in which he handles econo-
mic policy. In May 1993, Tajikistan and Russia
signed a fdendship and co-operation treaty. The
agreement included military assistance to the
Rakhmonov government. Since August 1993,
Russian forces with some support from troops
from three CIS member countries, Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan, have been helping the
present government to protect Taj$istan's border
witn afghanistan and avoid infiltration from
Afghanistan. Negotiations carried out under Uni-
tedNations' auspices to bring about a cease-fire
between the opposing sides have been unsuccess-
ful. The Tajiks, a people with languageand cultu-
ral ties with Iran, account for roughly 607o of the
population of the country.
46. In Moldova, the fourteenth Russian arrny,
stationed in TransdniesE, in the east of the coun-
try, and led by the very General Lebeds, sided
with the Russian-speaking inhabitants of that
area, when, in June 1992,the Moldovan Govern-
ment tried to establish confrol over the territory by
force. In September 1991, the Russian-speaking
inhabitants had demanded independent status for
the territory on the left bank of the River Dniestr
in the east of the country (Dniestr Republic).
Since 1990, skirmishes between Moldovan natio-
nalists and Russian-speaking separatists, particu-
larly in eastern Moldova, have become increasin-
gly frequent. About 800 000 of the Moldovan
population of 4.4 million live in the Transdniestr
iegion. The rest of Moldova was part of Romania
until the second world war. The main language
there is Romanian. However, Russian- and Roma-
nian-speaking groups live on both sides of the
Dniesr river. The presence of several very impor-
tant Russian military bases confers a major geos-
fategic interest on the region in the eyes of Rus-
sia, which is seeking to preserve a sphere of
influence in the region between the Black Sea and
the Balkans. The Moldovan Government is
demanding the withdrawal of the Russian forces,
but the majority of the soldiers of the fourteenth
army who come from Transdniestr are opposed to
it'?6. The agreement, signed on 10th August 1994,
between the Moldovan and Russian negotiators,
on the withdrawal within three years of troops sta-
tioned in eastern Moldova, where the majority of
the inhabitants are Russian or Ukrainian, leaves
open the question of the status of this so-called
Dniestr Republic. The text of the treaty states
merely that the withdrawal will be synchronised
with definition of a special status for the Moldo-
van territory of Transdniesff2T. Chances to unify
the split country are weak. The Moldovan
Government accuses Romania of further compli-
cating the issue, referring to Romanian declara-
tions that deny the existence of Moldovan natio-
nality and claim that Moldova was a part of
Romania2s.
47. As to the Caucasus region, in 1993 Russia
succeeded in obtaining the accession of Georgia
and Azerbaijan to the CIS, in return for support to
the governments concerned. Georgia even accep-
ted the presence of military bases on its territory.
In June 1993, the Georgian President, Eduard
Shevardnadze, after months of calls for interven-
tion by international ffoops under United Nations
auspices going unheeded, became so desperate
thai he yielded to Russian troops being stationed
in order to control the border between Georgia
and Abkhazia. As western nations took no interest
in the issue, the United Nations Security Council
decided, on 21st July 1994, to authorise Russia to
keep the peace in this conflict. Moscow now
hopes to obtain a similar mandate to deploy Rus-
sian peace-keeping forces in Nagorno-Karabakh.
The United States Government has already decla-
red that it would not oppose this2e. In Georgia, in
particular, Russia has succeeded, with the unwit-
iing help of western countries not only in justi-
fying its military presence there but also in achie-
ving other ends3o: firstly, maintaining access to
the Black Sea and the Georgian ports; second,
accession by Georgia to the CIS and the retention
of Russian military bases located on Georgian ter-
ritory; third, protecting access to Armenia; fourth,
stabilising its frontier with the Caucasus and, last-
ly, protecting the frontier between Tirrkey and
Georgia.
48. Other neighbours of Russia are subjected to
Russian political pressure by other means. The
26. In the New York Times of 24th October 1994, General
Lebed said that " they were born here " and that " they will
stay and call themselves the 'National Liberation Army' ".
27 . l* Monde, l2th August 1994.
28. New York Times, 28th October 1994.
29. l* Figaro, I I th August I 994.
30. Allen Lynch, DerEinfluss des Milifiirs auf die Aussenpo-
litik Russlands, Europa-Archiv, Folge 1511995, pages 441-
442.25. See footnote 3.
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Baltic countries, Ukraine and Belarus, have often
suffered from the fact that they were economical-
ly dependent on Russia. In regard to the Black Sea
Fleet and the resulting dispute with Ukraine, Rus-
sia has openly pursued an arbitrary policy towards
its energy supplies.
49. The problem of managing the various
conflicts on CIS territory has also influenced Rus-
sia's attitude in the framework of the discussions
within the United Nations and the CSCE on the
r6le of regional organisations in crisis-prevention
and management and particularly as regards
peace-keeping and peace-enforcement. There is,
at least theoretically, a basic rule at CIS level for
peace-keeping operations. This is the collective
security agreement signed in Kiev in March 1992,
followed, on 28th September 1993, by the Thsh-
kent protocol on collective peace-keeping forces.
However, none of the current operations quite fits
in the framework of these agreements. The Kiev
agreement requires that a truce be signed and that
all parties to the conflict accept the deployment of
buffer forces. This was not the case when CIS
forces intervened on Tajikistan's frontier with
Afghanistan3'. Furthermore, the Kiev agreement
only allows the use of troops of countries that are
not party to the conflict. However, until now, CIS
peace-keeping forces have invariably been made
up of nationals of countries parties to the conflict,
among them Russia32. Indeed, peace-keeping
policy is, for Russia, a means of preserving its
influence over neighbouring countries. It is also
an instrument for justifying the presence of troops
and the maintenance of military bases in several
new republics.
50. The Russian Government still regards the
external borders of the member countries of the
CIS as Russian borders. After the attack by the
Tajik Islamic opposition against a border post in
August 1994, leading to the death of four Russian
soldiers, the chief-of-staff of the Russian border
guard units described the situation as " no longer
a domestic issue for Tajikistan " but rather " a
gauntlet thrown down to Russia "33. And the Rus-
sian First Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister, Ana-
toli Adamichin, has again described the Tajik-
Afghan frontier as the border of both the CIS and
...Russia " r.
51. In this context, Russian policy tends to pro-
mote recognition of the CIS (in which Russia
feels impelled to play a driving r6le) as a United
Nations regional organisation with the status des-
31. Michael Orr, Peace-keeping 
- 
a new task for Russian
military doctrine, Jane's Intelligence Review, July 1994,
pages 307 - 309.
32. Michael Orr, Peace-keeping 
- 
a new task for Russian
military doctrine, Jane's Intelligence Review, July 1994,
pages 307-309.
33. L,e Monde, 2lstl22nd August 1994.
34. Le Monde, 2lstlZ2nd, August 1994.
cribed in Article 52 of the United Nations Charter.
Its recognition as such by the United Nations
could make the CIS relatively independent as
regards peace-keeping on its own territory and it
is not insignificant that a CIS representative parti
cipated at a meeting that the United Nations
Secretary-General organised in New York in early
August 1994 with representatives of regional
organisations, at which were also present, inter
alia, representatives of the CSCE, the European
Union, WEU and NATO.
52. In a joint declaration of the ministry for
foreign affairs and ministry of defence of the
Federation of Russia, issued on 29th March 1994,
the Russian leaders stressed that peace-keeping
actions undenaken in the CIS would fully accord
with:
" the provisions of the United Nations
Chaner, according to which a possibility of
dealing with matters of peace-making on
the basis of agreements of the states
concerned not only is accepted but welco-
med (Article 52 of the United Nations
Charter). The only exceptions are enforce-
ment actions, which, according to Article
53 of the United Nations Charter, should be
taken under the Security Council's authori-
ty. But all current peace-making operations
on the territory of the former USSR do not
fall under this provision, because they do
not involve enforcement and are taken with
the consent of all conflicting sides. The
United Nations and the CSCE are informed
on these operations on a regular basis.
Russia is consistently favouring the widest
involvement of the United Nations and the
CSCE in the settlement of conflicts in the
CIS countries. There is no need, however,
for any " permission " on the part of the
United Nations and the CSCE to conduct
peace-making operations in accordance
with the abovementioned criteria, in which
Russia and its neighbours take part. The
operations are carried out on the basi,s of
the sovereign rights of respective states
enshrined in the United Nations Charter
and do not require additional legitimisa-
tion. "
53. Should any doubt remain as to whethei all
Russian froop activities in the crisis flashpoints in
the CIS are in line with the above statements, it is
for western authorities to show greater interest
and greater commitment in terms of pacification
of the regions in question than they have to date.
It is perhaps too soon to say whether the organisa-
tion of the first joint Russian-American
manoeuvres undertaken in the Urals35 in a peace-
35. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,3rd September 1994
and Intemational Herald Tribune, 7th September 1994.
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keeping framework can be regarded as the first
sign olincreased interest by the West in possible
palticipation in peace missions in crisis flash-
points in CIS territory. It would also be useful for
Russia and Europe to enter into consultation on
the division of peace-keeping r6les and tasks
throughout the world; WEU would offer the most
appropriate framework for this.
54. As to the attitude, r6le and rank to which
Russia aspires in affairs of world policy, the coun-
try's posilion is not yet fully defined. Notwith-
standlng the infighting between the " isola-
tionists ", " neo-Eurasists " and the advocates of
rapprochement with the West, it is abundantly
cl6ar that Russia is determined to play a full r6le
among the international ranks of the great powers.
It is therefore interested in participating in the
work of all the international bodies and in streng-
thening any international organisation offering it
maximum opportunity of being associated in the
decision-making process.
55. Moreover, account has to be taken of the
fact that Russia, which regards itself as the prin-
cipal heir to the former Soviet Union, has still
not accepted the loss of major territories - both
those belonging to the Soviet Union and to the
former Russian empire 
- 
a loss which has, for
example, brought the western borders of Russia
to within a few hundred kilometres of Moscow.
As Mr. Yeltsin stressed in late June 1994, in an
address to students from military academies,
given in the Kremlin, Russia was a Eurasian
state with security interests to protect both in
Europe and in Asia. Russia could not be exgmP-
ted fiom its political and moral responsibility in
relation to the destiny of the countries and
peoples which, for centuries, had marched
alongside the Russian state. Of course, your
Rapporteur doubts whether such an explanation
can justify for instance Azerbaijan being refused
the right to exploit its oil resources, in other
words, to exercise its sovereignty.
56. For a long time, there have been doubts
about there being a consensus in political circles
in the country regarding what was in the national
interest. After the collapse of the former Soviet
Union, President Yeltsin initially pursued a policy
very much directed towards the West. Howeveq
in face of political opposition that accused him of
neglecting national interests 
- 
an ill-defined
concept, even by his opponents 
- 
he started to
define them in a more specific manner. It is now
evident, at least since the Russian-American sum-
mit meeting in September t994, that Russia
considers the former republics as being within its
sphere of vital interests. Addressing the 49th ses-
sion of the General Assembly of the United
Nations, President Yeltsin considered that Rus-
sia's economic and foreign policy priorities were
in the countries of the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States 36. He continued that when it was a
(uestion of maintaining peace on the territory of
the former Soviet Union, the main burden was the
responsibility of the Russian Federation alone.
The army seems to share this view and military
doctrine provides for the deployment of the army
in countries abroad if national security or Russian
citizens are threatened.
57. The rationale of the Russian approach
requires the government to support the strengthe-
ning of the CSCE and NACC, while remaining
extremely aloof from NAIO, opposed even to any
enlargement of that organisation to include the
Cenffal and Eastern European countries. Russia's
attitude to the partnership for peace programme
offered by NATO has, from the outset, been ambi-
guous and hesitant. It initially welcomed what it
considered to be a means of preventing the acces-
sion of the Central and Eastern European coun-
tries to NATO. However, even though it finally
signed an accession document to the partnership
fol peace, opinions on the usefulness of this
undertaking are still hotly disputed in Moscow,
and the iurangements for participation in the part-
nership, to which the Russians subscribed at
NATO, have not even been made public.
58. Russia's thinking, recently formulated by
its minister for foreign affairs, tends towards
making the CSCE the main collective security
organisation contributing to the maintenance of
security and stability in Europe, with other orga-
nisations such as the CIS, NACC, the European
Union, the Council of Europe, NATO and WEU
subordinate to it. To achieve this, Russia has pro-
posed creating a management body of the CSCE
of the same type as the United Nations Security
Council.
59. It seems clear that these ideas and propo-
sals have no real chance of frnding favour with the
majority of Russia's partners in the CSCE, as
already noted at one of the recent meetings, held
in Prague, of the group of senior officials of the
organisation3T. [f it appears that Russia's propo-
sals to promote its rapprochement to European
and Atlantic security and defence structures and
to improve the quality of its participation in their
decision-making processes have little chance of
succeeding, there is a strong risk that Russia
might feel increasingly isolated, which cannot be
in anyone's best interest.
60. The problem of Russia's possible isolation
is less acute in the area of economic co-operation
at European and world level than in security mat-
ters and this requires examination, particularly in
the CSCE, NATO and WEU frameworks, in order
to develop guidelines according to which rela-
tions with Russia can progress towards a partner-
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ship based on information, consultative and even
co-operative mechanisms. This presupposes in
particular co-ordination between WEU and
NATO, while taking account of the peculiarities
of each of these organisations.
61. In order to achieve such an objective, it is
necessary first to be aware of the political para-
meters and preoccupations of Russia in security
matters. Such assessment should begin with a
study of the Russian military doctrine adopted in
November 1993 by the Russian Security Council
and ratified by the President of the Russian Fede-
ration. Analysis of the provisions of this new doc-
trine, the published text of which is merely a sum-
mary of the fundamental principles set out in the
document, and seemingly not a final text, reveals
several passages deserving of attention.
62. It should be noted at the outset that the
terms " vital interests of the Russian Federation "
are used at least seven times in this document,
without this notion being clearly defined. Thus
the Russian Federation considers it essential to
have armed forces to " defend the sovereignty and
territorial integrity and the vital interests of the
Russian Federation in the case of aggression
against it or its allies; ".
63. The document refers, inter alia, to " territo-
rial claims by other states on the Russian Federa-
tion and its allies; " as the main sources of danger,
in military terms and from without, for the Rus-
sian Federation. This may apply specifically
to on-going disputes with Estonia and Latvia
because of the former's territorial claims on
Russia, resolution of which must be sought
around the " regional tables " of the conference on
the stability pact.
64. The Russian military doctrine also inveighs
against the danger of " suppression ofrights, free-
doms and legitimate interest of citizens of the
Russian Federation in foreign countries ", which
can be applied not only to the problems of Rus-
sian-speaking nationals in Estonia and Latvia, but
also in other " near abroad " countries where
approximately 25 million Russian nationals live.
65. One crucial point is the severe criticism of
any " expansion of 
-ilitary blocs and alliances to
the detriment of the interests of military security of
the Russian Federation ". It should be recalled in
this connection that Russia continues to regard
NATO as a military bloc and is therefore not in
favour of an enlargement of this organisation to the
East which would exclude Russia. Russia does not,
however, take a negative position on enlargement
of the European Union to include the Central and
Eastern European countries, but it is more ambi-
guous when it comes to enlargement of WEU.
66. It should be recalled in this connection that
when WEU granted the nine Central and Eastern
European countries a status of association, the
Russian minister for foreign affairs issued a decla-
ration to the press on l2thMay 1994 to the effect
that this decision by WEU:
" ... cannot be evaluated in a one-dimensio-
nal fashion. We see this as an attempt to
find some new form of military and politi-
cal co-operation within a defined area of
Europe. This is in contradiction with the
need to establish a truly pan-European sys-
tem of security and stability. It is wrong to
bank on co-operation where there is no
place for a country like Russia. If this trend
is confirmed, it will carry with it the danger
of creating artificial barriers, of a new divi-
sion of Europe.
We are in favour of another way, one based
on the principles of a truly broad co-opera-
tion between all European states. We are in
favour of WEU becoming an in-prospect
component of pan-European security struc-
tures under the auspices of the CSCE. We
wish to stress once again Russia's earnest
interest in developing constructive dia-
logue and practical co-operation with WEU
and its member states. "
67. The contacts pursued on this subject in the
meantime between the representatives of Europe
and Russia seem to indicate that the latter might
accept a gradual convergence between the coun-
tries in question and WEU on condition that this is
not a pretext for bringing them into NAIO by the
back door.
68. Among the other sources of concern can be
counted the dangers resulting from " the increase in
contingents deployed on the borders of the Russian
Federation to such a level as to destroy the estab-
lished balance of forces " and " the inffoduction of
foreign troops into the territory of states bordering
on Russia (if not linked to peace-enforcement or
peace-keeping measures in conformity with a deci-
sion of the United Nations Security Council or a
regional collective security organisation with the
agreement of the Russian Federation) ". It will be
recalled that Russia had argued in this connection
that any deployment of NATO forces in the territo-
ries of the countries of the former Warsaw Pact
" 2 + 4" treaty on final seftlement of the German
question which prohibits NATO forces being sta-
tioned in the territory of the former GDR without
authorisation from the German Government.
69. The significance must also be evaluated of
the Russian military doctrine as regards the use of
nuclear weapons and the use of Russian armed
forces in the event of attack against Russian citi
zens, a large number of whom live abroad.
70. Morever, alarge number of other questions
will need to be clarified in the framework of a
more intensive dialogue between the western
authorities and the Russian leadership; these
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include, first and foremost, the importance that
Russia attaches to its relations with the United
States, which has provided it with vital help,
through a trilateral agreement, in resolving the
problems of the military denuclearisation of
Ukraine, a country that is still Russia's most
important and difficult partner. Russian policy
towards Ukraine is somewhat less than transpa-
rent to a western observer and the future evolution
of Russian policies towards the Baltic countries is
equally uncertain.
71. Many experts believe Russia's conduct
towards Belarus, and in particular, Ukraine,
reveals the imperialist or non-imperialist nature of
Russian policy. Regarding the latter, which is a
very important factor in Russian history Russians
on the whole have difficulty in realising that this
territory where they find their roots and origins
can become an independent and foreign state. It is
therefore necessary to look closely at the Russian
attitude towards the questions of the Black Sea
Fleet, the autonomy of Crimea or the linking up of
the eastern part of Ukraine, where the majority of
the population is Russian and where the new Pre-
sident of Ukraine, Leonid Kutchma, obtained the
most votes.
72. Regarding relations between Russia and
tlre United States, in recent months atzcit agree-
ment seems to have taken shape between the
two countries, in particular at the last Americar/
Russian meeting, on their respective zones of
influence in the CIS, Latin America and the
Caribbean. European countries, and in particular
WEU, should analyse this tendency very carefully
and prepare a response because inaction by Europe
might encourage the idea in Russia that only the
United States is a political partner of equal stand-
ing. Russian/American domination would then be
inevitable.
73. Because of the conflicts in the Caucasus,
Russia requested that the provisions of the CFE
Treaty concerning deployment of troops on the
southern flank should be amended; however, ano-
ther major question remains outstanding, namely,
how Russia intends in future to use its enclave in
the Kaliningrad region, which it has declared a
special defence zone, causing particular concern
to the Baltic countries, primarily Lithuania as a
transit country, and to Poland.
74. For Poland and, even more, for Lithuania,
the question of an agreement with Russia on mili-
tary transit to and from its Kaliningrad enclave is
serious cause for concern about their national
security". If asked to monitor arrangements for
this transit, the WEU Council would have to take
such a proposal very seriously. It should be recal-
led that WEU had already shown its ability in
such matters with its contribution to ensure res-
pect for the resolution of the United Nations Secu-
rity Council on the embargo on the Danube.
Regarding relations between the Baltic countries
and Russia, it should also be noted that with the
Skundra radar station, Russia maintains a pre-
sence in Latvia although its noops left the country
on 31st August 1994. Some territorid questions
still remain to be resolved between Russia and
Estonia.
75. Another subject of prime importance is
Russia's r6le in relation to attempts at international
level to find a solution to the conflict in former
Yugoslavia, where Russia has played such an acti-
ve part that it is inconceivable that this conflict can
be resolved without its involvement. This is bound
to have an effect on Russia's ambitions as regards
settlement of future conflicts of the same type.
76. As to Russian policy towards the defence
industry and armaments production and export,
whereas concerns were previously concentrated
on the conversion of military assets to civil use, it
would appear that a new policy has since been
adopted directed towards increasing exports, a
policy which, according to Mr. Kozyrev, consti-
tutes an essential component of Russia's foreign
policy. Russia has some reason for concern when
it sees the countries of the Visegrad Group and
several other countries of Central and Eastern
Europe turn towards NATO for their military pro-
curement. Indeed, Russia has already lost a very
large part of the armaments market.
77. The military-industrial complex including
the Russian nuclear industry, is in a period of
great change. This time of uncertainty in an indus-
trial sector that was a major stake in the economic
policy of the former Soviet Union is a threat to
world security. First, it is increasing the danger of
a black market in nuclear and military equipment.
WEU should perhaps look more closely at this
problem.
78. Regarding Russian commitments towards
Asia, particular note should be taken of the arran-
gement recently reached with China with the aim
of establishing a new partnership, one of the
essential elements of which is the decision by the
two countries to cease training their missiles on
the other's territory. Relations with Japan are still
diffrcult because of the unresolved problem of the
Kuril islands, however, it is apparent that Russia
is seeking to develop productive relations with
several Asian partners, among which the ASEAN
countries, and specifically with India, to which it
provides aid, particularly in the area of ballistic
missile production technology 
- 
regularly giving
rise to negative reactions on the part of the United
States. The impression is, however, that the centre
of gravity of Russian policy remains Europe and
the United States, which opens wide the door to
the development of concepts for intensifying dia-
logue with Russia.38. Atlantic News,2659,5th October 1994.
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IV Some guidelines
for the development of relations between WEU
and the Russian Federation
79. At present, matters are still at the stage of
declarations of intent. Thus the communiqu6 of
the WEU Council of Ministers, issued in Luxem-
bourg on 9th May 1994, states that " ministers, in
the context of the growing r6le of WEU in pro-
moting peace, security and stability in Europe,
agteed on the importance of developing dialogue
and exchanges of information on issues of com-
mon concern between WEU and Russia. " Given
the very meagre substance of this declaration,
the Permanent Council in Brussels should be
requested to give clarification. In panicular, infor-
mation should be given on the content of recent
contacts between the WEU Secretary-General and
the Russian Embassy in Brussels and/or on other
contacts between WEU and the Russian
authorities.
80. On the Russian side, several signs denoting
an increasing interest by the authorities of that
country in WEU are observable. First, representa-
tives of the two chambers of the Russian Parlia-
ment participated in the colloquy organised by the
Assembly on 17th October 1994 and then met
with the Political, Defence and Presidential Com-
mittees in Paris. Moreover, the participation of a
delegation of Russian parliamentarians at the next
Assembly session seems virtually certain.
81. Regarding the policy of the Russian
Government, the Russian Embassy has recently
provided information about a document defining
that country's policy towards WEU. This docu-
ment, which would appqr to have been approved
by the Russian Head of State on 9th June 1994,
may be summarised as follows:
Russia's aims would appear to be:
(r,) to establish special partnership rela-
tions between Russia and WEU, the
objective being to synchronise co-
operation with WEU and the develop-
ment of relations between Russia and
the European Union in economic and
political matters. It is not a matter of
replicating the status of the associate
partner countries of WEU but of a
stable partnership with Western Euro-
pe in political and military matters;
(ii) to give more regular form to Russia's
contacts with WEU through meetings
between Russian foreign affairs and
defence ministers and the Secretariat-
General and the ministers of the
countries holding the Presidency of
that organisation;
(iii) to pursue further the institutionalisa-
tion of a consultation mechanism bet-
ween Russia and WEU, parallel to
that existing between Russia and the
European Union. Such consultations
would concern current problems rela-
ting to European and international
security. A start could be made with
discussions on peace-keeping mat-
ters, the Yugoslav crisis and the pact
on stability in Europe. Moreover,
possibilities might be raised of co-
operation with Western Europe on
defence matters, particularly co-ope-
ration on tactical missile defence;
(iv) beaingin mind that the WEU Assem-
bly plays an important part in defining
the future evolution of the Union, to
contribute to developing stable links
between the Russian Federal Assem-
bly and the WEU Assembly;
(v) to establish contacts between Ros
Voorongenie (the Institute assigned
responsibility by the presidency for
studying the problem of arms sales,
chaired by General Chaposhnikov)
and WEAG;
(vi) to take measures towards establishing
co-operation, on a commercial basis,
between the Torrej6n Satellite Centre
and the Russian ministry of defence
and other bodies working in this area;
(vii) to develop exchanges, includingjoint
events, between Russian scientific
centres and the WEU Institute for
Security Studies.
82. It goes without saying that all of these sug-
gestions should be examined with particular care.
A basic factor of note, it would appear that the
Russian use of the term " partnership " is entirely
in the sense WEU would wish. The vital interest
which the establishment of relations with Russia
should present for WEU lies in the setting up of a
regular political dialogue the purpose of which
must be to exchange information in order to
improve transparency and establish a climate of
confidence.
83. The WEU approach is determined by the
organisation's r6le as an integral part of the deve-
lopment of the European Union and European
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Its first objective
must be confidence-building and the avoidance of
a feeling of isolation on the part of the Russians.
84. As to the nature of the dialogue, a system of
mutual information must first be established
which might develop into one of consultation and
even 
- 
depending on how matters progress 
-
move towards co-operation in certain specific
areas to be determined. A decision must also be
taken in this context as to whether it is hoped to
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the same degree to establish relations with
Ukraine, Belarus and other CIS countries. Sub-
jects for inclusion in the framework of the dia-
logue are those falling within WEU's area of res-
ponsibility on the basis of the modified Brussels
Treaty and this approach should be in parallel
with that of the European Union, and complemen-
tary to the relations which NATO is preparing to
develop with Russia.
85. One of the main objectives of this dialogue
with Russia should be to allay Russian fears by an
assurance to the effect that the Central and Eas-
tern European countries' moving closer to WEU
and the enlargement of the European Union to the
Scandinavian countries and Austria do not consti-
tute any danger whatsoever for Russia's own
interests and will not have the effect of establish-
ing new demarcation lines across Eastern Europe.
In fact, it should be made clear to the Russian side
that stable and reliable political conditions in
Eastern and Central Europe contribute to Russian
security and are therefore in its own interest.
86. In order to achieve this, it would be useful
to support every effort tending to give Russia the
widest possible participation in decision-making
in other forums; furthermore, the proposals Rus-
sia has put forward for the ffansformation of the
CSCE should not be rejected out of hand, but
should be the subject ofconsultations on the basis
of counter-proposals developed in Western Euro-
pe, WEU having an important contribution to
make in this area.
87. The Russian proposals to discuss peace-
keeping matters, the Yugoslav crisis and the stabi-
lity pact seem entirely acceptable, but should be
supplemented by other subjects for discussion, for
example, joint risk assessment, disarmament, the
problems of dismantling chemical arsenals in
Russia, the proliferation of nuclear material,
armaments export policy, etc.
88. It should not be forgotten that in all the
more specific areas proposed by Russia, such as
for example anti-missile defence co-operation,
co-operation with WEAG and the Torrej6n Satel-
lite Centre, a large part of this co-operation still
takes place in WEU within fairly restricted frame-
works, from which a certain number of associate
or observer countries are excluded. It is therefore
necessary to avoid giving Russia a more privile-
ged position than WEU observer or associate part-
ner counffies. It should be recalled, however, that
technical co-operation between WEU and Russia
already exists in the framework of the implemen-
tation of the Open Skies Treaty. The WEU Coun-
cil should consider il and to what extent, bilateral
co-operation of certain member countries with
Russia might be developed in the area of defence
equipment and the defence industry so as to offer
it co-operation specifically in areas where WEU
has developed initiatives.
89. The Russian proposal on the organisation
of exchanges and joint events involving Russian
research institutes, many of which are extremely
prestigious, and the WEU Institute for Security
Studies, seems especially useful and should be
very warmly welcomed.
90. Regarding the modalities of the dialogue,
consideration should be given as to how institu-
tionalised it should be. It will be advisable, for
various reasons, not to seek to make it too formal
in order to retain a certain freedom of action and
initiative, as circumstances demand. From ano-
ther point of view, it is important not to give the
Russians the impression that they are being held
at a distance; a degree of institutionalisation could
therefore be useful, both at parliamentary level
and in intergovernmental relations. Within the
framework of the European Union's agreement
with Russia, it has been decided to create a " par-
liamentary co-operation committee " which would
determine the frequency of its own meetings.
There are also provisions for holding summit
meetings twice yearly between the President of
the Union and the Russian President, and for the
creation of a co-operation council which will meet
annually. There will also be regular meetings of
top civil servants.
91. The Russian proposals dealing with the ins-
titutionalisation of the mechanism of consultation
between Russia and WEU should be studied care-
fully, however, at the present stage the time for
reaching definitive conclusions does not as yet
seem ripe. However, it would appear essential at
the very least to establish regular meetings bet-
ween the Russian Parliament and the WEU
Assembly.
V Conclusions
92. The Political Committee's impressions
during its recent visit to Russia are varied: on the
one hand it heard Mr. Churkin, Deputy Minister
for Foreign Affairs of Russia, express the convic-
tion that the 2lst century would be Russia's cen-
tury. Again, it was struck by the silence among the
students of the Institute for International Rela-
tions in Moscow when a member of the commit-
tee asked them for their views on the future evo-
lution of Russia and the CIS as a whole.
93. Furthermore, its meetings with the various
bodies revealed that Russians still knew very
little about the r6le and duties of WEU and its
Assembly in the European and transatlantic fra-
mework. The feelings that emerged from most of
the meetings were fear of isolation and being side-
lined by the European institutions, persistent mis-
trust of NATO and hostility to the enlargement of
NATO towards Central Europe and the wish to
make itself better known in the West.
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94. Reverting to more specific questions, one
must take very seriously the information provided
by Russian parliamentarians on the difficulties of
the Russian authorities, despite their goodwill, in
tackling the destruction of enormous arsenals of
chemical weapons. In the framework of the deve-
lopment of relations between WEU and Russia,
the Council should examine the question of the
extent to which its member countries might offer
the Russian authorities their assistance in this
matter. Furthermore, it appears that several mem-
ber countries of WEU have concluded or are
negotiating bilateral agreements with Russia in
various areas of military co-operation, although
the Assembly has not been informed of this. It
would be essential for the WEU Council to ensu-
re co-ordination between these various initiatives
and keep the Assembly informed. Any strengthe-
ning of relations between WEU and Russia should
replace the lack of knowledge by information,
mistrust by confidence and the feeling of isolation
on the Russian side by the building of a European
security architecture in which Russia might find a
place commensurate with its importance.
265
DOCUMENT I44O APPENDIX
APPENDIX
Maps 3e
39. Keesing's, 1994, page 39969 (Russia) and the Economist, 6th August 1994 (Caucasus).
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I.Introduction
1. At the time of the presentation of the draft budget for the financial year 1995, your Rapporteur stres-
sed that Greece's accession to WEU and the creation of specific statuses for associate members, associate
partners and observers would imply the adaptation of the facilities available to the Assembly. At succes-
sive meetings, initially at the level of officials (on 19th July and lst September 1994) and then between a
delegation of the Assembly, the Secretary-General and a representative of the Chairmanship-in-Office of
the Council (on 26th September 1994) various solutions were examined and proposals agreed. The Chair-
man of the Assembly subsequently informed the Permanent Council (on 27th September 1994) that in
view of the Council's invitation to the Assembly in its Kirchberg declaration and taking the agreed pro-
posals as a starting point, a supplementary budget for 1995 would prove essential. These proposals were
ratified in their entirety at the meeting of the Presidential Committee on27th September 1994.
2. In accordance with these guidelines, the draft supplementary budget submitted to you sets out the
needs of the Assembly arising from the accession of Greece and the reception of associate members, asso-
ciate partners and observer countries in the Assembly of Western European Union. These proposals take
account of the limited and ad-hoc nature of certain solutions retained in the agreement ratified on
26thl27th September 1994, dealing in particular with placing at the Assembly's disposal certain 2nd and
3rd floor premises, either permanently (Office 3L7 on the 2nd floor) or on a temporary and occasional
basis (access to the reading room and library of the Institute during sessions). The budgetary requirements
deriving from this agreement are grouped under two items:
* S". f Ott .ltting, 30th November 1994 (previous question, Document 1447 , agreed to).
1. Adopted unanimously by the Presidential Committee on 3rd November and by the committee on 4th November 1994.
J.__M_embers of the committee: Ml Rathbone (Chairman); Mr. Redmond (Alternate: Iord Mackie of Benshie) (Vice-Chairman);MM. Alvarez, Antretter, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Biefnot, Branger, Brugger, Bilchler, Curto, Daniel, Mrs. Durrieu,
D_ame Peggy Felngr, Mrs. Gaiotti de Biase, MM. Homs I Ferret, Howell, Lauricella, Leers, Maass, Masson,
Meyer zu Bentrup, Mrs. Moreno Gonzalez,MM. Pinto, Regenwetter, Scaglioso, Thissen.
N.B. ?he names of those taking pan in the vote are printed in italics.
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making a distinction in each case between sums requested by way of ordinary and extraordinary expendi-
ture. In view of the temporary and ad hoc nature of the points of agreement reached with the Council for
the use of the Institute's premises, no provision has been made in this supplementary budget for additio-
nal expenditure for furnishing and equipping these two areas. The area occupied in the p-ast by the tele-
phone exchange operators will be furnished from existing stock, pending a decision on its final allocation.
The distinction between ordinary and extraordinary expenditure refers in the first case, to current opera-
ting expenses which will also affect the budgets of future financial years; in the second, to once only
investment expenditure. Analysis of the amounts provided for under each of the two items is therefore pre-
sented separately in the draft supplementary budget for 1995.
II. A 
- 
Accession of Greece
3. To enable the Greek Delegation to participate in the work of the Assembly in conditions comparable
to those of the other delegations of member states, it will be necessary to broaden the range of languages
used in the Assembly and to furnish and equip the second floor office to be made available to the Greek
delegation (see A/WEUIBA(94) 6 Appendix V).
(a) Ordinary expendilure
4. As already announced in the draft budgets of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the
financial years 1994 (Document 1383) and 1995 (Document 1429), Greece's accession to WEU has made
it necessary to strengthen services organised for the sessions, namely:
(a) Interpretation services: for this service 
- 
since Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedule of the Assem- 
=bly provides that the Office of the Clerk must provide simultaneous interpretation of speeches made
in the official languages of the member states into the other official languages 
- 
simultaneous inter-
pretation must be provided from eight and no longer seven languages. This means recruiting four
Greek interpreters for the new Greek team. The sums necessary for this requirement can be estima-
ted at aroundF 242 000 at present salary scales.
(b) Stenographic services: to organise this service two Greek verbatim reporters are required. The
amount necessary is estimated at F 81 000 at present salary scales.
(c) Translation service: the translation team must be strengthened by recruiting a reviser and trans-
lator from Greek to both English and French. The necessary additional amount involved is F 61 000
at present salary scales.
5. Overall the amounts necessary for strengthening the three abovementioned services, totalling
F 384 000, have been included under sub-head 6: Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly of Head II
of the budget: Temporary staff.
6. An additional sum of F 116 000 should be included under sub-head7: Interpretation staffrequired
for Assembly work between sessions, of Head II of the budget: Temporary staff. This should cover the
additional cost of recruiting a third interpreter in each of the two booths in use during committee meetings_
to provide simultaneous interpretation into French and English. Rule ?) (b)of the Rules of Procedure of
the Assembly states: " speeches in committee may be made in the official languages of member states.
The secretariat shall provide simultaneous interpretation of these speeches into French and English. "
7. The recruitment of temporary staffmentioned in paragraphs 3 and 4 will also imply the inclusion in
sub-head 9: Social charges, oT budget Head II: Temporary staff, of a further sum of F 31 000 for social
charges.
8. The considerations set out in paragraph 3 (a) above also serve tojustify the inclusion under sub-
head 12 Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions, of budget Head III: Expenditure on pre-
mises and equipment, of the operating budget of a further sum of F 80 000. This amount is to cover the
cost of temp6rarily connecting an eighth booth in room B to the seven booths in room C, ?nd equipping
it with audib and video facilities, so as to be able to use it during sessions, on the assumption, still to be
tested in practice, that the booths in the meeting rooms would be used for simultaneous_ interpretation of
the debat6s in plenary sessions of the Assembly, in order to make additional seats available in the gallery.
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9. Finally these considerations also serve to justify the inclusion under sub-head 30: Expenses for poli-
tical groups, of budget Head V: Other expenditure of a sum of F 35 500. The Greek delegation will in fact
have 14 members (7 representatives and 7 substitutes).
10, A: [Accession of Greece - ordinary expenditure] thus shows additional ordinary expenditure of
F 648 500.
(b ) E xtraordilwry e xp e nditur e
11. The considerations set out in paragraph 3 (a) above serve tojustify the inclusion under sub-head 15:
Purchase or rep4r of office- equipment, of_budggt Head III, of a sum of F 20 000 to furnish and equip the
second-floor office to be allocated to the Greek Delegation.
12.- Similarly the Greek ygrbatiln reporters qd the delegation office will probably have to be provided
with computer equipment. Therefore a sum of F 30 000 for the purchase of-three stand-alone microcom-
puters with approprifle- keyboar{s and qo_ftyrare packages, two printers, cabling and a printer sharing
device must be included under sub-head 16: Purchase of reprographic and other o-ffice equipment.
13. In total A: [Accession of Greece] shows an additional sum of F 698 500 in respect of ordinary and
extraordinary expenditure.
III. B 
- 
Arrangements in the chamber
14. In response-to encouragement 
-from the Council of Ministers, the Assembly is preparing to receivea large number of parliamentarians from very many non member countries, wiftr aiffeient s-tatuses and
yoling rights.in various Assembly bodles. Their arrival poses major problems of accommodation, particu-
lqfv i1_th9 chamber,-because the number of delegates will very coniiderably exceed the228 placbs avai-lable. Until now, each qepresentative had, as is normal in continental parliamentary assembliei, his or her
own specilc seat. This enabled the President.qt the Assembly to -ensure that ihe debates progressed
smoothly since he was.able to identift without diSgylty each of the parliamentarians present adcorting to
position and each parliamentarian was guaranteed his or her own seat.
15. The reception of numerous delegates in a chamber which can no longer guarantee the principle of
" one delegate,-one seat " makes it necessary to mimage the available space more flexibly. Aftdr study and
reflection and drawing on experience on the spot in international, natiohal or regional asiemblies, elecro-
nic methods have proved to be the only effective way of managing the situation. The solution advocated,
moreover, recalls in some measure that employed by the WEU Council which involves the permanent ins-
tallation of an electronic system enabling the President of the Assembly:(i) to identify each representative rapidly and correctly wherever he or she is seated in the chamber;
(ii) 
. 
to-identify-each representative, wherever he or she is seated in chamber by a badge, to be inser-
ted in the machine of the seat he or she occupies;
(iii) tobe aware of representatives' intentions to speak and thus be able to draw up a list in the order
they will be called upon to speak;
(iv) to be able to count with absolute certainty, each representative's vote and in particular to take
into account the different types of votes cast;
(v) to record and display in the two official languages the voting results and other messages as
necessary, quickly and unambiguously.
16. As the chamber in which this facility should be installed belongs to the French Economic and Social
Council, these arrangements will.require its agreement in principle, Ind, if the installation is to be perma-
nent, account must be_taken of the particular working methods of that assembly. In this event also, one
Tlght envisage 4f9B_S sharing part.of the cost. Nevertheless, no formal comrnitment has been given at
this stage Py ttre CES. In view of the time needed to obtain this agreement, draw up the final specifrcations
and negotiate the breakdown of costs and, fi1ally, the cumbersome nature of buiget proced'ures on both
sides, it has been necessary to deal with all of these aspects at one and the same tifre. -
17. In order to obtain facts for examination, SATI has been asked, on the basis of its experience, to pro-
vide an initial estimate of the possible cost of such an installation. The figures which foflbw are basei on
this estimate and are submitted, qubjec.t_ to the usual reservations, at the eipress request of the Budget and
Organisation Committee of the Council.
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18. A distinction can be made, as in the case of the accession of Greece, between costs which will conti-
nue to affect the budgets in future years and once only investments. An initial breakdown of the estimates
gives the following information which all relates to sub-head 12 of the-Assembly's budget: Technical-and
6ther installations for Assembly sessions, with the exception of expenditure on stafftraining which relates
to new sub-head 29: Stafftraining.
(a) Orulinary e x p e nditur e
19. Within this category of expenditure might be included expenditure basically on consumables such
as the purchase of badges and a machine (or the cost of an external-s9ryige) for programmi$ thg badges.
A surnof F 53 000 peisession should therefore be included, ie F lM 000 per annum for this sub-head.
(b ) E xtraa rdinary e xp e ndilur e
20. Three types of expenditure fall within this category which should be included under sub-head 12
referred to above:
(i) Central management unit: this unit will be the heart of the installation. It will carry the infor-
mation on each representative: status, voting rights, country, necessary to identify him-or her
to the system and run the installation: frontal calculating machine, microcomputer, software,
RS 485 interfaces, group dishibutors, power supplies 
- 
F 295 000;
(ii) Chamber equipment: The equipment will comprise (a) aterminal installed on the presidential
tribune giving the President all the information necessary to allow him to chair the proceedings
with ththeb of his assistants: i.e. identify representatives wherever thgy may be seated, deter-
mine the order in which they are to speak, communicate with individual representatives through
their personal display units; (b) individual units, installed at the seats in the chamber, for use by
the representatives: an optical reader to read the badge insertgd by the occup-ant 9f q" seat; a
microirhone enabling him or her to speak while standing, byttols to ?!\. for the floor and
swirch the microphone on and off; bunons for voting, including for the small display unit referred
to above, and for use also in communicating with the cenfial management unit and for user
assistance; alargedigital display unit installed above the hibune and visible to all present, sho'
wing voting results and messages for general information. The individual units run offan inter-
nal micropiocessor and are equipped with VO ports, an RS 485 link, and cabling - F 2 105 000;
(iii) tnstallation: This equipment needs to be frtted to the existing installation in the chamber,
cabled, adjusted, tested and delivered with fitness certificate 
- 
F 392 000.
21. Furthermore there should be provision for staff training expenses (sub-head 29) in the use of new
technologies and badge programming and management: 3 people for 9 days or F 162 000.
22. It might be estimated that the total extraordinary expenditure will not exceed F 3 364 000.
23. Total expenditure attributable to fitting out the chamber can therefore be estimated at F 3 470 000.
24. In short, the supplementary budget, as compared with the ordinary draft budget for 1995, includes
the following amounts:
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Heads and Sub-Heads Budget 1995
(proposed)
Supplementary
budget 1995
Budget 1995
(revised)
Part I : Operating budget
Section A Expenditure
A 
- 
Accession of Greece
Ordinarv exnenditure 648 500
F.xfraordinarv exnenditrrre 50 000
Total : Accession of Greece 698 500
B 
- 
Arrangements in the chamber
Ordinarv exoenditure 106 000
Ex fraordinarv exnendifirre 3 364 000
Total : Arrang ement s in the chnmbe r .................... 3 470 000
Tofal exnenrlih 3r 315 000 4 168 500 35 483 500
Section B 
- 
Receints 95 000 95 000
Net total operating budget........ 3t 220m/0 4 168 500 35 388 500
Pafi II : Pensions budget
Section A 
- 
Expenditure ............ 5 2s8 000 5 258 000
Section B 
- 
Receints l 037 500 I 037 500
Net total of nensions budset 4220 500 4220 5N
Gnllrn NFT TorAr 3s 440 500 4 168 500 39 609 000
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Part I 
- 
Operating budget
Heads and SuF-Heads Budget for 1995 Additional
credits requested
Budget for 1995
(revised)
SncnoN A 
- 
ExpBNorunE
Headl-Permnnentstaff
Sub-Head 1 
- 
Basic salaries
Sub-Head 2 
- 
Allowances . .
SufHead 3 
- 
Social charges
Sub-Head 4 
- 
Expenses relating to the recruifrnent
and departure of permanent officials
Sub-Head 5 
- 
Medical examination
'Fnra r
13 768 500
3 224 500
2665 5W
238 500
14 000
13 768 500
3 224 500
2665 500
238 500
14 000
19 911 000 19 911 000
Head II 
-Temporary staff
Sub--Head 6 
- 
Staff recruited for sessions of
the Assemhlv 3 086 500
828 000
75 000
187 000
384 000
116 000
31 000
3 470 500
944000
75 000
218 000
Sub-Head 7 
- 
Interpretation staff required for
Assembly work between sessions
Sub-Head 8 
- 
Temporary staff for the Office of
th'e flcrlz
Sub-Head 9 
- 
Social charges
Tnrar 4 t76 500 531 000 4707 500
Head III 
- 
Expenditure on premises
and equipment
Sub--Head 10 
- 
Share of joint expenditure on the
Da#c nramicac 599 000
10 000
809 000
60 000
20 000
40 000
9 000
600 000
147 000
3 388 000
20 000
30 000
3 438 000
599 000
l0 000
4 t97 000
60 000
20 000
60 000
39 000
600 000
5 585 000
Sub-Head 11 
- 
Hire of committee rooms
Sub-Head 12 
- 
Technical and other installations
for Assembly sessions
Sub-Head 13 
- 
Various services for the organi-
sation of sessions
Sub-Head 14 
- 
Maintenance of the premises of
the Office of the Clerk
Sub-Head 15 
- 
Purchase of the premises of the
OfFice nf thc Clcrk
Sub-Head 16 
- 
Purchase of reprographic and
other office equipment
Sub-Head 17 
- 
Hire and maintenance of repro-
graphic and other equipment
Toral.
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Heads and Sub-Heads Budget for 1995 Additionalcredits requested
Budget forl995
(revised)
Head IV 
- 
General administrative costs
Sub-Head 18 
- 
Postage, telephone fax and trans-
nnrt nf docrrments 853 000
237 W
100 000
75 000
85 000
500
853 000
237 W0
100 000
75 000
8s 000
500
Sub-Head 19 
- 
Duplication paper, headed
paper and other office supplies......
Sub-Head 20 
- 
Printing and publication of
docrrme.nfc
Snh-Elead ?1 
- 
Errehese of docttments
SuFHead 22 
- 
Offrcial car..............
Sub-Head 23 
- 
Bank charges.......
Torar 2 350 500 2 350 500
HeadV 
- 
Other expenditure
Sub-Head 24 
- 
Truvelling and subsistence
allowances and insurance for the President of
the Assembly, chairmen of committees and
346 000
4M 000
s 000
830 000
60 000
10 000
510 000
534 000
3 000
28 000
t62 0N
37 500
346 000
404 000
5 000
830 000
60 000
t72000
510 000
571 500
3 000
28 000
SuFHead 25 
- 
Expenses for representation........
SuFHead 26 
- 
Committee study missions..........
Sub-Head 27 
- 
Offrcialjourneys of members of
the Offiee nf the Clerk
Sub-Head 28 
- 
Expenses of experts and the
andifnr
Sub-Head 29 
- 
Expenses for stafftraining...........
Sub-Head 30 
- 
Expenditure on information.........
SuFHead 31 
- 
Expenses for political groups ......
Sub-Head 32 
- 
Contingencies and other expen-
rlihrre nnt else$rhere nrnvided for
Srrh-I{eed ?? 
- 
Non-recoverahle f
2730m0 199 500 2929 500
Tnrar (F.TrnN A 
-Exnendihrre 31 315 000 4 168 500 35 483 500
Torer sEcrIoN B 
- 
Receipts.................. 95 000 9s 000
Nrr rorru- oF OPEMInNG BuDcET... 3t 220 W 4 168 s00 35 388 500
Part I 
- 
Operating budget
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Part II 
- 
Pensions bud.get
Heads and Sub-Heads Budget for 1995 Additional
credits requested
Budget for 1995
(revised)
SnctoNA-Expenditure . . . . .
SecnoN B-Receipts ........
Ner rorer- oF PENsroNs Buocnr
5 258 000
1 037 500
4220 500
s 2s8 000
I 037 500
4220 5N
GneNo NET TorAL (Operating budget and
nensions hrrdset\ 35 ,+40 500 4 168 500 39 609 000
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QUESTION 32s
put to the Council by Mr. Pdcriaux
on 6th April1994
Has WEU played a r6le so far on the terri-
tory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and more particularly
in Sarajevo? Does it intend to play a r6le there in
the near future and, if so, what r6le?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly on
13th October 1994
The Council informs the Honourable Par-
liamentarian that the r6le WEU is currently
playing on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina is
conflned to implementing WEU's contribution to
the administration of Mostar by the European
Union.
At the European Union's request, WEU has
agreed to organise the supervision of local police
forces, their future organisation as a single, uni-
fied force and certain aspects of participation in
the exercise of police functions by means of a
WEU contribution in the framework of the EU
administration of Mostar, that took effect on 23rd
July 1994.
The deployment of WEU's police contin-
gent in Mostar, which depends on contribution by
member states, is in progress. A prograrnme to
integrate the two local police forces (a Croat and a
Muslim one) into a Unified Police Force of Mos-
tar (UPFM) is being developed by the WEU-poli-
ce Commander in Mostar in agreement with the
EU administrator.
As regards a possible r6le for WEU in Sara-
jevo, the Council does not wish in any way to pre-judge how it might follow up any initiative or
action by the European Union, CSCE or United
Nations calling for specific WEU contributions or
support.
QUESTTON 326
put to the Council by Mr. Goerens
on 25th April1994
Article VIII, paragraph 3 of the modified
Brussels Treaty confers the power " to consult
with regard to any situation which may constitute
a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat
18th November 1994
should arise, or a danger to economic stability ".
Moreover, paragraph 2 of the same article stipu-
lates that the Council " shall be so organised as to
be able to exercise its functions continuously "
and paragraph 1 states that it is empowered to
" consider matters concerning the execution of
this Treaty ".
What is the basis of the Council's statement
to the effect that:
1. It " cannot allude to the decisions of Euro-
pean Community countries regarding their rela-
tions with the successor states to the former Yugo-
slav Federation ", or to " relations between the
member states of WEU and those of the Com-
monwealth of Independent States (CIS) ", in view
of the threat to international peace from the situa-
tion in certain of these countries (Replies to
Recommendations 548, 552 and 554)? Under
such circumstances, what are the " topical ques-
tions " that the Council regards itself competent to
consider and deals with, as we are led to believe
from Chapter II of the second part of the thirty-
ninth annual report? Has the Council not for many
years essentially devoted its meetings to bilateral
relations between member countries and non-
member countries of the organisation? Does the
Council consider that its competences have been
modified since reactivation of WEU and, if so, by
what acts?
2. The issue of possible financial compensa-
tion for the riparian countries implementing the
Danube embargo " does not come within the com-
petence of the WEU Permanent Council " even
though WEU is participating in the implementa-
tion of this embargo (Reply to Recommendation
s48)?
3. " Advanced technologies are outside the
WEU Council's field of competence " when these
concern the security of Europe, and that neither is
it " within the competence of the WEU Council to
recommend the creation of a European data centre
nor even to discuss it " when it is " aware of the
need to promote ffansparency in the transfer of
equipment for civilian and military use " (Reply
to Recommendation 554)?
4. The Permanent Council has separate com-
petences from those attributed to the Council by
the modified Brussels Treaty and that the Council
need not reply to recommendations from the
Assembly if the Permanent Council does not dis-
cuss the questions addressed by such recommen-
dations (Reply to Recommendations 548 and
ss4)?
Written questions 325 to 327 and replies of the Council
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Does the Council no longer admit it should
reply to Assembly recommendations dealing with
the application of the modified Brussels Treaty,
even if certain WEU competences are entrusted
to other organisations? What is the point of
exchanges between WEU and NATO or the Euro-
pean Union if they do not permit the Council to
make such reply, despite the fact that it undertook
to do so before such exchanges were organised?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
commanicated to the Assembly on
13th October 1994
Although the Brussels Treaty modifled by
the Paris Agreements gave Western European
Union wide powers, it also evidenced its signato-
ries' concern that the body they had set up should
not duplicate other intergovernmental organisa-
tions.
Article IV of the treaty states that the signa-
tory countries and any organs established by them
will " work in close co-operation with the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation ", and emphasises
" the undesirability of duplicating the military
staffs of NAIO ".
The same concern to avoid any duplication
led the Council of Europe Committee of Minis-
ters, with the approval of the WEU Council, to
transfer in 1960 the exercise of the social and cul-
tural competences conferred on WEU by Articles
II and III of the modified Brussels Treaty to the
Council of Europe, except for those formerly
exercised by the WEU Public Administration
Committee.
When negotiations on the accession of the
United Kingdom to the Treaty of Rome were
undertaken between the United Kingdom and
the Communities on 14th September 1970, the
Council decided to cease to exercise its compe-
tences in the economic fleld.
The Council's political activities have been
further reduced since the development of political
consultations within the framework of European
political co-operation (EPC), set up within the
European Community, which are now taking
place within the framework of the common foreign
and security policy (CFSP) in the European
Union.
The Council assures the parliamentary
Assembly of its determination to exercise its
powers, even though 
- 
in order to avoid duplica-
tion 
- 
it may acknowledge that certain work is
best conducted within the context of NATO or the
European Union. The Council is, moreover,
convinced that the modifled Brussels Treaty is an
important instrument for the promotion of the
European security and defence identity of the
European Union.
1. On the basis of the foregoing, the Council,
with reference to its statement that it cannot allude
to the decisions of European Community coun-
tries regarding their relations with the successor
states to the former Yugoslav Federation, nor to
relations between the member states of WEU and
those of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (reply to Recommendations 548,552 and
554), took as its basis the fact that these decisions
and relations are already discussed and evaluated
in the appropriate fora of the European Union. To
discuss these questions in the WEU Permanent
Council would amount to repeating discussions
that have already taken place elsewhere.
This state of affairs does not, however,
exclude any debate on threats to peace and stability
in Europe arising from the situation in certain
states.
Under the agenda heading " topical ques-
tions ", the Council discusses any issue that a
member state or the Secretary-General may wish
to raise. In May and June, the subjects raised have
included the Franco-German summit in Mulhouse,
the launching of the conference on stability in
Europe, the Secretary-General's visit to the head-
quarters of Eurocorps, Russia's attitude to the sta-
tus of association with WEU, developments in
Hungary following its elections and the United
Nations operations in Rwanda.
The Council has not for many years essen-
tially devoted its meetings to bilateral relations
between member countries and non-member
countries of the organisation. It has done so only
in special cases with the goal to contribute to
greater understanding and to the strengthening of
bilateral relations between WEU as a whole and
third countries.
The Council does not consider its compe-
tences to be modified since the reactivation of
WEU. While bearing in mind the vital need to
avoid duplication with other organisations having
a rOle to play in the various economic, social and
cultural fields and in European defence and secu-
rity, the Council is actively pursuing the concep-
tual and operational development of a European
security and defence identity, in accordance with
its twofold vocation as the defence component of
the EU and as the means of strengthening the
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.
2. The Council may draw the parliamentary
Assembly's attention to the following characteris-
tics of the Danube embargo operation:
it is based on Security Council Resol-
ution 787 of 16th November 1992,
which in turn is linked with Resolutions
713 and757;
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- 
the purpose of this action is to render
assistance, at their request, to riparian
states responsible for adopting their
own measures to assure compliance
with the United Nations Security Coun-
cil resolutions;
- 
the operation is complementary to and
supportive of the efforts deployed by the
CSCE and the European Union.
The Council is of the view that WEU,
which ceased to exercise its economic compe-
tences in 1970, does not have the competence to
deal with the issues of financial compensation for
the riparian counffies implementing the Danube
embargo.
3. The Council's statement that " advanced
technologies are outside the WEU Council's field
of competence ", and that it is not " within the
competence of the WEU Council to recommend
the creation of a European data cenffe nor even to
discuss it ", when it is " aware of the need to pro-
mote transparency in the transfer of equipment for
civilian and military use " (reply to Recommenda-
tion 554) should be viewed in the overall context
of the Council's reply to the parliamentary
Assembly. In point 1 of the recommendation in
question, the Council states that " as regards the
sffengthening of contacts at regional and plant
level, the Council considers that it should not pre-
judge the results of specific initiatives taken by
the United Nations, the World Bank, the EBRD,
the OECD and the European Union in this context
nor the effects of government incentives to pro-
mote bilateral co-operation agreements ".
4. The Council would like to draw the Assem-
bly's attention to the fact that it did not state in its
reply to either Recommendation 548 or to Recom-
mendation 554 that it has competences separate
from those attributed to it by the modified Brus-
sels Treaty.
Nor could such a statement be inferred
from the replies given, although, in the exercise of
its competences, the Council takes account of the
institutional division of labour which in practice
exists between European and transatlantic organi-
sations as it has developed to date.
The Council has, moreover, replied to all
the Assembly's recommendations and will conti-
nue to do so in the future.
On the question of exchanges between
WEU and NATO or the European Union, these
serve mainly to promote ffansparency and com-
plementarity among the three organisations.
In order to provide timely responses to the
Assembly's recommendations and written ques-
tions, the Council devotes special attention to
questions and recommendations relating to
WEU's direct responsibilities, and merely indi-
cates to the Assembly the organisation primarily
competent for other issues which are raised.
QUESTTON 327
put to the Council by Mr. Pdcriaux
on 12th September 1994
Was the WEU Council informed of Fran-
ce's intention to use its armed forces in a humani-
tarian mission to Rwanda between June and
August 1994? Did it discuss the matter? Did it
take measures with a view to associating its part-
ners with France in this initiative? Were the Plan-
ning Cell and the WEU Satellite Centre called
upon to participate in this intervention? Did the
withdrawal of the French troops in August alter
the arrangements made by WEU in this matter?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communitated to the Assembly on
10th November 1994
At the urgent request of several delega-
tions, the Permanent Council met on 17th June
1994 to consider what action could be undertaken
within the WEU framework to help co-ordinate
conffibutions to United Nations efforts to stop the
slaughter of civilians and alleviate the suffering of
refugees in and around Rwanda. The Council then
decided to monitor the situation in Rwanda close-
ly, especially after the adoption of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 929 onZ2ndlune.
On this occasion the French Permanent
Representative informed the Council that France
was prepared to send troops for a humanitarian
mission to contribute to the implementation of the
relevant United Nations Security Council resolu-
tions.
Since the start of Operation Turquoise on
23rd June 1994, the Council was kept regularly
informed by the French Representative on deve-
lopments concerning the operation.
Subsequently the WEU Permanent Council
had several meetings, including ad hoc meetings,
to discuss further the situation in Rwanda and
humanitarian needs. A number of WEU states
then confirmed their readiness to contribute to the
initiative to help remedy the Rwanda tragedy.
In this context, the Council decided that
WEU would support the efforts of contributing
states by ensuring the co-ordination of their
contributions if and when necessary. To this end,
the Council confirmed the mandate given to the
Planning Cell to closely monitor the situation and
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to act as a contact and co-ordination point beween
contributing states and the relevant operational
headquarters.
The Planning Cell received daily reports
through its officer seconded to the French opera-
tional headquarters. WEU countries continued to
provide all relevant information on needs and
conffibutions. Links were established with the
United Nations. WEU states were kept informed
on a regular basis by the Planning Cell.
Furthermore, the WEU Satellite Centre was
tasked by Belgium to update national information
in preparation of eventual humanitarian opera-
tions.
2'.19
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Texts transmitted by the Council to the Assembly
at the close of the ministerial meeting
on 14th November 1994, Noordwijk
WEU Council of Ministers
14th November 1994
Noordwijk Declaration
l. To mark a new step on the path towards enhanced co-operation in the field of security and defence
in Europe, ministers of foreign affairs and defence meet today in Noordwijk, the Netherlands, for the first
time with the participation of their colleagues from the nine associate partner countries in the Ministerial
Council of Western European Union.
I
2. Ministers reaffirm their countries' dedication to the principles upon which their democracies are
based and are resolved to preserve peace, stability and freedom in Europe and elsewhere. They recall that
the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and
defence.
3. The modified Brussels Treaty and the Treaty on European Union were important steps in this pro-
cess. Inspired by the same ideals, other states are progressively being associated with WEU and the Euro-
pean Union.
4. The ministerial meetings in Petersberg, Rome, Luxembourg and Kirchberg have set the stage for the
revitalisation of WEU, as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to sffengthen the
European pillar of the alliance, and its development as an effective defence organisation with full opera-
tional capacities to carry out the Petersberg tasks.
5. Ministers endorsed the document, approved by the Permanent Council, containing the preliminary
conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy. They are determined to elaborate
to the full the recommendations and considerations contained therein so that an effective common Euro-
pean defence policy can be established in the years to come. The aim of WEU ministers is that the present
policy document will evolve into a comprehensive common European defence policy statement in the
perspective of the intergovernmental conference of 1996.
6. Ministers considered that WEU member countries, associate members, associate partners and
observers should now reflect in common on the new European security conditions, with due regard for the
work already undertaken, in order to a:rive at a common analysis of the problems, including those related
to the security and stability of the Mediterranean basin, with which they are faced and to reach agreement
as to the appropriate responses. Ministers asked the Permanent Council to initiate reflection in this area,
including the proposal put forward by France to draft a white paper on European security.
7. Ministers agreed to consider the possibility of holding a WEU meeting at summit level before the
IGC in order to finalise its political input to the conference.
8. Ministers stressed their intention to continue to work together in close association with the North
American allies. The security of the alliance and of Europe as a whole is indivisible. The transatlantic
partnership rests on a shared foundation of values and interests. Just as the commitment of the North Ame-
rican democracies is vital to Europe's security, a free, independent and increasingly more united Europe
will contribute to the security of North America.
9. Further reinforcement of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and of WEU's r6le in peace-
keeping and crisis-management will permit Europe to contribute to peace and security in a manner which
will strengthen the transatlantic partnership.
II
10. Ministers feel that the participation of associate partners in the meetings of the Council, according
to the Kirchberg arrangements, contributes to a true sffengthening of WEU and they are convinced that
their greater participation in WEU activities and closer consultations and further co-operation on security
questions are instrumental in enhancing stability in Europe. They express their satisfaction with the pro-
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gress made in implementing the agreement on the content and modalities of a status of association reached
at their Kirchberg meeting and asked the Permanent Council to exploit fully the possibilities provided in
those agreements, in particular those relating to the participation of associate partners in working groups
and liaison ilrangements with the Planning Cell. Ministers are resolved to continue in this direction, thus
complementing developments in the European Union. They also express their appreciation of the readi-
ness of some associate partners to contribute to WEU operations.
11. Ministers also reviewed the progress made in implementing the decisions taken at Kirchberg on
9th May 1994 to reinforce the relationship of the associate members with WEU. They express their satis-
faction that associate members are now in the process of nominating forces answerable to WEU and offi-
cers to the Planning Cell, and are being connected to the WEUCOM network. These measures will consi
derably strengthen the significant contribution associate members are already making to WEU.
12. Ministers warmly welcome the successful outcome of the referenda in Austria, Finland and Sweden
on their accession to the EU and they reiterate their hope that Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway will
accede to the EU by 1st January 1995. Bearing in mind the WEU declaration of Maastricht, they are look-
ing forward to discussing with them their relations with WEU once they become members of the EU.
13. Ministers attach great importance to security and stability in the Mediterranean basin, which are
fundamental for the security of Europe, and express satisfaction at the intensified dialogue that is being
conducted on the basis ofdecisions taken at Kirchberg. In this respect, they note the encouraging results
of the first meetings of the Mediterranean Group with government experts from Algeria, Egypt, Maurita-
nia, Morocco and Tunisia. They welcome the initiative for a presidency seminar on the subject.
14. In order to increase transparency and promote stability throughout Europe, ministers underline the
particular importance of establishing appropriate relationships with Russia and Ukraine.
15. Ministers acknowledge the constructive contributions from the Assembly to the further strengthen-
ing of European security.
m
16. Ministers stress the importance of developing closer relations with the EU. In the light of the review
of Article J.4 of the Treaty on European Union that will take place during the intergovernmental confe-
rence of 1996, ministers decide that WEU should make a timely contribution to the work of the conference
on the basis of its own review of the provisions of the declaration on the rdle of WEU and its relations with
the EU and with the Atlantic Alliance of December 1991.
17. Ministers welcome the co-operation between WEU and the EU in the adminisffation of Mostar as
the first example of the implementation of Article J (4) 2 of the Maastricht Treaty. Close co-operation is
an important condition for the success of the EU administration.
18. Ministers note with satisfaction that detailed arrangements for close co-operation between the WEU
and EU Council Secretariats and the modalities for exchanging information and holding consultations bet-
ween WEU and the European Commission have now been agreed and are being implemented.
19. The setting-up of an informal group of government experts of WEU/IVEAG and EU member states
to study options for a European aflnaments policy is an example of practical co-operation in dealing with
issues which regard these bodies.
*
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20. Ministers considered WEU's relations with NAIO since the Council's move to Brussels and the
alliance summit of January this year. They agree that there is further scope for developing closer working
relations between the two organisations on the basis of transparency and complementarity. In this context,
they note with satisfaction progress made in NAIO's discussion on the issues and expressed their confi-
dence that concrete proposals would be made to increase these relations by practical measures. Ministers
recall the significant possibilities that the results of the alliance summit of January 1994 offer for the fur-
ther development of WEU, and have taken note of the work done in WEU as a follow-up to these deci-
sions. In particular they welcome the contribution WEU has made to the ongoing work in the alliance on
combined joint task forces by formulating criteria and modalities for effective use by WEU of CJTFs.
They look forward to intensified co-operation in these matters, in particular between the corresponding
working groups, and to further close consultations between the two organisations, which will contribute to
a further strengthening of WEU's operational r6le and to ensuring that the CJTF concept can be imple-
mented to the full satisfaction of all allies.
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IV
21. Ministers discussed the document containing preliminary conclusions on the formulation of a com-
mon European defence policy, in the longer term perspective of a corrmon European defence policy
within the European Union, which might in time lead to a common defence, compatible with that of the
Atlantic Alliance. Ministers consider that the operational part of the document contains useful guidelines
for direct, concrete follow-up in the respective WEU bodies. Along these lines they task the Permanent
Council to proceed swiftly with further elaboration of the operational r6le of WEU.
V
22. Ministers discussed the ongoing regional armed conflicts, particularly in Europe. They expressed
their deep concern at the recent developments with respect to former Yugoslavia, which at the moment
present a growing risk of escalation.
23. Ministers express their full support for the continued efforts by the EU, the United States and the
Russian Federation, including through the Contact Group, to search for a political solution to the conflict.
In this respect, they express their concern at the continued refusal by the Bosnian Serbs to accept the peace
plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a result of which hostilities continue. The deterioration of the situa-
tion in Bosnia and Herzegovina and particularly the attacks on the United Nations-protected safe areas of
Sarajevo and Bihac, as well as on Mostar, should be effectively addressed. Ministers agree on the need for
the United Nations Security Council to consider the appropriate measures.
24. Ministers reiterated their view that lifting the arms embargo would cause the conflict to escalate fur-
ther, pose grave risks to the civilian population and to organisations in the field, leading to a situation in
which United Nations forces had to withdrawr.
Ministers take note with regret of the United States mquures to modify its participation with res-
pect to the enforcement of the arms embargo in the combined WEU/NAf,O Operation Sharp Guard in the
Adriatic. In this context, they particularly stress the importance that the United States in NAIO structures
will continue to observe fully the mandatory provisions of all relevant United Nations Security Council
resolutionsr.
Ministers emphasise that the United States measures will not affect the determination of WEU to
continue ensuring compliance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. Minis-
ters reiterated their intention to continue to implement fully the enforcement of all embargoes. Ministers
received a report by the Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Willy Claes, on discussions within NAIO on
these measures. They request the Permanent Council, in co-ordination with NAIO, to consider the impact
of the measures on Operation Sharp Guard and, if necessary, to adopt provisions so as to ensure its conti-
nued effectiveness while preserving the unity of effort. In this context, they affrrm their commitment to
continue contributing the necessary resources to Operation Sharp Guard'.
Ministers also underline the importance of the WEU police and customs mission on the Danube in
the implementation of the embargo and the economic sanctions and express their appreciation for the work
of the personnel made available by WEU nations in this regard.
25. Ministers recognise the full development of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an essen-
tial factor in a political settlement which should be based on the principle of balanced ffeatment of all the
peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Ministers emphasise the crucial importance of the efforts to arrive at a single, multi-ethnic admi-
nisfration of the city of Mostar. Ministers today received an extensive account by the EU administrator,
Mr. Hans Koschnick, on the progress made in the adminisffation of Mostar, including the establishment of
a unified police force. They expressed their appreciation and gratitude for the work done by Mr. Kosch-
nick and his staff. They reviewed the implementation of WEU's contribution to date and expressed their
appreciation for the important efforts of the WEU police contingent. They welcome the individual contri-
butions to the WEU contingent offered so far and confirm that they should be fully deployed as soon as
possible. Ministers agree that the deployment of the WEU police contingent in its entirety is crucial in res-
toring public order and building confidence between the two sides in Mostar. They also express their satis-
faction at the close co-operation between WEU and EU, which constitutes an important cbndition for the
success of the administration.
1. Tirrkey wishes to dissociate itselffrom these paragraphs.
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26. Ministers stress again the unacceptability of ethnic cleansing and the acquisition of territory through
aggression.
They welcome the important decision by Belgrade to support the peace plan and to close the border
with Bosnia in order to make the Bosnian Serbs accept the plan. The continued closure of the border must
be verified internationally in an effective way. Ministers reaffirm the need for further effective pressure on
the Bosnian Serbs.
27. They expressed the need for continued consultations and renewed urgent efforts between the EU,
United States and the Russian Federation, including in the Contact Group at the political level, and other
efforts, to make progress towards a lasting peace settlement. They underlined the importance that the
Contact Group fully share relevant information with non-Contact Group members who, through the
contribution of troops, military assets or otherwise, contribute to the international effort to establish peace
in former Yugoslavia.
28. Ministers believe that, at the appropriate time, the inftoduction of arms control and confidence-
building measures, including in the political field, should be envisaged in order to help preserve peace and
stabilit, in the Balkan region. In the longer term, a rdgime aimed at wider rehabilitation could also be
considered in this context.
VI
29. Ministers support efforts by the CSCE towards a stable and lasting peaceful solution to the conflict
in Nagorno-Karabakh, including the possibility of a CSCE peace-keeping operation based on the prin-
ciples of Chapter III of the Helsinki document 1992.
30. Ministers stress the importance they attach to the place of the CSCE in the European security archi-
tecture and its growing r6le, notably in the field of early-warning, conflict-prevention and crisis-manage-
ment. They undertake to make the ongoing review conference and the forthcoming summit in Budapest a
success in terms of critically evaluating the implementation of existing standards and procedures wlQ a
view to better preparing the CSCE for its future tasks. They support proposals to enhance the CSCE's
r6le as a regional -arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter by giving it
greater resp-onsibility foi conflict-prevention and resolution and crisis-management, in compliance with
Article 53 of the United Nations Charter, in the CSCE area.
31. Ministers note that substantial progress has been made in the field of arms control and disarmament
in recent years. In the light of the new challenges, they reiterate their intention to promote all arms conffol
measures aimed at enhancing stability and security in Europe as well as in other regions.
32. Ministers reiterate their hope that all instruments of ratification necessary for the entry into force of
the Open Skies Treaty will have been deposited at the time of the CSCE Budapest summit. In this context,
minisiers welcome the adoption of the standing operating procedures for the WEU group of states parties.
These procedures will contribute to the effective implementation of the treaty.
33. Ministers welcome the success of the process initiated in Paris aimed at the conclusion of a pact on
stability in Europe. The launching of the two " regional round tables " has shown the progress that can-be
achiev6d through rapprochement between European states. This initiative is a major contribution to stabi-
lity on our continent-. Ministers recommend that this close co-operation aimed at the conclusion of the pact
on stability in Europe should be continued so as actively to further good neighbourly relations in Central
and Eastern Europe.
34. Ministers welcome the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Baltic states, which represents a signi-
ficant contribution to the security situation in the region and enhances general stability in Europe.
VII
35. Ministers underline the importance of developing further the operational r6le of WEU in accord-
ance with the declaration of Petersberg and the operational considerations of the document on a common
European defence policy.
Recent events have underlined the importance for WEU to be able to play a more signiflcant and
effective r6le in facing humanitarian emergencies caused by international crises or natural catastrophes.
Taking account of the-leading r6le of the European Union as a major body for coordination of European
humanitarian assistance, ministers sffess that it is one of the r6les of WEU to provide for a European ins-
trument of reaction in cases where, due to the urgency of a humanitarian crisis or the need for military pro-
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tection, military means must be employed. Consequently, WEU has to be able to count on immediately
available capabilities and arrangements which allow a rapid response to such emergencies. Ministers
endorse the report regarding the setting-up of the arrangements and the provision of the means for a
humanitarian task force and mandate the Permanent Council speedily to implement this initiative.
36. Ministers took note of the initial report, approved by the Permanent Council on WEU's r6le in eva-
cuation operations. Ministers request the Permanent Council to continue work on this subject in close
co-ordination with the relevant EU bodies.
37. In reaction to appeals to WEU to become active on the Danube and in Mostar, WEU has demons-
trated its ability to perform combined civiliar/military activities, which require close co-operation bet-
ween civilian and military authorities. Ministers decide that WEU's operational r6le in this field should be
further developed. They request the Permanent Council to develop proposals so as to facilitate the incor-
poration of non-military aspects in planning processes.
38. Ministers consider that the Council needs to have appropriate information and consultation mecha-
nisms and procedures and more support, in particular to enable prompt reactions to crises, inter alia
through a politico-military working group in Brussels which can be reinforced as necessary according to
the specific nature of the contingency. The support capacities of the Secretariat in the politico-military
field need to be reinforced accordingly so that the Secretariat can fully support the work done by the Coun-
cil and its politico-military working group. The Secretariat and Planning Cell need to be complemented by
capacities in the area of intelligence and crisis-management in order to fulfil the tasks mandated by the
Petersberg declaration: for instance, a situation centre and an intelligence section, which are already under
study. The studies being conducted in this field should be submitted to the Permanent Council so that it
can take the appropriate decisions.
39. Ministers welcome progress accomplished in bringing the European corps up to full operational
readiness and the incorporation of Spain, which has also recently subscribed to the joint declaration sta-
ting the conditions for the use of the corps in the framework of WEU.
40. Ministers take note with interest of the positive development of the initiatives currently under consi-
deration by France, Italy and Spain envisaging both an air maritime force and a ground force answerable
to WEU.
4I. Ministers take note with interest of the discussions of the Chiefs of Defence Staff during their mee-
ting in The Hague of 3rd November.
42. Ministers reiterate their commitment gradually to develop the Institute for Security Studies into a
European Security and Defence Academy and request the Permanent Council to take this matter forward
as a priority.
43. Ministers considered that the finalisation of the appropriate financing irrrangements was essential
for the development of WEU's operational capabilities. They tasked the Permanent Council to examine at
the earliest opportunity the necessary arrangements, including the setting-up of a WEU operational
budget.
VIII
The Defence Ministers of the 13 nations of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) met
before the WEU Council meeting to review the armaments co-operation activities carried out by the
group. Ministers noted with satisfaction the successful establishment of an Armaments Secretariat within
WEU and the greater focus this provides for European arrnaments co-operation. Ministers agreed to esta-
blish in spring 1995 a research cell to support the conduct of the EUCLID programme and welcomed other
steps to improve the arrangements for its implementation, in particular a recent EUCLID symposium.
Ministers welcomed the German initiative to set up an informal group of experts to study the options for
a European armaments policy and endorsed the guidelines for the group. Ministers also took note of fur-
ther work on a European armaments agency and approved the principles for the operation of such an orga-
nisation. Ministers agreed that national armaments directors would continue their considerations on this
subject, recognising that conditions do not currently exist for the creation of an agency conducting the full
range of procurement activities on behalf of member nations. They agreed to consider favourably the
Franco-German initiative to create a new armaments co-operation structure as a subsidiary body under the
modified Brussels Treaty, when introduced to the WEU Council. The agreements by defence ministers
were subsequently adopted by the Council at 13.
*
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Ministers said farewell to Secretary-General Willem van Eekelen and thanked him for his inva-
luable contribution to the development of WEU over the past five and a half years. They paid tribute to
Dr. van Eekelen's inspiring leadership which was instrumental in the transformation of WEU.
Ministers endorsed the decision by the Permanent Council appointing Ambassador Jose Cutileiro of
Pornrgal as the new Secretary-General of WEU.
Preliminary conclusions on the formulation of
a common European defence policy
Part A: penpective of a common European defence policy
I.Introduction
1. The reflection on the formulation of a common European defence policy is based on the conviction
expressed by ministers in the platforrn on European security interests adopted in The Hague on 27th Octo-
ber 1987 according to which " the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as
it does not include security and defence ".
The essential political conditions for the new r6les and tasks of WEU have been created at Maas-
tricht. Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty states that the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) shall
include all questions related to the security of the Union. Furthermore, in the WEU declaration adopted on
that occasion, WEU members agreed to sffengthen the r61e of WEU, in the longer-term perspective of a
common defence policy within the European Union which might in time lead to a coflrmon defence, com-
patible with that of the Atlantic Alliance. WEU is being developed as the defence component of the EU,
and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of NAIO.
In paragraph 5 of the Kirchberg declaration of 9th May 1994, the Council of Ministers of WEU
tasked the Permanent Council to begin work on the formulation of a common European defence policy
with a view to presenting preliminary conclusions at its next ministerial meeting in the Netherlands. The
present document is an initial contribution on the objectives, scope and means of a common European
defence policy.
II. Common European defence policy: definilion and scope
2. Being an element of security policy in a wider sense, the common European defence policy is direc-
ted towards the reduction of risks and uncertainties that might threaten the common values, fundamental
interests and independence of the Union and its member states and towards contributing to the preserva-
tion of peace and the strengthening of international security, in accordance with the principles of the
United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris
Charter.
A common European defence policy will need to incorporate elements on the necessary structures,
mechanisms and capabilities, as well as on the definition of principles for the use of the armed forces and
armaments of WEU states.
3. A common European defence policy should enhance security and stability by ensuring a commen-
surate European participation in collective defence, and by an active engagement in conflict-prevention
and crisis-management in Europe and elsewhere, in accordance with Europe's importance. Institutionally
and substantively, the development of a common European defence policy in WEU must be seen in the
context of broader European and transatlantic relationships, which are closely intertwined. This common
policy should lead to an increased European contribution to the objectives of collective defence and a new
sharing of responsibilities, which should not only be compatible with the defence policy of the Atlantic
Alliance but should also be a means of strengthening and renewing the transatlantic partnership.
4. A common European defence policy will need to be formulated against the background of a
thorough analysis of European security interests and should take as its basic assumption the collective
co-operative approach to defence, as established in collective defence alliances under the Brussels and
Washington treaties. It should take into account the following four levels of European responsibilities and
interests in the field of defence:
- 
WEU governments have a direct responsibility for the security and defence of their own peoples
and territories.
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- 
WEU governments have a responsibility to project the security and stability presently enjoyed in
the West throughout the whole of Europe.
- 
WEU goveflrments have an interest, in order to reinforce European security, in fostering stability
in the southern Mediterranean countries.
- 
WEU governments are ready to take on their share of the responsibility for the promotion of
security, stability and the values of democracy in the wider world, including, through the execu-
tion of peace-keeping and other crisis-management measures under the authority of the United
Nations Security Council or the CSCE, acting either independently or through WEU or NA[O.
They are also ready to address new security challenges such as humanitarian emergencies; proli-
feration; terrorism; international crime and environmental risks, including those related to disar-
mament and the destruction of nuclear and chemical weapons.
5. In carrying out these potential r6les, consideration should be given to which interests are specifi-
cally European and which interests are more widely shared beyond Europe. WEU should be ready to
explore actively options for working with the widest possible range of non WEU partners and allies in a
particular set of circumstances, not least because of the important possibilities of additional resources this
will open up. This in no way detracts from the requirement that European govemments maintain the
necessary levels of resources to provide, on an equitable basis, suitable, properly equipped, trained and
maintained defence capabilities and military forces for the purposes of carrying out commitments arising
from the above considerations, as well as ensuring the necessary support of their parliaments and more
widely of their publics for the goals pursued.
Adapting ourselves to the changing security environment and the evolution of the transatlantic part-
nership, the responsibility towards the whole of Europe requires the involvement of the associate partners
of Central Europe in a reflection on changing conditions with respect to security and defence in Europe as
a whole. Developing dialogue and exchanges of information with Russia and Ukraine on issues of com-
mon concern is also vital for wider European security and stability.
6. The full development of a common defence policy will require a common assessment and defini-
tion of the requirements and substance of a European defence which would frst require a clear definition
of the security challenges facing the European Union and a determination of appropriate responses. This
will in turn depend upon a judgement of the r6le the European Union wishes to play in the world and the
contribution it wishes to make to security in its immediate neighbourhood and in the wider world.
Europeans have a major responsibility with regard to defence in both the conventional and nuclear
field. In addition to their r6le of national deterrent, the British and French nuclear weapons contribute to
global deterrence in accordance with the Ottawa Declaration of the North Atlantic Council of 1974 and
The Hague platform of WEU of 1987. The alliance's new strategic concept of 1991 recognised that " the
independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent r6le of their own,
contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the allies. "
III. The rdle of Western European Union
7. According to Article J.4 of the Treaty on European Union, the European Union may request WEU
to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which havg defence implications. As laid
down in the WEU declaration adopted on that occasion and through several declarations since then, WEU
is being developed as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the
European pillar of NATO. More recently, WEU is developing its relations with the Central European
countries in the context of the evolutionary process leading to their closer integration into European
institutions. Furthermore, WEU is taking an interest in establishing relationships with countries in the
Mediterranean area.
8. [n the Petersberg declaration of 19th June 1992, ministers declared the preparedness of member
states to support the effective implementation of conflict-prevention and crisis-management measures,
including peace-keeping activities of the CSCE or the United Nations Security Council. It was stated that,
apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and
Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, military units of WEU member states, acting under the autho-
rity of WEU, can be deployed for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, and tasks of com-
bat forces in crisis-management, including peace-making. The participation of associate members in such
tasks was also allowed for in this declaration and fuither elaborated in the Kirchberg declaration, which
also allowed for the participation of associate partners.
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9. Some important results have already been achieved on the organisation and functioning of WEU in
times of crisis on WEU humanitarian missions and on WEU's r6le in peace-keeping. The preliminary list
of forces answerable to WEU (EAWEU) provides an indication of units available for WEU operations.
10. ln 1996, the European Union will hold an intergovernmental conference. As far as the CFSP is
concerned, it was agreed that the relevant provisions may be revised on the basis of a report that the EU
Council of Ministers will present to the European Council. The conference will address Article J.4 of the
Maastricht Treaty and therefore issues of defence policy. WEU will contribute to the work of the
conference as far as defence-related issues are concerned and will itselfundertake a review ofits declara-
tion of December 1991. This review will take account of the progress made and the experience gained
until then and will also extend to the relationships between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance. The relation-
ships between EU and WEU will be re-examined in l996.In the meantime, links between both organisa-
tions are being further sffengthened. To this effect, the Permanent Council should complete its examina-
tion of the question of harmonisation of presidencies in accordance with the ministerial mandate of
November 1993. Also, the Permanent Council continues to develop practical measures to enhance rela-
tions with NATO.
IV The relatianship between WEU and the European Union
11. The European Council meeting in Brussels on 29th October 1993 has adopted important measures
on the implementation of the CFSP. The CFSP working group on security has done substantial work on
the development of a theoretical framework for a European security policy. It has stated general principles
which could provide a basis for the further development of a CFSP. [t has formulated several criteria that
might apply to thinking and decision-making on possible joint actions and serve as guidance. It has also
studied ways and means of reducing duplication between the activities of different security organisations.
12. It has made an analysis of European security interests in the new sfategic context and of the risks
for European security, which provides a good basis for the development of a common foreign and security
policy. Furthermore, the working group has studied the implications for European security of the situation
in various neighbouring regions (Central and Eastern Europe, the Meditenanean, the Maghreb and the
Middle-East). These studies should be complemented with a WEU military analysis, so as to take account
of their defence implications for the further elaboration of a common European defence policy.
Thus, some important steps have been taken to develop a more coherent vision of a European secu-
rity and defence policy, helping to ensure an integtated approach to security by making use of Europe's
economic, political and security instruments.
13. The defining of a common European defence policy will be a substantial contribution to the elabo-
ration and implementation by WEU of decisions of the European Union having defence implications. In
this respect, reference can be made to the ongoing co-operation between the European Union and WEU in
Mostar.
V The relationship between WEU and NATO
14. Continued security and stability is underpinned by the transatlantic political, security and defence
links embodied in NAIO. Its basic operating principle 
- 
solidarity 
- 
translated into practical collective
defence arrangements, ensures that no single ally is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in
dealing with basic security challenges. The result is a sense of equal security amongst members, rggard-
less of differences in their circumstances or in their national military capabilities. Solidarity should also be
expressed by the willingness of each country to share fairly the risks, burdens and responsibilities of the
coflrmon effort as well as its benefits.
15. WEU is being developed in harmony with, not in competition to, the wider framework of trans-
atlantic defence co-operation in NATO on the basis of transparency and complementarity. When under-
taking military operations, which will use existing national and collective capabilities, NAIO and WEU
should continue their efforts to avoid unnecessary duplication. We recall that the multinational European
sffuctures answerable to WEU would also contribute towards reinforcing the allies' capability to work
together for their common defence. NATO will remain the essential forum for consultation among its-
members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of
allies under the North Atlantic Treaty.
16. At the same time, it is recognised that the alliance could benefit from a more balanced sharing of
risks, responsibilities and burdens, through the development of WEU's operational r6le. At the NAIO
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summit of 10th and 1lth January 1994,the heads of state and government supported strengthening the
European pillar of the alliance through WEU. They stated that NAIO stands ready to make collective
assets of the alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the NAC, for WEU operations undertaken
in pursuit of the CFSP of the European Union.
17. The full support which the NAIO summit has given to the development of a European security and
defence identity points the way to a new level of mutually reinforcing co-operation between NAIO and
WEU. The CJTF concept offers an innovative model to combine European security and defence co-ope-
ration with political solidarity within the alliance, while making economic use of resources and offering
the possibility for non-NATO members to participate. In the Kirchberg declaration, ministers welcomed
the endorsement of the principle that collective assets and capabilities can be made available for WEU
operations, preserving WEU's own planning procedures and capabilities. Ministers underlined the impor-
tance of co-ordination with the alliance on the implementation of the CJTF concept and the definition of
separable but not separate capabilities so as to ensure their effective use where appropriate by WEU and,
in that case, under its command. Both from a European and an Atlantic perspective it is important that this
concept be developed and implemented soon, as this could provide WEU and NATO with an increased
capability to undertake contingency operations, including peace-keeping.
VI. WEU andthe CSCE
18. The CSCE is the only European and transatlantic forum in which all states from Vancouver to Vla-
divostok participate. In order to avoid the emergence of new divisions in Europe, WEU states support fur-
ther sffengthening of the CSCE. CSCE will have to play a leading r6le in particular in the field of preven-
tive diplomacy, in the building up of co-operative structures and in the promotion of democracy, the rule
of law and human and minority rights. WEU reaffirms its resolution to support CSCE with its own
resources and to continue working with the CSCE, thus giving effect to the concept of mutually reinfor-
cing institutions developed in the 1992 Helsinki declaration.
VII. The ties with Central and Eastern Europe
and the Meditenanean
19. Another element of the broader context in which WEU is functioning is its relationship to the coun-
tries of Central Europe. At the May 1994 Kirchberg ministerial meeting, WEU has upgraded the relation-
ship with nine Cenffal European countries that have concluded or will conclude Europe Agreements with
the EU, to the status of associate partners. Their participation in meetings of the WEU Council gives them
the opportunity to conffibute to collective European policy-making in the field of defence. The enhanced
dialogue is an important contribution to stability in Europe. They may also be invited to participate in
working groups on a case-by-case basis, they may have a liaison iurangement with the Planning Cell and
they will be able to panicipate, in principle, in the implementation of Petersberg tasks as well as in rele-
vant exercises and planning. Through these arrangements WEU is making a contribution to the gradual
process of integrating these countries into Western security institutions. This developing network of rela-
tions with the Central European countries will have to be taken into account when a common European
defence policy is being formulated.
The development of these relations contributes to the stability of the European continent, in paral-
lel to their progressive involvement in a process of reflection within the CFSP framework. This process,
complementary to the one pursued by the Atlantic Alliance in particular through the partnership for peace,
is an essential element for future stability on the European continent.
20. European security also has a Mediterranean dimension, and the framing of a European defence
policy will have to take this into account. The problems of this area are primarily of a political, economic
and social nature and have to be addressed mainly through political and economic means. The security
implications are however more and more relevant. The importance of the r6le of the Mediterranean has
been recognised by WEU, which established in 1987 a working group on security in the Mediterranean,
as well as by the EU which, within the framework of the CFSP, has recently conducted an analysis of the
implications of the Mediterranean situation for European security. The CFSP Security Working Group has
concluded that stability and equilibrium in the Mediterranean region, which are fundamental for European
security, are a responsibility of the European Union as a whole. In the Kirchberg declaration, ministers
agreed further to develop the dialogue already initiated with the Maghreb countries and to expand it to
Egypt and gradually to other non-WEU Mediterranean states.
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Part B: The construction of a cornmon European defence poticy
21. In the 1996 intergovernmental conference the future relationship between WEU and the EU will
feature prominently. WEU should through its own review provide an input into this conference. Whatever
the outcome of the IGC will be, the intrinsic link between a common European defence policy and NATO
will remain.
I. WEU's political rdle
22. The formulation of a corlmon defence policy requires a detailed analysis of risks to European secu-
rity. Tg that end the aforementioned analyses of the CFSP working group 6n security should be comple-
Tg{9d by a military analysis, to be prepared by WEU taking account of risk analyses carried out withinNATO. T.t9 analyses will provide insight in the relationship between security-concerns and defence
issues and what r6le defence instruments can play vis-d-vis the range of other instruments, notably
ecolomic and diplomatic, available to Western European governments, including through the European
Union.
ry. 
- - 
Solidarity.should continue to be the fundamental principle of any common defence policy, and
should be the basis for multinational military action. For situations which might call for its in-volvement,
WEU should formulate criteria which could play a r6le in the decision-making process within WEU, in par-
ticular on the basis of common interests, including those related to the security of citizens of WEU stat'es.
The level of involvement of different states can vary according to the circumstances. Decision-
making should 9_e sufficiently flexible in order not to frusffate joint activities by WEU states who have
expressed the will to undertake such activities.
24. WEU should examine developments in the transatlantic partnership which represent an imponant
corlmon interest with the aim of introducing joint positions agrbed in WEU into the-process of consulta-
tion in the alliance.
Another aspect that could merit consideration, while taking into account the particular situation of
some member states, is the relationship between the development of the FAWEU planning process and the
NATO force planning process. Equally, it is necessary to consider possible relations in-times of crisis
between, on the one hand, forces and headquarters answerable to WEU and, on the other hand, NATO.
In taking up_-these questions, further thought may also be needed on the procedural aspects such as
the introduction of WEU views into the alliance, joint meetings of the respective Councils, arid other wor-
$1g relationslps such as enhanced co-operation between civilian and rfulitary institutions (secretariats,
!Qg, s1atrs). These questions have become even more topical in the light of the new tasks of NAIO in thefield of crisis-management, including peace-keeping.
II. WEU's operational rdle
25. WEU should be in a position to elaborate and implement European Union decisions and actions
laying defence implications, in accordance with Article J.4 of the Tieaty on European Union. As thedefence gglnponen_t o_f_the European Union and as a means to strengthen the Euiopean pillar of the
Atlantic Alliance, WEU should sffengthen its operational capabilities, diveloping the mitital, and opera-
tional aspects of security such as:
- 
institutional aspects of defence;
- 
exercising, preparation and interoperability of forces;
- 
generic and contingency planning;
- 
strategic mobility;
- 
the question of anti-missile defences in Europe;
- 
defence intelligence in Europe (including the space component);
- 
mechanism for the sharing of burdens and the pooling of resources.
26. WEU needs more comprehensive and continuous access to information on emerging and ongoing
crises. Satellite information can provide one possible way of contributing to this requirlment. tn tfre
KilchQgrq declaration, ministers reaffirmed their will to sef up an independent European satellite system
and said that a decision would be taken subject to evaluation of the costs and merits of the proposed sys-
tem and of other WEU alternatives and affordability. The Space Group is preparing a proposal'for rr"L u
decision with a view to a 1995 ministerial meeting.
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The Space Group has also assessed the requirement-s to ensure the continuity of the operation of the
Satellite Cerife until the completion of the evaluation of its capabilities. Based on this assessment, the
Centre will be able to continue its activities until the end of 1995 without additional funding. At the spring
1995 ministerial meeting, an evaluation of the Centre's work should be completed, p_o_ as_!o permit a deci-
sion to be taken on the establishment of the Satellite Centre as a pennanent body of WEU.
Pl.anning requirements and operationnl capabilitie s
27. A more systematic approach to identifying and meeting contingencies f91 European military
deployments is called for. Buifding upon concreie eiperiences, and in accordance with the three main mis-
sions defined at Petersberg, the Planning Cell should address the mechanisms for identifying the leces-
sary assets and capabilitieJas well as possible shortages. Generig planning ,lroul9 provide a better insight
int6 the needs ani requirements. A generic plan, baied on precise data and.a plausible scenario, should^eneri l
contain the necessary itetailed specifications and/or assumptions of capabilities such as the size and com-
position of the forc6 (including support capabilities), reaition time and command and control_9_Tge:
inents. Takins into account sucf, eei6ric plannins, the Planning Cell should examine existing FAWEU andm . i g g n6ri  l i g, 
-_t_ ^^allied assets I including CJTF 
--that migtrt be made available in order to identify *d P$" Ploposals as
to which headquarters Ind forces can be used for particular scenarios. This could result in realistic force
packages for a range of options, which would allow f9r quick implementation in case of (an eggging)
brisis.iuitOing onictiviti^es in this field, WEU will refine-the conCept of " forces answerable to WEU ".
28. The tasks and composition of the Planning Cell need further consideration in the light-of the deci-
sions taken at Kirchberg. irriority should be given to the development of appropriate plans and procedures
for humanitarian and rescue operations, including evacuation operations.
29. WEU should continue its activities in the field of strategic mobility and intelligence policy.
30. WEU can also offer the assistance of the Planning Cell to the European Union, should it decide to
develop a capacity for forecasting and analysis of crisei. Io E. case,- the Plqnynq Cell could prwide a
compl6mentary military risk analfsis. WEu-shall continue its efforts in harmonising its security regulations
wim NafO inbrder to reach agr6ement on the exchange of information and data nansmission procedures.
Mixed civilian and military activities
31. The assistance of WEU to riparian states for implementation of United Nations sanctions on the
Danube and the contribution of a poiice force to the EU'i administration of Mostar show that WEU is also
able to perform combined civiliin/military activities. This can be the case for WEU humanitarian or
rescue missions, which are among the Petersberg tasks. Thought could be given to appropriate ways and
means of integrating such activities into WEU policy.
Decision-making, command and conffol and burden-sharing
32. WEU will need appropriate mechanisms for political decision-making a1d military command and
control. WEU's operati6rial i6le should be developed in a flexible way, ensuring.tle_gapacity to, on the
one hand, operate autonomously (where appropriate in close consultation with NATO) and, on the other
hand, to operate together with non-WEU countries.
The Council needs to have appropriate information and consultation mechanisms and-procedures
and more support, in particular to eiriUte prompt reactions to crises, inter alia thr-ough a.politico-military
working groiip in nnissels which can be ieinforced as necessary according to t4e specific nature of the
contingEricy. the support capacities of the Secretariat in the politico-military fie-ld need to be reinforced
accordlngly so that thi, Secreiariat can fully support the wor! done by the Council and its.politico-military^
working-gioup. The Secretariat and Planning Cell need tote complement"d bJ capacities in the area of
intellig6nie and crisis-management in order to fum the tasks mandated by the Petersberg declaration: for
instanEe, a situation centre anA an intelligence section, which are already under study. The tasks of the
Military Delegates in support of the Chiefs of Defence Staff as well as the members of the Council also
need to be defined more clearly in this context.
33. During operations, WEU command and control structures and arrangements will have to allow for
the use by WEtJ of collective assets and capabilities made available b_y the_alliar_rce and for the use of
national assets of non-WEU members, as well as for the participation of non-WEU nations in WEU ope-
rations, where appropriate. WEU should aim at the highestpossible degree of multinatignglity at all levels
of the command ihain, particularly at the level of force and operations headquarters. Multinational head-
quarters should be available for use by both WEU and NATO. On the level of force headquarters, the
ionsequences of the CJTF concept are already under consideration. A similar approach to multinationality
should be developed for operations headquarters.
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WEU exercise policy should be actively implemented in order to determine whether its procedures
for command and control and for activation of FAWEU need to be adjusted.
34. Participation in a specific operation is and will remain based on a sovereign decision of each mem-
ber state. However, a common defence policy presupposes, in the operational sense, the readiness of par-
tigipatiqg nations to share in practice the responsibilities in the execution of operational tasks. The prin-
ciple of European solidarity, or even " European burden sharing " would seem to be relevant here. The
following mechanisms may need to be examined further:
- 
rotation of forces: Nations may find it difficult to participate in any particular operation because
of a lack of capability to sustain their contribution over a longer period. A solution to this pro-
blem may be found by accepting a rotation scheme at the start of a WEU operation. More gene-
rally, a rotation scheme may be helpful in reaching an equitable share of responsibilities;
- 
pooling of capabilities and resources: This may apply, for example, to ransport capabilities
(especially aircraft), simulation equipment, special munitions and spare parts;
- 
operational budget: For WEU operations, WEU must have available the necessary decision-
making procedures and mechanisms to ensure adequate and timely resourcing and financing of
the preparation and implementation of these operations. The necessary arrangements including
the issue of budgets and fixed conribution keys should now be examined at ministerial level as
a matter of priority;
- 
task specialisation.
Development of the WEU Institute into an academy
35. The development of the Institute into a European security and defence academy, as stated in the
Maastricht declaration of 10th December 1991, should be gradually pursued.
Armnme nt s c o - op e ration
36. The necessary development of a European annaments policy as part of a common European defen-
ce policy is being advanced by the activities of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) within
WEU. As agreed at Maasfficht, further proposals for enhanced armaments co-operation are also being
actively pursued with the aim of creating a European annaments agency. In addition, an informal group of
experts, composed of governmental experts of WEU/I\IEAG and EU member states, to study the options
for a European annaments policy has been set up. Issues to be addressed among others in advancing
European armaments co-operation and the development of a European annaments policy include:
- 
the r6le of armaments co-operation in strengthening the European defence identity;
- 
the improvement of the interoperability of armed forces, through inter alia the promotion of har-
monised requirements and standardised equipment;
- 
the reduction of duplicative national research, development and production costs;
- 
the creation of conditions for an integrated, rationalised and competitive European defence
industry;
- 
identification of conditions and measures which could improve market conditions for a more
competitive approach to European, including intra-European, procurement;
- 
as far as extra-European exports a^re concerned, within the context of the informal group, a study
of the possible harmonisation of national practices, taking into account developments under a
common European foreign and security policy in the area of arms export controls, and a study of
ways to fanslate the developments of the CFSP into practice in the area of arms export controls.
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II. The strength ofairforces
lII. Demands
fV. Conclusions
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Baumel (Chairman); Mr. De Decker, I['I'rs. Baan,eld-Schlaman (Vice-Chairmen); MM.
Alloncle, Bianchi, Borderas, Briane, Bito, Cox, Dees, Dolazza, Dumont, Femandes Marques, Hardy, bmer, Jacquat, Kelchter-
mans, La Russa, Mrs. Lentz-Comette, Mr. Marten, Lord Newall, MM. Parisi, P6criaux, Petruccioli, Reis lrite, Scheer, Sir Dud-
ley Smith, Mr. Sole Tura (Alternate:. Cuco), Mrs. Soutendijk van Appeldoom, Sir Keith Speed, MM. Steiner, [,6pez Valdivielso
(Altemate: lipez Hennres), Yazqtez (Alternate: Bolinaga), Zierer.
N.B. Tlre names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Drafi Recommendation
on the reodiness and capobilities of airforces
in WEU member stttes
The Assembly,
O Considering that WEU member states should review the national capability of their airforces to
meet their obligations within the alliance and to provide a proper contribution to the exercise of interna-
tional authority and humanitarian obligations;
(ii) Recalling that, for member states, it is not enough to possess appropriate numbers of military air-
craft since such numbers are of little use if the aircrews are not capable of current operational activity or
if the aircraft themselves are not maintained in serviceable condition;
(iiil Expressing concern about the quality and relevance of flight training and stressing that low-level
flight training is necessary to sustain the possibility of operational survival;
(iv) Drawing attention to the absence of, or inadequacy ol low-level flight training in a number of mem-
ber states which fails to provide reasonable assurances that the nature and the scale of flight training in
their airforces meets the standards to which they are committed;
(v) Regretting possible shortcomings in logistic support capacity and the reliance upon civilian trans-
port aircraft for military purposes especially where pursuit of peace in the service of humanitarian causes
may require both aircrew and aircraft to be prepared to face a hostile environment, which testifies to the
need, in the long term, to build a European military transport aircraft;
(vi) Considering existing anxieties about the need for adequate air defence, in particular in terms of all-
weather capability, air-to-air refuelling and reconnaissance and early warning in airforces of WEU mem-
ber states;
(vii) Considering that the aircraft in service in several member states are obsolescent thus extending the
considerable range and variety of different types, there being, for instance, some thirteen different types of
strike aircraft;
(viii) Considering that rather more attention should be paid to making provision for adequate air-to-air
refuelling in view of the increased capacity this might provide;
(ix) Noting that the airforce exercise Purple Nova held in November 1994 under WEU auspices is an
interesting development and trusting that further similar exercises will be held in order to assist co-opera-
tion between airforces of member states to enable them to develop further co-operative capacity in
response to crises and international need,
RSCOIvIN,IBNDS TI{AT TTTE COUNCIL
1. Remind member states that more attention should be paid to the provision of sufficient military air-
craft and aircrews capable of operations in support of international need and to ensuring that sufficient
personnel are trained and employed to maintain the numbers of military aircraft which their commitment
to the alliance requires;
2. Urge member states to recognise that whilst their services need to be operated efficiently, the
defence of their realms and their obligation to both the alliance and the international community require
the retention of a sufficient number of uniformed personnel to ensure that support as well as operational
requirements can be permanently secured;
3. Pay close attention to the success of the recent airforce exercise Purple Nova with a view to extend-
ing such iurangements on a regular basis.
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Drafi Order
on the reodiness and capabilitias ol airforces
in WEU menber states
The Assembly,
(i) Aware that, in the near future, further budget reductions in WEU member states may have a nega-
tive influence on their ability to respond to threats to European security;
(ii) Stressing that WEU member states will increasingly need to support international stability or
sustain the humanitarian cause for which they must have available the appropriate aircraft and personnel;
(iiil Considering that opposition to fiaining at low altitudes is at present leading to its prevention or
inhibition and, as a consequence, to the diminishing qualify of aircrew training,
INsrnucrs rrs DEFENcE Couurrree
1. To meet representatives of the WEU Planning Cell in order to consider these matters and to provide
an analysis of the conditions in airforces of WEU member states during 1996;
2. To monitor the response to the present report and to inform the Assembly of the state of national
airforces during 1996.
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Explanatory Memorand.um
(submifred by Mr. Hardy, Rapporteur)
L lntroduction
1. Political changes in Europe in recent years
persuaded governments and people that defence
expenditure could be reduced substantially and
diverted to areas which commanded greater prio-
rity in the form of social provision and the reduc-
tion of taxation or the reduction of total public
expenditure.
2. Until this drawing down of defence provi-
sion, a large part of the expenditure was incurred
to face the possibility of east-west conflict either
to respond to any aggression or to deter it. It is
accepted that these dangers have diminished
markedly.
3. Obviously, ministers must make a careful
assessment of existing or emerging risks and
threats to security and although at this stage
governments have not yet entirely dismantled
their capacity to respond to potential aggression
within Europe, the available capacity to provide
such response has been and is still being greatly
reduced.
4. At the same time, it can be perceived that
the cold war with all its perils did contribute to a
greater degree of stability in Europe than we have
witnessed in the last five years. The fact that for
the first time in half a century there has been
serious conflict in Europe recently may illustrate
that instability.
5. Whilst one is hopeful that European and
international effort will see peace achieved in for-
mer Yugoslavia and reduce the possibility of any
conflict within Europe, it does seem reasonable to
point out that the ability to effect such purposes
may not be helped if there is little in the way of
defence capacity readily available to reinforce
political argument and underline diplomatic
endeavour.
6. Unfortunately, instability and localised
conflicts experienced in Europe have been accom-
panied by other crises elsewhere. The invasion of
Kuwait and the horrors of Rwanda are but two
examples and they illusfiate the need for the exer-
cise of international authority. After all, points of
conflict do seem to increase remorselessly.
7. Perhaps few Europeans now believe that
the United Nations is able to exercise effective
and swift response to dreadful crises. Certainly,
we seem to have little ground for confidence that
the international community could be able to gua-
rantee international peace-making yet alone pro-
vide any real peace-keeping effort. But that capa-
city is desirable and its achievement does require
the commitment of men and material from mem-
ber states prepared to contribute to a particular
cause at the behest of international authority.
8. Whatever the need for international and
European effort may be, the exercise of interna-
tional authority, the adequate support of the
humanitarian cause, or the protection of endan-
gered minorities, then our operational involve-
ment is essential. That is being demonsffated in
the skies over Northern Iraq, the Gulf and Bosnia
today. These matters have considerable relevance
for WEU and its member states for few other
countries possess the aircraft and the skills to
make such sustained operational activity possible.
At the same time, both WEU itself and its member
states might acknowledge that it is scarcely sen-
sible for the exercise of international authority to
be wholly dependent upon one state even if that
be the superpower.
9. Inevitably, there will be groups and perhaps
countries which balk at both the cost or even the
principle of such involvement. However, if Euro-
pean counfties are to support the case for interna-
tional stability and the sustenance of the humani-
tarian cause, then it is both right and logical for
them to accept that the capacity to respond to need
must be available. It is therefore inherent in this
report that I should offer an assessment of the
contribution which member states are capable of
making, both in regard to the security requirement
within our alliance and in providing meaningful
contribution in the international cause. That is the
purpose of this report. What follows is my own
assessment. I trust that it is not unrealistic.
II. The strength of airforces
10. The various national airforces possess a
wide range of aircraft in both numbers and types.
For the purposes of this report, I have listed only
the strengths of aircraft which are in the
combat/strike, reconnaissance, tanker and trans-
port r6les possessed by each member state toge-
ther with other directly relevant information
including the total numbers of personnel engaged
in these services (see tables hereafter).
11. I had hoped to include the numbers of air-
crew and of these the numbers who could be des-
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Strength and inventory of national ahforces
Country Air Defence Strike
Air Defence
/Strike
(dual use)'
Recon-
naissance
AWACS
Early
Waming
Transport'
Tanker/
Transport' Tanker
Maritime
PaEol
Total
number
of personnel
Belsirr 35 F-16 100 F-16 Mirage F-5 t2c-130
2B-727
t2t00
Franre 4 98 F-1
132I!,I-2000
134 Jaguar
93 M-2000
N&D
37 M F-l CT
5I F-l CR 4E-3 F Sentry t2c-130
7l c-160
2 A-3t0
4 DC-8
lr KC-135 16 Atlantict
9 Atlantiquel
s Garaian 
I
n
a
v
89 800
(incl. 33 300
conscripts)
Germany................... 143 F-4
20MiG29
182 Tomado 36 Tornado 4B-707
3 A-310
85 C-160
14 Atlantic
(navy)
82 900
(incl. 24 600
conscripts)
Creeae a 36 M2000 92 A-7
72F-5
54F-4
78 F-104
35 F-16
26F-l
6 RF-5
l0 RF-4
15 c-130 26 800(incl. 14 400
conscripts)
Italv. 99F-104 70 Tomado
54 AMX
58 G-9r
15 AMX t G-222V5
l2 PD-808
2DC-9
12 c-130
44G-222
2B-1W l8 Atlantic
(navy)
73 000
(incl. 25 000
conscripts)
Netherlands 166 F-16 19 F-16 2C-130
t0F-27
2DC-IO 2F-27 M r na
t:P-3C lvy
16220
Nom 48 F-16 15 F-5 6 C-130
3 DHC-6
6 P-3 7 900
(incl. 4 000
conscripts)
Pornrgal 20F-16 37 A-7
26 G-91
18 G-91 4 Falcons 6 C-130 6 P-3 ll 000(incl. I 800
conscripts)
Snein a 17 F-t 22F-5
30 F-l
70 F-18 8 RF-4
11RF-5
2 Falcons 7 C-r30 3B-707
5 KC-130
7 P-3
3F-27
28 400(incl. 12 000
conscripts)
Tlrrkev t46F-16
149 F-4
134 F-5
37 F-4 13 c-130
19 c-160
13 CN-235
56 800
(incl. 28 700
conscripts)
United Kingdom...... 135 Tornado
F-3
98 Tomado
54 Jaguar
50 Harrier
29 Tornado
7 Canberra
13 Jaguar
7 ESD Sentry
3 Nimrod
55 C-130
3 Tristar
6 Tristar
t3 vc-10
5 C-l30
26 Nimrod 72 500
Torar- Ancnarr...... 783
7 types
I 191
13 types
841
5 types
238
10 types
33
5 types
360
12 types
24
3 types
23
4 types
125
7 types
tJ\o
o\
l. In several forces dual use strike/air defence is unstated but available.
2. Does not include smaller transport/communications aircraft.
3. Dual use transport/air-to-air refuelling may be available but not listed.
4. States which did not respond.
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Strength and inventory of national airforces'
Airforce Avg. annualflying hours
Fighter
ground attack Interceptor Reconnaissance Transport Helicopters
Belsir t2 100 165 (combat pilots) 4 sqn 2 sqn I sqn 2 sqn 5
France 89 800 180 (fighter/FGA pilots) 9 sqn 9 sqn 2 sqn 20 sqn 137
Gemanw 82 900 .l 5O (Thmadn aircrewc) 8 sqn 7 sqn 4 sqn 130
Greece 26 800 6 sqn l0 sqn I sqn 3 sqn 22
Tf4lv 73 300 8 sqn 7 sqn I sqn 3 sqn 122
Netherlands 9 000 180 (F-16 aircrews) 8 sqn I sqn I sqn I sqn 54
Norwav 7 900 4 sqn I sqn 2 sqn 34
rcal ll 000 4 sqn 4 sqn 3t
Snein 28 400 180 (EF-l8A{irage F-1)
16s (F-5)
4 sqn 8 sqn 7 sqn 5l
Trrrlrerr 56 800 14 sqn 6 sqn 2 sqn 6 sqn 173
United Kingdom................. 75 700 220 (FGA) 5 sqn
@GA/Bomber) 6 sqn
6 sqn 2 sqn 5 sqn 186
I. Source: IISS Military Balance 1994.
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cribed as " current ", i.e. fully capable of imme-
diate involvement in operational activity, but this
information is not included since adequate res-
ponse was not received in time. Had the necessary
request been dispatched earlier, then this impor-
tant aspect of the matter could have been very
usefully included.
12. The Assembly might care to note that the
Rapporteur felt it to be essential to avoid reliance
on published reference since, in a number ofcases
at least, the open record available may not reveal
an entirely accurate picture for reduction in
strength has been made in several services since
such works were published.
13. It should also be understood that statements
simply conveying aircraft strengths could be mis-
leading. If such aircraft were inadequately main-
tained then the numbers which are readily avail-
able could be very much less than in services
where maintenance is satisfactory and availability
of spares is significant. The same comment could
be applied to aircrew. If raining and flying hours
have been limited then availability is very much
affected. Both the quality and nature of the flying
is also relevant. If such flights are made to avoid
complex manoeuvres and highest speeds then that
raining is less relevant and the Assembly should
not assume that the military capacity is quite so
great as mere numbers might suggest. With these
reservations in mind, it would be appropriate for
relevant information about the position in each
member state to be considered.
14. It should be noted that these lists may not
offer an accurate assessment of serviceability of
aircraft or competence and currency of aircrew.
15. There do seem to be grounds to believe that
the quality of aircrew training might be question-
able, for example, where training at low altitudes
is prevented or inhibited then there are grounds to
question capabilities and it is suggested that this
may be further considered in the report which is
recommended for one of the part sessions in 1997.
It does seem questionable that some airforces lack
relevant experience.
16. A further note of caution is expressed in
regard to the accessibility and stocks of spare
parts. There is some anxiety that supplies of this
kind may not always be readily available if exten-
sive need arose. No doubt this matter could be fur-
ther considered in the suggested follow-up report.
17. It could also be noted that the inventory of
aircraft types within some member states reveals a
considerable range stretching from ancient to
modern.
18. Certain anxieties may develop not least in
regard to air-to-air refuelling capacity since such
provision enables range and operational duration
to be effectively extended.
IIL Demands
19. Substantial demands have been placed
upon and met by some WEU member states' air
forces. This is illustrated by the experience of the
United Kingdom's airforce.
20. In order to maintain adequate levels of
experience, substantial participation in NATO
exercises continues. Between April 1993 and
March 1994,the Royal Air Force took part in ttrirty
NATO exercises and thirty bilateral exercises with
other partner states.
21. Locations of these exercises varied. Forty-
two were in Europe but exercises also took place
in Alaska, Canada, the Middle East, the Carib-
bean, Belize and Australia.
22. Such exercises are essential parts of train-
ing and help to fulfil the need for co-operation
between member states' airforces.
23. That co-operation is necessary in the fulfil-
ment of obligations as with Operation Warden
which commenced in September 1991 and
involves the continuing commitment as part of the
international force engaged in the policing of Nor-
thern Iraq under the terms of the agreement made
after the Gulf conflict. The Royal Air Force has
flown over 3 000 sorties and well over 6 000
hours in this theatre.
24. Operation Jural began in August 1992 in
supervision of the air exclusion zone over sou-
thern Iraq (south of latitude 32 N). Well over
6 000 hours have been flown by the Royal Air
Force detachments with around 2 500 sorties.
25. Operation Cheshire describes the large
number of flights made by RAF Hercules aircraft
carrying supplies in the humanitarian relief of
Sarajevo. This effort began in July 1992 and
thousands of sorties have been flown in addition
to many others to various airfields in former
Yugoslavia.
26. Operation Sharp Guard 
- 
the monitoring of
activities over and around former Yugoslavia
involved the deployment of E-3D and Nimrod air-
craft of the RAF from July 1992.
27. Operation Deny Flight followed Sharp
Guard and involves the enforcement of the no-fly
zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. RAF Tornado F3
and Jaguar combat aircraft and VC10 and Tristar
tankers have been deployed since this responsibi-
lity commenced in April 1993. The Jaguar and
Tornado sorties involved in this exercise approach
2 000 hours.
28. During the last two years, every type of
operational aircraft in the RAF has been com-
mitted to operations and these demands must have
required more flying hours than were previously
authorised or anticipated.
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29. These additional strains may provide
emphasis not only of the need for adequate stores,
supply and maintenance programmes but they
underline the necessity of a programme of repla-
cement aircraft for both operational and logistic
purposes.
30. It is interesting that as this report is being
completed exercise Purple Nova is underway.
This involves aircraft from France, Portugal, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The com-
mand centre is at joint headquarters, Northwood.
It may be the first formal WEU air exercise.
IV Conclusians
31. I would have preferred to have submitted a
fuller and more detailed report. Unfortunately, the
brief questionnaire I compiled in December 1993
was not sent out until late spring and then it omit-
ted a question concerning the numbers of aircrew
regarded as "current" 
- 
the numbers readily avail-
able for operational flying in the particular aircraft
type.
32. It is also unfortunate that as late as early
November, as I write this, a number of member
states have not yet provided the necessary infor-
mation. As far as these countries are concerned
the information listed is that available from public
sources, information which the Rapporteur consi-
ders may be a little out of date, since during the
present year a number of member states have
effected significant cuts in provision or proposed
reduction in relevant areas of expenditure.
33. Again, it would be appropriate for a further
report to be prepared in due course. This could
allow the Assembly to consider the actual reality of
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Draft Recommendation
on a European defence policy
The Assembly,
(i) Welcoming the Council's initiative in starting to formulate a common European defence policy as
announced in the declaration on Western European Union attached to the Maasfticht Treaty;
(iil Having taken note of both the Noordwijk declaration and the preliminary conclusions on the
formulation of a common European defence policy of 14th November 1994;
(iii) Noting that WEU's inability to react quickly to crisis situations as in Bosnia or Rwanda is due not
only to a lack of political will, but also to the fact that joint European interests have not yet been identified
clearly enough and that mechanisms for making and implementing decisions rapidly have not yet been
developed;
(iv) Stressing that the operational rOle of WEU urgently needs to be strengthened in order to match the
ambitions set out in the Maastricht Treaty and repeatedly expressed by the Council, while recognising that
the lack of progress in developing WEU's operational r6le is due partly to the lack of political guidance
from a common European defence policy on which it should be based;
(v) Stressing that the ftansformation of NA[O, and especially the implementation of decisions taken at
NATO's 1994 Brussels summit meeting, is of vital importance for the reinforcement of WEU;
(vi) Recognising that WEU's reinforcement must be founded partly in NAIO and not replace a failing
NATO;
(vii) Surprised that the reinforcement of the European pillar of NATO is accompanied by a reduction in
WEU member states' share of defence expenditures in the Atlantic Alliance;
(vili) Recalling that the possibility of making NATO's collective assets available to WEU cannot relieve
European states of their obligation to make a specific effort in those key defence areas where the alliance
has no collective assets while being dependent on the national assets of the United States, specifically in
the area of satellite intelligence and logistic capacity;
(bt) Recalling that the massive airlift capacity now available in the United States armed forces inventory
may considerably diminish in size by the turn of this century, making it necessary for European armed
forces to assume their own responsibility in this field;
(x) Recognising that European armed forces are increasingly called upon to perform humanitarian and
peace-keeping tasks while at the same time defence budgets are being reduced in most European states,
perhaps even in some cases below a level compatible with the maintenance of credible armed forces;
(xi) Insisting that co-operation between European national armed forces must be intensified, also
through the formation of multinational forces, in order to make the most effective use of diminishing
defence budgets and smaller armed forces;
(xii) Noting that the status of associate partner has provided signifrcant opportunities for the countries
concerned to help shape a future European defence policy and to co-operate closely with WEU in possible
future WEU operations of all kinds;
(xiii) Welcoming the first meetings of WEU's Mediterranean Group with government experts from
Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, but at the same time stressing that WEU should pay
closer attention to the situation in the southern Mediterranean extending beyond the present diplomatic
dialogue;
(xiv) Recognising that the situation in the former republics of the Soviet Union, in particular Russia,
should be continuously followed by WEU, inter alia through regular contacts at both political and
military level with the objective of fostering mutual confidence and understanding;
(m) Considering that lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia would be an incentive for the parties
concerned to escalate the conflict, further endanger the civilian population and cause unacceptable risks
for the United Nations forces on the ground;
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(rui) Regretting the decision of the United States Government, taken unilaterally and without appropriate
prior consultation with the other states participating in the combined WEU/I.{ATO operation Sharp Guard
in the Adriatic, to stop policing the United Nations arms embargo against Bosnia;
(rvii) Stressing that the October 1994 crisis in Iraq and the decision of the United States to stop policing
the arms embargo against Bosnia in the framework of operation Sharp Guard have provided compelling
evidence that Europe needs to have its own independent intelligence policy, including a fully-fledged
satellite system,
Rrcourrmxos rHAT rns CouNcu-
1. Strengthen the r6le of the Secretary-General, while at the same time defining clearly WEU's
responsibilities compared with those of the European Union and NATO;
2. Reinforce the operational rdle of the Planning Cell, duly enlarging its staffand providing it with the
appropriate equipment and technical resources for data processing and communications;
3. Give liaison officers from associate partners a more active r6le in the Planning Cell, in particular by
drafting a list of forces of associate partners available to WEU and by including units from these countries
in force packages for contingency plans;
4. Actively support the creation of a multinational African peace-keeping force which should be able
to act rapidly under a United Nations mandate, by encouraging WEU member states to preposition equip-
ment on the African continent and to take responsibility to train African units for such tasks;
5. Help in creating a readily available multinational European humanitarian intervention force to be
included among the forces answerable to WEU;
6. Give further thought to a common security and defence policy, leading subsequently to the drafting
of a white paper on European security as proposed by the French Prime Minister specifying the r6le, tasks,joint command structures and politicaUmilitary interface procedures of WEU for approval at a summit
meeting of heads of state and of government of WEU member states in 1996 at the latest;
7. Accelerate the creation of a European armaments agency to manage multinational co-operative
programmes, drawing on experience gained from the Franco-German armaments agency now being
established;
8. Continue to pursue actively the establishment of a European satellite system which will be a vital
part of Europe's defence identity;
9. Notwithstanding the United States unilateral decision to end enforcement of the United Nations
arms embargo against Bosnia, maintain its determination to continue to implement fully the enforcement
of all existing embargoes against the different parts of former Yugoslavia, including the arms embargo
against Bosnia.
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Explnnatory Memorandam
(submifred by Mn Baumel, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
1. In the Kirchberg declaration of 24th May
1994, the WEU Council tasked the Permanent
Council " to begin work on the formulation of a
common European defence policy with a view to
presenting preliminary conclusions at their next
ministerial meeting in the Netherlands ".
2. The Assembly greatly welcomed this ini-
tiative and expressed its wish to play an active
r6le in the formation of this common European
defence policy. It is recalled here that in Anicle J4
of the Treaty on European Union the Union
requested WEU, as an integral part of the deve-
lopment of the Union, " to elaborate and imple-
ment decisions and actions of the Union which
have defence implications ".
3. In the declaration on Western European
Union which is attached to the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, the WEU member states agreed " to
strengthen the r6le of WEU in the longer term
perspective of a common defence policy within
the European Union which might in time lead to a
common defence, compatible with that of the
Atlantic Alliance ". They also stated that WEU
would " formulate a common European defence
policy and carry forward its concrete implementa-
tion through the further development of its own
operational r6le ".
4. According to the last paragaph of the above-
mentioned Article J4, the provisions of this article
" may be revised (...) on the basis of a report to be
presented in 1996 by the Council to the European
Council, which shall include an evaluation of the
progress made and the experience gained until
then ",
5. After the signing of the Maastricht Treaty
in February 1992, WEU started to implement the
abovementioned declaration on WEU and an
important first step was made with the Petersberg
declaration of 19th June 1992, which in particular
laid the foundations for the strengthening of
WEU's operational r6le. It appears, however, that
the member states were far more reluctant to for-
mulate a common European defence policy which
logically should have preceded the future deve-
lopment of WEU's operational r6le. The timely
initiative of the Council to start work on this issue
is therefore fully endorsed by the Assembly and in
the present report an effort is made to discuss a
number of issues which are bound to play a r6le in
Europe's common defence policy.
6. The transformation of NAIO, set in motion
after the fall of the Berlin wall, is considered to be
of vital importance. In addition to providing more
flexible forces for many new and different tasks, it
also envisages including the states of Central and
Eastern Europe in a process of building security in
an area which extends far beyond that covered by
the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty. Moreover,
it is emphasised that, without the transformation
of NATO, WEU will not be able to play a signifi-
cant operational r6le. Prospects for the CSCE as
an all-encompassing European security forum are
reviewed. For a discussion of the issues related to
the enlargement of NAIO and WEU, reference is
made to a parallel report of the Assembly's Politi-
cal Committee'.
7. The present state of affairs in Russia, in
particular as related to defence issues and the spe-
cific position of the Baltic states, is discussed suc-
cinctly. Then follows the inevitable inventory of
major risks and threats to European security.
8. Finally, an account is given of develop-
ments in WEU and its member states.
II. The transformation of NATO
(a) The eaily phase
9. After the collapse of the Berlin wall, the
Atlantic Alliance understood that it had to trans-
form itself from a purely defensive organisation,
created to protect its members against a massive
attack from the East, into something quite different.
10. The foundations for this transformation
were formulated in the London declaration of 5th
and 6th July 1990. While maintaining the original
objective of providing common defence, it was
thought that the alliance should also help build
structures of a more united European continent,
" supporting security and stability with the
strength of our shared faith in democracy, the
right of the individual, and the peaceful resolution
of disputes "2.
11. Reaffirming that security and stability do
not lie solely in the military dimension, it sought
l. A European security policy 
- 
report submitted by Mr.
Soell, Rapporteur, Document 1439.
2. NATO's London declaration, 5th and 6th July 1990,
paragraph 2.
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to enhance the political component of the alliance
as provided for by Article 2 of the North Atlantic
Treaty. It recognised that: " The move within the
European Community towards political union,
including the development of a European identity
in the domain of security, will also contribute to
Atlantic solidarity and to the establishment of ajust and lasting order of peace throughout the
whole of Europe3 ".
12. It was decided that NAIO should build new
partnerships with all the nations of Europe and
extend the hand of friendship to the countries of
the East which were its adversaries.
13. Arms control agreements were considered
essential and, with their implementation, the
alliance's integrated force structure and its strate-
gy would change fundamentally to include the
following elements:o
- 
" NAIO will field smaller and restructu-
red active forces. These forces will be
highly mobile and versatile so that allied
leaders will have maximum flexibility in
deciding how to respond to a crisis. It
will rely increasingly on multinational
corps made up of national units.
- 
NATO will scale back the readiness of its
active units, reducing training require-
ments and the number of exercises.
- 
NATO will rely more heavily on the
ability to build up large forces if and
when they might be needed. "
14. Important decisions were also taken to
reduce the alliance's reliance on nuclear wea-
ponso.
15. Finally, it was stated that the Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)
should become more prominent in Europe. A
number of recommendations regarding the r6le
and institutionalisation of the CSCE were made,
which were formalised at the CSCE summit mee-
ting in Paris, in November 1990.
16. A new allied military strategy would be
prepared " moving away from forward defence,
where appropriate, towards a reduced forward
presence and modifying flexible response to
reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons "6.
3. NATO's London declaration, 5th and 6th July 1990,
paragraph 3.
4. NATO's London declaration, 5th and 6th July 1990,
paragraph 14.
5. This subject has been dealt with in a recent Assembly
report: The rOle and future of nuclear weapons, Rapporteur
Mr. De Decker, Document 1420.
6. NATO's London declaration, 5th and 6th July 1990,
paragraph 20.
Copenhagen meeting, June l99l
17. One year later, the North Atlantic Council
met in Copenhagen on 6th and 7th June 1991
providing an opportunity for a first evaluation of a
changed security environment in Europe.
Although the general feeling could still be called
optimistic, it was clear that the first lines of divi-
sion in the " Europe whole and free " of the Lon-
don declaration became visible. Certain Central
European states were seeking to establish a close
relationship with, if not membership of, NATO.
These states were still feeling uncomfortable with
the Soviet Union at their eastern frontiers and
were trying to obtain formal security guarantees
from the alliance. For a number of reasons, the
alliance was reluctant to provide NATO member-
ship or security guarantees and in Copenhagen it
could only state that " our own security is insepa-
rably linked to that of all other states in Europe. "
18. [t further stated that: " The consolidation
and preservation throughout the continent of
democratic societies and their freedom from any
form of coercion or intimidation are therefore of
direct and material concern to us, as they are to all
other CSCE states under the commitments of the
Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris. "
19. Common security, it said, could best be
safeguarded through " the further development of
a network of interlocking institutions and rela-
tionships, constituting a comprehensive architec-
ture in which the alliance, the process of European
integration and the CSCE are key elements. "
20. Furthermore, it stated that it did not " wish
to isolate any country nor to see a new division of
the continent. Our objective is to help create a
Europe whole and free "'.
21,. The alliance strongly emphasised the cen-
tral r6le of the CSCE " in expanding the network
of co-operative relationships across Europe ". [n
particular, it would try " to reinforce the CSCE's
potential for conflict-prevention, crisis-manage-
ment and the peaceful settlement of disputes by
appropriate means ".
22. Further steps were also taken to develop a
security partnership with the Soviet Union and the
other Central and Eastern European states.
23. As regards the emerging common European
foreign and security policy and defence r6le, the
final communiqu6 of the North Atlantic Council in
Copenhagen stated that the alliance would " deve-
lop practical arrangements to ensure the necessary
transparency and complementarity between the
European security and defence identity as it
emerges in the Twelve and WEU, and the alliance.
There will be a need, in particular, to establish
7. Statement issued by the North Atlantic Council on 6th and
7th June 1991, paragraph 3.
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appropriate links and consultation procedures
between them in order to ensure that the allies that
are not currently participating in the development
of a European identity in foreign and security poli
cy and defence should be adequately involved in
decisions that may affect their security "s.
24. In fact, this paragraph reflects the clear
determination of the Bush administration to main-
tain its influence on new developments in the
establishment of a European defence identity.
Rome declaration, November 1991
25. In the Rome declaration, issued by the
heads of state and of government on 7th and 8th
November 1991, the concept of a framework of
interlocking institutions tying together the coun-
tries of Europe and Norttr America in order to pre-
vent instability and divisions was confirmed.
A new strategic concept was published along the
lines set out in the London declaration and it was
stated that the alliance's security was " based on
three mutually reinforcing elements: dialogue,
co-operation, and the maintenance of a collective
defence capability "'.
26. The declaration stated that " the develop-
ment of a European security identity and defence
r6le, reflected in the further shengthening of the
European pillar within the alliance, will reinforce
the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic
Alliance "ro.
27. The enhancement of the r6le and responsi-
bilities of the European members was called " an
important basis for the transformation of the
alliance ". On the other hand, it was stated that the
alliance was " the essential forum for consultation
among its members ".
28. Further, it was stated that the alliance's new
strategic concept " should facilitate the necessary
complementarity between the alliance and the
emerging defence component of the European
integration process " r r.
29. As a next step in the alliance's relations
with the Soviet Union and the other countries of
Cenfral and Eastern Europe, the alliance announ-
ced the establishment of a more institutional rela-
tionship of consultation and co-operation on poli-
tical and security issues in the framework of a
North Atlantic Co-operation Council.
8. Final communiqu6 of the North Atlantic Council, 6th and
7th June 1991, paragraph 3.
30. Finally, the alliance was said to remain
deeply committed to strengthening the CSCE pro-
cess " which has a vital rdle to play in promoting
stability and democracy in Europe "'2. It made
many suggestions to enhance the CSCE's r6le.
(b) NATO's co-operation programmes: NACC, PFP
and. the issue of enlaryemeil
31. Implementing NATO's November l99l
summit meeting in Rome, the North Atlantic
Co-operation Council (NACC) was created in
December 1991 assembling the NATO member
states, the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe and the now independent republics of the
former Soviet Union. NACC, with its annual work
plans, provides the allies with an excellent oppor-
tunity to give support for reforms through practi-
cal assistance in a broad range of activities while
building confidence through increased contacts.
The annual work plans include consultations on
security-related matters and extensive military
contacts.
32. Very soon, however, experience showed
that these activities had given rise to a dynamic
process which obliged NATO to move faster than
initially thought. There was also a need for more
flexibility in the co-operation process which
would enable progralnmes to be set up that were
adapted to the individual needs and wishes of the
different participants without giving up NACC's
general co-operation programme.
33. The Brussels summit meeting of January
1994 therefore created the partnership for peace
(PFP) with significantly different scope and inten-
sity, while remaining within the overall frame-
work of NACC.
34. According to its framework document, the
objectives of the PFP are:
(i) to facilitate transparency in national
defence planning and budgeting pro-
cesses;
(ii) to ensure democratic control of defence
forces;
(iii) to maintain the capability and readi-
ness to contribute, subject to constitu-
tional considerations, to operations
under the authority of the United
Nations and/or the responsibility of
the CSCE;
(iv) to develop co-operative military rela-
tions with NAIO, for the purpose of
joint planning, training, and exercises'3
9. Rome declaration, 7th and 8th November
graph 4.
10. Rome declaration, 7th and 8th November
graph 6.
11. Rome declaration, 7th and 8th November
graph 7.
1991, para-
1991, paru-
1991, para-
12. Rome declaration, 7th and 8th November 1991, paru-
graph 13.
13. The first exercices of this kind have meanwhile been
held in Poland and the Netherlands.
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in order to sftengthen their ability to
undertake missions in the fields of
peace-keeping, search and rescue,
humanitarian operations, and others
as may subsequently be agreed; and
(v) to develop, over the longer term,
forces that are better able to operate
with those of the members of ttre
North Atlantic Alliance.
35. Slightly different from the NACC, the PFP
has been designed to provide the partners with an
opporrunity to develop progressively closer rela-
tions with the alliance on the basis of their own
interest and actual performance.
36. It is also noted that, although the PFP does
not provide the formal security guarantee of
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the frame-
work document contains an article similar to
Article 4 providing for a commitment to consult
with any active participant if a partner perceives a
threat to its territorial integrity, political indepen-
dence or security.
37. In order to carry out the military co-ordina-
tion and planning needed for the implementation
of PFP programmes, a Co-ordination Cell has
been established at Mons, near SHAPE, where
representatives of the participating countries are
now taking office. Liaison offices for NACC/PFP
partners are being established in permanent facili-
ties at NAIO's headquarters in Brussels.
38. The framework document, which is a
public text, common to all partners and setting out
the objectives of the programme, has at present
(October 1994) been signed by 23 countries. Of
these, 14 partners have submitted their presenta-
tion document which addresses the political and
military aspects of the partnership, provides an
indication of the co-operative activities and indi-
cates military forces and other assets available for
PFP activities. With four partners, an individual
partnership progftrrnme has been developed.
39. A Political Military Steering Committee(PMSC) has been established to facilitate the
implementation and, if need be, co-ordination of
the different individual programmes.
40. The PFP could eventually lead to member-
ship for some partner states although it is empha-
sised that this is not an automatic consequence of
a country's decision to participate. Implementa-
tion of the PFP has only just begun and NAIO and
its partners should allow time to bring it to frui-
tion. While emphasising that a future enlargement
of the organisation to include Central and Eastern
European countries is not excluded, most NATO
member states think that it would be premature to
set a timetable for this process. Enlargement, it is
said, will have to be co-ordinated with Russia and
it should be done only if it improved stability in
Europe. It is also noted that at present any deci-
sion to enlarge would, for a number of reasons,
involve a choice to include some nations, exclu-
ding others. Ratification of a limited enlargement
by the 16 member states might not be a smooth
and swift process and there might even be divi-
sions between members over the fundamental
issues at stake. A premature discussion of enlar-
gement issues might also lead to divisive debates
over the r6le of Russia and its thoughts and ambi-
tions and jeopardise a difficult but very important
and precious process of co-operation with Russia.
(c) Combined joint taskforces and
the transfomulion of NATO
4L. A major step forward on the road towards
the creation of operational capabilities for WEU
was taken at the NAIO summit meeting in Brussels
on 10th-1 lth January 1994.
42. At this summit meeting, it was decided that
the alliance's organisation and resources would be
adjusted so as to facilitate the development of
WEU as the defence component of the European
Union. It was also stated that the alliance stood
ready to make collective assests available, on the
basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Coun-
cil, for WEU operations.
43. In their declaration, the heads of state and
of government further said: " We also will need to
sftengthen the European pillar of the alliance by
facittating the use of our military capabilities for
NATO and European/WEU operations... " To
improve, among other things co-operation with
WEU and to reflect the emerging European secu-
rity and defence identity, they endorsed " the
concept of combined joint task forces as a means
to facilitate contingency operations, including
operations with participating nations outside the
alliance ".
4. The North Atlantic Council, with the advice
of the NATO military authorities, was directed to
develop this concept and establish the necessary
capabilities.In co-ordination with WEU, it would
work on implementation in a manner that would
provide " separable but not separate " military
capabilities that could be employed by NAIO or
WEU.
45. The CJTF plan calls upon the Supreme
Allied Commander Europe and Supreme Allied
Commander Atlantic to designate a notional
general officer and headquarters staff that could
be drawn out of the NATO integrated structure.
NATO " would then deploy them to a theatre of
operations for the purpose of conducting the com-
mand and control of a contingency. "
46. In an early working definition, military
authorities at NATO defined a CJTF headquarters
as a deployable, multinational, multiservice head-
307
DOCUMENT 1445
quarters of variable size, formed to commandjoint forces of NATO and, possibly, non-NAIO
nations, for the purpose of conducting peace ope-
rations outside the territory of NATO. A NATO
CJTF headquarters could also be detached for
European-led (WEU) operations. It is assumed that,
for the composition of a CJTF headquarters, ele-
ments will be drawn from CINCENT, AFSOUTH
and AFNOMHWEST.
47. In the Kirchberg declaration of 9th May
1994,the WEU Council stated that:
" They welcomed the summit's endorse-
ment of the principle that collective assets
and capabilities of the alliance can be made
available for WEU operations in order to
strengthen WEU as the defence component
of the European Union and as the means to
strengthen the European pillar of the Atlan-
tic Alliance. They underlined that the
modalities for making these available
should preserve WEU's own planning pro-
cedures and capabilities.
Ministers stressed the importance of work
under way in WEU on the WEU-related
aspects of the adaptation of the alliance
structures. In order to enhance WEU's
ability to carry out the tasks defined in the
Petersberg declaration, Ministers endorsed
the approach to identify the assets and
capabilities required to perform the neces-
sary military functions.
Ministers underlined the importance of co-
ordination with the alliance on the imple-
mentation of the CJTF concept and the
definition of separable but not separate
military capabilities so as to ensure their
effective use where appropriate by WEU,
and in that case under its command.
While recalling their commitment to
strengthen the operational capabilities of
WEU, they also agreed that WEU would
benefit from careful management of
resources as well as existing standardised
procedures.
Ministers requested the Permanent Council
to take discussions on these matters for-
ward as fast as possible with a view to the
timely presentation of joint positions into
the process of consultation in the alliance. "
48. The final communiqu6 of the North Atlan-
tic Council at Istanbul, 9th June 1994, made it
clear that little progress had been made on this
subject:
" Close co-operation and co-ordination
between NATO and WEU will continue to
be developed in accordance with principles
of complementariry and transparency. The
summit decisions have set the course for
our co-operation, including the readiness of
the alliance to make its collective assets
available, on the basis of consultations in
the North Atlantic Council, for WEU ope-
rations undertaken by the European allies
in pursuit of their common foreign and
security policy. "
49. After thorough preparation by a specific
CJTF political-military working group, on 29th
June 1994, WEU tabled a document with its gui-
ding principles for the implementation of the
CJTF concept. Since then, little progress has been
made and no decisions regarding this subject were
taken at the Seville meeting of NAIO's defence
ministers on 28th-30th September 1994.
50. Initially, it was hoped that final conclusions
on the CJTF concept could be presented to
NAIO's defence ministers by the end of 1994, but
in view of the slow progress being made, only an
interim report will be presented. Final decisions
are now expected to be taken in late spring 1995.
51. It was pointed out in an earlier Assembly
reportra that CJTF will make little sense for WEU
if the organisation fails to create the appropriate
political-military infrastructure to deal with it
effectively. Even if some progress has been made,
existing infrastructure is still largely ad hoc.
52. For command and control of operations as
envisaged in the CJTF concept, a strategic inter-
face is required between political and military
structures, an element still missing in WEU. The
prevailing command and control regulations in
WEU operations have been agreed on an ad hoc
basis, lacking universality.
53. While CJTFs were originally conceived as
mechanisms for providing command and control
for non-Article 5, out-of-area operations, there is
a growing feeling in NATO that non-Article 5
operations may easily develop into Article 5 ope-
rations. Most NATO authorities are therefore in
favour of robust CJTFs, which could also provide
complete command and control for a large-scale
alliance operation. This idea is running counter to
the original idea of having adaptable structures
and flexible procedures conceived to be used in
relatively minor but possibly complicated and
autonomous, multinational operations.
54. NATO's SACEUR, General Joulwan, has
stated that he wants specific authority to approve
any operational requirements for a CJTF, but it
should be noted that this would leave any Euro-
pean operation without participation of the trans-
atlantic allies still completely dependent on the
decision of a United States commander. It really
seems illogical to have an American general as
14. The WEU Planning Cell, report submitted on behalf of
the Defence Committee by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Rap-
porteur, Document 1421.
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the linchpin of Europe's security and defence
identity.
55. In recent negotiations, however, some pro-
gress has been made, inter alia because the United
States has relinquished its emphasis on the rdle of
major NATO command, while adopting a more
positive approach to the flexible modular concept.
56. It is also noted that CJTF makes little sense
without a European command, including a gene-
ral staff reflecting the armed forces commitments
of each of the participating nations with the pre-
paration of political decisions and operational
planning in the hands of the Europeans.
57. In order to solve a number of these and
other outstanding questions, it has been proposed
to start experimental exercises with CJTF general
staffs.
58. Altogether it is quite clear that the Atlantic
Alliance quite naturally prefers to maintain exis-
ting structures insofar as possible, while among
Europeans there is insufficient consensus to pre-
sent a distinct and logical European view. In fact,
in negotiating the implementation of the CJTF
concept, WEU is working out details for its ope-
rational r6le while the basis for this r6le, a cohe-
rent European defence policy, has not yet been
established. Here again, with agreement on the
general principles of a future redistribution of
r6les and responsibilities, it appears difficult to
mobilise the consensus needed to put them into
practice.
(d) France and NATO
59. In particular, since last year, France has
made certain moves in the direction of NATO,
indicating that it was prepared to give up some
long-standing taboos as regards this organisation.
60. The French Chief-of-Staff, Admiral Jacques
Lanxade, signed an agreement with SACEUR
enabling the French division in the European corps
to be placed under NAIO command in certain cir-
cumstances. Also, since 1993, the French represen-
tation at NATO has been participating in meetings
of military organs which may have consequences
for French armed forces deployed in such opera-
tions as in former Yugoslavia.
61. At the end of September 1994, the French
Defence Minister, Frangois L6otard, attended a
meeting of NAIO defence ministers in Seville for
the first time since France withdrew from the inte-
grated military structures of NATO. There should
be no misunderstandings regarding this develop-
ment in France's position towards NATO. France
will keep clear of NAIO's integrated military
structures and will decide on a case-by-case basis
whether it is appropriate for the defence minister
or the chief-of-staff to attend meetings of the
Atlantic Alliance's organs.
62. On lst Jaly 1994, France created a French
military mission under General Patrick Woillez at
CINCNORTHWEST, the Commander-in-Chief
Allied Forces Western Europe, at High-Wycombe,
which combines the former CINCNORTH'5 and
CINCUKAIR'6 in the framework of the resfructu-
ring of the different allied commands in Europe.
63. In 1993, France had already created a mili-
tary mission with CINCSOUTH, the Commander-
in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe in
Naples, some of whose units are involved in
monitoring the embargo against Serbia and Monte-
negro in the Adriatic.
64. Since summer l994,France also has a mili-
tary mission with CINCENT, Commander-in-
Chief Allied Forces Central Europe in Brunssum.
65. At the same time, it should be noted that the
increased French participation in NAIO is closely
linked with the implementation of NAIO's January
1994 decisions to adapt its structures and to make
iurangements which should enable WEU to act on
its own, making use of NATO assets without
being subjected to NAIO command.
66. France considers the possibility of joint
action with the transatlantic partners as being of
great importance for the security of the European
continent. Shared values and solidarity are the
foundations of the Atlantic Alliance which are
still vital.
67. However, it should be noted, as stated by
the French Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur'7,
that the alliance cannot do everything. It should
not stand in the way of a proper European defence
identity and should leave room for Europeans to
act on their own if they wish and are able to do so.
68. If the United States and Canada wish to act
together with their European allies, then NATO is
the appropriate framework. In that case, France
would not hesitate to co-operate, but for France to
be fully available, two conditions must be met:
- 
NATO should be transformed, in particu-
lar in the field of peace-keeping, where
the usual mechanisms of the integrated
structure cannot be used, along the lines
decided by the alliance's summit mee-
ting in January 1994;
- 
member states must be prepared to
deploy their forces in joint action in
order to defend peace and liberty should
the need arise.
15. Commander-in-Chief North Europe, commanding the
allied forces of Norway and the Baltic coast.
16. Commander-in-Chief United Kingdom Air Force, com-
manding the airforce of the United Kingdom, attached to
NATO.
17. Address of the French Prime Minister, Edouard Balla-
dur, at the IHEDN on 8th September 1994.
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III. Conference on Security and Co-operation
in Europe (CSCE)
69. What has become of the CSCE's r6le after
the signing of the Charter of Paris in November
1990 and the many initiatives taken since then to
sfrengthen the CSCE process and to enhance its
r6le?
70. Apparently, in recent years the CSCE has
not been able to play the key r6le attributed to it
after the collapse of the Berlin wall.
71. What has happened and what are its pros-
pects at present?
72. Indeed, after the signing of the Helsinki
Final Act inl975, in particular the " third basket "
with its focus on human rights, it has been a key
instrument in the unravelling of the dictatorship in
the Soviet Union and its firm control of its War-
saw Pact allies. However, once that process was
accomplished, expectations of its r6le in main-
taining peace and stability in Europe have been far
too high.
73. It should be noted that despite many efforts
made in the recent past, the CSCE's core structure
has remained weak. Its different institutions are
scattered all over Europe, the permanent staff is
far too small to provide internal strength and
continuity and the position of its Secretary-General
is such that this official has only adminisffative
responsibilities and no real authority.
74. Recent history has demonstrated that it has
only been able to play a useful r6le in crises or
conflicts where both parties were convinced that
consultations and negotiations were the only pos-
sible way to find a satisfactory solution.
75. In fact, while theoretically it has a unique
potential for an effective rOle in the newly inde-
pendent states of the former Soviet Union, this has
come to almost nothing because of the attitude of
Russia which is clearly determined to re-establish
its influence in what it calls its " near abroad ", to
name only Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh. A
notable exception should be made for the success-
ful CSCE missions in Estonia and Latvia, where it
helped defuse tension between ethnic Russians
and the indigenous population, but here clearly
both parties had understood that there was no
other solution.
76. In the preparatory negotiations for the
CSCE summit in Budapest (30th November 
- 
1st
December 1994), Russia had proposed the crea-
tion of a CSCE Security Council with permanent
seats including a veto right as well as a system
under which limited groups of states would handle
issues of direct concern to them. Furthermore,
Russia had proposed that the CIS be recognised as
equivalent to the CSCE, NAIO and the European
Union, and that Russia or CIS peace-keeping acti-
vities be supported by the rest of the CSCE.
77. It soon appeared that these proposals were
not supported by a majority of other CSCE mem-
ber states.
78. Speaking at the opening of the CSCE
review conference in Budapest on 10th October
L994,Mr. Yuri Ouchakov, the head of the Russian
delegation, said that the CSCE should be the
" major moving force in European security " but
that there was no need to set up a " hierarchical
system ". Apparently, Russia has understood that
there is little chance of transforming the CSCE
into Europe's most powerful security structure
with the CIS, NATO and WEU subordinated to it.
The present review conference will provide an
important indication of the success or failure of
Russia's diplomatic offensive.
79. It is known that Russia is seeking interna-
tional support for its peace-keeping operations in
its near abroad, where it recently has been playing
at both arsonist and fueman. In particular, Russia
is asking for a CSCE mandate to act as mediator
and peace-keeper in disputes in former Soviet
states.
80. On this specific issue, the policy of both
European countries and the United States has
been particularly ambiguous and unhelpful. It
seems that no one is prepared to give Russia a free
hand in these matters, but on the other hand it is
quite clear that neither Western European states
nor the United States are prepared to send their
soldiers to Thjikistan to co-operate with Russian
troops in what is, to say the least, a doubtful
peace-keeping mission.
81. The United States Ambassador to the Uni-
ted Nations, Mrs. Madeleine Albright, approved
Russia's peace-keeping r6le within the CIS, while
sftessing that it fell short of the best solution for
settling disputes in the region. She stated that the
burden of proof was on Russia to demonstrate that
what it sees as peace-keeping activities are benign,
but she made it clear that the United States was
prepared to accept the continued presence of
Russian peace-keeping forces in the more volatile
republics in the Caucasus and Cenfral Asia.
82. According to Mrs. Albright, it would be
preferable for the United Nations to police the
trouble spots in the former Soviet Union, but she
added that this was impractical because of the
demands on its resources'8.
83. One month later, at the CSCE review
conference, the United States delegate, Sam
Brown, said that if Russia wanted international
approval for such peace-keeping activities, it
would have to be genuinely and independently
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invited to intervene in conflicts and its interven-
tion would have to be for a limited duration and
with clear goals.
84. Germany, speaking on behalf of the Euro-
pean Union, proposed strengthening the CSCE by
suggesting members use its conflict-resolution
mechanisms.
85. Altogether, it seems that the most promi-
sing part of the CSCE's activities may be conflict-
prevention. In this field, the CSCE has established
a number of procedures and mechanisms intended
to provide early warning of tensions of any kind
which may lead to crisis or conflict. An important
element of early warning within the CSCE frame-
work is the " intensive use of regular, in-depth
political consultations " for which the possibi-
lities were expanded with the establishment, in
December 1993, of the CSCE's Permanent Com-
mittee in Vienna, which now meets at least once a
week in a formal session. The two-yearly review
conference, such as the present conference in
Budapest, also offers an opportunity to examine
possible violations of CSCE commitments and
the degree of implementation of confidence- and
security-building measures can also serve as an
early warning indicator.
86. The CSCE High Commissioner on Natio-
nal Minorities plays an important rOle with his
two-fold mission, on the one hand of trying to
contain and de-escalate tensions concerning
minority issues and on the other alerting the
CSCE whenever such tensions threaten to deve-
lop to such a level that he would not be able to
contain them with the means at his disposal.
87. The conclusion of a European stability
pact, which is now being negotiated at different
regional round table conferences, will contribute
another important element in the CSCE conflict-
prevention mechanism.
88. On the other hand, it should be emphasised
here that in the timely exchange of information
over rising tensions, early consultations over pos-
sible crisis situations and efforts to prevent
conflicts, European states, also within WEU, have
an individual responsibility which they cannot
simply pass on to the CSCE and it would seem that
in this respect there is still room for improvement.
IV. The situation in Russia
(a) Positian of the armedforces in Russia
89. In Russia, the military accounts for some
1.7 million men and women; police and paramili-
tary account for another I million. During the
Soviet era, the country was militarised to a high
degree and it is well known that the industry's
best plants were geared to produce weaponry
while the best engineers, technicians and scien-
tists were set to work on military output and
research.
90. There can be little wonder that the legacy of
this huge defence machine is causing numerous
problems for the present government. Its main
tasks in this field are to redefine the r6le of the
Russian military in the post-cold war world, to
restructure the armed forces and to convert the
industry from being defence oriented towards one
responding to a civilian consumer market. A first
step was taken recently with the publication of a
new military doctrine.
91. Notwithstanding its present-day problems,
Russia still regards itself as a superpower and a
regional leader. On the other hand, it feels liable
to be isolated by surrounding states, vulnerable
and deprived of protection. Naturally, it is there-
fore trying to protect itself by concluding agree-
ments with the newly independent former Soviet
republics to have their borders policed by Russian
ffoops as well as by native border guards.
92. Isolation from the international community
from which it is expecting help and support in the
process of transforming the country's economy
and society would be disasftous for Russia. This
is a good reason why both the government and the
military are interested in international co-opera-
tion, be it on a multi- or bilateral basis.
93. On the other hand there are concerns that
positive public declarations, in particular in the
field of disarmament, are not always followed up
by action. Recently, on 16th September l994,the
Clinton administration decided to put off new
strategic arms reduction talks with Russia because
of uncertainties of reform in Russia and the slow
pace ofnuclear weapons reductions. It should be
noted indeed that the START II reaty has not yet
been ratified. On 28th September, President
Clinton and President Yeltsin agreed to speed up
the timetable for the 1993 START II agreement,
saying that their countries would begin to dis-
mantle the warheads as soon as that agreement
was ratified, but this can barely be called a new
development'e.
94. The United States administration is also
suspicious that Russia is still concealing its efforts
to develop binary chemical weapons, despite its
pledge in an understanding on chemical weapons
reached between the United States and Russia in
1989 to disclose details of its poison gas program-
me to the United States. Apparently, Russia also
has problems in devising an effective plan to
destroy its huge 40 000 ton stock of chemical
weapons agentsm.
Intemational Herald Tribune, 29th September 1994.
Intemational Herald Tribune,24th June 1994.
19.
20.
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95. Most recently, on 18th October 1994, the
Chairman of the State Duma's Committee on
Questions of Geopolicy, Victor U. Ustinov, stated
that preparations for destroying the stock were
" slack and inefficient ". He said that no destruc-
tion technology had been fully developed and that
there was no central management nor control of
the programme. Storehouses may be completely
inadequate within five years. Mr. Ustinov also
suggested that co-operation in this field with the
United States might have to be intensified. The
Defence Committee planned to ask President
Yeltsin to speed up the submission of draft laws
on chemical disarmament.
96. For the time-being, conscription will be
maintained even though there is widespread eva-
sion, but there are not enough financial resources
to implement the long-term objective of creating a
professional army. At present, there is a huge
oversupply of officers and generals compared to
other ranks while the offrcers often remain badly
housed and sporadically paid.
97. On 3lst August 1994, the last Russian
troops left Estonia and Latvia under an earlier
agreement which had been negotiated with some
difficulty. While at the peak of its power, the
Soviet Union had about 350 000 hoops stationed
at over 1 000 military bases in the three Baltic
states, then an integral part of the empire. Russia
will now leave only 210 military behind to dis-
mantle the nuclear submarine base at Paldiski in
Estonia and about 300 at the Skrunda radar instal-
lation in Latvia up until the end of the century.
98. This does not mean, however, that all
problems between Russia and these two Baltic
states have been solved. Most Latvians are not
satisfied with the continuing presence of Russian
military at Skrunda, Russia is accusing Latvia of
discriminating against Russian citizens in its citi-
zenship law and there is no final agreement over
the question whether Estonia will grant residency
to the 10 000 retired Russian military personnel
on Estonian soil. Moreover, Russia and Estonia
are still involved in a dispute over their common
border.
99. Also at the end of August, the last Russian
soldiers left German soil where, before the collapse
of the Berlin wall,400 000 Soviet troops had been
stationed.
100. With the accomplishment of these troop
withdrawals, it is the first time now since 1939
that Russia has no soldiers west of its state bor-
ders which are roughly the same as those it had
three centuries ago.
101. It goes without saying that these inevitable
consequences ofthe end ofthe cold war have cau-
sed some uneasy feelings in the ranks of both
politicians and military in Russia.
lO2. All in all, some 640 000 military of the for-
mer Red Army have been withdrawn from Cenffal
and Eastern Europe and now independent former
Soviet republics since 1990, of which around
240 000 came back to Russia in 1994. With little
to do and often non-existant or insufficient hous-
ing, chaos and general discontent is increasing in
the armed forces.
103. Morale in the armed forces is said to be
low. Budget cuts have limited the number of exer-
cises and the state of readiness is thought to be
1ow.
104. A recent extensive survey of Russia's
senior military officers, carried out for the Ger-
man Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, has clearly demons-
trated that the military do not feel at ease with
Russia's place in the world and with their own
place in Russia. Although they do not endorse the
more extreme nationalist politicians and parties,
they are overwhelmingly in favour of a strong
hand to guide the state and evidently feel that such
a hand is lacking at present.
105. In popularity ratings, President Yeltsin sco-
red a little over 257o with a disapproval rating of
50Vo, while Defence Minister, Pavel Grachev,
scored 20Vo with a disapproval rating of more
than 50Vo. Most military were very pessimistic
over the immediate future with possibilities of
uprisings, strikes and a putsch but few foresaw a
return to socialism, the cold war or a planned
economy. Understandably, the most popular
foreign policy goal, endorsedby 55Vo, was the re-
establishment of Russia as a great power enjoying
respect throughout the world2r.
106. Traditional loyalty and subservience to
civilian leadership has not yet been broken, but
the danger is greater than before.
107. The government publicly suspects a num-
ber of generals and other military of misappro-
priation of funds attributed to the armed forces. It
is said that frequently billions (milliards) of
roubles disappear. A recently published report of
the Deputy Military General Attorney, Grigori
Nossov, mentions the names and other details of
military accused of fraud, embezzlement, active
comrption and misappropriation of funds22.
108. Russia's top brass is losing its grip over
regional commanders throughout the former
Soviet Union. Its efforts to oust the Commander
of the 14th army in the Trans Dniestr enclave on
three different occasions in August 1994, remai-
ned unsuccessful, to name only one example23.
Financial Times, 8th September 1994.
Le Figaro, 30th August 1994.
Financial Times, 6th September 1994.
21.
22.
23.
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(b) Defence spending
109. At the end of June l994,the Russian budget
for 1994 passed both Houses of Parliament.
According to initial figures, total spending would
amount to 194.5 trillion roubles ($ 97 .25 billion),
with military spending fixed at about 40 trillion
roubles ($ 20 billion). The parliament, supported
by the Russian military, had demanded a military
budget of 55 trillion roubles, an amount the mili-
tary consider essential to maintain basic effective-
ness. Initially, the military had insisted on a bud-
get of 80 trillion roubles.
110. According to the government, the 40 trillion
roubles would include 22.1tillion for basic mili-
tary financing, 8.5 trillion for arms purchases,
4.8 trillion for capital construction, 2.5 trillion for
scientific research and testing and 1.9 trillion for
pensions'.. At the end of September 1994, the
Russian budget, with its income cut almost in half
because of a huge shortfall in tax revenues, again
came under heavy attack from the military. They
say that lack of money is causing Russia to default
on its commitments to disarm, because only 22%o
of the planned budget for disarmament had been
received.
111. According to Colonel General Alexander
Kuznetsov, in the first nine months of 1994, the
Defence Ministry had received only 14.6 trillion
roubles, or 53Vo of the 27.2 trillion roubles it
should have received. In a hearing before the State
Duma's Defence Committee, the situation in the
defence industries was called catastrophic. With
95Vo of the defence plants having stopped work-
ing and no new weapons research work being
financed, the Defence Ministry would not receive
a newly developed piece of equipment until the
year 2000'z5.
lI2. The 1994-95 edition of the IISS Military
Balance put the complaints of the military into
perspective, asserting that Russian defence bud-
gets have been effectively static in real terms
since 1992 with " perhaps a small increase in
1994 ". Contradicting official statistics which
show a real decline in defence budgets based on
the evidence of GDP decline statistics, the institute
has roughly doubled its previous estimates for
the 1992 and 1993 Russian defence budgets to
$74.6 billion and $ 76.6 billion, from $ 39.7 and
$29.1billion respectively, by using a new measure
of purchasing-power parity. The figure provided
for the 1994 budget is $ 79 billion, adding that
even this estimate makes Russian military expen-
diture " in real terms substantially higher than that
of any counffy apart from the United States "26.
24. Financial Times, 25th-26th June 1994.
25. Financial Times, 27th September 1994.
26. T\e Military Balance 1994-95, London 1994.
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113. It should also be noted that Russia has not
stopped all activities in the development and pro-
duction of new military equipment.
Il4. As a consequence of the START agree-
ments, there will be more emphasis on sea-based
strategic nuclear weapons. Russia is expected to
start the production of a new SSBN, a successor to
the Delta III, Delta IV and Typhoon class by the
end of this decade.
115. Recently, submarines of the Russian Nor-
thern Fleet have resumed their Atlantic Ocean
patrols from their Murmansk base. Icelandic
authorities stated that for the first time for two
years these submarines have shown up in the seas
between Iceland and the United Kingdom. Train-
ing purposes have been mentioned as the most
obvious reason for the resumption of these routine
patrol missions ". A recent Norwegian study
argues that Russia's northern fleet, based in the
Arctic, is emerging as the most important part of
the former Soviet navy28.
116. In 1993, the operating tempo of the most
modern classes of Russian SSNs and SSBNs did
not decline for the first time in six years. In the
same year, Russia launched four submarines and
another four are expected to be launched in 1994.
A new cruise missile will be in operation in the
next three or four years and several new anti-ship
missiles have been developed'e.
lI7. A new attack aircraft, the Su-34, made its
frst flight at the end of 199330 and Mig is develo-
ping the MFI future air superiority fighter for the
Russian airforce. The funding for several other
aircraft development programmes has been made
available3'.
118. On the other hand, a shortage of fuel is
affecting the Russian airforce and the whole
training prograrnme is only available for the best
pilots.
(c) Russia's rehtions with its near abroad
lI9. A large part of the Russian political and
military elite is seeking ways to reassert the Rus-
sian authority to protect former Soviet republics
with Russia's armed forces, including its nuclear
arsenal. To that purpose, the Collective Security
Council of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) has endorsed a draft agreement for a
military alliance, to be submitted to the CIS lea-
ders in early 1995. This military alliance is inten-
ded to provide a shield against " possible aggres-
sive intentions against all CIS participant states ".
NRC-Handelsblad, 26th August 1994.
Financial Times, Tth October 1994.
Jane's Defence Weekly, 21st May 1994.
Jane's Defence Weekly, 23rd April 1994.
Jane's Defence Weekly, 9th April 1994.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
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The draft agreement calls for the eventual creation
of joint armed forces, collective peace-keeping
forces and a joint air defence system and would in
this way restore a cohesive, co-ordinated military
force under unified control and under Russia's
nuclear protection.
l2O. At the same time, Konstantin Zatulin,
Chairman of the Russian parliament's Committee
for Commonwealth Affairs, is proposing a strate-
gic partnership between Russia and Ukraine,
hinting that if such partnership came about, the
issue of Ukraine's nuclear disarmament would not
be a top priority for Russia32.
l2l. It can be argued that Russia's frontiers with
the three Baltic states, apart from a still lingering
border dispute with Estonia, now have the same
legal status as other long-established international
frontiers such as those with Finland and Norway.
122. On the other hand, the exact status of
Russia's borders with the eleven former Soviet
republics linked with Russia in the CIS is still
fluid. Five of these eleven states 
- 
Georgia, Arme-
nia, Tajikistan, Kirgizstan and Turkmenistan 
-
have officially agreed to the stationing of Russian
troops on their territory. Others agree that they
share certain security interests with Russia, while
maintaining their attachment to strict sovereignty
and independence.
123. On 22nd September 1994, Yevgeny Pri-
makov, the head of Russia's foreign intelligence
service, publicly stated that the re-integration of
most of the former Soviet Union into the Com-
monwealth of Independent States was an undoub-
ted fact. He added: " If a negative attitude toward
this becomes accepted in western capitals, then it
could very adversely affect relations between
them and Moscow. " In the report which he
released on this subject, it is said that an economic
union of the CIS states is inevitable and a defence
and political union desirable, and that such unions
would safeguard the independent and democratic
development of these states. The report further
states that a federal structure would diminish the
threat of ethnic and interstate conflicts within the
cls33.
124. In fact, Russia's endeavours to reintegrate
all the former Soviet Republics except the three
Baltic states into the CIS, which was created
immediately after the Soviet Union's dissolution
in 1991, is clearly meeting with only a lukewarm
response from the other partners. The problems
are many-fold. Most of the newly independent
republics are tied to Russia hand and foot. They
lack financial resources, are dependent on Russia's
energy supplies and other natural resources, their
32. International Herald Tribune, 31st August 1994.
33. Financial Times, 22nd September 1994 and Le Monde,
27th September 1994.
industrial production is in shambles and Russia is
their natural trading partner. Still, they are reluc-
tant to hand over their national sovereignty to CIS
structures. On the other hand, there is Russia
which wishes to control the situation in what it
repeatedly calls its near abroad, partly also to
re-establish its former superpower status on the
Eurasian continent. There are clear signs that
Russia wants to retain conffol over the oil export
pipelines from vast energy reseryes in the Caspian
sea region, while some observers assert that it
wants to re-exert control over the energy
resources of the former Soviet Union. At the same
time, it is aware that supporting other CIS repu-
blics and the establishment and maintenance of a
Russian rouble zone will cost money, which it
does not have. A full-blown fiscal crisis (in the
first nine months of 1994, the Russian federal
government collected only 37.3Vo of the tax and
other revenues it counted on receiving this year)
and the steep decline of the rouble in October
1994 arc clear indications of the chaotic economic
situation in the country.
125. At the last summit meeting of the twelve
CIS republics in Moscow on 2lst October, a num-
ber of new political and economic agreements
were signed, but many of the participating states
expressed reservations and retained the right to
opt out of CIS agreements.
V The position of the Bahic states
126. After regaining independence in August
1991, the three Baltic states went through a tur-
bulent period in their new relationship with the
Soviet Union and later with Russia.
127. The withdrawal of all Russian troops by
3 lst August 1994 has heralded a new era for these
states. Many reports by international bodies,
amongst others the Council of Europe and the
CSCE, have refuted Russian allegations of infrin-
gement of human rights for Russian speakers in
the Baltic countries. Certainly, there are obvious
problems remaining to be overcome and the
Latvian legislation on citizenship is one of these.
128. At present, Russia has fully and wholly
recognised the independence of the Baltic states.
Any questioning of the integrity of the Baltic
states or any serious crisis in relations between
Russia and these states would no doubt have an
immediate impact on the overall relationship
between Russia and the West.
I29. On the other hand, strong western support
for the efforts of these states to secure their inde-
pendence and to transform their economies and
societies is vital.
130. Understandably, the Baltic states are
making great efforts to enhance their security. The
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objective of all three is full membership of NAIO
as soon as possible, but everyone knows that this
is unlikely to happen at short notice. Not only
because NATO would be reluctant to provide
security guarantees which it might not be able to
put into practice, but also because an extension of
NATO's treaty area to the very borders of Russia
could play into the hands of Russian hardliners.
131. The next best solution for these countries
which they are now implementing is to forge
diplomatic and military ties which draw them into
the western sphere and out of Russia's orbit. In
fact, the Baltic defence strategy is to raise the
political price of any Russian interference.
I32. All three are participating in the partnership
for peace and a Baltic battalion, which will be
trained by Scandinavian and British soldiers, is
being created for United Nations peace-keeping
operations.
133. In this framework, they have to completely
rebuild and reform their armed forces. This is a
tall order, since there are no indigenous military
structures and there is a lack of equipment and
proper barracks. Moreover, most of the regular
officers have served in the Soviet armed forces
and are used to a different military culture and
doctrine, not compatible with those of western
forces. The most urgent need of all three Baltic
states in the defence field is therefore to have their
military trained according to western standards.
I34. A sensitive problem which has been pushed
to the backstage at present, but will return to a
more prominent position in the future is the situa-
tion of the Russian region of Kaliningrad, which
has common borders with Poland and Lithuania
and not with Russia. Kaliningrad is playing an
important r6le as a ffansit camp for Russian ffoops
which have been withdrawn from Central Euro-
pean countries.
135. Lithuania and Russia are now negotiating
transit arrangements for the transport of Russian
troops and equipment from Kaliningrad to the
mainland of Russia. This issue is causing acrimo-
nious debates in Lithuania.
136. With the exception of the Lithuanian
Democratic Labour Party and the Union of Poles,
all political groups represented in the Lithuanian
parliament have demanded of President Algiradas
Brazauskas that no agreement be signed with
Russia on military transit and that Lithuania limit
itself to the regulations which it had made earlier.
The CSCE might play a r0le in guaranteeing the
smooth pursuit of the operation.
137. On 27th September 1994, the representa-
tive of Lithuania raised this transit problem in
WEU's Permanent Council and asked the Council
to consider the possibility of making WEU obser-
vers available to monitor the transit arrangements
once they are agreed betrveen Lithuania and Russia.
The proposal was fully supported by the represen-
tative of Poland. At that meeting, the Permanent
Council agreed to consult national capitals, but
since then no further news has filtered through.
138. Once this problem has been solved, one
might still wonder how the Kaliningrad area will
be able to subsist without direct land connections
with mainland Russia and without resources of its
own.
VI. The new dividing line in Europe
139. What about the Europe whole and free, so
much hailed in the London declaration of 1990? It
should be recognised now that this concept has
been over optimistic. Indeed, progrcss has been
made through efforts to create frameworks of co-
operation and consultation, but there is now an
understanding that Russia cannot be an integral
part of either NATO or the European Union, if
only because of its size. Both organisations would
collapse under the weight of Russia's membership.
140. Russia has also clearly understood that
there is no room for it in either of these organisa-
tions. It has tried in vain to subject them to a Euro-
pean superstructure 
- 
the CSCE in which it had
proposed a right of veto for itself.
l4l. Apparently there will be no all-encompas-
sing security system in Europe and there is no
denying that a new western and a new eastern
group of countries are emerging. On the one hand
there is the European Union with WEU which
will, in the not too distant future, gradually incor-
porate the Central and Eastern European countries
not belonging to the CIS. On the other hand there
is Russia and the now independent former Soviet
republics which are members of the CIS.
142. The central challenge for European secu-
rity is to make sure that this new and inevitable
dividing line will not develop into a new line of
confrontation. Vague rhetoric over the possibi-
lities of partnership will not help, even less if at
the same time this is accompanied by ambiguous
language over Russia's ambition to intervene in
the near abroad. A policy of words without
follow-up would only reinforce the idea that the
West is not really interested in security in the
former Soviet Union.
143. In this constellation, NAIO, the bulwark of
western co-operation, seems to be leaning
towards a r6le of mediator and all-encompassing
organisation, covering all states on both sides
with NACC and offering them an i la carte
co-operation of much wider scope with its PFP
programme.
144. The European Union and Western Euro-
pean Union have chosen a different policy. They
cannot and will not stretch further eastward
315
DOCUMENT 1445
beyond the borders of the CIS, if only for reasons
of internal strength and political and economic
coherence. This policy was confirmed at a mee-
ting of twenty-two ministers for foreign affairs in
Luxembourg on 31st October 1994.
I45. With the states of the CIS, however, they
should make sure to maintain the closest possible
relations in an atmosphere of full transparency in
order to prevent any resurgence of alienation
while, at the same time, preparing a framework of
narrower relations which could come to fruition in
a more distant future when the present situation of
political and economic transformation in that part
of Europe has settled into a new balance.
146. It seems that the European Union, Western
European Union and NATO, in a natural way,
have developed different policies which are in no
way contradictory but rather complementary and
perfectly adapted to the situation today.
VII. Risles and threats to European security
I47. Many developments on the Eurasian conti-
nent and elsewhere after the fall of the Berlin wall
have demonstrated that, despite revolutionary
changes, the world has not become more secure
than before. Although by now the new risks and
threats to Western European security are suffi-
ciently well-known, it seems useful once again to
provide an overall review in the framework of the
present report.
(a) Balkans
148. It is no secret that the Balkans, with the
conflict in ex-Yugoslavia at the centre, will
remain an area of interest and instability for
many years to come. All the efforts of the contact
group (France, Germany, Russia, the United
Kingdom and the United States) to present a
peace agreement which would be acceptable to
the parties involved in the Bosnian conflict have
so far been in vain. It would seem that the situation
is still deteriorating and that violence is again the
only language of first and last resort between the
parties.
149. Moreover, the conflict has brought into the
open many debates and disagreements between
Europe and the United States and also between
NATO and the United Nations over the best way
to put an end to it and how to act and react in the
protection of humanitarian aid, own troops and
safe areas.
150. Apart from the violence raging in the Bos-
nian conflict, unrest is still simmering around
Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia, where frontiers
do not coincide with ethnic populations and where
minorities feel threatened by the ruling class.
151. Furthermore, no solution has yet been
found for those regions of the republic of Croatia
which are occupied and claimed by Serbs. At pre-
sent, there are rumours that a formal reconcilia-
tion between Belgrade andZagreb is under active
consideration, since President Milosevic has
come under strong pressure from western coun-
tries and Russia to recognise the Croatian govern-
ment and acknowledge in principle Croatia's
territorial integrity'0. Recently, a dispute over
confiscated Italian properties and other claims of
the Italian minority in the peninsula of Istria has
divided Italy, Slovenia and Croatia. Vojvodina, a
region in Serbia where around 300 000 Hunga-
rians are living, is now out of the limelight but it
may be a focus of attention at a later stage.
(b) Minorilics and fronticrc
I52. Problems of minorities and frontiers in
Central Europe may remain on the agenda for
some time to come, but there are hopeful signs.
153. The new socialist-liberal coalition govern-
ment in Hungary has clearly stated its determina-
tion to obtain a historic reconciliation with its
neighbours, in particular Slovakia and Romania,
where, respectively, more than 500 000 and 1.7
million to over 2 million ethnic Hungarians live.
Immediately after coming to power in July 1994,
the Hungarian Prime Minister, Gyula Horn, paid a
visit to Bratislava in September. It is not yet clear,
however, what action will be taken by the new
Slovakian government.
154. The Romanian Minister for Foreign Affairs
paid a visit to Budapest in early September 1994
where he used conciliatory language while not
hiding the fact that negotiations between the two
countries would be long and complicated. Here as
well, the situation may become more complica-
ted, now that the ultra-nationalist Party of Roma-
nian National Unity has been included in the
government. So far, both Romania and Slovakia
have stipulated that the inviolability of frontiers
should be written into the bilateral agreements,
while Hungary claims guarantees for the rights of
minorities. According to the Hungarian Foreign
Minister, Laszlo Kovacs, Hungary would be pre-
pared to consider the question of minorities sepa-
rately in order to accelerate negotiations and to
mention it in an annex to the bilateral treaties.
155. The European stability pact, now being
negotiated and later to be inserted in the CSCE
framework, will certainly play an important r6le
in defusing possible tensions between Central and
Eastern European states, especially as regards
minorities and frontiers.
34. Financial Times, l2th October
October 1994.
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(c) Meditenanean
156. The situation in the southern Mediter-
ranean is extremely volatile.
157. In Algeria, since the cancellation in January
1992 of a general election which the fundamen-
talist Salvation Front was expected to win, an
armed Islamic power struggle between Islamic
fundamentalists has wrought havoc in the country
involving the violent death of thousands of civi-
lians, military and police officers. While the Alge-
rian government says that 10 000 people have
been killed since the beginning of the conflict,
foreign experts provide estimates of up to 30 000.
158. In spite of more than two and a half years of
dour struggle, the government has not succeeded
in eliminating Islamists from Algerian politics
and eradicating armed Islamic groups. In Septem-
ber 1994, the government released some of the
leaders of the Islamic Salvation Front (ISF),
including the two most senior leaders, Abbasi
Madani and Ali Belhadj, from prison hoping that
they could give support to the objective of stop-
ping the violence. It is by no means clear, how-
ever, that these leaders can command the loyalty
of younger fundamentalists who have taken charge
of the armed revolt and until now there have been
no signs of the violence diminishing. It is no
secret that both the Islamic movement and the
government are divided over practically all the
main issues now at stake, and negotiations would
be long and difficult without there being any gua-
rantee of positive conclusions in sight.
159. Meanwhile, on29th Octobet the Algerian
President, Liamine Z€rotal, publicly declared that
the government's efforts to start a dialogue with
the Islamist movement had failed, while accusing
the representatives of the ISF of having continued
to encourage terrorism and extremism. The Presi-
dent announced that presidential elections would
be organised before the end of 1995.
160. It remains to be seen how serious the divi-
sions within the Islamic movement are, but there
are signs that there is an increasing similarity with
the Afghan Islamic movement, which has divided
into different camps which fight each other. The
recent agitation by the Berber movement will cer-
tainly not ease the already tense situation in the
country.
161. In the neighbouring countries, Morocco and
Tunisia, the situation is still under control, but
understandably the governments of both countries
are extremely worried over developments in
Algeria. The governments of both countries are
reluctant to relax their hold or power for fear that
Algeria's political umest might spread across the
border. The Algerian government's decision to try
and negotiate with the Islamic fundamentalists
has only increased these worries.
162. Libya is to a large degree still isolated from
the other North African countries, being suspected
of secret support for Islamic fundamentalist
movements. United Nations sanctions, imposed in
November 7993 after Libya failed to co-operate
with investigations of the PanAm and UTA disas-
ters over Lockerbie and Niger respectively are
troubling the r6gime of Colonel Kadhafi. The
country's annual oil revenues have plummeted
from $ 21 billion a decade ago to $ 6 billion at
present.
163. Egypt too has to cope with a rebellious and
violent campaign of Islamic fundamentalists
which the government, despite sustained efforts,
has not been able to quell.
164. Little progress is being made regarding the
situation in Western Sahara. In April 1994, the
pro-independence Polisario Front had agreed to
abide by United Nations Security Council Resolu-
tion 907 for organising a long-delayed referen-
dum on the territory's future before the end of
1994, but recently the process incurred new
delays because of Moroccan claims.
165. Although the five-country Arab Maghreb
Union35 held its delayed sixth Supreme Council
meeting in Tunis on 2nd and 3rd April 1994 with
a final communiqu6 stressing the need to continue
working towards the ultimate goal of Maghrebian
unity, it appears that, in practice, very little pro-
gress has been made.
166. A recent document of the Commission of
the European Union rightly says that political,
economic and social conditions in a number of
North African countries are sources of instability
leading to mass migration, fundamentalist extre-
mism, terrorism, drugs and organised crime. The
Commission has therefore launched a proposal to
create a Euro-Mediterranean economic area, akin
to the European economic area, set up with the
EFIA countries earlier in 1994.In this initiative,
the European Commission has proposed to more
than double the European Union's aid to help par-
ticipants restructure their economies. The target
date for a full Euro-Mediterranean free trade area
is 2010. Meanwhile, special association agree-
ments are being negotiated with Israel, Tunisia
and Morocco.
167. It should be noted that North African coun-
tries are still worried that they receive less atten-
tion from the European Union than the countries
of Central and Eastern Europe. In 1993, all non-
European Union Mediterranean countries receiv-
ed 407 million ecus in aid, compared with
1.04 billion ecus for Central and Eastern Europe.
168. It seems, however, that with the present
volatile situation in mind, WEU cannot sit and
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wait to see what will happen next. It will have to
prepare for a situation which may give rise to
greater concern over Europe's southern flank than
is the case at present.
169. In its Luxembourg meeting on 9th May
1994, the WEU Council, after having stressed
" the importance of security and stability in the
Mediterranean basin for the security of Europe "
agreed " to develop the dialogue already initiated
with the Maghreb countries and to expand it to
Egypt and gradually to other non-WEU Mediter-
ranean states. "
l7O. This is all very well and the Council's
activity and intentions should certainly be wel-
comed, but one may question the effectiveness of
these modest steps, which are little more than an
exchange of information with the diplomatic
representatives of these countries in Brussels.
Moreover, the existing divisions and wide diffe-
rences of views among the abovementioned coun-
tries is almost a guarantee for low effectiveness
and little progress in this dialogue.
l7l. This should not discourage Europeans from
continuing their efforts in political dialogue and
discussions. The idea of creating a Conference on
Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean
(CSCM) in the mould of the successful CSCE
should not be discarded, even if its establishment
may take a long time.
172. On the other hand, Europe will also have to
prepare itself for an even more volatile situation
in North Africa, which may result in a direct
threat to its southern flank which traditionally has
been its soft under-belly. Security and defence
policy is notjust dialogue, it is also vigilance and
preparedness to act physically if circumstances
demand.
173. The French-Italian-Spanish initiative for a
reaction force in this region should be encouraged
and a link should be established between this
force and other forces answerable to WEU which
could reinforce its operations.
(d) The Caucasus
(i) Georgia
174. The war between Georgia and Abkhazian
separatists is only one example of how the mili-
tary have taken control in different conflicts on
the territory of the former Soviet Union. While
Georgia's leader, Eduard A. Shevardnadze, was
seeking an accommodation with the Abkhazian
separatists, his Minister of Defence, Tengiz Kito-
vani, invaded Abkhazia without his approval. The
tide turned when in September 1993 the Abkha-
zians, supplied with weaponry, money and opera-
tional planning by Russians, drove the Georgians
back to their own territory. It is generally believed
that hard-liners in the Russian military authorised
support to Abkazians at the time when hesident
Yeltsin was entangled in a serious conflict with
hard-liners in the Russian parliament.
175. The only way for Georgia to make Russia
stop giving covert aid to Abkhazian separatists
was to agree to accept permanent Russian military
bases on its soil. At the end of June 1994, Presi-
dent Shevardnadze had to accept 3 000 Russian
troops to monitor the border between Georgia and
Abkhazia. On 21st July 1994, the presence of
these troops was legitimised by the United
Nations Security Council, allegedly in exchange
for Russian support for an invasion of Haiti by the
United States with the backing of the United
Nations.
(ii) Nagomo-Karabakh
176. The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is
still not solved, and it is obvious that a solution
can be found only if it has the full agreement of
Russia.
177. Recently, negotiations between President
Geidar Aliev of Azerbaijan and President Levon
Ter-Petrossian of Armenia meeting in Moscow
almost reached agreement on a peaceful settle-
ment. Parties involved in the conflict have now
asked for an international peace-keeping force to
police a cease-fire, but there are still some issues
outstanding. There is no agreement over when
Armenian forces will withdraw from Azeri areas
seized outside the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave,
over the final status of the enclave and over the
exact size and composition of the peace-keeping
force.
178. A request for a peace-keeping force has
now been made at a CSCE meeting in Prague on
30th September which could lead to the first
CSCE peace-keeping operation.
I79. At the beginning of October, political
umest caused President Aliyev to impose a state
of emergency followed by the dismissal of Prime
Minister Suret Huseinov who was accused of
siding with opposition forces trying to incite a
coup.
180. Whatever may happen in the Caucasus,
Russia will always make sure that it will keep a
firm hand on developments in this strategically
important region with oil and rising Islamic fun-
damentalism as important ingredients.
181. Here, it should be recalled that in Septem-
ber Azerbaijan signed an $8 billion oil production
agreement with a consortium of western oil com-
panies to drill in the Azeri section of the Caspian
Sea. Following this agreement, Russia has propo-
sed the establishment of a multinational co-ordi-
nating committee to decide on the exploitation of
oil and gas reserves in the Caspian Sea to which,
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it stated, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan had already
agreed36. At the initiative of Russia, on 12th Octo-
ber 1994, representatives of all the countries sur-
rounding the Caspian Sea met in an effort to reach
agreement over claims to the region's natural
resources 3'.
(iii) Chectutya
I82. Russian efforts to regain control over
Chechnya have so far been less successful. Three
years ago, Dzhokar Dudayev, a former Soviet air-
force general, declared Chechnya's independence
from Moscow. President Yeltsin is now openly
supporting Mr. Dudayev's opponents with money
and arms, partly because he cannot tolerate fla-
grant defiance, but also in order to pre-empt his
nationalist critics by appearing tough against
independence in other restive regions, to name
only Tatarstan and Bashkiria. Moreover, all three
autonomous republics mentioned here are oil-
producing regions. It should be noted, however,
that the most conspicuous opponent of Mr.
Dudayev is Ruslan Khasbulatov, the former
speaker of Russia's parliament, who was released
from prison in February last.
183. Russian military forces in neighbouring
regions have been put on full combat alert to pre-
vent the Chechen conflict from spreading to other
parts of the Caucasus. Recently, the Russian depu-
ty Prime Minister, Sergei Chakrai, has stated that
in Chechnya, being part of Russia, ffoops of the
Ministry of Interior should re-establish order38.
184. On several occasions, both political and
military leaders in Russia have called for a
renegotiation of the CFE Treaty in view of the
unstable situation in the Caucasus. The Defence
Minister, Pavel Grachev, has stated that the
amount of equipment authorised " in no way cor-
responds to the military needs entailed by an ade-
quate defence capability ". The Minister also
noted that according to the treaty, after 1995
Russia will be limited to " 700 tanks, 580 armou-
red troop transport vehicles, and 1 280 anillery
systems for the military regions of Leningrad and
the Northern Caucasus ". However, in his view,
these regions require about 1 500 tanks, 3 000
armoured transport vehicles, and 2 100 artillery
systems of which 600,2 200 and I 000 respecti-
vely would be required in the Caucasus.
185. NATO has stated that it is against a renego-
tiation of the ffeaty, but that, in accordance with
Russia and the states of the Caucasus, changes
would be possible, provided that the global
ceiling authorised by the treaty for these countries
were not exceeded.
Financial Times, 27th September 1994.
Financial Times, l2th October 1994.
Le Monde, 28th September 1994.
(e) Tajikistan
186. Russia has deployed a25 000 strong mili-
tary force in Tajikistan, mainly in this country's
southern region on the border with Afghanistan.
187. The Russian troops have been instrumental
in overthrowing a coalition of intellectuals, demo-
crats and Islamics which had come to power in
autumn 1992 and re-installing a government of
old guard hard-liners from the previous commu-
nist administration under the interim head of state,
Imamali Rakhmonov. In this power struggle, tens
of thousands have been killed while many others
have fled the country into Afghanistan.
188. At present, Russia claims that these troops
play an important r6le in protecting the former ter-
ritory of the Soviet Union against Islamic funda-
mentalist forces from Afghanistan, but more proba-
bly they have become heavily tangled in the power
struggle between different clans inside Tajikistan.
189. Meanwhile, several rounds of negotiations
have been held in Islamabad between represen-
tatives of the Tajik government and opposition
covering such issues as a pefinanent cease-fire,
the return of refugees from Afghanistan and
Tajikistan's government system. A temporary
cease-fire monitored by United Nations military
observers came into force on 19th October. On
6th November 1994,Imamali Rakhmonov was
elected president in elections which were not
recognised and boycotted by the opposition and to
which the United Nations and the CSCE declined
to send observers.
$) Ulaaine
190. The election in July 1994 of Leonid Kuch-
ma as the President of Ukraine, who during his
election campaign had promised closer links with
Russia, seems indeed to have a positive influence
on the relations between the two states.
191. On 18th August, Russia and Ukraine reach-
ed an agreement on the repayment of Ukraine's
debt to Russia for the supply of gas. In early
September, a number of agreements were prepa-
red for signature on the occasion of President
Boris Yeltsin's visit to Kiev. Some agreements
were prepared on economic and trade issues, but
Ukraine also stated that it would agree to split the
on-shore facilities of the Black Sea fleet. This
agreement would clear the way for the solution of
questions which remained after the basic agree-
ment on the division of the Black Sea fleet,
concluded in April 19941'.
192. It should be pointed out, however, that
Ukraine has clearly stated that it does not intend to
change its status as an associate member of the CIS
36.
37.
38.
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economic union, wishing to keep its distance from
a closer union with this Russian dominated body.
193. Mr. Kuchma's election may also lead to an
easing of tension in Crimea, the autonomous
Ukrainian peninsula which earlier in 1994 elected
the separatist Yivu Meshkov as its President.
Crimea is dominated by ethnic Russians for
whom there seems to be little distinction between
calls for independence and reintegration in Russia
of which Crimea was part until 1954. At present it
appears, however, that Russia is giving priority to
good relations with Ukraine and its new leader-
ship, rather than support a Crimean secessionist
movement. It seems that this new reality has been
understood by Crimean politicians.
(g) Moldova and the Trans-Dniostr region
194. The republic of Moldova which declared its
independence in August 1991, shortly after the
failed coup in Moscow, is still facing a multitude
of threats to its very existence as an independent
state. While two-thirds of its population is of
Romanian origin, the idea of reunification with
Romania is no longer topical. With no other
important markets for its agricultural and indus-
trial production and completely dependent on
Russia for its energy, Moldova had no choice but
to integrate into the economic union of the CIS in
October 1993.
195. The Gagauz, Turkish-speaking christians
living in the south of the country, have obtained a
statute of autonomy. No solution has yet been
found for the Trans-Dniestr region inhabited by
the largest part of the Russian and Ukrainian
minority. This region declared its independence
and, after a short but violent armed conflict with
the central authorities of Moldova, is now being
protected by the 14th Russian army.
196. At present, Russia is keeping its 14th army
in Moldova without any formal agreement or any
other accord on military bases. Repeated efforts
of the Russian government to replace the com-
manding general of the 14th Army have all been
in vain. One may doubt whether the government
has full control over this part of its armed forces.
197 . On 21st October 1994, at the CIS summit
meeting in Moscow, the Russian and Moldovan
Prime Ministers agreed on the withdrawal of the
Russian 14th army from the breakaway Trans-
Dniestr region by 1997 .It is by no means certain,
however, whether this agreement will be ratified
and implemented.
198. The Moldovan government has declared
that Trans-Dniestr could be given the statute of
autonomous region while sharing a common
foreign policy and armed forces, but Trans-Dniestr
itself insists on being an independent republic.
(h) ProWralian of nuclurweapons
199. In the spring of 1995, a conference is to be
held in New York to decide, in accordance with
Article X 2 of the ffeaty on the non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons (NPT), whetlrer the ffeaty should
" continue in force indefinitely, or shall be exten-
ded for an additional fixed period or periods ". The
decision on extending the treaty must be taken by
a majority of the present 164 signatories. Many
have cast doubts on the effectiveness of the NPT,
but it should be noted that at present only three
countries (India, Israel and Pakistan), which have
not signed the NPT, are " threshold " or " suspect "
states meaning that either they have a nuclear
weapon or are actively developing one. Algeria,
another potential " suspect " has now promised tojoin the NPT and has accepted a safeguard agree-
ment for its nuclear reactors.
200. The nuclear status of Israel may be consi-
dered as potentially the most destabilising since it
has incited a number of Arab states not to ratify the
chemical weapons convention. These states may
also refuse to support NPT extension unless the
United States can convince Israel to denuclearise.
201. The breaking up of the Soviet Union into a
series of new independent republics has created
new nuclear weapon states with an uncertain sta-
tus as regards the NPT. It seems, however, that
most of the problems caused by this development
not provided for in the NPT have now been
solved. All tactical nuclear weapons of the former
Soviet Union have been transferred to Russian
territory the transfer of strategic nuclear weapons
is under way and Belarus and Kazakhstan havejoined the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.
Ukraine had agreed to do the same and finally, on
16th November 1994, the parliament of Ukraine
ratified the NPT by a wide margin. Ukraine will,
however, only formally accede to the treaty as a
non-nuclear state once it has have received assu-
rances from the United States, the United King-
dom, France and Russia about its territorial inte-
grity. The parliament had not been in a hurry to
ratify Ukraine's NPT accession, also because it
accused the United States of dragging its feet on
the implementation of a $ 350 million promise in
disarmament aido0. Meanwhile the transfer of
strategic nuclear weapons to Russian territory is
under way and those remaining on Ukraine terri-
tory cannot be targeted or fired without Russian
co-operation. Ukraine has also agreed to an audit
by the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) of all nuclear materials on its territory.
202. Two states, Iraq and North Korea, have
managed to establish a nuclear weapons develop-
ment programme despite IAEA monitoring, but
Iraq has been deprived of the programme while
320
40. Financial Times, 2nd September 1994.
DOCI.JMENT 1445
North Korea has frozen its programme and on
21st October 1994 signed an agreement with the
United States to restructure its nuclear programme.
203. A proposed world-wide ban on nuclear
tests is high on the agenda of the 1995 NPT
review conference, in particular because a very
large number of the non-nuclear weapon states
consider adherence to a test ban treaty by the
nuclear weapon states as a litmus test of their
good faith.
204. Many NPT signatories are accusing nuclear
weapon states of failing to fulfil their side of the
non-proliferation bargain, which, under Article 6
of the NPT, commits them " in good faith " to
negotiate an end to the nuclear arms race and
eventual nuclear disarmament.
205. Altogether, it should be noted that the pros-
pects of indefinite NPT extension, as supported
by France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the
united States is not yet assured.
206. When establishing a common European
defence policy, European nations should therefore
take into account that, early in the next century
some more states may have acquired weapons of
mass destruction. Proliferation of these weapons
remains one of the major challenges for inter-
national security and for European defence. There
may be not only a threat of such weapons to Euro-
pe's territory, but European armed forces opera-
ting overseas will also need new strategies and
protective capabilities in possible crises or
conflicts with adversaries who are in possession
of mass destruction weapons. A ballistic missile
defence capability of some kind will have to be
developed which not one single European country
will be able to afford. European and trans-atlantic
co-operation in this field is urgently required.
207. The initiative taken at NATO's summit
meeting in Brussels in January 1994 * that work
begin immediately in appropriate fora of the
alliance to develop an overall policy framework
to consider how to reinforce on-going prevention
efforts and how to reduce the proliferation threat
and protect against it " should therefore be wel-
comed.
208. An issue which is perhaps even more diffi-
cult to handle is the theft and smuggling of pluto-
nium and other nuclear materials, mostly from the
Soviet Union, to would-be proliferators else-
where. The German authorities have been particu-
larly active and successful in tracking down cases
of nuclear smuggling, not only because it is a
crossroad of trade routes but also because it has
acquired a thorough knowledge of Central and
Eastern European criminal activities through the
reunification process and the gradual withdrawal
of the former Soviet forces from the territory of
the former German Democratic Republic. The
number of cases of suspected nuclear smuggling
investigated in Germany has increased alarm-
ingly, from 4 in 1990 to 4l in 1991, 158 in 1992,
241in 1993 and 90 in the first half of 1994.
209. Little is known about nuclear smuggling at
the southern border of Russia into lran and other
Middle Eastern countries, but there is no reason to
feel comfortable about that. Not all nuclear smug-
gling is alarming to the same degree, sometimes it
is just a sniffof plutonium from a smoke detector.
Other cases, such as those reported in May and
August 1994, however; involve weapons-grade
plutonium 239.
210. Why is it suspected that these nuclear mate-
rials come from Russia? This country is now dis-
mantling almost 10 000 nuclear warheads, return-
ing the plutonium to store, where it is easier to
stealar. Moreover, it has a large quantity of highly
enriched uranium and civil reactor-grade pluto-
nium which also may be hazardous if handled by
malicious people. Without modern western bar-
coding and computerised stock systems, Russia
has great difficulty in accurately keeping track of
all its nuclear material.
2Il. Smuggled plutonium is more likely to
come from nuclear stockpiles or research labora-
tories than from one of the three manufacturing
cenffes for weapons-grade plutonium. In this frarne-
work, it should also be noted that Russian nuclear
scientists, who in the Soviet era were part of a
highly-privileged community, have suffered a
serious decline in status, income and motivation,
which, each in themselves, may easily lead to
compensatory activities.
212. The risks, caused by nuclear smuggling and
the brain-drain of nuclear scientists are almost too
obvious to be mentioned here. Some non-nuclear
weapon countries are interested in the establish-
ment of a nuclear weapons progralnme and wish
to acquire the knowledge and material to do so.
Others are already one stage ahead and may try to
improve existing programmes. Nor can the possi-
bility of terrorist groups acquiring nuclear mate-
rial be excluded.
213. What has so far been done to curb the risks
involved? In order to counter the threat of a
nuclear scientists brain-drain from Russia, the
European Union, Japan, Russia and the United
States set up the International Science and Tech-
nology Cenffe in Moscow in March 1994, which
has now approved more than 50 research projects
and committed $ 30 million to sponsor 3 000
scientists over the next three years.
214. This is a good start but, knowing that these
3 000 scientists may represent only l0Vo of the
41. In the framework of recent nuclear disarmament agree-
ments, the United States and Russia will each have to store at
least 50 tons of plutonium extracted from dismantled
warheads.
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Russian scientists who have knowledge that is
useful to anyone intent on building a nuclear
bomb, it seems to be just a drop in the ocean. The
$ 30 million committed is also ridiculously little
when compared to the $ 4.5 billion which an
international consortium is going to spend in
order to dismantle North Korea's nuclear pro-
grarnme and replace it with new energy supplies
and safer light water reactorsa2.
2t5. Since 1991, the United States Congress has
authorised $ 988 million to help diminish the
nuclear threat from the former Soviet Union. In
July 1994 only $ 58 million of this formidable
sum had been spent. An amount of $ 4.2 million
has been spent on improving export controls for
the accounting of nuclear materials, of which only
$ 1 million has been spent in Russiao3.
216. It is said that, to a large degree, the pro-
gramme was only very fragmentarily imple-
mented because of friction with Russian nuclear
experts, low funding and lack of attention from
the top level of the United States administration.
217. It should be noted here that while the Uni-
ted States is contemplating methods to make its
surplus of weapons-grade plutonium as unusable
as possible, most Russian experts consider such
behaviour as sacrilege. For many years, Russia
has spent a disproportionate part of its national
income on plutonium production and now thinks
that, in the next centur/, plutonium may become
an atffactive fuel for nuclear energy plants.
218. Apparently, there is an urgent need for
more co-ordinated multilateral action in order to
produce the highest standards to control stocks of
nuclear material, in panicular plutonium, and to
prevent theft and smuggling. Positive results can
be expected only if such action is the result of
careful negotiations among equal partners.
219. Moreover, agreements should be concluded
to provide mechanisms for the continuous and
swift sharing of intelligence on nuclear smug-
gling. In this respect, Germany has set an example
in its agreement with Russia on this subject. At an
informal meeting of Foreign Ministers from the
European Union on 7th-8th September, Germany
pressed for Europol, the European police agency,
to be given greater responsibility for fighting this
sort of crime. WEU could make an important
contribution to non-proliferation by creating a
nuclear non-proliferation research and monitoring
centre at WEU level, which could co-ordinate
European efforts in this field.
42. Ot the total amount of $ 4.5 billion, South Korea is
expected to provide 55Vo,the rest being split among the hve
United Nations Security Council members and Australia,
Canada, Germany and Japan.
43. International Herald Tribune, 29th August 1994.
220. The large plutonium stocks resulting from
the bilateral nuclear disarmament agreements
between Russia and the United States make it
imperative for them to meet their specific respon-
sibilities. The possibilities include proposals to
put their surplus plutonium into internationally
controlled safe storage, where it could be properly
monitored; also, both countries could agree on the
stocks to be degraded and offer a more open audit
of their total plutonium stocks.
VIII. The rdle of WEU
(a) Recent operations 
-
oatside and inside thetramework otWEU
221. In recent years, WEU has taken responsi-
bility for several operations which have been, or
are still being, conducted successfully. Mention is
made here of the mine-clearing operation in the
Persian Gulf. Currently, the WEU mission on the
Danube and the Operation Sha.p Guard in the
Adriatic, both monitoring the sanctions against
the different republics of the former Yugoslavia,
are still continuing. Earlier Assembly reports have
discussed these missions in detail.
222. The following paragraphs will review miss-
ed opportunities in Rwanda and WEU's activities
in Mostar. Sadly enough, on both occasions and for
different reasons, WEU did less well than could
have been expected if its member states, represen-
ted in the Council, had shown greater promptness
of action and political will to act together.
(i) Rwanda
223. Events in Rwanda have again clearly
shown the futility of the nearly endless discus-
sions on peace-keeping and humanitarian action
in recent years. On 6th April 1994, the death of
President Juv6nal Habyarimana appeared to be
the signal leading to a genocide in which more
than 500 000 people were killed while many more
fled their homes and country. A large number of
the refugees died from cholera and dysentery.
From 9th to 14th April, both Belgium and France
deployed troops to evacuate their nationals. On
22nd Apil 1994, the United Nations reduced its
United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda(UNAMIR) from2 500 to 270 members.
224. On 17th May, the United Nations Security
Council agreed in principle to expand UNAMIR
to 5 500 troops in order to protect civilians under
attack in special humanitarian zones and help
guard international relief convoys. Implementa-
tion of this decision proved difficult because eight
of the nine African countries which had voluntee-
red troops had stipulated conditions, such as the
supply of arms and equipment, which took time to
be met.
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225. Meanwhile France took the initiative of
sending troops to Rwanda in the framework of a
humanitarian action. At the request of France and
Italy, the Permanent Council of WEU held an
extraordinary meeting on 17th June to discuss the
situation in Rwanda.
226. The Permanent Council instructed the
Planning Cell to act as a point of contact and
co-ordination between the member countries
contributing to the action and the headquarters
commanding the operation.
227 . Later, a member of the WEU Planning Cell
was incorporated in the Centre op6rationnel inter-
arm6es (COIA) at the French Ministry of Defence
to co-ordinate the support in material and troops
that was provided by other WEU member states.
This was the first time that the WEU Planning Cell
participated operationally in a force deploymenta.
228. On 21st June, the Permanent Council again
met in the configuration of fifteen countries.
229. It appears that the Permanent Council tried
not to oppose the French initiative of sending
troops while at the same time trying to become
involved as little as possible. The communiqu6
issued after the meeting on 21st June stated that a
number of member states had confirmed that they
were prepared to contribute to the initiative to ease
the tenible suffering in Rwanda, provided the Uni-
ted Nations Security Council reached a new deci-
sion and due account being taken of the time
needed to build up the means necessary for the
effective deployment of an enlarged UNAMIR.
230. It was decided, however, that the support
providedby member states would notbe announced
in the framework of WEU, but directly by the
capitals concerned.
231. At a later stage, logistical and humanitarian
support was indeed provided by Belgium, Ger-
many, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and
the United Kingdom.
232. One really wonders why, with eight of the
nine full member states providing some form of
tangible support in material and human resources,
and the involvement of the Planning Cell, the
Council took so many pains to ensure that it was
not called a WEU operation.
233. It should be noted that France, when it took
the initiative of sending troops, had taken into
account all the lessons that had been learnt from
recent humanitarian operations. It would not act
without a United Nations Security Council man-
date, only in a multinational operation, Article VII
of the Charter was to be applied in order not to be
dependent on the parties involved in the conflict,
and both the length and the objective ofthe opera-
tion were to be determined in advance.
234. With the approval of the United Nations
Security Council, France, on23rdJune then laun-
ched Operation Turquoise, deploying 2 500
troops in two bases in Zaire, Goma and Bukavu.
Of these, some 1 000 troops would cross the fron-
tier with Rwanda to provide humanitarian aid. As
regards the objective, the French government had
clearly stated that it had no intention of fighting
anyone nor of becoming involved in internal poli-
tical problems. Contact was being maintained
with the RPF (Rwanda Patriotic Front) to ensure
that France's action was seen as purely humanita-
rian. It wished to help and encourage non-govern-
mental organisations by protecting human lives.
French soldiers had strict instructions to avoid any
contact with areas of hostilities and not to take
issue with the RPF.
235. Why, in the face of a major humanitarian
disaster, was there so much reluctance in Europe
to act? Indeed, it has been said that not all the
reasons for this passivity are shameful, one of
them being that civil war in Rwanda was not a
threat to stability in the region or in Africa as a
whole. On the other hand, it was quite surprising
that the United Nations had withdrawn its troops
just when they could have at least done something
to reduce the killing and make less difficult the
creation of a new civil order.
236. In fact, Rwanda was an excellent instance
of the theory and logic of the common European
foreign and security policy being put to the test.
Joint European action would have been in accor-
dance with WEU's Petersberg declaration. It
would have spread the cost and risks of a humani-
tarian or military intervention and it would have
reduced suspicion of individual actors having
potential national agendas, providing a balance
between the more interested and the less interested
countries. Instead of deciding to act together,
most of the WEU member states used the Council
meeting on Rwanda to stammer excuses while
incriminating others of trying to act with the
wrong motives or in self-interest.
237. Indeed, in Rwanda " something " has been
done, but it could have been done better if WEU
had been better prepared for the type of operation
that after some years of experience with the " new
world order " could be anticipated. The Planning
Cell could have done more if it had not been
trapped in the vicious circle where the Council
does not provide more resources in the belief that
the Planning Cell is not operational.
238. The situation in Rwanda would also have
offered an excellent opportunity to involve the asso-
ciate parbrers in a WEU operation. The full possibi-
lities of this new statute, as defined in the Kirchberg
declaration of May 1994, should be implemented.
If there is no compelling reason to leave them on the
side lines, they should be involved and participate
in meetings of the Permanent Council.,14. Le Monde, 30th June and lst July 1994.
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239. Rwanda is not a unique case. Africa is boil-
ing, and one needs barely mention Burundi,
Somalia, Liberia and Angola to realise that the
political situation is still far from stable. If the
WEU Council considers the preparation of
contingency plans to be a serious matter and not
merely a pretext for keeping its Planning Cell
busy, Africa is a point in case. WEU should
create a European humanitarian action force
which could function as a fire brigade in case of
urgency.
240. At the same time, because the United
Nations Security Council correctly tries, in the
first place, to rely on regional forces, WEU should
help in establishing an African action force com-
posed of troop contingents from different African
nations, trained and equipped by WEU member
states.
(ii) WEU's activities in Mostar
241. [n the presidency report on Mostar of
5th May 1994, it is mentioned that at the request
of the Council of the European Union, prelimi-
nary work on a possible WEU contribution was
carried out in 1993.
242. The options presented ranged from merely
supervising a specific agreement among the
parties on the policing of Mostar to the possibility
of WEU establishing a police force proper,
carrying out its duties directly on the spot.
243. Later, WEU focused on the possibility of
a contribution to the supervision of the local
police forces, their future organisation as a
single, unified force and some of the ways in
which WEU could contribute to the discharge of
police duties.
244. WEU has taken part in a preparatory mis-
sion decided on by the European Union and it is
pointed out that under the auspices of the prepa-
ratory mission and with WEU participation, the
local police chiefs have held their first joint meet-
ing for over a year.
245. On 12th October, the European Union
Administrator of Mostar, Hans Koschnick, stated
that the support of WEU " until then had not been
very encouraging ". He asked WEU to lose no
time in sending the police force it had promised.
WEU had promised to send 180 police offrcers to
Mostar of which only 100 were in place by the
end of October 1994, including some 40 Fiench
and German. At that time, one quarter had not yet
been committed by member states. At present, the
Muslim and Croat parts of the city each have their
own police force. The intention now is to provide
the local police with the opportunity to work
together in order to guarantee security throughout
the city.
246. Considering the rather limited activities of
WEU, one might well wondbr why it takes so
much time to send a small police force of 180.
Again, this is an operation which fits perfectly
into WEU missions as formulated in the Peters-
berg declaration. The theoretical framework
exists, but apparently the political will among the
changing coalitions of member states to imple-
ment a policy to which everybody has agreed is
still lacking. The reluctance to act, which is parti-
cularly manifest in the time-consuming beating
around the bush and procedural battles in the
Council, is tarnishing the image of the organisa-
tion. This is especially exasperating when it
concerns limited operations such as Mostar where
swift action would be possible with a coalition of
the willing.
247. As the Dutch Defence Minister, Joris
Voorhoeve, rightly said: " In Mostar WEU's
credibility is at stake. It should not fail this test. "
(b) Reinforcing the operationd organs of WEU
(i) The WEU Satellite Centre at Tbruejdn
248. The establishment of the WEU Satellite
Centre in Torrej6n, which started its three-year
experimental phase in April 1993, has been an
important step forward. It is a first concrete proof
of the Council's recognition that satellite observa-
tion is a vital element of a European security and
defence identity. Many issues regarding the
Cenfte are discussed in the report of the Techno-
logical and Aerospace Committee " The future of
the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrej6n ", submitted
by Mr. Lopez Henares, Rapporteuras.
249. Notwithstanding the remarkable progress
achieved by the Satellite Cenffe, which has beenjustly welcomed in the abovementioned report, it
is thought here that some additional comments
should be made in the light of the development of
a European defence policy. With increasing Euro-
pean security and defence responsibilities and the
changing attitudes of the transatlantic partners
over their r6le in Europe, it is steadily becoming
more evident that initial ideas regarding the r6le
and functioning of the Satellite Cenffe in its expe-
rimental phase were too limited in regard to the
tasks and objectives of the Centre. At present,
some of these limitations prevent the Centre from
developing a more operational r6le. When taking
decisions in spring 1995 to ensure the continuity
of the Centre's work, the Courrcil should take the
opportunity of redefining the r6les and responsi-
bilities of the Satellite Centre in order to give it a
far more active and operational r6le. The first is
that the equipment and premises should be adap-
ted in such a way as to be able to put into effect
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the memorandum of understanding concerning
the interpretation and use of Helios I images. [t is
well known that this can be done without funda-
mental changes in the Centre's equipment
and without involving disproportionate financial
commitments.
250. The second is that a working relationship
should be established between the Centre and the
WEU Planning Cell in Brussels. From the very
start it was thought that the Centre could become
more operational by using data from the Helios
satellite. It should also be recalled that the terms
of reference of the Planning Cell include its task,
in times of crisis, to provide advice to the WEU
authorities on the practicability and nature of any
WEU involvement.
251. It would be only logical to establish such
links between Satellite Centre and Planning Cell
as to enable both organs to acquire the necessary
experience in their support tasks for crisis-mana-
gement. An organisation which claims to play an
important r6le in the European security and defence
identity can be effective only if its various parts
are able to co-operate on a practical level so that
the options for a decision may be presented to
those responsible in the event of emergency.
(ii) The Planning Cell
252. At its June 1994 session, the WEU Assem-
bly discussed a report on the WEU Planning
Cell6 and adopted recommendation 561 on that
subject. The Council has given its reply to this
recommendation on 2nd November 19940'.
253. Since then, the situation has not changed
basically. It is useless to repeat the conclusions of
the Defence Committee's earlier report which are
still valid. The main problem is clearly that the
Planning Cell does not get enough political sup-
port to do its work properly. A year and a half
after its establishment, the Planning Cell is
expected to present a full list of forces answerable
to WEU. The development of an inventory of
force packages which should enable WEU to
carry out the tasks conferred on it has only just
started.
254. Once again, it is not the Planning Cell itself
that should be blamed for this, but rather the
member states of WEU which, through their shuf-
fling, reluctance, and hesitant, slow actions, are
blocking any real progress.
255. With contingency plans and force packages
available, it should have been a matter of days to
send a humanitarian mission to Rwanda. At pre-
46. The WEU Planning Cell, report submitted on behalf of
the Defence Committee by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Rap-
porteur, Document 1421.
47. Assembly document A./WEUIDG (94) 23.
sent, even a very limited operation such as send-
ing a modest police force to Mostar takes many
months to materialise.
256. If the Planning Cell is meant to be a useful
organ which would contribute to the operational
capabilities of WEU, the Council should provide
it with the appropriate equipment and staff to
develop it into a real headquarters for the co-ordi-
nation of European operations.
257. According to the document on a status of
association for the nine Central European states,
published as part of the Luxembourg declaration
of 9th May 1994, the associate partners may
have a liaison arrangement with the Planning
Cell. At present, this means no more than that
each of these states can ask the Planning Cell
to be informed about specific activities of the
Cell, or that the Planning Cell can take the initia-
tive to inform them of such activities as deemed
appropriate.
258. According to the abovementioned docu-
ment, associate partners may associate them-
selves with decisions taken by member states
concerning humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-
keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis-
management, including peace-making.
259. The document further states that associate
partners " will be able to participate in their
implementation as well as in relevant exercises
and planning unless a majority of the member
states, or half of the member states including the
Presidency, decide othenrise. They will be invited
to provide information on forces. They will also
be able to offer forces for specific operations.
When it is agreed that they join such WEU opera-
tions by committing forces, they will have the
same obligations as other participants, as well as
the right of involvement in the command struc-
tures and in the Council's subsequent decision-
making process. The precise modalities of their
participation, including their rights and obliga-
tions, in each such WEU operation will be agreed
on a case-by-case basis ".
260. Given the fact that an open invitation has
been extended to associate partners to participate
in WEU's main operational tasks, it would seem
appropriate for the Planning Cell to prepare a list
of the forces associate partners might make avai-
lable to WEU and to include such forces in the
force packages which are being prepared for
contingency plans.
26I. It is also noted here that the scope ofasso-
ciate partnership as defined in the Kirchberg
document would justify a closer permanent link
with the Planning Cell than the present liaison
arrangement which seems unsatisfactory for part-
ners who might wish to make full use of the
opportunities thus offered.
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IX. Defence spending in Europe
262. If Western European states are serious in
their assertion that there may be situations where
they will have to act on their own, without the par-
ticipation of their transatlantic allies, they will
have to stop cutting their defence budgets, mainly
because they currently have so little useable
defence capability.
263. One may well wonder how the WEU mem-
ber states will ever manage to develop the famous
European defence identity if there continues to be
such a wide and even increasing gap between
their words and deeds. To a certain degree, it may
be understandable that the share of defence
expenditures in the GDP has decreased in recent
years as shown hereafter:
of the burden or the increased responsibilities to
which the WEU member states lay claim.
266. It should be recalled that the United States,
with 250 million people, wishes to maintain a
capability to conduct simultaneously and success-
fully two regional wars, while the European
Union states, with more than 320 million people,
cannot even conduct one without significant out-
side help.
267. In an interview, General George Joulwan,
NATO's SACEUR has expressed concern about
the recent drop in force levels among NATO
member statesso. Most nations are falling short of
their commitments to the multinational force
structure of Allied Command Europe and the
rapid reaction forces. General Joulwan confirmed
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264. This is a general trend, occurring in almost
all NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries,
which can be ascribed to the remarkable change in
international relations.
265. It is completely incomprehensible, how-
ever, that the member states of WEU which
accounted for 36Vo of the Atlantic Alliance's
defence expenditures in 1983, only accounted for
28Vo in l993on. This is a far cry from the fair share
48. Source: NAIO review, April 1994.
49. Report by Mr. Jacques Genton, Senator, on behalf of the
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces Committee on
the military programme bill for 1995-2000, page 67. (Second
ordinary session, 1993-1994, No. 489).
that the Europeans are relying too heavily on the
United States to fulfil their needs in the areas of
communications and airlift.
268. Now that the cold war has made way for a
far less stable and secure world than initially
expected, it is time to stop taking peace dividends.
Too many European nations still think they can
afford to use their defence budget as a money-
spinner to solve all other budgetary problems.
269. In fact this is rather the moment to mark
time and reconsider defence spending from a
different angle, taking into account a far less pro-
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mising security situation. Knowing that there will
be circumstances where it can no longer rely on
its transatlantic partners to intervene, Europe will
have to make its own specific threat-risk analysis
and evaluate its own security environment in the
framework of WEU.
270. In the following paragraphs, mention is
made of recent developments in some WEU
member states.
(a) Germany
27L A white paper on the security of the Ger-
man Federal Republic and on the situation and the
future of the Bundeswehr, published on 5th April
1994, has advocated a complete reorganisation of
the armed forces. The white paper proposes the
establishment of a core of crisis-reaction forces,
integration into multinational structures and a
two-tier conscript army.
272. The crisis-reaction forces will be assigned
primarily to international missions in multinatio-
nal formations within the framework of NATO or
WEU or under the auspices of the United Nations
or the CSCE. They will, however, also be avail-
able for ensuring territorial defence under plans
for the full mobilisation of main defence forces.
These crisis-reaction forces will comprise about
one fourth of the ground forces, one third of the
airforce and about 40Vo of the navy, and will enjoy
equipment and funding priority. As regards equip-
ment, priority will be given to enhancing C3I and
transport capacities.
273. The German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, has
announced that Germany's armed forces budget
will be increased slightly and will remain un-
touched over the next four years. While in 1994
the defence budget stood at DM 47.5 billion, it
would be increased to DM 47.9 billion plus infla-
tion over the next four years. The length of mili-
tary service will be shortened from 12 to 10
months and the size of the Bundeswehr will be
reduced to 338 000 men and women by the begin-
ning of 1996. Both these decisions.will_produce
savings, as a consequence of which it will be pos-
sible to ase 3OVo of the defence budget for new
investments instead of the present22%os'.
274. Germany is also planning to build an all-
purpose ship to be used as a troop transporter and
floating headquarters. It is designed to show that
Germany is taking its new international responsi-
bilities seriously.
275. With the army structure 5 reorganisation
almost completed, the German army now com-
prises eight divisions, one air mobile command
and24 brigades. According to the German Chief
of Defence Staff, General Klaus Naumann, the
German contribution to the NATO rapid reaction
forces will be as follows: the army is to provide
five fully ready brigades plus the German compo-
nent to the Franco-German brigade to NATO's
allied rapid reaction corps, the multinational air-
mobile division and the Allied Command Europe
mobile force as well as the Eurocorps.
276. The Luftwaffe is to provide six squadrons
for attack, air defence and reconnaissance, two
mixed SAM wings and two to three mixed trans-
port wings. The navy will make available two to
three task force groups.
277. For deployment outside the NATO area, the
army has been directed to earmark up to one divi-
sion, while the Luftwaffe is expected to prepare
all transport assets as well as a number of combat
aircraft to be specified at the time.
(b) Italy
278. In August 1994, the new Italian Govern-
ment endorsed the proposals of the Defence
Minister, Cesare Previti, io restructure the armed
forces. The length of military service will gra-
dually be shortened from the present twelve
months to six months in 1999. The total strength
of the armed forces will be reduced from 330 000
to 250 000. There will be an increased reliance on
specialised volunteers.
279. The main objective of the present restruc-
turing proposals is the creation of specialised
units which could be deployed at the request of
the United Nations or WEU. Italy is planning to
create a rapid reaction force together with Spain
and France, to be based in Tuscany.
280. Around 80 billion lire in the next ten years
have been earmarked for modernisation, in parti-
cular for new equipment. The share of defence
spending in Italy's GNP would increase from the
present L6Vo to 2Vo.
(c) United Kingdom
281. The United Kingdom has drastically redu-
ced its defence budget in recent years. A Novem-
ber 1993 review of public spending cut defence
spending by almost f,900 million over the next
three years, following a budget cut of more than
f 1 billion announced in 1992. The budget alloca-
tion for 1994-95 (f23.49 billion) and the provi-
sion for 1995-96 represent cuts of 3.5Vo and6.8Vo
respectively in real terms.
282. The United Kingdom's regular armed
forces numbered 254 488 on 1st Aprll, 1994, a
reduction of more thanTTo from 1993 and ITVo
from the " Options for change " defence reduc-
tions baseline of lst April 1990. Under present
plans, the army strength will be 119 000 person-
nel and 40 battalions by 1997.51. Financial Times, 29th August 1994.
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283. Two divisions, 3 (UK) Division and 1 (UK
Armoured Division) are assigned to NATO's
Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps
(ARRC). Moreover,24 Airmobile Brigade is assi-
gned to the ARRC's Airmobile Multinational
Division (Central).
(d) France
284. The French government has proposed a
defence budget of F202253 for 1995, represen-
ting a l.5%o increase as compared with the 1994
budget. According to the government's white
paper, presented in March 1994, the French army
should have a stand-by force of 120 000 to
130 000 ffoops that could be quickly projected to
a distant theatre.
285. The military programme law 1995-2000
adopted in spring 1994, pledges to raise defence
spending by 0.5Vo annually until the end of the
decade. However, since it takes neither future
inflation nor economic gtowth into account, mili-
tary spending will in fact decline from 3.3Vo of
gross domestic product in 1994 to 2.9Vo in the
year 2000.
286. The programme law calls for an army of
227 000 men with eight divisions by the year
2000. The total of armed forces personnel will
drop from 609 000 in 1994 to 579 000 in 2001.
On the basis of the military programme law and
the white paper mentioned earlier, the French
army is now planning a new internal structure of
general staff to be approved by the government in
early 1995. The basic principle is that the army
should be able to project abroad a force of 40 000
troops. In fact, this force will have to be rotated,
which means that I20 000 should be available for
this task, reinforced by support and logistic units.
This objective may be a tall order, when one
recalls how much trouble it took to send 17 000
troops to the Gulf in the framework of Operation
Daguet. Recently when 2 500 roops, 700 vehicles
and 9 000 tons of freight had to be transported to
Zaire-Rwanda for Operation Turquoise, logistics
was a problem, and Russian transport aircraft had
to be chartered to do pan of the job.
(e) The Netherlands
287. In the Netherlands, the coalition partners in
the new government have concluded an agrcement
to economise 2.4 billion guilders in the defence
expeditures for the 1995-98 period. It was agreed
that these reductions should not affect the imple-
mentation of the 1993 Defence priorities review,
which, if fully implemented would bring about a
reduction of M%o of the total armed forces person-
nel in 1998 as compared with the situation in 1990.
The government has now made proposals for
implementing the budget cuts, which will be dis-
cussed in parliament at the beginning of next year.
X. Earopean armed forcet co-operation
288. On 13th September 1994, France and the
United Kingdom concluded an agreement to
twin the French Rapid Action Force, (FAR,
45 000 troops) and the British Field Army
(57 000 troops), both qualified to be developed
for action in theatres abroad. The agreement
envisages exchanges of instruction, joint trai-
ning and participation in joint manoeuvres. A
first practice is planned to take place in 1995,
when high ranking officers will participate in
simulated mancuvres in order to discuss mili-
tary doctrines and tactics.
289. More co-operation between French and
British armed forces is being prepared. A Franco-
British summit in Chartres on 18th November
1994 will be devoted largely to defence and
'security issues. Both countries are now planning
to establish closer co-operation in military avia-
tion which would make it easier for their air-
forces to co-operate in humanitarian and peace-
keeping operations overseas under the aegis of
the United Nations. Such operations, it is said,
could take place in the framework of NATO or
WEU.
290. The Anglo-French Joint Commission on
Nuclear Policy and Doctrine52 is continuing its
work and will present a report at the Anglo-French
summit meeting.
29L The airforces of Belgium, Germany, the
Netherlands and Norway have recently concluded
agreements making air transport assets available
to each other in order to improve airlift capability
and reduce costs.
292. The agreements cover the whole spectrum
of possible military operations, including peace-
keeping and rescue operations.
293. The Defence Ministers of Germany and the
Netherlands have signed an agreement to create a
German-Netherlands anny corps which will be
operational at the beginning of 1995. The army
corps will consist of 40 000 to 50 000 men,
15 000 being provided by the Netherlands. Mixed
units will be stationed in both Germany and the
Netherlands and the headquarters of the corps is
to be located in Miinster.
294. On 7th September 1992, aFranco-Spanish-
Italian proposal was launched to constitute an
aero-maritime force capable of fulfilling missions
under the auspices of WEU. The guiding principle
for this proposal was a desire to co-ordinate aero-
maritime forces so that a maximum number of
assets between the three countries were available
52. The work of this committee has been discussed in the
report on the r6le and future of nuclear weapons submitted on
behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr. De Decker, Rappor-
teur, Document 1420.
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at any one time. Having been placed on the table
of WEU, the proposal led in part to Combined
Endeavour, a WEU maritime operation plan for
the use of maritime forces answerable to WEU.
295. In fact, the Combined Endeavour solution
elaborated by WEU with the help of the Planning
Cell did not meet the expectations of the three ini-
tiators. Pursuing the earlier initiative, Italy has
suggested a ground element to complement the air
and naval components. The French Defence
Minister, Frangois L6otard, speaking in March
1994, linked the earlier proposal with a sugges-
tion to create " European intervention forces,
commanded by a European General Staff and
which would be both multinational and have inte-
grated (air, land and sea) forces ". At WEU's col-
loquy on 17th October 1994, Mr. L6otard insisted
on the achievement around the European corps of
a network or reserve of variable-geometry air, sea
and land multinational forces with flexibility
allowing the governments of member states to
respond in an appropriate manner to the require-
ments of a given crisis.
296. No further details have been provided
about the creation of the common intervention
force planned by France, Italy and Spain, which
could be particularly useful for operations in the
Mediterranean. Recently, the Spanish Defence
Minister declared that there are no problems with
the naval component for this force, but that there
are still problems to be solved with the army com-
ponent. It is hoped that some of the remaining
obstacles can be overcome in the framework of
the trilateral manoeuvre Tramontana which is to
take place in Spain, in November 199453.
297. In June 1994, Poland established a rapid
reaction force, the 25th Air Cavalry Division,
which is on five hours' notice to be deployed
anywhere within Polish territory. The division
will consist of three independent regiments, com-
bining paratroop elements and 150 helicopters
when at full strength. The principal helicopter, the
PZL W3W will be completely modified with wes-
tern avionics and a new air-to-surface missile and
chin-mounted canon.
298. The Netherlands and Poland have signed a
naval co-operation agreement which, it is hoped,
will lead to increased interoperability between
Polish naval forces and those of NATO. The main
objectives of the agreement are:
- 
exchange of information and experience;
- 
participation in training and joint naval
exefclses;
- 
joint training of mine countermeasures
and search and rescue units in the Baltic;
- 
maintaining regular working contacts
between the Hydrographic Ofhce of the
Polish Navy and that of the Royal
Netherlands Navy.
299. Many similar agreements have been or are
being concluded between WEU member states and
associate parhers with the aim of making the armed
forces of partner states familiar with practices and
procedures in Western European armed forces and
preparing possible future joint operations.
300. On 28th June 1994, the Defence Ministers
of Belgium and the Netherlands signed an agree-
ment on the reinforcement of co-operation
between their naval forces. The agreement envi-
sages the creation of a bilateral operational head-
quarters in 1995 to manage the surface ships of
both navies. Both Ministers have asked their air-
force chiefs to study co-operation possibilities
between the airforces.
XI. European equipment co-operation
301. Europe must get its act together to impro-
ve co-operation in procurement and arms produc-
tion. The protracted policy of fiddling and make-
shift measures which has been characteristic in
past decades, with varying success and many
failures, should now be renounced. With decrea-
sing defence budgets on the one hand and new
equipment requirements on the other, European
nations which state that they wish firmly to esta-
blish a European security and defence identity
can no longer afford merely to dabble with
equipment co-operation.
302. The importance of and need for European
armaments co-operation has been recognised by
the WEU member sktes in many official declara-
tions, to name only the 1984 Rome declaration on
WEU's revitalisation and the 1987 The Hague
platform on European security interests. In the
declaration by member states of WEU, which are
also members of the European Union, on the r6le
of Western European Union and its relations with
the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance
which is attached to the freaty on European Union,
it is stated that enhanced co-operation in the field
of armaments will be examined further " with the
aim of creating a European armaments agency ".
303. In December 1992, the defence ministers of
the thirteen countries united in the Independent
European Programme Group (IEPG) decided to
transfer IEPG's functions to WEU.
304. Since then, IEPG has been transformed into
WEAG, the Western European Armaments
Group, based in Brussels within the framework of
WEU. However, many problems still have to be
solved to make it an effective organisation and it
is said that the creation of a European armaments53. Le Monde, lst October 1994.
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agency, now actively under study, will take many
more years if not decadesso.
305. The time has come for Western European
governments to think collectively and urgently
about the dimensions of the defence industrial
capabilities and the technological expertise they
wish to maintain in Europe, the techniques they
could use to maintain these capabilities and the
costs they are willing to incur. Action should be
taken urgently.
306. Should Western European states become
involved in a conflict in the future, they should be
able to rely on the appropriate industrial support.
307. Even when defence spending is low, desired
basic capabilities have to be maintained on the
assumption that the international political situa-
tion may deteriorate in the longer term and the
need for defence increase once again.
308. Despite occasional co-operative program-
mes, the European defence industry is still sfton-
gly divided and the size of different national
companies is not great enough to face sfrong com-
petition in international defence markets. Ratio-
nalisation in the United States' defence industry
began earlier than predicted with the taking over
of Grumman by Northrop, Lockheed buying
General Dynamic's F-16 fighter plant and the
recently announced merger between Lockheed
and Martin Marietta Corporation as the most
spectacular events. This may not be the end of the
process. A comparative table of turnover in defence
business of the fargest United States and Euro-pean companies is revealing.
Tfumover in detence bushess 19935s
($ billion)
Lockheed...
McDonnell Douglas
Martin Marietta......
Northrop Grumman.
British Aerospace...
GM Hughes
Thomson CSF........
Raytheon
GEC-Marconi.........
DASA........
A6rospatiale
309. The continuing consolidation of the United
States' defence industry presents European manu-
facturers with a powerful challenge and they will
have to be tough and aggressive about doing the
same.
54. The subject of a European amaments agency has been
discussed in a recent Assembly document: The European
afinaments agency 
- 
reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of
the Council, report submitted on behalf of the Technological
and Aerospace Committee by Mr. Borderas, Rapporteur.
55. Source: Lehman Brothers.
310. European governments.should not hamper
the transnational consolidation of their defence
industries. Political and legal barriers must be
cleared. WEAG may have been a laudable initia-
tive but, since its establishment almost two years
ago, little progress has been made apart from the
usual political declarations.
311. Arms co-operation can help bring down
procurement costs, but in co+perative projects,
the principle of fair return in individual pro-
grammes may have to be given up, being applied
rather to a range of collaborative programmes.
Squabbles in coming months and years over
national workshares in vital co-operation pro-
grammes such as the future large aircraft, the only
just-revived NH-90 helicopter and the Eurofighter
2000 will merely increase the cost of such equip-
ment and will make Europe's defence industry
resemble a three-ring circus rather than the lean
and mean industrial base which is needed.
312. If European states are serious in their ambi-
tion to rationalise procurement on a European
level, they may have to reduce the degree of natio-
nal preference which they exercise at present in
awarding conEacts.
313. Implementing the decision taken at the
Franco-German summit meeting at Mulhouse in
May 1994, both countries are now settling the
establishment, legal statute, working methods and
internal organisation of the structure which will
have to link them in armaments matters. Before
the end of 1995, this will lead to the creation of a
Franco-German armaments agency, which should
manage co-operative procurement programmes
such as the Tiger attack helicopter, the VBM
light-armoured vehicle, the future large aircraft
and possibly the Helios [I recoruraissance satellite.
314. This Franco-German armaments agency
could be the nucleus of a future European agency
which still seems many years away.
XII. The needfor more air-ffi capability
315. Earlier Assembly reports have already
emphasised the need for more air-lift capability in
WEU member states if they want to enable WEU
to intervene independently. The Gulf war and all
recent humanitarian and peace-keeping opera-
tions have clearly demonstrated the serious short-
fall in air-lift which has forced European nations
to rely on the United States' air-lift capacity or to
charter such means on the civilian market, often
using Russian large transport aircraft.
316. Indeed, NATO has taken decisions which
would make certain collective assets available to
WEU if needed, but a distinction should be drawn
between the collective assets of NAIO and the
national assets of member states of the alliance, in
10.06
9.40
7.55
6.95
6.06
6.0s
5.00 (estimate)
4.79
4.21
3.40
3.30
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particular the powerful resources of the United
States. It should also be noted that there may be
circumstances where, for a number of purely
practical reasons, the United States will not be
able to meet requests from its European allies.
317. The United States airforce's Air Mobility
Command (AMC) has now limited its24l C-141
Starlifters to 900 hours flying time per year in
order to prevent these aircraft from reaching their
expected lifetime prematurely. Morever, the C-
141 cannot accommodate many of the newer
types of equipment.
318. The C-5 Galaxy fleet has an average relia-
bility of under 757o but the 20 C-5s recently
deployed in Europe, inter alia for support opera-
tions in Rwanda, had maintenance problems
which kept 35-40Vo of them out of commission
for the frst two or three weeks.
3I9. The new C-17 programme, with an origi-
nally planned procurement of 120 aircraft, may be
capped at 40 aircraft56.
320. According to the Pentagon's 1993 bottom-
up review, the United States armed forces should
be able to fight two near-simultaneous major
regional conflicts by 1999, but planned reductions
in the defence budget are thought to create an
important gap between air-lift requirements and
capacity available by the end of this century 57.
321. European countries cannot afford to wait
until it comes to the worst. They will have to take
decisions in the near future if they want to have
sufficient air-lift capacity to meet contingencies in
the first decade of the next century.
322. A consortium of European aircraft manu-
facturersss is now developing a tactical transport
aircraft, the future large aircraft (FLA), which is
intended to replace existing fleets from 2002. This
consortium has now decided to charge a military
equipment subsidiary of Airbus with the develop-
ment and production of the FLA, apositive sign in
view of Airbus's good recent record in developing
and marketing aircraft in a relatively short time.
The intention is to provide customers with a fixed
price, fixed specification programme to reduce
the risk of cost over-runs. The consortium esti-
mates that over the next 20 years there may be a
market for 350 FLA in Europe alone.
323. As usual, up until now in European co-ope-
rative equipment programmes, the sharing of
work in any FLA production depends on the
financial commitments of the companies involved
56. Jane's Defence Weekly, l0th September 1994.
57. Jane's Defence Weekly,2lst May 1994.
58. The consortium consists of A6rospatiale (France), Ale-
nia (Italy), British Aerospace (United Kingdom), CASA
(Spain) and Deutsche Aerospace Airbus (Germany) with
FLABEL (Belgium), OGMA (Portugd) and Tusas (Turkey)
as associated partners.
and their respective govemments, and the number
of aircraft required by each specific country.
324. The feasibility study now being conducted
in which France, Germany, Italy, Pornrgal, Spain
and Turkey are participating, with Belgium and
the United Kingdom as observers, will be com-
pleted at the beginning of 1995. This should be
followed by the pre-development phase, culmina-
ting in the formal launch of the programme in
mid-1997 through firm orders. First deliveries
could then be made at the end of the year 2002.
325. The FLA, which would be able to meet the
requirements of practically every WEU member
state, would be an excellent method to unite these
counffies in research, development and procure-
ment and could be instnrmental in bringing together
European aircraft manufacturers to meet the chal-
lenge of the United States' defence indusfiry.
XIII. The establishment of an independent
European satellite sy stem
326. As is known, the WEU Council has asked
the Space Group to prepare, for its spring 1995
meeting, a proposal for decision to set up an inde-
pendent European satellite system. This proposal
should also include a draft memorandum of
understanding containing the detailed specifica-
tions to be concluded between the present WEU
member states.
327. The indusffial studies which were conduc-
ted under the supervision ofthe (so-called) Study
Management Team, chaired by Mr. Leonardo
Gagliardi, have concentrated on the technical
aspects of satellite system concepts providing
optical, infra-red and radar imaging capabilities.
Comparisons have been made between satellite
system concepts and programme steps with
respect to capabilities, cost, development times-
cales and risks. There can be little doubt that these
studies offer a sound basis for the Space Group to
prepare a proposal for decision by the Council.
328. An important question still to be addressed,
however, is which organisation will be respon-
sible for managing the establishment of an inde-
pendent European satellite system. This, in iself,
is a complicated task, requiring specialised know-
ledge. The limited size and human resources of
the Secretariat General of WEU in its present state
would certainly not be able to accomplish this
task.
329. Another question, closely related to the
creation of a satellite system and to be addressed
urgently, is the establishment of a proper colnmon
European intelligence policy, which is a vital pre-
requisite for a European security and defence
policy. It would be unwise to leave this question
open, because of the many problems which it may
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indeed evoke, one of them being the need for a
European electronic intelligence satellite.
330. The sudden and short-lived crisis in early
October last when haq began a massive deploy-
ment of armed forces near its border with Kuwait,
is the most recent illustration of the apparent
shortcomings in this field. At that time, the United
States raised the alarm and responded by imme-
diately sending tens of thousands of troops and
supplementary equipment. In the absence of
proper intelligence-gathering equipment such as
sufficiently high performance earth observation
satellites, European countries had no choice other
than to believe what the United States told them,
using among other things a selection of their own
satellite images.
33 1. In this framework, it should also be recalled
that the NATO air command and control system
(ACCS)s'q, an automated command and control
system, combining the control of air defences,
offensive air and air support missions, does not
include the essential fields of intelligence and
threat evaluation. For these fields, ACCS, at a
cost of $25 billion over 15 to 20 years, to be finan-
ced by NATO infrastructure funds and individual
NATO member states, will have to rely on infor-
mation provided by the United States.
332. Altogether, there are enough reasons to
study the political and military aspects of a truly
common European intelligence policy without
delay.
XIV. Conclusions
(a) The translormation of NATO
333. The transformation of NAIO initiated with
the London declaration of 1990 has since conti-
nued. NAIO has become a more politically-orien-
ted organisation. Any enlargement would be a
revolution in the European geopolitical balance
which cannot take place without further funda-
mental conceptual and structural changes.
334. When implemented, the decisions taken at
the Brussels summit meeting of January 1994,
will establish a new balance in the alliance bet-
ween Europe and North America. This may still
be difficult to achieve since the United States,
having accepted a strengthening of Europe's
defence identity, will not easily share the highest
responsibilities in the alliance.
335. A real European defence policy can exist
only if Europeans have the military means needed
to act together with their ffansatlantic allies accep-
ting to intervene out of the NAIO area, or to act
alone with their own forces, possibly reinforced
59. This subject has already been dealt with in Document
1229.
with NAIO assets placed at the disposal of WEU
with the agreement of the Unired States. To this
end, the Brussels summit meeting has developed
the concept of combined joint task forces (CJTF)
opening the possibility of separable but not sepa-
rate forces and enabling European forces to ope-
rate efficiently without the participation of the
United States.
336. The implementation of the CJTF concept is
taking longer than expected but final decisions are
expected to be taken in late spring 1995.
(b) The r^le olthe CSCE
337 . Immediately after the collapse of the Berlin
wall in 1989 and the signing of the Paris Charter
in November 1990, expectations of the CSCE's
r6le in maintaining peace and stability in Europe
have been far too high.
338. Russia's recent proposals to make the
CSCE the umbrella organisation for European
security to which all others, including NATO,
would be submitted would not be the right solu-
tion for anybody.
339. It seems, however, that the CSCE can play
a useful r6le in conflict-prevention for which
appropriate mechanisms have been developed.
In this framework, the r6le of the High Commis-
sioner on National Minorities should not be
underestimated.
340. The conclusion of a European stability
pact, possibly in 1995 and now being negotiated
at various regional round table conferences, will
be another important part of the CSCE conflict-
prevention mechanism.
(c) Russia
341. The situation in Russia is bound to be a
determining factor for Europe's security. Nobody
would venture that at present, or in the foreseeable
future, Russia poses a serious threat to Central or
Western Europe. On the other hand, there is no
denying that the process of transforming Russia
into a market-oriented democracy is taking place in
a context of political instability and economic crisis
which are both equally disquieting. In Russia, the
armed forces have traditionally been a reliable ins-
trument under full confrol of the political authori-
ties and, in general, this is still the case. Increasing
pressure on the defence budget, however, is cau-
sing growing dissatisfaction in the armed forces
and this could be exploited by nationalist extre-
mists. At the moment, defence expenditures are
lacking transparency and this is causing serious
shortcomings in democratic confrol of the military
budget, which is still taking too large a share of the
overall federal budget. A strong Russia will suit
Europe's security, but it should be a democratically-
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controlled constitutional state, where human rights
and rights of minorities are fully respected.
Understandably, Russia wishes to develop a close
relationship with its neighbouring states in the fra-
mework of the CIS, but this should not lead to a
restoration of imperialism with its negative aspects
of blackmail and divide and rule policy. Because of
its factual status of nuclear superpower, Russia is
entitled to a special relationship with the United
States, but this should go hand-in-hand with close
practical relations with European states, on both a
bilateral and multilateral level. Russian member-
ship of the Council of Europe is a fully-justified
prospect, provided the conditions are met, but
membership of the European Union, WEU or
NATO is out of the question. On the other hand,
these organisations should make sure that they
entertain the closest possible relations with Russia
on a pennanent basis.
342. There is no doubt about Russia's intention
to dismantle its nuclear weapons as agreed in
START I and START II, but little progress is
being made because of technical and financial
problems. Russia should accept western assistance
in this area.
343. Although it is recognised that Russia is not
the only possible source of illegal trade in nuclear
material, no counter-proliferation policy can be
successful without its full participation.
(d) The Baltic states
344. By now, the independence of the three Bal-
tic states is fully confirmed and after many initial
problems also recognised by Russia, which is
aware that any infringement of their sovereignty
would be considered by western states as an act
profoundly destabilising to Europe's security.
These states are facing numerous problems in their
efforts to build credible armed forces for which
they need help from Western European states. This
process has now been started and necessary agree-
ments have been or are being concluded.
345. Notwithstanding these positive develop-
ments, it should be recognised that, for their
security, they will always be dependent on good
relations with Russia and political and military
protection from other states. They have signed
up for NATO's partnership for peace and are
associate partners of WEU. On the other hand,
they have not been included in the list of the next
six candidates for European Union membership
which has recently been made public, nor have
they been included in the list of candidates for a
possible enlargement of NAIO. It is understood
that, in relations with the Baltic states, delicate
diplomacy is required vis-i-vis Russia, but they
cannot be left on their own. WEU will have to
make sure that they are included among its mem-
bers as soon as the six Central European coun-
tries join the European Union and, as a conse-
quence, WEU.
(e) Risks and threols to Earopean securily
346. There is no need to repeat the rather long
list of possible risks and threats to European secu-
rity; it is well known, although it does not always
seem to be taken into account. In some cases the
threat may be immediate, others are less explosive
and of more remote importance. Tlvo regions at
Western Europe's frontiers stand out: the Balkans
and the southern Mediterranean.
347. In the Balkans, the Bosnian conflict is still a
subject of daily concern for all countries involved
in one way or another. The risks of escalation and
of extension of the conflict to the rest of the
Balkans with possible intervention from neigh-
bouring countries can still not be excluded. Strain-
ed relations between NATO and the United
Nations, between European and transatlantic allies
and between different members of the contact
group over the policy to be followed, air strikes
and other issues are practically always the order of
the day. If finally the arms embargo against Bosnia
is lifted, it may well lead to chaos and the United
Nations blue helmets will have to withdraw in
exftemely diffrcult circumstances and the conflict
will continue. If, on the other hand, a final cease-
fire is concluded, a huge peace-keeping operation,
requiring more than 50 000 troops will have to be
set up. Europe should be better equipped and pre-
pared to prevent such conflicts.
348. As regards the southern Mediterranean, it is
indeed extremely difficult to control develop-
ments but Europe cannot afford to neglect a situa-
tion which might threaten its exposed under-belly.
The establishment of a cautious dialogue, ideas to
create a Conference on Security and Co-operation
in the Mediterranean (CSCM) and the perspective
of a special relationship with the European Union
in the next century should be welcomed, but that
is not enough. It is also important to establish a
European humanitarian intervention force and to
accelerate the setting-up of an Italian-Spanish-
French aero-naval force.
349. Close relations with Russia at all levels,
both bilateral and multilateral, must be established
and maintained in order to prevent Russians fee-
ling isolated. At the same time, a way must be
found to agree, with them, on the most appropriate
way of peace-keeping in Russia's near abroad,
without turning this into a new source of conflict
or new imperialism.
awEU
350. By now, it is generally accepted that, in
order to face future risks and threats to its security,
Europe must shoulder more responsibilities in
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defence and security and create a real European
defence identity reinforcing its operational capa-
bilities. However, this is easier said than done.
351. In the Maastricht Treaty, WEU is asked to
elaborate and implement decisions and actions of
the European Union which have defence implica-
tions. This leads to fundamental political ques-
tions such as whether in defence matters the Euro-
pean Union can take autonomous decisions,
independently from NATO and the United States.
There is also the question of how the European
Union and WEU will handle defence matters if,
inevitably, they have different membership. Will
WEU be able to remain autonomous in its own
specific field of action? Will future WEU member
states have to be NAIO members in order to be
protected by the security guarantees of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty? If no unequivocal answer is
found to these questions, there will never be a
European defence policy.
352. Some of the abovementioned questions, in
particular those regarding the relations between
WEU and the European Union with their different
membership and different authority, could be sol-
ved if both were prepared to consider the idea of ajoint European Security Council.
353. A European defence policy also depends on
the availability of the military means needed for
Europeans, either to act together with their trans-
atlantic allies outside NATO territory, or to act
alone with their own forces, reinforced with col-
lective assets of the alliance on the basis of
consultations in the North Atlantic Council. In
this framework, implementation of the CJTF
concept is of crucial importance for Europe's
defence identity.
354. The establishment of a valid European
defence policy will have to go hand-in-hand with
a reinforcement of WEU's operational capabili-
ties. A prerequisite is for the Ministerial Council
to give up its exfreme caution and gradually deve-
lop WEU into a decision-making centre rather
than limiting itself to the r6le of a security organi-
sation, waiting for others to act. In this frame-
work, the Council should also vest the Secretary-
General with more power. At present, too many
subjects are dealt with in ad hoc working groups.
The Secretariat-General should be extended in
order to make more knowledge directly available
to the Council, thus enhancing its performance
and efficiency. Following the example of the
Planning Cell, a permanent " Think Cell " should
be created which could contribute to the develop-
ment of European strategic thinking.
355. The staff and equipment of the Planning
Cell should be increased in order to transform it
into a headquarters for European co-ordination. In
its present state, the Planning Cell lacks the capa-
city to act in a crisis situation such as Rwanda.
356. Supporting the non-proliferation initiative
taken at NAIO's Brussels summit meeting in
January 1994 and co-ordinating European efforts
in this field, a nuclear non-proliferation research
and monitoring centre should be created at WEU
level.
357. A fully-fledged European satellite intelli-
gence system will have to be established in order
to provide Europe with the intelligence needed to
make an independent judgment on crisis situa-
tions and, if needed, take its own decisions. The
WEU Satellite Cenre in Torrej6n, if employed in
an appropriate manner, could be a first step
towards a satellite system which can be achieved
only through European co-operation.
358. There is an urgent need to establish a Euro-
pean humanitarian intervention force and to acce-
lerate the establishment of the air and naval inter-
vention force composed of French, Spanish and
Italian units announced earlier.
359. The various multinational forces which
have been or are being established such as the
allied rapid reaction corps, the Anglo-Dutch
amphibious force, the European corps and others,
should prepare the best possible co-ordination in
case they are needed for operations on a European
scale. Such co-ordination between different inter-
vention units in Europe should result in the estab-
lishment of a European rapid reaction force.
360. For all these forces, European nations will
have to provide logistics and, in particular, appro-
priate air-lift capacity. The future large aircraft, a
co-operative project which includes the major
European aircraft manufacturers, could meet
existing needs in this important area. This pro-
grarnme should be given the support it needs so
that the first aircraft might be delivered in the
early years of the next decade.
361. Co-operation in the European defence indus-
try needs to be further developed. The establish-
ment of a European armaments agency must be
accelerated in order to combat American competi-
tion and achieve standardisation of the equipment
ofEuropean forces such as the European corps.
362. Finally, WEU must make a common ana-
lysis of the new security situation, taking into
account the work of the " Think Cell " proposed
in paragraph 354 of the present report. This work
should be given a new dimension, as proposed
by the French Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur,
by progressively including WEU's associate part-
ners in the analysis. It should lead to the drafting
of a white paper on European security, to be sub-
mitted to a summit meeting of European heads of
state and of government of all the countries
concerned. Approval of this white paper would be
the first evidence ofEuropean sotdarity in defence
matters.
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Amendments l and 2
2Eth November 1994
A European defence policy
AMENDMENTS 1and2l
tnbledby Mr. Borderas onbehalf of the SocialistGroup
1. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, after " under a United Nations mandate " insert
" in agreement with the Organisation of African Unity ".
2. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " readily available multinational
European humanitarian intervention force " and insert " readily available multinational European force
which would protect the humanitarian organisations on the ground and ".
Signed: Borderas
l. See 9th sitting, 29th November 1994 (amendments I and 2 withdrawn).
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Amendment 3
28th November 1994
A European defence policy
AMENDMENT 3 
'
tabled by Mrs. Gaiotti de Biase
3. [n the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out paragraph (x) and insert:
" Noting that European armed forces are increasingly called upon to perform humanitarian and
peace-keeping tasks and that defence budgets ofEuropean countries must consequently provide for
a sufficient level of armed forces to carry out these tasks; "
Signed: Gaiotti de Biase
1. See 9th sitting, 29th November 1994 (amendment agreed to).
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Amendment 4
29th November 1994
A European d.etence policy
AMEI\DMENT 4'
tabled by Mr. Iipez Henares
4. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " Give further thought t9 ggmTon
security eind defe-ncy policy, leading subsequently tothe drafting of a white paper " and insert " Give fur-
ther th6ught as soon as poisible to-a common security and defence policy, so that a white paper may be
drafted forthwith ".
Signed: Iipez Herwres
l. See 9th sitting, 30th November 1994 (amendment agreed to).
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The situation in Bihac
MOTION FOR A RECOMMENDATION I
tabled by Mn De Decker on behalf of the Liberal Group
with a request for urgent procedure
The Assembly,
(i) Anxious for the safe areas decreed by the United Nations Security Council in former Yugoslavia to
be respected;
(ii) Recalling the urgent need to prevent further massacres,
Uncnxrly RECoMMENDs rHAT rne CouNcr
Decide to send immediately a European buffer force to Bihac and recalls to this end the latest deci-
sions of the North Atlantic Council for making the alliance's rapid action forces available to WEU.
Signed: De Decker, Brasseur, Verbeek, Blaauw, Mackie of Benshie, Wolfgramm, Feldmann, Dees,
Aguiar, Pogas Santos, Reis Leite, Latronico, Rodeghiero, Ehrmann
l See 7th sitting, 28th November 1994 (urgent procedure agreed to).
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Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly
for the financial year 1995
Draft supplementary budget of the administrative
expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1995
PREVIOUS QUESTION'
moved by Mr. Rathbone
on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration
under Rule i3 of the Rules of Procedure
The Assembly,
(i) Considering the procedure for approving the Assembly's budgets;
(ii) Considering that the opinion of the Council has not yet been communicated to the Assembly;
(iii) Considering that the Assembly is therefore unable to vote in full knowledge of the facts on the
budgets for 1995,
Dscroes
That the draft ordinary and supplementary budgets are withdrawn from the agenda of the session.
Signed: Rathbone
1. See 10th sitting, 3fth November 1994 (previous question agreed to).
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Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly
for the financial year 1995
Draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly tor the financial year 1995
MOTION FOR AN ORDER'
submitted by Mn Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur
of the Comminee on Budgetary Affairc and Administralian
The Assembly,
(i) Having heard the report by the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration;
(ii) Noting the absence of the opinion of the Council on the draft budget and draft supplementary bud-
get of the administative expenditure of the Assembly for 1995;
(iii) Noting that this is the first time since the year 1985 that the Assembly has not received the opinion
of the Council on its draft budgets in time for consideration at its autumn session;
(iv) Noting that preliminary views expressed by delegates in the Council Budget and Organisation
Committee were unsupportive of the Assembly's plans to meet satisfactorily the requirement of expanded
membership including guest members and obierv-ers;
(v) Considering that the Council had, in its Kirchberg declaration, invited the Assembly to welcome
new members and to adjust its rules accordingly;
(vi) Regretting efforts by budgetary experts to curtail the establishment and maintenance of parliamen-
tary contacts according to the Kirchberg declaration and its intentions;
(vii) Reiterates its support for the outlined plans to meet the logistics of the Assembly in the foreseeable
future in particular the requirement to accommodate over 400 members in a chamber conceived to seat
228;
(viii) Expresses its disappointment at the Council's delay in giving its opinion on the draft budgets of the
Assembly,
INsrRucrs flrs PRESTDeNflAL Corrnrlrrrnn
1. To negotiate urgently with the Council for the Assembly to be granted adequate financial means to
allow it to play its r6le in a reactivated WEU, taking into account in particular the Kirchberg declaration
and its requirements;
2. In application of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure, to take the necessary measures to
finalise the Assembly's draft budgets for 1995 to fulfil that r6le as speedily as possible.
l. See l0th sitting, 30th November 1994 (Motion agreed to).
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The need to strengthen WEU in the light
of the worsening situatian informer Yugoslavia
MOTION FOR A RECOMMENDATION'
tabled by Mr. De Decker and otherc
The Assembly,
(i) Concerned at the unilateral decision of the government of the United States no longer to particip-
ate in enforcing the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina;
(ii) Noting that this decision, at the behest of Congress, does not take into account the interests of the
European states with troops participating in UNPROFOR;
(iii) Noting that the United States has always refused to participate in the United Nations
force deployed in the territory of former Yugoslavia;
(iv) Noting, however, that the United States has not opposed the use by Europeans and
protection
the United
Nations of NATO military structures;
(v) Fearing an escalation of the conflict and intensification of the fighting that might endanger the
UNPROFOR troops now deployed and which are insufficiently armed;
(vi) Questioning whether NATO is adapted to security tasks in Europe in the post cold war period when
divergent interests appear to be causing division in the alliance between Americans and Europeans;
(vii) Questioning also the applicability of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in the event of threats to
detachments of NAIO forces deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina on behalf of the United Nations,
RncorraueNos rHAr rrm CouNcn-
1. Accelerate the process of strengthening Western European Union by providing it with satellite intel-
ligence means and strategic ftansport and units of combined forces;
2. Request the convening of a summit meeting of heads of state and of government of WEU member
countries in order to examine the situation and measures to be taken.
Signed: De Decketr Baumel, Soell, Baarveld-Schlaman, de Puig, Fassino, Martinea latronico, de
Lipkow s ki, F in s b e r g, B laauw, G e lde rbl om - Lankhout
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1. Motion withdrawn.
Document 1450 30th November 1994
The situation in Bihac
and the need to strengthen WEU
Draft Recommenfutian'
submitted on behalf of the Polifical Committee'
by Mr. Roset4 Rapporteur
The Assembly,
(i) Anxious for all the security zones in Bosnia-Herzegovina defined by the Security Council to be
scrupulously respected;
(ii) Noting nevertheless that the fact that Bosnian Serb forces have penetrated the safe area around
Bihac shows the difficulties encountered by UNPROFOR in implementing Security Council resolutions
authorising it inter alia:
to deter attacks against the safe areas,
and to take the necessary retaliatory measures, including recourse to force, against bombing of
the safe areas by either side, armed incursions or any obstacle to free movement by UNPRO-
FOR;
(iii) Fearing an escalation of the conflict and intensification of the fighting that might endanger the
UNPROFOR froops now deployed and which are insufficiently armed;
(iv) Disturbed that profound differences have emerged between the United States and its European
allies regarding the measures to be taken to ensure compliance with Security Council resolutions and to
restore peace in the regions concerned;
(v) Convinced that the lifting of the embargo on Bosnia is not an appropriate means of facilitating the
resolution of the conflict in the region in question;
(vi) Regretting nevertheless that neither the United States nor the countries of Europe have been prepa-
red to send in a buffer force that is large enough and equipped to be able to put an end to hostilities;
(vii) Noting also that the contact group's efforts to achieve a cease-fire that is complied with and a poli-
tical solution to the conflict have so far failed;
(viii) Determined to do everything possible to prevent a further massacre occurring on former Yugoslav
territory;
(ix) Still convinced that, to avoid escalation, efforts to find a political solution to the conflict acceptable
to all parties concerned must not be relaxed;
(x) Recalling nevertheless that, for such a solution not to remain a dead letter, the parties concerned
must be convinced that its implementation will be guaranteed by effective measures of enforcement,
l. Adopted by I 3 votes to 2 with 2 absentions.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. de Puig (Chairman); Lord Finsberg, Mr. Roseta (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Alegre (Alternate:
Mrs. Aguiar), Sir Andrew Bowden, MM. Caballero, Ehrmann, Fassino, Feldmann, Goerens, Homs I Ferret, Sir Russell Johnston,
Mr. Kaspereit (Altemate: Baumel), Lord Kirkhill (Alternate: Marshalt), MM. Kittelmann, van der Linden, de Lipkowski, Miiller
Picriaux, Pozzo (Altematei Ragno), Mrs. Prestigiacomo, MM. Puche Rodriguez, Reddemann, Rodeghiero, Rodigues, Salvi
(Alternate; Mrs. Gaiotti de Biase), Seeuws, Seitlinger, Soel/, Sir Keith Speed, MM. Vingon, Wintgens (Alternate: De Decker),
Woltjea Zijlstra.
N.B. Tfte names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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UncrxT y RrcoN,ItvtsNDs rHAT rtre Coui.{c[
1. Immediately hold an urgent joint meeting with the North Atlantic Council with a view to:
(a) appealing to all governments and all competent international organisations to make a new
effort to find a political solution to the conflict, in view of the negotiations in progress on the
basis of the proposals of the contact group, and demonstrate the responsible attitude of the
international community by opposing with great determination and firmness those responsible
for prolonging an unjustifiable and nonsensical war;
(b) considering the timeliness of using all appropriate means to prevent further massacres and to
end the fighting in Bihac;
(c) ensuring that the unilateral decision of the United States Government no longer to participate
in monitoring the embargo on Bosnia cannot affect NAIO's commitment nor its operational
capabilities in the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina;
2. Accelerate the process of strengthening Western European Union by providing it with satellite intel-
ligence means and strategic transport and units of combined forces.
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